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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Significance 
 
In the decade after 2003, Iraq’s prominence on Australia’s foreign policy and 
national security agendas diminished significantly. Australia and other 
‘Coalition of the Willing’ states that had engaged in the US-led ‘Operation 
Iraqi Freedom’ campaign officially withdrew their troops from the country, 
leaving behind a complex legacy of war and little ‘freedom’ for Iraqis. 
Political and economic challenges, as well as multiple security concerns, 
including violent sectarian conflict and the devolution of power to militias, 
continued to plague the country’s population. Among the many challenges, as 
existed in 2010-11 at the outset of this project, was an estimated 4.7 million 
Iraqi civilians who were scattered beyond, or lost within the country’s borders; 
all of them dealing with the fallout of war and conflict and most living in an 
ongoing situation of displacement and uncertainty (Sassoon 2010).  
 
In 2015, the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated further. Violence and 
insecurity has ensued in light of an ongoing civil war in neighbouring Syria 
since 2011, as well as widespread sectarian conflict raging in Iraq and the 
region. In this mix is the rise of an extremist, jihadist group called Islamic 
State (IS), which is waging a violent campaign of territorial expansion across 
Iraq and Syria, aimed at establishing an Islamic caliphate fashioned on an 
antiquated, fundamentalist reading of Sunni Islam. Killing, looting, 
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kidnapping, forced religious conversions, widespread destruction of cultural 
heritage and even public beheadings, which are carried out and filmed on the 
streets and in town squares, are some of IS’s violent tactics. Footage of their 
exploits is then distributed via the Internet for the world to see. IS are the latest 
in a series of pogrom-like groups with fundamentalist Islamic iconoclastic 
missions that are flaring up in the region. Their brutal methods and stark 
fundamentalist message have captured global political attention and elevated a 
sense of fear. IS effectively utilises modern communications technologies not 
just to spread its radical, reactionary ideology, and illustrate its convictions, 
but also to reach and recruit Muslims from around the world to join the jihadist 
cause. This has sparked renewed national security concerns in countries like 
Australia, which are now involved in characterising and addressing not just the 
threat of terrorism from without, but ‘home-grown terrorism’ from within the 
Australian populous, too. The Australian state has again beefed up its anti-
terrorism rhetoric and laws in reaction to these events, as well as sending a 
small-scale military contingent back to Iraq in 2014.  
 
As for displaced, civilian Iraqis in 2015, the UNHCR conservatively estimates 
their number at 4.1 million (UNHCR, 2015). That is, approximately one in six 
Iraqis is currently uprooted from their home, which is equivalent to the entire 
population of greater Sydney. The bulk of Iraq’s displaced live in unsafe 
conditions inside the country as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In June 
2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated Iraq’s internally 
displaced at upwards of 4 million people (IDMC, 2015), most of who live in 
unsafe, informal settlements. For those beyond the borders, the majority are 
currently in countries of first or second asylum in the immediate region, most 
commonly Turkey and Jordan. The 1.2 million Iraqis who had taken refuge in 
Syria after 2003 were forced to flee once again when the Syrian civil war 
broke out in 2011. Most are presumed to have fled back across the border to 
Iraq or on to countries of second asylum, such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.  
 
With no end in sight to the conflict in Iraq, the number of displaced doubtless 
continues to increase, though most are unaccounted for. Dire infrastructural 
shortages, such as poor access to basic shelter, water and sanitation, plague the 
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country’s displaced populations. The response mechanisms of agencies like 
the Red Crescent and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) remain ad hoc and insufficient, particularly given that their access 
to populations of concern is non-existent or extremely limited. Furthermore, in 
such a context of chronic insecurity, many Muslims in the region and beyond, 
people for whom the status quo has done little to break the cycle of militant 
identity politics, violence and poverty in which they have been stuck for years, 
if not their whole lives, are enticed by the pull of radical ideologies and 
reactionary behaviours. IS, for example, exhibits a notable demographic 
makeup, in that many of its members are young, disillusioned Sunni Muslims 
who were recruited over the Internet. Many are purported to come from the 
sprawling, displaced, unemployed and alienated swathes of Iraqi and Syrian 
youths living throughout the war torn region. Social psychologists working in 
the field of radicalisation contend that extremist causes, such as that of IS and 
other fundamentalist groups, represent a break from an endless sense of 
powerlessness, normlessness and hopeless desperation and humiliation that 
many young people in the Middle East region feel on a daily basis. By joining 
groups like IS, their “alienation is replaced by identification with the group, 
powerlessness is replaced by potency derived from being involved in group 
operations, while humiliation is mitigated by participation in actions” (Wright-
Neville & Smith, 2009, p. 95).  
 
Iraq has a long history of imperialism, violent wars, foreign intervention and 
sanctions, and military dictatorship, which provide context for the sectarian 
conflict and dire living conditions that prevail in 2015. Much about the current 
state of affairs, however, may be traced back to the Western intervention in 
Iraq in 2003, of which Australia played a part. The conservative Howard 
government’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 was primarily a strategic 
move designed to “strengthen the US-Australian alliance” (Cox & O’Connor 
2012, p. 179). The government made the decision behind closed doors and 
subsequently marketed it to the Australian public as a dire national security 
issue. They framed their justification for military action in light of the ‘War on 
Terror’, Iraq’s links to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and, most crucially, the 
Saddam Hussein regime’s possession of weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMDs).  Howard made the claim about WMDs despite a parliamentary 
inquiry, “Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction,” which drafted 
a report at the time advising the government to the contrary (Swieringa, 2013). 
The decision to intervene in Iraq also lacked parliamentary approval and 
majority public support. A series of polls conducted between August 2002 and 
March 2003 asked Australian citizens if they were in favour of a war in Iraq. 
An average of 54 per cent answered in the negative, with more than twice as 
many being strongly opposed than strongly in favour (Goot & Goldsmith, 
2011). Furthermore, Australia’s military action in Iraq was waged outside the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN) and in contradiction to the vote of the UN 
Security Council. 
 
The increasingly hawkish public statements made by Howard in the period 
leading up to the deployment of troops in 2003 were not ephemeral. Rather, 
they were the culmination of a distinct, nationalistic political discourse that 
characterized his entire prime ministership. Howard’s populist approach 
crystallized in 2001 in line with a rising sense of crisis over ‘unauthorized 
maritime arrivals’ and the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 
11. In this atmosphere, appeals to post-September 11 insecurity became 
sanctioned as legitimate grounds upon which a large part of Australia’s foreign 
policy and its increasingly restrictive asylum seeker policy were 
contextualized and justified. The prerogative to defend liberal democratic 
‘freedoms’ – popularly dubbed ‘Australian values’- and the country’s borders 
were linked and became the driving logic behind political calculations in these 
areas (Wesley, 2002). The coupling of immigration and asylum seekers with 
terrorism in the children overboard affair of October 2001, and Howard’s view 
of the Australia-US alliance as “a relationship that is built upon common 
values” (Cox & O’Connor 2012, p. 183) stand as resounding examples of this.  
In terms of enabling military action in Iraq, Howard’s foreign policy discourse 
represented “an effort to find a new Australian synthesis between values and 
realpolitik” (Kelly, 2006, p. 41). Under these conditions, Australia’s 
participation in the war was conceivable and plausibly communicable to just 
enough of the domestic population (Holland, 2010).    
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By 2013, ten years on, Australia’s initial casus belli was emphatically 
disproved. Indeed, Australia’s military foray into Iraq in 2003, as a partner in 
‘Operation Iraqi Freedom,’ was largely characterised as an abject failure. Not 
only was the pretext for war false, but also the re-framed objectives, to “topple 
Saddam Hussein and bring peace to the long-suffering Iraqi people; to replace 
the autocracy of the Ba’athist regime with the Western liberal model of 
democracy; and to transform Iraq into a prosperous state governed by a free-
market economy,” (Isakhan, 2013) remained largely unrealized.  Peace and 
prosperity in Iraq were elusive, and the country’s democratic credentials 
improved minimally. Nevertheless, by 2013, Australian boots were off the 
ground and Iraq had slinked off the country’s pressing foreign policy agenda 
Forced migration policy, however, remained central to the country’s political 
agenda. Indeed, regulation of migration, and especially symbolic attempts to 
display control over forced migrant arrivals, continued to develop in dialogue 
with a discourse of threat to national sovereignty, which justified the need for 
ongoing securitization and deliberalization (Gauthier et al, 2011).  
 
Since Australia’s military intervention into Iraq in 2003, a number of scholars 
have pointed to the political and practical paradox faced by Iraqi exiles1 who 
seek refuge in the country. For they are at once victims of circumstances in 
which the Australian state played an active role, while being subject to, indeed 
the target of, the country’s deterrent, militarised, punitive and racialised forced 
migration policy and rhetoric (McNevin, 2007; Marfleet 2006; Dunn et al, 
2007; Crock, 2010). As stated, more than four million Iraqi civilians have been 
uprooted in the wake of the 2003 war (UNHCR, 2015). This is the largest 
scale, protracted human displacement situation in the country’s history, and 
one of the largest in the world’s recent history.2  It is the largest displacement 
of population in the Middle East since the Palestinian displacement, the Nakba 
                                                
1 Joseph Sassoon says, ‘Iraqis, in general, abhor the word ‘refugee’ (laji’) as they see it as a 
term indicating failure and the need to seek support from others. They prefer the Arabic term 
2 According to the UNHCR definition, the term 'Protracted Displacement' refers to situations 
in which refugees have been in exile for five years or more since their initial displacement, and 
in which immediate prospects for solutions are bleak. By definition we are talking here about 
displacements for which there are no solutions in sight, which is definitely the case for 
millions of Iraqis.  

 6 
of 1948, which is a phenomenon that continues to resonate politically and 
violently in the region and around the world to this day.  
 
In response to the Iraqi displacement, Australia has granted protection to 
approximately ten thousand Iraqis over the past decade, refusing an average of 
82 per cent of offshore applications over the five year period between 2006-
11, a time when violence and insecurity in Iraq was rising (DIAC, 2012). The 
majority of onshore Iraqi applicants (that is, asylum seekers), whose numbers 
have on average been in the low hundreds each year, have spent upwards of 
three months in mandatory detention before being granted protection, and 
some remain in detention indefinitely. They have also “borne the brunt of 
government-reinforced, if not endorsed, hostility. The tenor and theme of 
media treatment has largely reflected the negative disposition of official 
government statements. Islamic asylum seekers have been constructed as less 
(than) human, incompatible and threatening” (Dunn et al, 2007, p. 582). The 
harsh political rhetoric around asylum seekers and Islam flared up again after 
2013, as thousands of asylum seekers had begun to arrive by boat to Australian 
shores each year (this occurred under the watch of the Labor governments of 
Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard), hundreds dying along the way, and IS surged 
into Western media focus, capturing the Australian public’s attention and 
elevating a sense of fear and concern. Counter-terrorism and national security 
issues, as well as renewed calls to protect Australia’s borders, again took 
centre stage in Australian domestic politics. 
 
Although Western authorities and intelligence agencies undoubtedly knew IS 
and other such militant Islamic groups existed in Iraq and the region before 
2013, they were not deemed to constitute a significant national or international 
threat. Once IS’s brutal methods of territorial expansion became known in the 
global, public domain, however, Western countries again turned their political 
focus to the region. Quickly, the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric used to justify a 
number of national security and foreign policy measures in 2003 were 
repackaged and reiterated by the Australian state, and came back into play in 
the domestic arena. Whereas the apparent threats emanating from Iraq had all 
but disappeared from national dialogue in Australia in the years from 2008-
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2012, these threats were reframed as resurgent and dire, in need of immediate 
action. Australia sent troops back to Iraq, pledged more funding, and, like 
clockwork, ratcheted up the national security rhetoric in justifying not just 
their foreign policies but also new, increasingly restrictive immigration 
policies and institutional arrangements, as well as a suite of anti-terrorism 
laws, many of which were designed to address the burgeoning threat of ‘home 
grown terrorism’.  
 
This political flashpoint aligned with the coming to power in 2013 of a new 
conservative Australian government, under the leadership of Tony Abbott, 
whose hard-line approach to forced immigration – much of his policy built on 
the central axiom of “stop the boats” - was a major platform for his electoral 
victory. In the mould of Howard, though perhaps less deft at the political art of 
plausible deniability and more attuned to frank rhetoric, Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott’s early days in the role saw him immediately disband or rename a 
number of government policies and departments, in line with his more militant 
approach to protecting the border and Australia from the terrorist “death cult,” 
as he repeatedly labelled IS in public discourse. The Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship became the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection: a semantic shift away from the notion of ‘citizenship’ - the 
potential inclusion of immigrants into Australian society – towards 
understanding of Australian society as exclusive, under threat and in need of 
protection at the border. ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ was initiated, and is 
led by the Royal Australian Navy. In terms of policy changes, asylum seekers 
arriving to Australia are now interdicted at sea, and no longer accepted for 
settlement in Australia. From June 2015, the Border Force Act – prohibiting 
any entry via a maritime route, as well as gagging Immigration department 
staff and contractors into silence – came into effect. Furthermore, there are 
plans by the Abbott government to pass laws that strip dual nationals of their 
Australian citizenship – their political membership – should they be found 
colluding in a terrorist plot or act. Referring to the draft of the proposed 
legislation as it stood at August 2015, legal experts have argued “the status of 
citizenship in a democratic society should not be treated as a tool of 
punishment or protection from threats to society” (Chalmers, 2015). Section 
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33A of the draft proposal, which would see dual citizens lose their Australian 
citizenship without having any conviction recorded, provoked the deepest 
consternation and confusion.  
 
It is such moves by the executive, which are yet to be tested in court, that 
readily illustrate the extent to which deliberalization measures taken in the 
name of border protection and counter-terrorism are also affecting the 
fundamental rights of Australia’s domestic population. Human rights and civil 
liberties defenders, in particular, tend to depict such policies and laws as 
undemocratic, amounting to an unnecessarily exaggerated and egregious 
attack on the fundamental strength of the nation’s liberal democratic socio-
political system. This manifests as heated and highly polarised political debate 
in the public sphere, as well as an obvious tension between the objectives and 
rhetoric of the executive government to protect its borders, and the 
responsibility of the courts in Australia, particularly the high court, to ensure 
the rule of law and uphold human rights principles in the country.  
 
Such political contention and the polarisation of community attitudes on issues 
pertaining not just to foreign policy, global terrorism and counter-terrorism, 
but also to forced migration and immigration policy and rhetoric more broadly, 
tend to inform the naturalisation of nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes 
towards forced migrants in the Australian context. Popular depictions of 
forced migrants, particularly of Muslim and Middle Eastern refugees arriving 
to Australia by boat, are consistently negative and designed around notions of 
threat and insecurity. Such widespread representations of Muslim refugees as 
the threatening ‘other’ have the propensity to corrupt the capabilities of forced 
migrants who are granted protection by the Australian state and live in the 
community, as well as Australia’s Muslim population more broadly, to feel 
substantively included in the socio-political fabric in Australia. It potentially 
disrupts their willingness or capability to voice their opinions, and participate 
in public discourse as valued political members, as per the fundamental tenets 
of a functioning, liberal democracy. That is, populist rhetoric about 
“Australian values,” which is used to justify foreign intervention in Iraq, the 
exclusion of certain types of refugees from the Australian polity, and 
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unprecedented counter-terrorism measures against Australian citizens, is a 
double edged sword insofar as it has the potential to alienate refugees resident 
in the Australian community, and corrupt their ability to act as full democratic 
members in the Australian context. In so doing, such rhetoric operates to 
corrupt the functioning of the country’s liberal democracy as a whole. Indeed, 
the potential for the sustained marginalization of forced migrants after arrival 
in the community in Australia represents a democratic dilemma for a nation 
concerned with reconciling the vision that stands behind human rights 
principles “with the institutional and normative necessities of democracy, as a 
form of government based upon public autonomy, namely that those subject to 
their laws also be their authors” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 221).  
 
In light of such discussions, this study seeks to explore the experiences of 
Iraqis who have arrived to Australia and been granted humanitarian protection 
since 2003.  Broadly, it aims to look at their settlement experiences and reflect 
on whether they feel included in the Australian milieu, and whether they 
behave as full democratic members in their new context. Such was the impetus 
for the following literature review, the development of research questions and 
a theoretical framework, and the subsequent fieldwork, analysis and findings 
presented in this thesis.  
 
1.2 Thesis Structure and Research Questions 
 
Before presenting the research project, it is worth outlining the basic structure 
of the following thesis and stating the project’s research questions, so that they 
are familiar to the reader from the outset. Chapter two presents a thorough, 
multi-disciplinary literature review. After completing this multi-disciplinary 
literature review covering both empirical and theoretical aspects of the 
research topic introduced above, the following research questions were 
proposed, and are addressed throughout the remainder of the thesis: 
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1. What are the socio-political behaviours and attitudes of individuals in this 
sample group of Iraqis refugees? 
 
2. Are individuals within the sample group of Iraqi refugees engaged with the 
socio-political system in Australia, or are they alienated from or disaffected by 
the very system that is meant to be their primary means of inclusion?  
 
3. In light of the results of the first two research questions, to what extent does 
the Australian political system, as perceived by the sample group, foster 
conditions that progress a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism? 
 
Chapter three presents the theoretical approach of the study, which outlines the 
main theoretical concepts used to inform the research design and provides a 
framework for meaningful discussion of the empirical data elicited during the 
project. This leads into chapter four, which presents the precise methodology 
used to investigate the project’s research questions, from sampling, participant 
recruitment and data elicitation and analysis, to ethical issues encountered 
during fieldwork. Chapter five presents the results of the quantitative data 
analysis, followed by the results of the qualitative data analysis presented in 
chapter six. Chapter seven, then, presents the discussion, which looks at the 
major themes to come out of the data analysis and discusses them in terms of 
the theoretical approach of the study so as to reflect upon the project’s 
research questions. This is followed by the conclusion chapter, which briefly 
sums up the overall findings of this research. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review 
                                                       
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a review of theoretical and empirical, multi-disciplinary 
academic and other literature about forced migration from Iraq to Australia. 
For the most part, it reviews literature extant at the initiation of this project in 
2011-12. The review aims to survey and critically appraise research on the 
topic of forced migration generally, and the issue of forced migration from 
Iraq to Australia since 2003 more specifically. By doing so, it teases out the 
central academic debates playing out in this field of study and hones in on 
particular aspects of the research topic that are not adequately dealt with 
already in the corpus of literature.  
 
Any approach to the vast body of literature on the topic of forced migration 
requires a clear, initial starting point. Given this study’s concern with refugees 
in the Australian context, where the politics of forced migration is readily and 
widely recognised as contentious (Klocker & Dunn, 2003;  McNevin, 2007), it 
was deemed appropriate to begin by seeking out common theoretical 
understandings and explanations for such political contention. It particularly 
looks at theoretical discussions playing out among scholars working in 
political philosophy, political science, sociology, and to a lesser extent, social 
psychology. It goes on to review empirical literature dealing with Iraq’s mass 
displacement since the Iraq War began in 2003, and discusses the particular 
socio-political dynamics of this phenomenon and how it is playing out in the 
global context. It then outlines a history of the Australian nation-state’s 
approach to forced migration so as to illustrate the development of 
contemporary politics associated with refugees and asylum seekers arriving to 
Australia. Finally, it gives an overview of the Australian state’s contribution to 
the protection of displaced Iraqis since 2003, before looking at literature about 
the settlement experiences of Iraqi refugees in the country. It concludes by 
 12 
summarising the findings of the literature review and positing the precise 
research questions that inform the design and aims of this research project. 
 
2.2 Understanding the Politics of Forced Migration 
 
“Forced migration”3 is one of the central political issues currently playing out 
in Australia and other liberal democratic nation-states of the “global north.”4 
Political discussions about how to ethically and practically respond to human 
displacement and forced migrant arrivals to countries like Australia tend to 
revolve around issues of nation-state obligations within a global political 
order, state border control, national identity, social citizenship rights, human 
rights and the norms of national and international law. For many scholars, the 
political debate surrounding issues of forced migration brings into relief “a 
conflict between the claims of refugees and those escaping desperate situations 
to a secure place of residence and the claims of citizens to act together to limit 
access to the territory and resources of their community” (Gibney, 2004, p. 2). 
The underlying issues in this debate, then, are concerned with defining the 
boundaries of belonging in national polities and determining the extent to 
which constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ continue to be naturalized (Yuval-
Davis, 2011). The subject of forced migration, as such, may be seen as a fertile 
ground for exploring divergent claims related to politics, power and ideology. 
 
A number of scholars have situated the emergence of discourses and policies 
that have at once contributed to and evolved as a response to the movement of 
refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people across borders to processes 
associated with globalisation, modernity and the political system of nation 
                                                
3 ‘Forced migration’ is an imperfect turn of phrase used to describe the social processes 
involved in human displacement. The term “forced” is misleading as it deprives the fleeing 
migrant of human agency over their flight, and whitewashes the social complexities of human 
displacement. Nevertheless, in the absence of an alternative, widely recognized term, “forced 
migration” and “forced migrant” are used throughout this thesis. Other terms employed are 
“displaced,” and more specific terms that have come to denote international legal categories 
but are also used in academic and popular lexicons, such as refugee, asylum seeker, internally 
displaced person (IDP), and stateless person (SP). 
4 Generally, the ‘global north’ denotes a loosely defined socio-economic and political divide 
between countries in the world. To an extent, it unites the concepts of the West and the “First” 
“developed” or “industrialized” world. It refers loosely to more economically developed and 
liberal democratic countries, such as in Western Europe, North Americas, some countries of 
East Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. 
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states (Adelman, 1999; Castles, 2001; Marfleet, 2006; O’Neill, 2010). 
Adelman conceptualises refugees as “products of modernity.” He argues that 
refugees’ “plight became acute when the processes of modernity became 
globalized, when the political system of nation states first became extended 
over the whole globe and efforts were made to sort the varied nations of the 
world into political states” (Adelman, 1999, p. 83). Such arguments contend 
that the “modern” effort to divide the socially complex and stratified world 
into bureaucratically, rationally defined, territorially delineated political 
communities such as nation-states inevitably marginalises or excludes some 
individuals or socio-cultural groups. Such exclusion and marginalization is 
commonly justified on the basis of distinguishing identity markers such as 
ethnicity, culture, language, religion and/or class, constructed and/or perceived 
as inimical to an abstract or “imagined” national identity (Anderson, 1991). 
That is, certain individuals or groups who are seen not to belong within 
particular national communities, such as the Jewish populations of Eastern 
Europe during WWII, are either repressed by or excluded from said nationally 
framed communities all together. Such exclusions are commonly orchestrated 
through mechanisms of statecraft, often by militaristic or coercive means. This 
potentially places such individuals and/or groups in contexts of chronic 
marginalization and state repression and control, or even displaced within 
nation-states. Alternatively, such persons may be stateless and/or displaced 
outside of their self-recognized homeland and unable to return due to well-
founded fear of persecution; fallen through the proverbial cracks of 
international order. The vast majority of forced migrants are persecuted 
humans in a state of limbo, caught between nation states and their territories, 
and with no legal status or recognised membership in any established polity 
(O’Neill, 2010). 
 
In light of such understandings, controversy over forced migration in liberal 
democratic states of the global north may be seen as part of a ubiquitous 
international problem in which displaced persons are the vanguard of a world 
where life chances, socio-political rights and entitlements, and economic 
opportunities are distributed with marked inequality. In a world of unequal 
nation states, the key principles that determine membership in disparate 
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political communities, jus soli and jus sanguinis, preserve starkly different 
opportunities of “well-being, security, and freedom for persons” (Shachar, 
2009, p. 262). Recognition of such power differentials lends to an 
understanding of forced migration as not “the result of a string of unconnected 
emergencies, but an integral part of north-south relations” (Castles, 2003, p. 
9). In other words, forced migration is part of a historically entrenched, 
complex and ongoing dialectic between all political communities, those of the 
wealthy, powerful global north, which are the historical, key stakeholders in 
the contemporary international world order, and those of the less wealthy, less 
powerful south.  
 
Hannah Arendt, a refugee herself in the wake of the Holocaust, described 
refugees as “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” (Arendt, 
1951, p. 277). This comment, made more than half a century ago but 
nonetheless germane to the contemporary moment, refers to the implications 
that a lack of citizenship  - the primary politico-legal institution that confers 
upon an individual membership in a national political community - has upon 
an individual in a world carved up among sovereign states. Perhaps Arendt’s 
contention is even more relevant in the current age of globalisation, given that 
“it is only since 1945 that the nation-state has become the global norm – and 
then more as an aspiration than a reality, for only a minority of countries can 
lay claim to a durable democracy” (Castles, 2001, p. 93). Further evidence of 
Arendt’s contention is the huge and growing number of displaced persons 
globally. In 2015, if the world’s approximately 60 million known displaced 
persons – those accounted for the by the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and more than half of whom are children - were to form 
their own nation state, they would represent the 24th most populous country in 
the world, ranked just behind Italy (UNHCR, 2015). Instead of having a nation 
state of which they are members, however, the vast majority live in poor 
conditions in countries of first asylum in the global south or in makeshift 
camps run by the UN or the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 
 
In a political sense, globalisation – the development of a world order - should 
be understood as both descriptive and normative. Sociologist and philosopher, 
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Pierre Bourdieu, contends that globalisation is to be conceptualised not as “a 
fate, but a politics... conscious and calculated” (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 1). A 
politics that is both constructive and constitutive of “the rise of an international 
human rights regime and the spread of cosmopolitan norms,” among other 
phenomena (Benhabib, 2007, p. 17). “Cosmopolitan norms”, in this sense, 
may be understood as distinct from international norms. According to political 
philosopher, Seyla Benhabib, “While norms of international law emerge 
through treaty obligations to which states and their representatives are 
signatories, cosmopolitan norms accrue to individuals considered as moral and 
legal persons in a world-wide civil society” (Benhabib, 2009, p. 695). The 
politics of globalisation, then, may be characterised on one level by a dialectic 
between age-old Westphalia state sovereignty norms (with its sacred trinity: 
nation, territory and state) and increasingly popular universal human rights 
norms, which conceive of people as rights-bearing by virtue of their humanity, 
rather than their membership in a sovereign polity. Refugees and asylum 
seekers represent a unique position within this political dialectic, as they claim 
entitlements and privileges (or, liberties) that are instituted at the nation-state 
level as citizenship rights, yet they do so on the basis of universal human 
rights norms. This is a consequence of the forced migrant’s social reality as a 
displaced, stateless and therefore citizenship-free human. In the contemporary 
age, then, forced migrants are the living, breathing claimants and champions of 
“the right to rights” (Arendt 1958). 
 
The millions of displaced humans or political non-members across the globe, 
those who are disenfranchised by or excluded from the international political 
order of rights-bearing citizens, may be seen to expose a fallacy or a certain 
imperfection that is built into the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity and 
capitalism, and its associated liberal democratic ideals and institutions. Indeed, 
the plight of individuals seeking refuge in liberal democracies of the global 
north, such as Australia, is symptomatic of a broader political conundrum 
facing liberal democracies in an age of globalisation and universal legal 
norms, as bounded nation-states are increasingly challenged to articulate and 
legitimate the limits of their particular political community (Chandler, 2009). 
Indeed, there is an inherent contradiction, a ‘fatal tension’ (Cole, 2000, p. 2) 
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between the expansive and inclusionary principles of moral and political 
universalism (as anchored in human rights norms and their legal expression in 
domestic legislatures) and the particularistic and exclusionary conceptions of 
democratic closure and sovereignty. Political scientists have dubbed this the 
‘liberal paradox’, which is most clearly borne out in the exclusionary asylum 
procedures of liberal democracies such as Australia (Gigauri, 2006; McNevin 
2008; Hollifield, 2004).  
 
Recognising this ‘liberal paradox’ manifest in a range of contexts, “social 
theory since the 1950s has developed a strong analysis of modernity as being 
constituted through totalitarianism and the destructive impact of rationalisation 
and bureaucratisation” (O’Neill, 2010, p. 2). That is, a number of scholars 
argue that it is the rationalistic and bureaucratic international political order 
itself, which tends to be relatively uncritical of, or assigns secondary 
importance to issues of power and culture, that constitutes the existence of 
refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people across the globe. Scholars 
working in the field of critical theory, who tend to adopt an interdisciplinary 
materialist approach to analyse totalitarianism and anti-democratic trends in 
modern societies, view the predicament of asylums seekers, refugees and the 
stateless as intimately related to and enabled by dominant discourses on rights 
that emanate from political elites in powerful countries such as Australia 
(Pulitano 2013). For critical theorists, such dominant discourses play a 
fundamental role in constructing and reconstructing collective identities, 
which operate in practice to include or exclude individuals from particular 
national communities for a range of reasons that tend to shift over time 
(Laclau & Moffe, 1985; Lamont & Molnar, 2002). Indeed, the question of 
what human rights are and how they are instituted depends on the social, 
ideological and philosophical system of various movements in various 
historical periods.   
 
In sovereign, liberal democratic polities, then, the interpretation of basic rights 
is a political project; “in the sense that such interpretations concern how a 
people that wishes to live by certain principles in the light of its own changing 
self-understanding, rearticulates the binding principles under which it has 
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constituted itself as a polity” (Benhabib, 2013, p. 4). In other words, it is a 
fundamental mistake to assume that rights are inherent or static. To the 
contrary, and as noted above, rights are principles that are continuously 
interpreted, articulated, then reinterpreted and rearticulated through self-
governing polities. The tension that arises, then, when particularistic 
interpretations of nominally “universal” rights principles, begets profound 
questions that come to bear upon how supposedly democratic and liberal 
nation state systems adapt in a globalizing world. It calls into question the 
cosmopolitan project when to bear rights foremost requires that an individual 
be a member of a sovereign polity that can protect one’s “right to have rights.” 
It further invites cynicism about the spread of human rights norms being an 
achievement of human kind, and casts it instead as a manoeuvre undertaken by 
the victorious nations of WWII to entrench their own narrow visions of the 
human through a so-called Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Reticence in contemporary scholarship to explain human rights in 
universalistic terms can be traced back to the fear that they would be 
instrumentalized for political ends (AAA 1947; Arendt 1951, 1958; Bourdieu, 
2002; Benhabib, 2013). 
 
Acrimony over the codification of universal rights norms existed at the 
inception of the UDHR in 1947. A famous example of this is the objections 
that came from the American Anthropological Association (AAA). The 
anthropologists, concerned with respect not just for individuals but the diverse 
cultural groups of which they are part, saw in this document a dilemma; the 
illegitimate universalizing of Western visions of order to the rest of humanity. 
The AAA’s statement on Human Rights pointed at the paradox inbuilt into the 
UDHR, arguing, 
“It is a truism that groups are composed of individuals, and human 
beings do not function outside the societies of which they form a 
part. The problem is thus to formulate a statement of human rights 
that will do more than just phrase respect for the individual as an 
individual. It must also take into account the individual as a 
member of the social groups of which he is a part, whose 
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sanctioned modes of life shape his behaviour, and with whose fate 
his own is thus inextricably bound” (AAA, 1947, p. 539).  
The statement went on to question what the AAA’s executive felt was the 
central issue not addressed by the UDHR, and which was integral to its 
potential effectiveness on a worldwide scale: “How can the proposed 
Declaration be applicable to all human beings,” the anthropologists asked, 
“and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values 
prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America?” (AAA 1947, p. 
539). The sentiment behind this statement is very much alive and debated 
today. So too is the social reality underpinning their fundamental concerns, as 
is evident in the predicament of the world’s chronically displaced and stateless 
people.  
 
Engaging with the unique challenge thrown down to contemporary political 
arrangements by refugees and asylum seekers, and examining the role of the 
state in trying to govern this process, Aleinikoff writes,  
“It is sometimes said that states have complete authority to 
regulate the movement of persons across their borders— that 
anything less than complete authority would undermine their 
sovereignty and threaten their ability to define themselves as a 
nation. Against this claim, it is regularly asserted that migrants 
have fundamental human rights that state regulations of migration 
cannot abridge.” (Aleinikoff, 2003, p. 1).  
Some scholars argue that there has been a decline in state power since WWII – 
a “hollowing out of territorial politics” (Chandler 2009, p. 53) - that may be 
attributed to the increasing relevance of an international human rights regime 
that overrides state decisions about border crossings (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 
1994). It is argued that international normative pressure has been exerted to 
“supersede the strength of state institutions and their monopoly on rights and 
the distribution of public goods” (Gest, 2010, p. 641).  
 
Conversely, a number of scholars concede that apart from the sovereign 
nation-state there are few other providers of public goods and care, no other 
bodies that monitor border crossings, and no alternative judiciaries to appeal to 
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about residency or nationality (Brubaker, 1994; Joppke, 1998; Gest, 2010). 
According to this perspective, the role played by the state may be seen to be 
particularly relevant to the lives of refugees and asylum seekers, a politically 
disenfranchised group who seek protection from nation states. Guiraudon and 
Lahav argue, “As long as the nation-state is the primary unit for dispensing 
rights and privileges, it remains the main interlocutor, reference and target of 
interest groups and political actors, including migrant groups and their 
supporters” (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Supporting this perspective, Heikki 
Mattila argues that governments, as the assenting parties to international 
human rights instruments, and the principle financial donors to the UN system, 
remain the principal actors as guardians of the human rights of all individuals 
residing in their territories (Matilla, 2006). Although the range of international 
arbiters of global migration is broadening (for example, UNHCR, IOM, airline 
carriers), the democratic state’s sovereign control of its territory and its 
subjection to the politics of its society remains the supreme ‘legitimate’ 
authority over all migration streams, humanitarian or otherwise. 
The globalization of politics and the politics of globalization may be seen as 
converging upon one another to “challenge our most basic ideas of the nature 
of political community and of membership within it” (Kymlicka, 2007; Cited 
in Benhabib, 2007, p. 128). In a world of global mobility, transnationalism, 
international migration and what Castles and Davidson (2000) have coined the 
“Asylum-migration nexus’, global north states have come to invest a huge 
amount of energy, time and money on securing the borders of their country, 
both symbolic and physical, erecting stronger and stronger barriers to entry 
(this trend is discussed at length below). The right to control over membership 
and entrance in such liberal democratic countries remains grounded in the 
entitlement of political communities to give public expression to their 
collective identity; a politics of belonging (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Castles, 
2001; Yuval-Davis, 2011).  
It may be seen that under current global political conditions it is “not the loss 
of rights… but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any 
rights whatsoever, has been the calamity that has befallen ever-increasing 
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numbers of people” (Arendt, 1968, p. 297). Arendt (1968, p. 297) further 
contends, “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without 
losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity 
itself expels him from humanity”. This is a pressing issue in light of the 
increasing number of forced migrants, internally displaced and stateless 
persons across the globe whose very existence and movement across borders 
challenges fundamental understandings of how the outer limits of political 
communities may be practically and ethically delineated. The implications of 
such a global political dialectic for forced migrants themselves are many. With 
their multifarious experiences, identities, perspectives, interpretations and 
expectations, refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people, crudely speaking, 
appear to embody the border zone between citizen and human.   
 
2.3 Shifting Tides of Global Mobility – A Contentious Politics 
 
This section briefly outlines the institutional arrangements of the international 
refugee protection system that was established in 1951 and the global patterns 
of human displacement since that time. It goes on to explore the popular 
political responses to this phenomenon that are evolving in liberal democracies 
of the global north. It looks at the language used in both academia and 
everyday public discourse to conceptualise, discuss and debate forced 
migration as a socio-political phenomenon. It then explores the relationship 
between popular rhetorical patterns that crop up in these dominant discourses 
and the design of a suite of policy and legal approaches implemented in recent 
years by developed liberal democracies to deal with the issue of human 
displacement both at the border and in the world more broadly.  
 
The contemporary international refugee protection system is based on the legal 
precepts written into the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951 (which 
entered into force in 1954) and the Protocol of 1967. Signatory states share 
responsibility (or “the burden”) for processing asylum seekers’ claims 
worldwide and offering genuine refugees effective protection through this 
system. Whereas earlier agreements on displaced persons were confined to 
particular refugee groups, the 1951 convention was the first effort to give a 
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universal definition to the term refugee, which it declared as “someone who is 
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, 
2010). This remains the central, legal definition of a genuine refugee to this 
day.  
 
Although the convention was and remains the most comprehensive effort to 
codify the rights of refugees at the international level, it was initially limited in 
scope and designed as a post WWII instrument to address protection for 
individuals fleeing before January 1951 and within Europe. Notably, it was 
felt at the time that this could be achieved within three years (Cook, 2015). 
More than sixty years later, however, a task that was once deemed temporary 
is now so complex and entrenched as to appear impossible. After the 
Convention came into force, the prevalence of forced migrants kept increasing, 
particularly in light of the huge number of Palestinian refugees protractedly 
displaced after the Palestine War in 1948. In response to this, the 1967 
Protocol removed the geographic and temporal limitations of the Convention, 
thus giving it universal coverage. Of the 193 member states of the UN, there 
are currently 145 contracting states to the 1951 Convention, and 146 
contracting states to the 1967 Protocol (UN, 1970; UNTC, 2015).  
 
States of the global north that are signatory to the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol contribute to addressing human displacement through the formal 
system of international refugee protection, spearheaded by the UNHCR. This 
system is made up of three key elements or protection mechanisms. The first is 
‘preventative measures,’ which refers to efforts to assuage the risk of potential 
displacements through conflict prevention, diplomacy, international aid and 
community development efforts, and monitoring environmental factors. The 
second mechanism is ‘temporary protection in a country of first asylum,’ 
which refers to measures established in countries of first asylum, usually in the 
global south, to shelter and nourish people fleeing persecution, often in ad hoc 
camps. The third element of international refugee protection is ‘durable 
solutions.’ The UNHCR framework offers three durable solutions, which are 
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said to provide for the long-term protection needs of people displaced by 
humanitarian crises. The first is ‘voluntary return (repatriation)’ to their home 
country in conditions of safety and dignity. The second is ‘local integration in 
the country of first asylum,’ which depends on the host state in question. The 
third durable solution is ‘resettlement in a third country.’ This third option is a 
key measure in the system of international refugee protection and is the only 
viable durable solution for a number of forced migrants caught in protracted 
displacement (those displaced for more than five years), often as part of mass 
movements of refugees from chronic conflict areas such as Iraq.  
 
The final element of the international protection system is asylum. Any person 
may legally seek asylum in the territory of UN Refugee Convention signatory 
states. It is based on the principle of non-refoulement laid out in the 1951 
Convention, which states,  
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion” (UNHCR 2010).  
Asylum is the most contentious element of the refugee system, and often 
receives the lion’s share of attention in political debates about forced migration 
that are playing out in Australia (discussed at length below).  
 
The number of forced migrants worldwide has been rising since the 1950. The 
movement of displaced persons across political borders then grew dramatically 
in the post-Cold War period. Using figures that account for refugees that were 
under the UNHCR mandate (not those who were displaced but not registered 
with the UN), Castles surmises, “The global refugee population grew from 2.4 
million in 1975 to 10.5 million in 1985 to 14.9 million in 1990. A peak was 
reached after the end of the Cold War with 18.2 million in 1993. By 2000, the 
global refugee population had declined to 12.1 million” (Castles 2003, p. 14). 
The latest UNHCR reports on global trends of displacement and asylum show 
that this decline in global refugee numbers was temporary, and increasing 
human mobility is an empirical reality and a significant challenge in the 
 23 
globalizing world. In 2012, for example, there were 35.8 million people of 
concern to the UNHCR – the second highest number on record at that time. In 
the same year there were 7.6 million newly displaced persons, with another 6.5 
million being internally displaced (IDPs), the second highest number in the 
previous ten years (UNHCR, 2013). Just two years later, at the end of 2014 
there were 59.5 million people of concern, including refugees, stateless people 
and IDPs. This is 8.3 million persons more than the year before (51.2 million) 
and represents the highest annual increase in a single year. Indeed, 2014 saw 
the highest displacement on record for a single year (UNHCR, 2015). Of the 
estimated 59.5 million displaced worldwide, just 14.4 million or 24 per cent 
are under the UNHCR’s mandate (UNHCR, 2015). Of these mandated 
refugees around the world, less than one per cent is submitted for resettlement 
annually. 
 
As stated above, global south countries host the vast majority of the world’s 
displaced. In 2013, over 80 per cent of the world’s refugees (compared to 70 
per cent ten years earlier) were hosted in the developing world (UNHCR, 
2013a). In 2014, developing countries hosted some 12.4 million or 86 per cent 
of the world’s UNHCR mandated refugees. The top six refugee-hosting states 
in 2015 are Turkey (1.59 million), Pakistan, Lebanon, Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan. That is, “in absolute terms and per capita, 
developing and socially unstable countries carry a disproportionate share of 
the burden in hosting and resettling refugees. There is a deep imbalance in 
international support for the world’s displaced” (Gauthier et al, 2011). Of 
those who seek asylum in one of the 44 industrialised economies of the global 
north, such as Australia, most seek protection in Europe and North America. 
In 2014, a record high of nearly 1.7 million individuals submitted applications 
for asylum or refugee status. UNHCR offices registered 245,700 or 15 per cent 
of these claims (UNHCR, 2015).  
 
It is in light of such phenomena that Bauman describes the contemporary era 
as “liquid modernity,” marked by the increasing global mobility of persons 
(Bauman, 2000). Castles and Miller, meanwhile, have utilised figures such as 
those given above, as well as figures on international voluntary migration 
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more broadly, to conceptualise the contemporary era as the “age of migration”, 
arguing that there are more people on the move now than at most times in 
history (Castles & Miller, 2009). In regards to forced migration specifically, 
the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres stated in 2014, 
“We are witnessing a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an era in 
which the scale of global forced displacement as well as the response required 
is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 3) Such 
characterisations draw attention to international migration as one of the most 
significant global phenomena since WWII. Moreover, most scholars working 
in the field of migration contend that increased migration will continue to be a 
reality of 21st century life (Castles, 2003; Marfleet, 2006, O’Niell, 2010). 
 
Sociologists Hania Zlotnik and Hein de Haas analyse and portray this 
statistical picture differently. They argue that characterisations of the 
contemporary age as marked by unprecedented human migration tend to be 
ahistorical and therefore perpetuate a myth (de Haas, 2007; 2008; Zlotnik 
1998). De Haas posits that the number of migrants relative to the total world 
population is almost on the same level as it was a century ago, at about 2.5 to 3 
per cent (De Haas, 2007, p. 821). In light of this, he argues, “the magnitude of 
contemporary international migration is not really unprecedented” (de Haas, 
2007, pp. 821-822). De Haas contends that complimentary to a tendency to 
underestimate levels of past mobility, there is a tendency to overstate the 
current scale of international migration. Although the share of international 
migrants in the world population did increase in the 1990s, the argument goes, 
“there were periods of equal if not more dramatic international migration 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Zlotnik, 1998, p. 14; Cited in de 
Haas, 2007, p. 822).  
 
The claim in the UNHCR’s 2014 Global Trends report that “the global 
humanitarian system has been severely stretched” (UNHCR 2015, p. 5) is self-
evident in the statistics. It is not, however, a new observation. Indeed, by the 
early 1990s the international refugee protection system that had been built on 
the 1951 Convention and then expanded over four decades was purportedly 
stretched beyond capacity (UNHCR, 1993). Some argue that this assertion was 
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made by states of the global north, which are the key stakeholders and donors 
in the United Nations system, for their own domestic political reasons, and is 
something of a discursive exaggeration (Ghosh, 2000; Turton, 2003; Haddad, 
2008). It was in the early 1990s, they contend, that the number of onshore 
asylum seekers to global north states increased, and the machinery of 
immigration legislation in countries such as Australia and the US became 
markedly more complex, securitized and restrictive; extraterritorial 
immigration detention, for example, was enacted for the first time in the US in 
response to the Haitian refugee crisis in 1991 and was soon followed by 
mandatory immigration detention in Australia in 1992.  
 
In light of such nationally framed political and legal manoeuvres, Zlotnik and 
De Haas argue that the salient factor in understanding patterns and responses 
to forced migration is not necessarily the absolute quantities of migrants 
themselves, but the direction of migration flows - namely, a reversal of trans-
continental migration flows that occurred throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century (De Haas, 2007). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the directions of international migratory flows were predominantly North-
North (Europe-North America), South-South and North-South (Europe to 
colonies). That is, South to North migration was limited. After WWII, 
however, international migration has tended to flow from South to North 
(certain anomalies exist, such as the Gulf oil countries). “The change has not 
been the relative change of international migrants,” Zlotnik argues, “but in the 
number of developing countries that have become incorporated within 
migration systems that link them to industrialized countries” (Zlotnik, 1998, 
Cited in de Haas 2007, p. 822). That is, migratory pathways became open and 
available to people in the global south; more persecuted and displaced people 
were now potentially able to reach the geographically distant, developed, 
bureaucratised global north states in search of asylum, and without the need 
for official papers or visas for entry. Such pathways, though legal under 
international law if used for the purpose of seeking asylum, were quickly 
dubbed as “irregular” or “unauthorized” and criminalized by global north 
states such as Australia, which preferred to maintain strict control over arrivals 
to their national political communities. 
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Whether the global mobility of humans in the contemporary age is accounted 
for as a net increase or a static rate in terms of global population, both 
statistical pictures cover a much more complex and politically contentious 
social reality. As scholars such as Zlotnik and Vertovec point out in their 
discussion of increased viable migration networks and pathways in a 
globalised world, another fundamental factor underpinning the statistical 
picture of global mobility is “the increased possibility for migrants and their 
families to live transnationally and to adopt transnational identities through 
revolutions in communication and transport infrastructure” (Vertovec, 1999; 
Cited in De Haas 2007, p. 823). In a similar spirit to the discussion above, De 
Haas has argued that, “this de facto transnationalization of migrants’ lives 
challenge assimilationist models of migrant integration and the modernist 
political construct of the nation-state and citizenship” as exist in countries like 
Australia (de Haas, 2005, p. 273). He contends that the sedentary populations 
of global north nation states, historically and rhetorically characterised by 
Western cultural norms and an underlying Christian ethos, “are now 
confronted with the challenge of receiving significant numbers of non-elite, 
transnationally oriented immigrants who do not necessarily share the majority 
culture and religion” (de Haas, 2007, p. 823). It is in light of such socio-
cultural realities that migration, then, is perceived as problematic and an issue 
of public concern. 
Indeed, after WWII, and especially since the 1970s, the increased mobility of 
culturally distinct people from poorer countries was increasingly perceived in 
developed countries as a problem in need of control. Mass migration was at 
once desirable in light of major labor shortages after the war, yet also 
represented the potential for a major disruption in national cultural, religious 
and linguistic continuity and delineation, and the associated socio-political 
change and economic burden this represented to the relatively wealthy, settled, 
domestic communities. By the early 1990s, such nationally framed perceptions 
and political logic came to uncritically trump the logic of refugee protection 
and substantive human rights principles in the design of forced migration 
policy and legislation.  
 27 
What may be seen in this widely popular interpretation of migration as a deep 
problem in need of control is, to an extent, a discursive exaggeration of the 
whole issue of international migration, and particularly forced migration, for 
socio-political reasons that are centred on the interests of the global North. The 
language used to conceptualise forced migration may be seen as a case in point 
for this discursive exaggeration. The discourse of forced migration, as 
emanates from global north political communities, particularly executive 
governments, is often constructed around aquatic metaphors. Turton (2003, p. 
5) argues, “We speak of flows, streams, waves and trickles of migrants. We 
speak of “asylum capacity”. Some speak of being flooded, inundated and 
swamped.”  It is also spoken about in capitalist materialist terms such as 
“products of conflict,” “migration stock” and the characterisations of people 
smugglers as businessmen “trading in human misery”. Asylum seekers 
represent are “economic opportunists” “seeking entitlements” not safety, an 
“economic burden” to the nation. Political elites in particular draw upon 
notions of “illegality,” “irregularity,” and the existence of an orderly “queue,” 
in which “good” migrants – those in UNHCR camps - line up so they may 
enter through the “front” not the “back door.” “Bad” or opportunistic 
“economic” migrants, such as onshore asylum seekers, unfairly ignore the 
orderly “queue” and “illegally” enter a country in violation its sovereignty 
(Crock et al 2006; Robertson 2013).  
Such metaphorical language, Turton contends in the manner of Pierre 
Bourdieu, is not innocent but is calculated and cultivated. He points to three 
main factors to justify his claim. Firstly, he argues “it is not the language of 
migrants themselves – it is spoken from a sedentary or state-centric 
perspective; ‘We’ use to talk about ‘them’.” Secondly, he contends, “the 
metaphorical language of migration requires us to think of it as some kind of 
natural event, an inexorable process with its own logic and force” (Turton, 
2003, p. 5). And finally, “metaphors we use to talk about migration require us 
to think of migrants as an undifferentiated mass”. The language used 
particularly in the global north tends to de-personalise and de-humanise forced 
migrants, ignores the forced migrant’s personal narrative and ascribes them a 
narrative tailored to state, domestic political interests.  
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As political elites and national populations, such as in Australia, try to 
understand, conceptualise and formulate appropriate responses to forced 
migration the approach tends to depend on what “they” – migrants – are to be 
used for, whether they will be good for the economy or a burden, and how 
well they enable people in a particular cultural or institutional context to 
achieve their objectives and satisfy their needs. Forced migrants, then, fleeing 
their homelands for fear of persecution and seeking sanctuary in countries 
such as Australia, have been embroiled in such dominant political discourse 
emanating from powerful global north states, and must attempt to orchestrate 
their social lives against such a global political backdrop. 
 
The language that has been formulated to conceptualise forced migration may 
be seen to have arisen out of relatively ad hoc responses to a series of domestic 
policy concerns aimed at restricting access for forced migrants, particularly 
onshore asylum seekers. As such, there has been a discursive exaggeration for 
political purposes, which leaves the vast majority of the world’s displaced 
persons where they are - displaced and without a political community willing 
to render them substantive spatial security rights. This is despite the forced 
migrants’ quest for “security spatial rights,” which tends to take precedence 
over any economic, political and civil rights or any other such entitlements 
they may receive from a national polity subsequent to their initial protection 
(Yuval-Davis, 2011). De Haas has observed, 
“The primary response of governments in the global North to 
unwanted migration since the 1970s has been the imposition of 
increasingly restrictive immigration laws and regulations 
(restrictive issuance of visa and residence permits), intensified 
border controls, carriers’ sanctions, deterrent policies and return 
migration policies… (de Haas 2007, p. 824).  
The failure of restrictionism to curtail or adequately address the phenomenon 
of human displacement as a whole has been well documented (Crock & 
Ghezelbash, 2010; de Haas, 2007; Czaika & DeHaas, 2011). Instead of 
reducing the number of forced migrants worldwide (Hatton 2011), it tends to 
have the dual function of obscuring the complex socio-political factors that 
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contribute to and perpetuate human displacement, as well as enabling leaders 
to shirk responsibility in finding solutions for the world’s displaced who are 
cast largely as unwanted, burdensome, abstract entities that threaten state 
sovereignty.  
Nonetheless, concerned foremost with domestic systemic outcomes, “elected 
leaders and bureaucrats increasingly have turned to symbolic policy 
instruments to create an appearance of control” (Massey et al., 1998, p. 288; 
Cited in de Haas, 2007, p. 826). As part of the harsh political response to 
asylum seekers in particular, wealthy signatory states have designed and 
implemented a range of policies aimed at limiting access to their territories via 
irregular and onshore channels. Such policies include extraterritorial detention, 
naval interdiction, excision of official migration zones, a reduced protection 
regime in the form of bridging visas and temporary protection visas for those 
found to be conventional refugees (Effeney & Mansouri, 2014). Such 
measures are commonly justified domestically in terms of the ‘deterrence’ and 
‘border protection’ imperatives. Although border controls and “restrictive 
immigration policies have undoubtedly had an effect on the number of 
legitimate arrivals, they have also generated the unintended effect of 
encouraging irregular migration” (de Haas, 2007, p. 824). Ironically, 
smuggling is a reaction to border controls, rather than a cause of migration.
 
One of the more controversial deterrence measures, instituted by countries 
such as Australia and the USA, is extraterritorial detention for the purpose of 
offshore processing, which is designed to prevent and deter access to statutory 
and judicial safeguards in the destination country (Francis, 2008). Offshore 
processing often incorporates “interdiction, transfer and processing practices 
and standards that are deliberately isolated from the national, legal and 
institutional protections within either the intercepting state or the third country 
where processing occurs” (Francis, 2008, p. 253). It has been argued that 
extraterritorial long-distance processing assists states in obfuscating 
international legal responsibilities to asylum seekers, by enabling them to 
exercise control covertly, and to place their targets outside the reach of the law 
(Dastyari & Effeney, 2013; Effeney & Mansouri, 2014).  
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As part of instituting and marketing offshore processing policies (and other 
deterrence measures) to domestic publics, border protection assumes a 
heightened symbolic and politicised dimension in the debate about forced 
migration; constructed as a social, cultural and economic frontier, where the 
battle between nationally framed prerogatives is waged against human rights 
obligations to displaced people. Indeed, since 2001, securitisation and 
deliberalisation are the foremost determinants of northern states’ approaches to 
asylum seeking (Hyndmann, 2012), with immigration and border control being 
inextricably linked to risk, insecurity and the need for strong exclusionary 
measures.  
The centrality and symbolism of borders in domestic and global politics 
cannot be underestimated, as borders constitute a hallmark feature of the 
international system. As was noted above, the Westphalian state’s right to 
control movements across its borders is perceived as a fundamental element of 
state sovereignty. Furthermore, the importance of borders is not confined to 
political, economic and security realms but transcend them to play an intrinsic 
and symbolic role in defining the nation state itself. As Rudolph (2006, p. 207) 
writes, borders “remain significant because they provide social closure and 
symbolic separation between peoples and cultures” and “together with the 
institution of citizenship, designate both inclusion and exclusion and define the 
socio-political community.” In other words, borders can be invoked to serve a 
dual function of defining and sustaining identities. Focus on such constructs 
and discourses allow national political communities to justify even the most 
inhumane exclusionary policies, such as the indefinite, extraterritorial 
detention of children (AHRC, 2014). Indeed, the displaced, and particularly 
those with the tenacity to seek asylum in the developed north, become the 
unwanted ‘deviant other’ that threatens the national community’s identity and 
values, not just its borders and its ability to meticulously plan its own 
immigration program (Marfleet, 2006; Dunn et al, 2007). 
 
2.4 Bounded Political Communities – Implications for Refugees 
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To recap, forced migrants seek certain rights, liberties and entitlements on the 
basis of human rights that only national governments and their local partners 
are in a position to render. Since the 1950s, human rights and cosmopolitan 
norms have been increasingly invoked in refugee and asylum debates and 
territorially delimited nations have been continuously challenged not only in 
their claims to control their territorial borders but also in their prerogative to 
define the boundaries of the national community. Indeed, so long as liberal 
democratic nation states such as Australia are legally and rhetorically 
committed to human rights norms, and are signatory to international 
covenants, the challenge of juggling particularistic, national interests (often led 
by the executive arm of the state) with universal rights principles incorporated 
into the domestic legislature (usually safeguarded by the judicial arm of state) 
is both inevitable and ongoing, with no end in sight.  
 
Articulating the limits of a national democratic community is, on one level, a 
complex metaphysical task that requires democratic members to justify the 
exclusion of other, human non-members, such that such the justification for 
exclusion is lawful and democratically constituted. That is, such that the 
exclusion of a person, and its justification, are legal and represents the will of 
an increasingly pluralistic national community (a community itself made up of 
former refugees and migrants). In the case of displaced persons seeking refuge 
in Australia, and contingent to the articulation of legitimate democratic closure 
in liberal democratic political systems more broadly, is the special claim that 
forced migrants make on citizens’  
“…concern. They require us to consider issues of membership, 
citizenship and democratic liberalism. They require us to ask 
what our responsibilities are to the stranger in distress, the 
stranger amongst us, on our doorstep, who is seeking a better 
life for himself or herself and for his or her children, and the 
stranger halfway around the world who is brought into our 
homes by satellite TV channels. They require us, in other 
words, to consider who we are – what is or should be our 
moral community and, ultimately, what it means to be human ” 
(Turton 2003, p. 8)     
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Turton points here to the responsibilities contingent to socio-political 
membership within liberal democratic polities, and the moral and ethical 
appeals to shared humanity that forced migrants lay down to sedentary, 
relatively wealthy citizens of states that nominally adhere to human rights 
norms. As Ossewaarde argues, “Ignorance no longer provides an alibi: to 
remain silent is to plead guilty” (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 376). Indeed, in a 
culturally diverse and technologically advanced society like Australia, citizens 
are less and less able to feign ignorance about what happens to strangers and 
are increasingly confronted with real world manifestations of the liberal 
paradox. As the current intuitional arrangements and discourses become more 
and more constrained, so too does the challenge to articulate a path forward 
become more necessary. 
 
Political philosophers tend to frame their discussion of issues pertaining to this 
liberal paradox in terms of a project of global justice. One aspect of this broad 
debate is a concern with illustrating an ethical and practical path forward from 
the current world order. This discussion plays out between Rawlsian thinkers, 
such as Thomas Nagel, and a variety of cosmopolitan thinkers, such as Seyla 
Behabib and Anthony Appiah. Rawlsian scholars are broadly directed by the 
“Law of Nations” thesis of John Rawls (1971), which view socio-political 
communities as isolated social entities, autonomous from one another. 
Although Rawls’s analysis is abstract, critics contend that using the isolated 
“society” as the central ontological unit of analysis obscures an examination of 
the various phenomena in the real world that transcend national boundaries. 
Human displacement, as a socio-political phenomenon, is a case in point. In 
light of this critique, scholars dealing with issues pertaining to forced 
migration tend to find greater theoretical analytic purchase in the work of 
cosmopolitan thinkers, which are many and varied in their approaches. 
Common to all cosmopolitan theories is the idea that humans beings – 
regardless of national, religious, cultural, or political affiliation – should be 
seen as members of the same community – humanity - and that this 
community should be cultivated (Strand, 2009).  
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The term “cosmopolitan” derives from Greek kosmo politeˆs, meaning citizen 
of the world. It dates at least to the Cynics of Greece in 4BCE and the Stoics’ 
later description of themselves as cosmopolitans—“human beings living in a 
world of human beings and only incidentally members of polities” (Barry 
1999, p. 36). In the contemporary moment, cosmopolitanism foremost views 
humans as moral beings capable of communicative freedom and who have a 
fundamental right to have rights, as per Hannah Arendt. As Ossewaarde 
argues, “To keep one’s conscience clear, cosmopolitanism proposes to 
cultivate the goodwill of locals or nationals to become engaged with strangers, 
to cultivate a sense of global responsibility for the fate of strangers in distress, 
regardless of their group identity or social distinctions” (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 
376). In crude terms, human rights principles and their expression in 
international law and domestic legislatures are an institutional manifestation of 
cosmopolitan ideals.  
 
Scholars interested in cosmopolitan theories tend to take impetus from what 
they perceive are unprecedented empirical conditions surrounding 
contemporary states, governments and national communities now forcibly 
enmeshed in international and regional networks. They recognize that 
individuals are no longer simply citizens of their respective states but are 
persons bearing universal human rights and potentially enjoying multiple 
citizenships and having a sense of belonging to a multitude of communities 
(Benhabib 2004, 2007, 2013; Archibugi & Held, 1995). Indeed, some scholars 
view cosmopolitanism as an empirical imperative; “with the globalization of 
national societies, cosmopolitanism has now become something of an urgent 
reality” (Arendt, 1968, p. 82) and “an actual social condition of many today” 
(Mazlish 2005, p. 106; Cited in Ossewaarde 2007, p. 384). Such an assertion is 
widely disputed. 
 
The empirical realities of international migration and human mobility, 
increasing socio-political diversity of national communities and the 
proliferation of mechanisms of global justice, such as the integration of human 
rights principles into domestic legislatures, do mark a move along a 
cosmopolitan trajectory. However, it far from engenders a wholesale adoption 
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of the normative principles of cosmopolitanism into the socio-political 
frameworks and practices of nation states such as Australia. Even as we see an 
ever more globally integrated economic system, issues of substantive social 
and political integration repeatedly tend to lag behind (Kendall et al, 2009). 
Indeed, cosmopolitanism is often criticized for its affinity with neo-liberal 
globalization, unchecked capitalism, elitism and its tendency for utopian 
abstraction that ignores anthropological and sociological literatures and in so 
doing whitewashes, or assigns secondary importance to issues of socio-cultural 
complexity, privilege and inequality.  
 
To overcome such weaknesses, some scholars have come to conceptualise the 
cosmopolitan project as an ongoing, social and political process, or, 
reminiscent of Karl Marx, a struggle. Moreover, that the reciprocal recognition 
of each other as beings who inherently bear the right to have rights inevitably 
involves political and social struggles, activism and learning processes both 
within and across classes, genders, nations, ethnic group and religious faiths 
(Benhabib 2013). These scholars tend to ground their more abstract, 
theoretical insights and assertions within an empirically demonstrable or 
explorable socio-political phenomena. Mitchell Cohen, for example, has 
conceptualised “rooted” cosmopolitanism” (Cohen 1992) and Kurasawa has 
dubbed his own treatment of cosmopolitanism as “cosmopolitanism from 
below” (Kurasawa 2004). Seyla Benhabib grounds her own take on 
cosmopolitanism in Habermasian notions of democracy (this is discussed 
below). “Universalism does not consist in a human essence or nature which we 
are all said to have or to possess,” she argues, “but rather in experiences of 
establishing commonality across diversity, conflict, divide and struggle.  
Universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for; it is not a fact, a 
description of the way the world is” (Benhabib, 2013, p. 70).  
 
Informing democratically grounded approaches to cosmopolitanism is the 
recognition that while the state’s role may be changing and attenuating in the 
contemporary age, it is certainly not withering away. Indeed, the discussion 
thus far has illustrated that the normative persuasion and mobilization of even 
the most powerful non-state actors can only be in the ultimate interest of 
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altering the practices of states (Gest, 2010). Kymlicka has termed this, the 
‘taming’ of liberal nationhood as opposed to any exaggerated notions of it 
transcendence (Kymlicka W; Cited in Benhabib 2007, p. 131).  
 
Among the various cosmopolitan theories that have grown ever more popular 
in an age of tamed liberal nationhood, are those thinkers, like Benhabib, who 
seek to articulate mechanisms by which to ground the cosmopolitan project in 
existing democratic socio-political structures of nation states. That is, 
philosophers and scholars concerned with reconciling new socio-political 
phenomena and conditions with existing structures of governance and power. 
Such scholars point to the inclusive potential of normative democratically 
grounded cosmopolitanism. They tend, in the first instance, to conceptualise 
democracy itself as discursive and procedural, in the fashion of Jürgen 
Habermas (Habermas, 1972; 1985; 1987). For Benhabib, for example, the 
limits of democratic ‘closure’ are fluid, constantly contested and redefined 
through dialectic processes that lead to democratic learning and iteration 
through law.  She argues, “although all democracies require borders, because 
every democracy must define very specifically who may vote and who may 
not, these boundaries are fixed by positive law and are therefore subject to the 
force of democratic iteration” (Benhabib, 2007, p. 33). Democratic iterations 
are to be understood as  
“complex processes of public argument, deliberation and 
exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested 
and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned 
throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the 
associations of civil society” (Benhabib, 2013, p. xx)  
Other scholars, such as David Held, have also grounded the cosmopolitan 
project in this fundamental theoretical point about ideal, theoretical democracy 
(Held, 2010). 
 
Thinkers such as Habermas, Benhabib and Held contend that any practical 
path forward in the current world order inevitably requires engagement with 
socio-political institutions that constitute democratic polities. Benhabib, for 
example, is concerned with the logic of democratic representation, rather than 
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any identity-based link between a government and its territory. She argues that 
state sovereignty has been frayed in the contemporary era and the institution of 
“citizenship has been disaggregated or unbundled into diverse elements. New 
modalities of membership have emerged, with the result of the political 
community, as defined by the nation-state system, are no longer adequate to 
regulate membership” (Benhabib 2004, p. 1). Such an approach conceptualizes 
the democratic political community foremost as demos, not ethnos, wherein 
peoplehood, or the nation, is regarded as a dynamic and not a static reality. 
She concedes that, ‘certainly, identification and solidarity are not unimportant, 
but they need to be leavened through democratic attachments and 
constitutional norms’ (Benhabib 2004, p. 221). By using the ‘liberal paradox’ 
as a broad starting point, this argument highlights a democratic dilemma for 
countries such as Australia, that are concerned with reconciling the vision that 
stands behind human rights principles “with the institutional and normative 
necessities of democracy, as a form of government based upon public 
autonomy, namely that those subject to their laws also be their authors” 
(Benhabib, 2004, p. 221).  
 
Benhabib takes this “democratic dilemma” up in her examination of the 
boundaries of political community in the contemporary age by focusing on 
political membership. She defines political membership as “the principles and 
practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, 
refugees and asylum seekers, into existing polities” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 1). 
She argues that “demos can alter its own understanding of citizenship, which 
in turn will alter the ethnos, understood as a shared community of fate” 
(Benhabib 2007, p. 69). That is, qualitative understandings and experiences of 
political membership, such as citizenship, necessarily change over time and in 
line with the social realities and needs of the shared democratic community. 
However, Benhabib (2007, p. 47) concedes that the end of the unitary model 
of citizenship “does not mean that its hold on our political imagination or its 
normative force in guiding our institutions have grown obsolete.” It does 
mean, however, that political communities and their members must be ready to 
“imagine forms of political agency and subjectivity that anticipate new 
modalities of political membership.” In an era of cosmopolitan norms 
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(instituted as human rights), a range of political actors are emerging that 
challenge traditional distinctions between citizens and long-term residents, 
insiders and outsiders, and call for a readjustment not just of the qualitative 
nature of political membership in democratic polities, but the boundaries of the 
demos (Benhabib 2007). As such, the structural, institutional arrangements 
designed to govern these communities - via laws, policies and the 
bureaucracies through which they are executed, as well as the rhetoric that 
justifies and sustains them - must too change and remain dynamic if they are to 
keep apace with the needs of the public, and thereby maintain democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
The strategy chosen by nation states like Australia to navigate this democratic 
dilemma has particular consequences for forced migrants seeking refuge in the 
country, both before and after they arrive, and despite their mode of arrival. As 
noted above, for the past two decades the strategies adopted to respond to 
forced migration have repeatedly displayed a propensity for domestic 
politicking, securitization and national cultural selectivity. The popular 
political imagination appears to remain beholden to territorial politics and the 
unitary model of citizenship rather than genuine, reflexive, democratic process 
and substantive adherence to human rights norms (Castles, 2001, Crock 2009; 
McDonald, 2011).  
 
Within such dominant discourse, the refugee is often represented as a 
dehumanised other, who is subject to, yet largely disenfranchised by, the 
national political system (Marfleet 2006; Dunn et al 2007). And yet, despite 
such top-heavy, rhetorical melodrama, sociological scholarship is premised on 
and repeatedly demonstrates refugees’ ‘capacity for agency at all odds’ (Soguk 
1999, p. 5, Cited in Turton 2003, p. 12). Refugees and asylum seekers exist as 
ordinary people, purposive actors whose very flight and arrival to countries 
like Australia is representative of contextualised and active decision-making 
and behaviour. Indeed, their protection by the Australian state and official 
membership in the community is a case in point for Benhabib’s argument; they 
gained entry and membership in the national society by leavening 
constitutional norms and democratic attachments, as is the nature of the 
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asylum process. However, once arrived and nominally integrated into the 
official socio-political system as political members, their resettlement 
experience and their substantive, democratic inclusion in their new polity over 
time, and across subsequent generations, is deeply affected by the normative 
and political discussions surrounding the politics of forced migration. It is a 
contentious politics that tends, for the most part, to cast forced migrants as 
socio-culturally incompatible with the national community, and furthermore a 
potential threat to social cohesion, economic prosperity and security (Kateb, 
2006).  
 
It is in light of such discussions, which beg redress of the increasingly obvious 
short circuit in the feedback loop between ruler and ruled/structure and agent, 
that there has been a conceptual shift in the field of political science in recent 
decades; what some dub a ‘representative turn’ (Näsström 2011; Saward 2010; 
Shapiro et al 2009), and others a ‘cultural turn’ (Kurasawa 2007). In short, 
there is a call for greater emphasis on human agency, a notion that has gained 
particular relevance in discussions about declining participation in democracy 
(Dahlgren, 2009; De Haas 2008; Robinson and Tormey 2009, Castles 2001). 
While most of these scholars concede that there has never been a perfect 
overlap between the circle of those who stand under the law’s authority and 
the full members of the demos, they argue that democratic political 
communities are to be foremost understood as reflexive. Populist liberal 
egalitarian discourses of political systems, such as prevails in Australia for 
example, are deemed insufficient to meet the challenges of globalization, as 
they render the social a passive recipient of political largesse qua ‘fairness’ 
instead of the social having a life and potentiality of its own (Robinson and 
Tormey 2009; Crock 2010).  
 
In order to bolster the value of macro-level, abstract philosophical discussions, 
such as Seyla Benhabib’s democratically grounded cosmopolitan theory, a 
trend has arisen which sees political scientists attempting to establish a 
behavioral link to the micro-level. In other words, much of the recent literature 
dealing with liberal democratic theories and governance is concerned with 
making explicit “the behavioral assumptions underpinning the macro-level 
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correlations they assume or describe” (de Haas 2011, p. 16; Niemi & Klingler, 
2012; Zingher & Thomas, 2012; Martin, 2012). It is with this in mind that this 
study seeks to build on an assumption of diffuse sanctions in democratic 
systems, whereby an account from a range of social actors is sought in order to 
both understand and innovate new political spaces and thereby recognise, 
explore and remain apace with dynamic social facts. It applies this approach to 
the context of exiles from the Iraq war who have sought refuge in Australia, 
for they, in crude terms, represent a compelling case study within this 
discussion. If Benhabib’s theory that ‘identification and solidarity are… to be 
leavened through democratic attachments and constitutional norms’ has any 
empirical bearing upon the case of Iraqi exiles settling and orchestrating their 
social lives in Australia, then they must a priori identify with and be engaged 
with democratic processes. 
 
 
2.5 Iraq’s Mass Displacement since 2003 
 
This section presents a review of literature about forced migration from Iraq 
since 2003. It briefly outlines the major events associated with Iraqi 
displacement as well as outlining the particular dynamics of migration from 
and within the country. It is worth restating that the UNHCR estimates that 
more than 4.1 million people are displaced inside Iraq or beyond the country’s 
borders (UNHCR, 2015). In other words, at least 4.1 million Iraqis are 
displaced from their home, which is equivalent to one sixth of Australia’s 
entire population, or the population of greater Sydney. 
 
The mass displacement of more than 4 million Iraqis since 2003 is no surprise. 
Before the US-led occupation, humanitarian agencies, academics and the 
media warned that there would be a major displacement of Iraq’s population; a 
humanitarian crisis would occur as a direct effect of the war or as a result of an 
ethnic and/or sectarian conflict, and widespread human rights abuses would 
ensue (Sassoon 2010). The international aid regime prepared accordingly, 
setting up emergency camps to house the inevitable outflow of forced migrants 
that would come in the immediate wake of intervention. But nobody came. 
Aid organizations “had miscalculated the Iraqi peoples’ response to the 
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invasion; the empty emergency camps were dismantled and pre-positioned 
food and equipment were removed” (Chatty & Mansour, 2012, p. 98). It was 
not until three years later, when the fragile security situation eroded into 
ubiquitous conflict and insecurity that Iraqis were uprooted and began to flee 
their homes on a large scale. The Iraqi refugee crisis that ensued and continues 
unabated exhibits socio-political characteristics peculiar to the historical 
context in which it arose and continues to morph. Indeed, the nature of Iraqi 
displacement defies neat characterisation and precludes many of the displaced 
from fitting the neat categories used by the International system of refugee 
protection.  
 
The people of Iraq are no strangers to upheaval; they bear witness to three 
major wars over the last four decades. Violence during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War, the 1991 Gulf War and the uprising in the south that followed, the 
several savage attacks on the Kurds in the north and the Shi’a in the south, and 
more than a decade of international aid, trade and economic sanctions 
drastically effected the country’s entire population (Fawcett & Tanner, 2002). 
As Sassoon points out, “the root causes of Iraq’s mess after 2003 cannot be 
seen in isolation from the events and developments in Iraq before this time, 
and during Saddam’s era” (Sassoon, 2010, p. 1). The Sunni Arabist Ba’th 
party under President Saddam Hussein fostered feelings of paranoia, 
xenophobia and distrust to create a hegemonic state and nurture a “culture of 
violence” in the country (Abbud 2002). During Saddam’s era, in the 1990s for 
example, Iraq witnessed large waves of migration and “brain drain” (when the 
most educated, skilled members of the national population emigrate en masse) 
from its territories as a result of authoritarian Ba’th policies and the 
deterioration of economic conditions. It is estimated that there were 1.2 
million people affected by protracted displacement over the course of 40 years 
leading up to 2003 (MoMD, 2008).  
 
It is the most recent conflicts in Iraq, however, which have led to the largest 
scale, protracted human displacement situation in the republic’s history. 
Marfleet argues, “the cumulative effect of pressures on the Iraqi population is 
the key to understanding recent patterns of movement. Living conditions have 
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declined steadily since 2003, while new crises of security have led more and 
more Iraqis to seek exit” (Marfleet, 2007, p. 408). The fragile fabric of Iraqi 
national society has been torn by violence and deepened a pervasive mistrust 
throughout the entire population, particularly between disparate religious and 
ethnic communities (Sassoon 2010). It is argued that Iraqis have fled “as a 
consequence of a conflict in which they have no stake but of which they were 
made victims” (International Crisis Group, 2008).  
 
Prevalent among the risk factors that prompted the flight of millions of Iraqis 
after 2003 were ethnic and religious identity, minority status, personal wealth, 
and professional association such as employment by foreign forces (Chatty & 
Mansour, 2012, p. 99).  Many others fled from Iraq’s central and southern 
provinces, and most notably from Baghdad and more recently from the 
country’s north, as a result of high levels of indiscriminate violence carried out 
by various actors in the name of sectarianism, tribal and/or ethnic affiliations. 
 
After 2006, state and society in Iraq fractured further as power devolved to 
localities and militias. Communal identities hardened and inter-group hatreds 
flared, even as more weapons poured into the immediate region, particularly 
from global north states to Syrian dissidents fighting the brutal Assad regime. 
Sassoon says “The armed militias filled the vacuum in humanitarian assistance 
as the national government lacked the skills and resources to take care of their 
internally and externally displaced populations” (Sassoon, 2010, p. 4). With 
the rise of Islamic State (IS, otherwise known as Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria or ISIS, or Da’esh), a militant Sunni fundamentalist jihadist group with 
territorial and state ambitions, ample weapons and funding, as well as media 
and technological know-how, there has been a further escalation of armed 
conflict across the country. This has led to new and secondary movements of 
internally displaced Iraqis in particular.  
 
In order to illustrate the complexity of Iraqi displacement and migratory 
movements since 2003, it is worth looking at the phenomenon in terms of 
three main displacement patterns. First it looks at the situation for Internally 
Displaced Iraqis, the number of which has increased markedly with the rise of 
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IS, particularly in central and northern Iraq. It goes on to look at the movement 
of Iraqis to countries of first asylum, often to countries that border with Iraq, 
including Syria, Iran and Turkey. And finally it reviews the movement of 
displaced Iraqis to nation states of the global North that are signatory to the 
UNHCR convention and protocol, such as Australia, countries of Europe, 
Canada and the US. 
 
Internally Displaced Persons 
 
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which 
utilizes figures from the UN and IOM, there were some 2.7 million IDPs in 
Iraq in 2010, and an estimated 2.1 million in 2012, of whom nearly three 
quarters were living in a situation of protracted displacement (IDMC, 2012). 
The UNHCR conservatively estimated that in 2012 there were 1.1 million 
IDPs in Iraq (UNHCR 2012), while according to Iraq’s Ministry of Migration 
and Displacement (MOMD), 235,610 people returned to their places of origin 
in 2012 and 1.1 million remained displaced (MOMD 2012). These official 
government figures, however, do not take into account the displacements that 
took place before 2006, the fact that not all IDPs are officially registered, and 
the questionable nature of some returns.  
 
Such a large-scale displacement within Iraq has led to pressing humanitarian 
needs that systematically fail to be publicly acknowledged by the Iraqi 
government and the international community, let alone met with an adequate 
response. After 2012 and before the publicly acknowledged, violent rise of IS, 
the civil war in Syria forced millions of people to seek shelter in Iraq, 
including Iraqi refugees who were fleeing back across the border, along with 
millions of newly displaced Syrians. That is, with no end in sight to Syria’s 
civil war, the direction of forced migration was reversed for many Iraqi 
refugees who had hitherto sought asylum in Syria. Hundreds of thousands of 
Iraqis who sought refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 continued to return 
home, which brought the number of Iraqi IDPs to roughly 2.8 million in 2013 
(Refugees International, 2013). Returning ‘home’ in this case simply meant 
returning to Iraq. Given the major social upheavals and physical destruction of 
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infrastructure that the country has witnessed since 2003, seldom can these 
Iraqi exiles return to a recognizable neighborhood of their childhood or 
previous life, if they are able to physically access it at all (Izady 2009).  
 
Since 2013, IS has violently captured and now control territory populated by 
some ten million people across large swathes of central and northern Iraq and 
into Syria (Nebehay, 2015). As a result, a new wave of mass displacement has 
occurred. In 2014 alone, Iraq suffered the highest new internal displacement 
worldwide with at least 2.2 million displaced. Overall, there were an estimated 
three million IDPs displaced from January 2014 to May 2015 (IDMC 2015).  
 
Given the chaotic conditions in Iraq, various bodies monitoring displacement 
from Iraq, such as the IOM, UNHCR and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq 
(UAMI), have no access to displaced populations, such as people in IS-
controlled territories, and no longer differentiate between newly displaced and 
the protractedly displaced. As such, internally displaced Iraqis are difficult to 
account for, and are extremely vulnerable given their limited access to shelter, 
food, and basic services. Iraq’s internally displaced live in makeshift 
arrangements under conditions of perpetual insecurity, continuing civil 
conflict, and economic uncertainty (Chatty 2012; IDMC 2015).  
 
Iraqi Exiles in the Region 
 
Of the estimated two million displaced Iraqis who were beyond the Iraq 
borders in 2012-13, the vast majority was living in regional asylum states, or 
first countries of asylum. Syria was the main host country for Iraqi refugees 
between 2003-2013, with an estimated one and a half million Iraqis residing 
there prior to the unrest in Syria that began in 2011 and significantly escalated 
in 2013. At 2015, the situation of those who were in Syria is largely 
unconfirmed, as violence persists and humanitarian agencies, such as the Red 
Crescent, have extremely limited or no access to these populations. It is 
presumed that most have fled back to Iraq and now live there as IDPs.  
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Jordan hosts the second largest number of Iraqi exiles, with an estimated 
population of more than half a million, of whom only 30,000 were registered 
with the UNHCR in 2014. Jordan is also host to Syrian and Palestinian refugee 
populations of even greater magnitude (UNHCR 2015). In relative, per capita 
terms, the size of the Iraqi refugee influx into this small Hashemite Kingdom 
since 2003 is equivalent to an influx of 1.9 million refugees into Australia. 
There are also significant populations of Iraqis in Turkey, Iran, Egypt, 
Lebanon and other countries of the region. 
 
The capacity of Iraq’s neighboring Arab countries to host and absorb the 
displaced was overwhelmed in the decade after 2003. After an initial open 
border policy for Iraqis, Jordan began to restrict their entry in November 2006, 
while Syria also came to tighten border controls after 2007. None of these 
states are signatories to the UN Convention or Protocol, and accepted Iraqis 
into their territories in the spirit of Arab brotherhood, affording them only 
temporary protection as “guests”. These countries have shown hospitality in 
hosting such large populations of displaced, yet fervently draw the line on the 
issue of integration of Iraq’s exiles into their societies (Chatty & Mansour, 
2010).  
 
Research has shown that Iraqis living in Syria (formerly), Jordan and Lebanon 
suffer from economic and social marginalization, and are plagued by 
continuing uncertainty as a result of their precarious legal status in these states 
(Amnesty International, 2008). The informal status of Iraqis in these countries 
prohibits them from attaining official, gainful employment, pushing many into 
exploitative informal sectors and/or religious groups/militias, leading to a 
perceptible spike in prostitution and child labour (Sassoon 2010). Such social 
arrangements also contributed to the rising influence of extremist and radical 
ideology over the increasingly alienated, impoverished and relatively young 
demographic of displaced Iraqis who are trying to make sense of their 
unsettled social reality. Under such conditions, many Iraqis pursue other 
coping strategies, too, tapping into transnational migratory networks, to move 
on to third countries via irregular pathways (Dorai 2011), or undertaking 
circular migration back into Iraq for “specific reasons such as to check on their 
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relatives, sell their assets, collect their pensions, and assess the security 
situation, first-hand” (Chatty & Mansour 2010, 102). The constant threat of 
deportation amplifies the uncertain and stressful environment in which many 
individuals and families attempt to orchestrate their lives, forcing many to 
maintain a deliberately hidden and marginalized existence (Ellis 2009). The 
individual and collective wellbeing of many Iraqi exiles remain very much in 
limbo in countries of first asylum. 
 
Iraqi Exiles and the International Community 
 
States of the global north that are signatory to the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol contribute to Iraqi displacement through the formal system of 
international refugee protection. The mechanisms of protection available 
through this bureaucratic system were outlined above. The first element, 
‘Preventative Measures,’ is redundant in the Iraqi context of mass, protracted 
displacement. The second element is ‘temporary protection in a country of first 
asylum.’ The provision of assistance and protection for Iraqis living in limbo 
and uncertainty in neighboring countries such as Syria and Jordan is hugely 
challenging and growing more untenable over time. The UNHCR, funded by 
international donors, operates in these countries of first asylum through 
agreements or memorandums of understanding with Arab host governments, 
whereby responsibilities for refugee assistance and protection are, in principle, 
shared. In effect, there is a de facto transfer of refugee policy management to 
the UNHCR which acts as a “surrogate state” in the Middle East, yet lacks the 
“capacity to fully substitute for a host government” (Kagan, 2011, p. 1; Crisp 
& Slaughter, 2008).  
 
High donor interest from countries such as the US and Australia in the years 
after 2007 has given the UNHCR considerable resources to mobilize for 
refugee service provision through this imperfect institutional arrangement. It 
has also allowed donors from the global north to symbolically shoulder their 
share of the “burden” as per global refugee policy. Despite this, the situation 
remains ad hoc and challenging due to a range of factors; the urban and 
“invisible” nature of Iraqi displacement, regional host states’ lack of domestic 
 46 
refugee law and opposition to local integration, and no clear, practical 
delineation of who is ultimately responsibility for protection failures (Kagan 
2011). Furthermore, since 2013 and in line with the territorial expansion of IS 
and related conflict, protection agencies have had severely limited access to 
displaced populations of concern (Nebehay 2015). 
 
The third element of international refugee protection is ‘durable solutions.’ As 
outlined above, the UNHCR framework offers three durable solutions. In light 
of the discussion above, the first solution, voluntary return is not feasible for 
displaced Iraqis at this point (AusAID, 2010; UNHCR, 2015). The 4 million 
IDPs currently resident in Iraq are testimony to the difficulty of repatriation. 
Furthermore, as Chaterland and Morris (2012, p. 8) note, the Iraqi parliament 
passed a resolution in June 2012 “banning the forced return of tens of 
thousands of failed asylum seekers.” The resolution threatened “to fine airlines 
that take part in deportation programs. There appears to be no precedent for 
the post-crisis legislature of a refugee-producing state to refuse to take back its 
own nationals” (Chaterland & Morris, 2012, p. 8). The second durable solution 
is “Local integration in the country of first asylum,” which has been touched 
on above and is ruled out by neighboring host states. The third durable 
solution is ‘resettlement in a third country.’ Indeed, this is the only durable 
solution being pursued for Iraqis. In 2010, Iraqis were the largest group of 
beneficiaries of UNHCR-facilitated third-country resettlement programs 
(26,700 people) and in 2011 they were the second largest group (20 000 
people) (UNHCR, 2012). By 2014, they were the fourth largest group (11, 
778) with other displacements emerging and taking priority – namely, refugees 
from Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Myanmar (UNHCR, 
2015).  
 
The US has accepted far more Iraqis than other resettlement countries, which 
include Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries, New Zealand and since 2013, 
Italy and South Korea. As of April 2013, 199,202 referrals to the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) had been approved and 84 902 
Iraqi refugees had actually arrived in the US (USCIS 2013). In Australia, from 
the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2013, the government granted offshore 
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visas to 15,881 Iraqis (Australia’s Iraqi refugee intake is discussed in detail in 
the next section). Although resettlement is projected as a humanitarian 
response, research shows that “it is in fact an intensely politicized process. 
Resettlement is a political tool used by states to meet political aims” (Long, 
2011, p. 18). Iraqi resettlement is particularly hampered by “structural 
inefficiencies in potential host states, by ‘security’ protocols that prolong and 
often terminate resettlement proceedings, and by a global trend in the de-
liberalization of refugee and asylum policies that intensified after 9/11” and 
was touched on above (Berman, 2010, p. 12). Furthermore, while resettlement 
programs represent a valuable and high profile demonstration of international 
burden sharing, the UNCHR successfully resettles less than ten percent of 
Iraqi applicants, who in turn represent the fraction of the refugee population 
registered with the organization. Current resettlement practices cannot hope to 
‘unlock’ the protracted displacement of Iraqis.  
 
The final element of the international protection system is asylum. Many Iraqi 
exiles, the majority of whom are protractedly displaced with little hope for a 
resolution of their situation, choose to undertake irregular migration and claim 
asylum in signatory countries upon arrival. While the US has been the main 
resettlement country since 2003, Western European states have received the 
largest number of in-country asylum applications from Iraqis, with Sweden 
topping the list. In 2007 the “number of Iraqi applicants for asylum in the 
industrialised countries was significantly more than from any other state, and 
more than the total of applications from both the second- and third-largest 
states of origin (China and Russian Federation) combined” (UNHCR 2008, 14; 
Cited in Chatty and Marfleet 2009, p. 4). In 2008 Iraqis remained the largest 
group of asylum seekers worldwide. They were the third largest by 2010-2011 
and in 2011-2012 Iraqis were the seventh largest group of asylum seekers 
globally (UNHCR 2013). In 2012-13 Iraqis were the fourth largest group of 
asylum seekers (59,181 Iraqi asylum seekers), and the second largest group in 
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2013-14, with 106,040 Iraqis making asylum claims, predominantly to 
European countries.5  
 
To recap, there are an estimated 4.1 million Iraqis displaced inside Iraq and 
beyond the country’s borders, most commonly in Jordan, Iran and Turkey. 
Their displacement is protracted and complex, marred by ongoing insecurity 
and violence in Iraq and its immediate region. A small minority of Iraqis have 
managed to secure durable solutions to their displacement under the 
International refugee protection regime, but the vast majority remain uprooted 
and living in unsafe, ad hoc conditions. Furthermore, humanitarian agencies 
have little to no access to the majority of the displaced in Iraq and their basic 
sanitation, nutrition and other needs systematically fail to be met. 
 
 
2.6 Australia’s approach to forced migration 
 
 
This section looks at the history of policies, laws and rhetoric designed to 
address the issue of forced migration to Australia. It reviews the contemporary 
political discourse and the state’s attendant institutional arrangements to deal 
with forced migrant arrivals. This provides background for the following section, 
which discusses the impact that the politics of forced migration has on refugees 
living in the Australian community.  
 
Australia has a paradoxical history of immigration. The popular slogan used by 
Labor Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell (1945-49) ‘Populate or Perish’, 
juxtaposed onto the ‘White Australia Policy’ (WAP) and its discursive 
bedfellow, the ‘Yellow Peril’, is a telling example of the contradictory politics of 
belonging that is built into public discourse on immigration. In a parliamentary 
debate in November 1946, Calwell argued of the economic and defence need for 
                                                
5 It is worth noting that in 2012-2013 alone there was a 32 per cent rise in annual asylum 
levels to Europe, from 368,400 to 484,600 claims. This increased to 712,300 claims to 
European countries in 2013-14, a rise of 47 per cent from the previous year. Conversely, the 
reported number of new asylum-seekers in Australia dropped by 24 per cent during 2014 
(9,000 claims) compared to the previous year (11,700). Australia receives far fewer asylum 
seeker arrivals than most other countries of the global north (Iraqi asylum seekers arrivals to 
Australia after 2003 are discussed at greater length in the next section). 
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more immigration to the country. He went on to assure the polity, which was 
anxious about the racial makeup and “character” of potential arrivals, that that 
for every “foreign” migrant there would be ten from the United Kingdom. 
Around this time, too, Calwell became infamous for his statement, “two wongs 
don’t make a white,” a racist sentiment strongly backed by the Australian public 
and considered an apt approach to planning the country’s immigration 
program (Warhaft, 2004, p. 244). Once arrived, he further assured the electorate, 
all “foreign” migrants (such as Italians, Jews, and “Negroes”) would have to 
“assimilate” - discard their origin culture and language, and adopt the attitudes 
and behaviours commensurate with “Australian nationality” (Vrachnas, Bagaric, 
Dimopoulos, & Pathinayake, 2011). Assimilation policies were in place well 
before Calwell’s time, and affected not just foreign arrivals, but also deeply 
affected Australia’s aboriginal communities (Buti, 2003).  
 
Immigration laws and policies, social attitudes and public policies have changed 
remarkably since the 1940s and 1950s. In saying that, contemporary 
governments champion the contributions that migrants and forced migrants have 
made to the country. Australia’s multicultural policies and its welfare-based 
refugee settlement programs, executed through Human Settlement Services 
(HSS), are relatively progressive and effective models by global standards for 
the political management of cultural diversity and are regularly touted by 
politicians (Bowen 2011). In addition to official multicultural policy, there exists 
an industrious civil society, with activist movements and civic organisations 
oriented towards notions of human rights and anti-racism, the respect and 
celebration of cultural and religious diversity, and inclusive refugee resettlement 
in the country. These include various migrant resource centres, advocacy 
movements and other non-governmental organisations working with migrant 
communities. Further to this, Australia consistently ranks among the world’s top 
three resettlement countries in the world (UNHCR, 2015).  
 
At the same time, however, the rubric of white Australia persists. Most 
obviously in the prerogative of the state to deem who is and is not a desirable 
migrant, particularly in relation to humanitarian arrivals. In line with this, 
barriers to entry for forced migrants are becoming ever more restrictive, or in the 
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case asylum seekers arriving by boat since August 2012, proscriptive. Rhetoric 
and policy towards asylum seekers, which tends to dominate the entire forced 
migration debate, is increasingly militarised, opaque and punitive. Indeed, 
Australia’s asylum policies over the past two decades have been formulated on 
the back of contentious political claims and populist discourse, which tends to 
frame debate about forced migration around notions of national security threat 
and other domestic concerns, cultural, religious and economic.  
 
Australia was a founding signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, of which Article 14 states, ‘Everyone has the right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ (United Nations, 1948). 
On January 22, 1954 the Liberal Menzies government voluntarily ratified the 
United Nations’ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. As the sixth 
country to ratify the agreement, Australia’s signature rendered the Refugee 
Convention a binding international treaty, though there was little public 
knowledge of the move (Manne, 2013). In 1959, at the opening of World 
Refugee Year in Australia, Prime Minister Menzies declared,  
“It is a good thing that Australia should have earned a 
reputation for a sensitive understanding of the problems of 
people in other lands; that we should not come to be regarded 
as people who are detached from the miseries of the world” 
(Menzies, 1959).  
It is with such nationally framed generosity of spirit that political leaders in 
Australia first approached the issue of forced migration.  
  
 It was after the fall of the South Vietnamese Government in April 1975, 
which sparked the mass flight of Vietnamese refugees into nearby countries, 
and prompted an international response, that Australia pledged support and 
developed a coordinated response to resettling refugees. Over the next two 
decades Australia resettled more than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees, more than 
2000 of them arriving in 55 boats over six years (1975-1981) to seek asylum 
(Phillips & Spinks, 2012). The seed of this refugee processing and settlement 
system remains in place until this day, though the nature of the program has 
changed over the past decades in terms of service provision, regional 
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composition and the numbers accepted. In terms of overall migration to 
Australia, the humanitarian program represented upwards of 10 per cent at the 
turn of the century, dropping to around 7-10 per cent after 2006  (See Table 2. 
1). 
 
YEAR MIGRATION 
PROGRAM 
HUMANITARIAN 
STREAM 
% OF 
MIGRATION 
PROGRAM 
2001-02 93,080 12,303 13.2% 
2002-03 108,070 12,522 11.6% 
2003-04 114,360 13,698 12.0% 
2004-05 120,060 16,697 14.0% 
2005-06 142,930 18,073 12.6% 
2006-07 148,200 13,521 9.1% 
2007-08 158,630 13,464 8.5% 
2008-09 171,318 14,351 8.4% 
2009-10 168,623 13,944 8.3% 
2010-11 168,685 13,797 8.2% 
2011-12 184,998 13,756 7.4% 
2012-13 190,000 20,019 10.5% 
2013-14 190,000 13,791 7.3% 
2014-15 190,000 (planned) 13,750 (planned) 7.2% 
 
Table 2. 1 Australia’s humanitarian intake relative to its overall permanent 
migration program, 2000-2015 (Source: Karlsen, 2015) 
 
There are two pathways currently available under Australia’s humanitarian 
migration program: onshore protection and offshore resettlement. The onshore 
component aims to provide options for people who wish to apply for 
protection or asylum after arrival in Australia. The offshore resettlement 
component, which generally represents the bulk of Australia’s annual intake, 
provides pathways for resettling refugees living outside of Australia. It 
comprises two categories of permanent visas: refugee visas and Special 
Humanitarian Program (SHP) visas. The majority of applicants who are 
considered under the refugee category are identified and referred by UNHCR 
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to Australia’s immigration department for resettlement. Applications for entry 
under the SHP require support by an Australian citizen, permanent resident or 
eligible New Zealand citizen, or an organization based in Australia. 
 
The Australian state sets an annual total intake for its entire humanitarian 
program. Given the unplanned nature of onshore asylum seeking, the number 
of refugees resettled via the offshore pathway reflects the number of visas 
available after the number of onshore visas granted in a particular year is 
deducted from the total intake. In 2012-13, the annual intake was increased 
from 13,750 to 20,000, in line with rising numbers of asylum seekers arriving 
to the country. However, since the state suspended processing applications for 
onshore “Irregular Maritime Arrivals” (IMA) in August 2012, the LNP 
government under Tony Abbott reduced the total intake back to 13,750 in 
2013-2014 (Karlsen, 2015). This is despite the ever-rising number of displaced 
persons globally. See table 2.2 for overall figures on visas granted under the 
two pathways of Australia’s Humanitarian migration program since 2001. 
 
YEAR OFFSHORE SHP 
VISA GRANTS 
OFFSHORE 
REFUGEE VISA 
GRANTS 
ONSHORE 
PROTECTION 
VISA GRANTS 
2001-02 4,258 4,160 3,885 
2002-03 7,280 4,376 866 
2003-04 7,668 4,134 1,896 
2004-05 6,585 5,511 4,601 
2005-06 6,836 6,022 5,215 
2006-07 5,275 6,003 2,243 
2007-08 5,026 6,004 2,434 
2008-09 4,586 6,499 3,266 
2009-10 3,244 6,003 4,697 
2010-11 2,981 5,998 4,818 
2011-12 714 6,004 7,038 
2012-13 503 12,012 7,504 
2013-14 4515 6501 2775 
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2014-15 5,000 (planned) 6,000 (planned) 2,750 (planned) 
 
Table 2.2 Number of Visas granted under Australia’s Humanitarian 
migration program, 2001-15 (Source: Karlsen, 2015)  
 
As stated above, Australia consistently ranks in the top three countries for 
refugee resettlement through the UNHCR system. Since 1975 it has accepted a 
total of 273,517 refugees for resettlement via the offshore pathway (Karlsen, 
2015), which represents approximately one per cent of Australia’s entire 
population of 23.13 million. The number taken in on an annual basis varies 
greatly, with the greatest amount being the Indochinese refugees resettled by 
the Fraser government in the early eighties. In 1980-81 Australia accepted 
20,795 and in 1981-82 accepted 20,195 refugees for resettlement. The lowest 
annual intake was under the Hawke government in 1989-90, when Australia 
received 1,238 refugees for resettlement (Karlsen 2015).  
 
In more recent years, Australia consistently ranks behind the US in terms of 
resettlement numbers. In 2012, for example, a total of 69,252 refugees were 
resettled in 44 countries. The US resettled 53,053 or 77 per cent of the total, 
while Australia resettled 5,079 or 7 per cent, and Canada resettled 4,755 
refugees (Karlsen 2015). It is worth noting that Australia, unlike most other 
countries in the world, is a geographically isolated island. This means that high 
resettlement numbers are the most practical measure the state can take in 
sharing the global burden of refugees. Its rank in the top three resettlement 
countries, then, taking into account that the number of asylum seekers arriving 
spontaneously at Australia’s borders is comparatively few, is reflective more 
of its geography than any particular state or public beneficence towards 
displaced persons.  
 
In terms of onshore arrivals, the numbers have varied over time, yet are 
consistently low compared to other countries of the Global North. In 2009, for 
example, 49,000 claims were made in the US, 42,000 in France and 33,300 in 
Canada. In comparison, Australia and New Zealand combined received 6,500 
claims (Karlsen, Philips, & Koleth, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, the vast majority 
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of asylum claims to the Australian state up until 2007 were from non-Irregular 
Maritime Arrivals (non-IMA) arrivals - people who arrived to the country by 
plane. Despite this, asylum seekers arriving by boat tend to be the central 
focus of debate about forced migration and the development of policy in the 
country.  
 
Since 1976 fewer than 50,000 asylum seekers have reached Australia on boats 
(Manne 2013), which represents 0.2 per cent of the total population. More than 
half of these arrived after the election of the Rudd Labor government in 2007 
(the particular dynamics that led to this are discussed below). After 2007, 
maritime arrivals increased significantly with 18,365 asylum seekers arriving 
by boat in 2012-13 alone - this is more than a third of Australia’s total asylum 
claims (see Table 2.3 for a breakdown of asylum claims to Australia according 
to IMA and non-IMA categories). Despite being high for Australia, this figure 
represents three per cent of the total number of asylum applications submitted 
around the world that year (UNHCR 2013). Overall, Australia’s contribution 
to the global refugee burden-sharing arrangements of the UNHCR is 
comparatively small. 
 
YEAR Non-IMA (plane) 
Protection visa 
applications 
lodged 
IMA (boat) 
refugee status 
determination 
requests received 
TOTAL 
 NO. % OF 
TOTAL 
 NO % OF 
TOTAL 
 
2001-02 7026 76.0 2222 24.0 9248 
2002-03 4959 98.8 60 1.2 5019 
2003-04 3485 97.6 87 2.4 3572 
2004-05 3062 95.4 146 4.6 3208 
2005-06 3191 96.9 101 3.1 3292 
2006-07 3723 99.4 23 0.6 3746 
2007-08 3987 99.5 21 0.5 4008 
2008-09 5072 88.0 678 12.0 5750 
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2009-10 5981 56.6 4597 43.4 10 578 
2010-11 6335 55.0 5166 45.0 11 501 
2011-12 7063 48.8 7373 51.2 14 436 
2012-13 8480 31.6 18 365 68.4 26 845 
            
Table 2.3 Onshore humanitarian applications by IMA/Non-IMA category, 
2001-14. (Source: Philips 2015)  
 
Beyond the raw numbers of humanitarian arrivals to Australia, it is important 
to look at the history of politics, and the development of policies and 
legislation that have been designed over the years to address the phenomenon 
of forced migration. Despite Australian support for the UN Refugee 
Convention more than half a century ago, there are a number of contemporary 
blemishes on the Australian state’s commitment to human rights, particularly 
to the claims of individuals seeking asylum in the country. Such 
misdemeanours include the state’s punitive mandatory detention scheme 
(HREOC 2011; UN 2013), including the incarceration of children (AHRC, 
2014), sexual and violent abuses against people in detention centres and 
officially under Australian state care (AHRC, 2014), a temporary protection 
regime which leaves the displaced in a protracted state of limbo (Leach & 
Mansouri, 2004), and various manoeuvres associated with offshore detention 
and processing, including contravention of the non-refoulement principle by 
implementing naval interdiction and return policies (Mountz & Hyndman, 
2008; Crock, 2003) and more. Such ongoing misdemeanours are best 
understood by looking at the socio-political context in which they developed. 
 
Robert Manne (2013) points to four key moments in the evolution of 
Australian forced migration policy, after its official establishment in 1975. His 
four-point thesis is a useful way of synthesising an otherwise convoluted 
social, political and legal story, without overlooking the key aspects. Such a 
historical lens problematizes simplistic explanations of Australia’s approach to 
forced migration as being an ongoing effect of Australia’s racist past, or 
placing blame for the current state of affairs on one or other political party or 
leader, though their actions indelibly contribute to the situation. It also helps to 
understand how asylum seekers arriving by boat have come to represent the 
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lynchpin issue in any discussion about forced migration in Australia. As such, 
Manne’s four-point history is used as a loose guide for the following 
discussion, and is supplemented with an analysis of public policies and 
rhetoric relating to the settlement of new migrants in the country. 
 
As touched on above, the Liberal Menzies government ratified the UN 
Refugee Convention in 1954. The decision came at a time when social 
attitudes towards racism were beginning to slowly change, and the work of 
dismantling the White Australia Policy began. Instituted primarily through the 
immigration restriction act, the White Australia Policy restricted ‘non-white’ 
immigration to Australia, and imposed a dictation test designed to exclude 
undesirable (non-European), illiterate migrants, as well as restricting the rights 
and freedoms of non-whites and indigenous populations living in the country. 
The immigration restriction act was one of the first acts of the newly formed 
Australian federal parliament in 1901 (Kendall, 2008), which highlights the 
fact that immigration, and control of immigration specifically, have long been 
a touchstone policy issue for consecutive Australian governments.  
 
In the decades after WWII, as stated above, a paradigm shift began to occur, as 
social attitudes came to regard racial discrimination as increasingly 
problematic. This shift occurred in light of the atrocities of the holocaust and 
later in relation to the brutal apartheid policies in South Africa. Political 
leaders in Australia understood that racial discrimination was starting to be 
considered incommensurate with the needs of a globalising world, which 
called for economic, trade and political cooperation across and between 
countries and cultural groups. By the early 1970s it had become untenable 
internationally and in Australia to keep explicit racial clauses in government 
policies. 
 
After Menzies’ Prime Ministership, consecutive governments remained 
committed to refugee protection and the liberalisation of immigration practices 
more broadly. The Whitlam government was particularly industrious, as it 
dismantled the final vestiges of WAP in 1973, introduced the Racial 
Discrimination Act (RDA) in 1975, and regularly championed a multicultural 
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philosophy. Indeed, it was as early as 1967 that post-war immigrants in 
Australia began lobbying the government for their cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic rights to be supported by funding for service provision. Social, 
political and legal changes were in train, and in 1978, under the Liberal 
government of Malcolm Fraser, the state implemented its first Multicultural 
policy. 
 
In this period, multicultural policy was premised on a broader social justice 
agenda designed to address the social and economic disadvantages 
experienced by recently arrived migrants.  Multicultural policy was applied as 
a means of addressing cultural diversity in Australia - “a set of practical 
policies aimed variously at improving the absorption of migrants and 
harmoniously integrating a culturally diverse society around liberal democratic 
values” (Brahm Levey, 2007, p. 1). Policy makers adopted an access and 
equity approach as expounded in the Galbally Report of 1978, which 
acknowledged the significant settlement needs of migrants and highlighted the 
need to foster multiculturalism through ethnic communities and all levels of 
government. It called for a focus on the recognition of heritage culture, equal 
opportunity and adequate services for migrants, a represented a marked 
rhetorical and policy shift away from the strict assimilationist policies of the 
old guard under the likes of Calwell (Galbally 1978).  
 
Support services for migrants were established, including language and social 
services, workplace and welfare assistance, and access to media in the first 
languages of migrants via the new Special Broadcasting Services (SBS). Many 
such services remain in place today. Along with these changes came 
superficial understandings of culture, which “led to celebrations of exotic food 
and folkloric traditions in schools, local government services, state-funded 
cultural production, and many other spheres” (Poynting and Mason, 2008, p. 
235). In this context, and in light of systemic, historically entrenched racist 
attitudes prevalent among the majority of the population, resentment began to 
grow among white Australians of British (or Western European) decent who 
became concerned with “cultural extinction” (Hage, 2003, p. 61) or “cultural 
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invisibility” (Hewitt, 2005, p. 126). A growing popular backlash against 
multiculturalism started to emerge throughout the mid to late 1980s.  
 
As stated above, the Fraser government was prompt in responding to the 
Indochinese refugee crisis in the late seventies and early 1980s and accepted 
Australia’s responsibility for refugees fleeing Vietnam, not least in relation to 
its combatant role in the Vietnamese war. Cabinet papers from the year 1979 
do reveal, however, that the arrival of Vietnamese asylum seekers by boat had 
been perceived as potentially problematic by the Fraser government. Indeed, it 
was during this time that terms such as “queue jumper” and “unauthorized 
arrivals” were first coined and used by members of the Cabinet and 
immigration department officials. These terms depicted forced migrants 
arriving by boat as opportunistic, using the “back door” not the “front,” and 
less deserving of protection, despite the Refugee Convention and Protocol 
suggesting otherwise (Smit, 2011). Those that facilitated the passage of 
Vietnamese asylum seekers, meantime, were quickly depicted as criminals 
deserving of punishment. The Immigration (Unauthorized Arrivals) Bill 1980, 
introduced under Fraser was the first piece of legislation intended to 
criminalize the “trafficker’s enterprise” (Smit, 2011, p. 78) and deter further 
boat arrivals. Despite popular understandings of this period of history as the 
“halcyon years” of Australia’s refugee policy (Manne 2010), thanks to 
generous intake numbers, it was under Fraser that Australia instituted its first 
suite of deterrence policies. This marks the loose beginning of perceiving 
asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat as a criminal issue.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the Hawke Labour government’s liberality toward 
asylum seekers was tested and found to be waning. With the arrival at the end 
of 1989 of a boatload of Indochinese asylum seekers, Hawke moved to enact 
the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989, which introduced changes to 
the system of processing boat arrivals and allowed officers to arrest and detain 
anyone suspected of being an ‘illegal entrant’. Although detention was still 
discretionary and not mandatory, the changes made in 1989 effectively 
introduced a policy of ‘administrative detention’ for all people entering 
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Australia without a valid visa, or any others present in the country unlawfully 
while their immigration status was resolved. 
 
According to Robert Manne, the first major change in the Australian state’s 
approach to forced migration came later in Hawke’s tenure and was carried on 
by the Keating government. It developed in response to the arrival of 735 
mostly Cambodian refugees who had continued to arrive to Australia’s north-
western shores after November, 1989, and up until January 1994. Much of the 
generous spirit shown to the Vietnamese “boat people” who had arrived prior 
to 1981 was gone, and the growing overlap between criminal justice and 
immigration policy, what some scholars have dubbed ‘crimmigration’ 
(Stumpf, 2007), became more pronounced. Instead of providing the onshore 
arrivals protection after a short stay in administrative detention, the state gave 
them prolonged detention (Manne 2013). Between November 1989 and 
January 1994, eighteen boats arrived carrying 735 people, one third remaining 
in detention until the end of this period (some of whom were in custody for 
over four years) (Phillips & Spinks, 2013). 
 
Manne argues that this period marked a significant shift in Australia’s 
treatment of asylum seekers. He contends, “The government publicly derided 
the Cambodians’ refugee claims. Prime Minister Hawke labelled them “queue 
jumpers”; a Keating government immigration minister “forum shoppers”” 
(Manne 2013). Furthermore, “throughout this period access to lawyers was 
deliberately made difficult. Decisions on their refugee claims were long 
delayed” (Manne, 2013). In 1992, a decision was made to turn down the 
Cambodians’ pleas for asylum, a decision to which the asylum seekers’ 
lawyers at once appealed to the Federal court. The legal upshot of subsequent 
exchanges between the executive arm and the judicial arm of the state was that 
“amendments to the Migration Act removed the 272-day limit [on mandatory 
detention] and narrowed the grounds for the courts’ involvement in asylum 
seeker cases” (Manne 2013). So marked the beginning of indefinite mandatory 
detention for asylum seekers arriving to Australia without visas, which 
enjoyed bipartisan political support. Parliamentary records reveal from this 
period reveal that long-term detention was deliberately implemented to deter 
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future boat arrivals (Manne 2013. Notably, the whole episode with the 
Cambodian boat arrivals largely escaped public attention and scrutiny. Manne 
argues that this signalled to the political class that they could deal with asylum 
seekers harshly and receive little to no public repudiation or concern.  
 
The next major shift in forced migration policy – at least, for onshore arrivals, 
which continued to dominate the state’s (if not the public’s) concern about the 
issue - came under the conservative Howard government in 2001. It is worth 
noting that it was under Howard’s leadership during the 1990s that a loss of 
explicit bipartisan support for multicultural policy occurred, and Australian 
public policy rhetoric began to shift. Political “retreat from multiculturalism” 
Joppke, 2004; Uberoi & Modood, 2013; Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) at this 
time was informed by distrust in aspects of multicultural policies by social 
critics and political analysts who argued that it is divisive (Brahm Levey, 
2008) and works against the harmonious integration of migrants (Modood, 
2007). Mansouri notes that the primary, popular critique leveled at 
multiculturalism at this time was “that migrants have been able to access the 
rights associated with Australian citizenship and more broadly the Australian 
way of life without having to assume the social and civic responsibilities 
necessary to a cohesive society” (Mansouri, 2013, p. 4).  
 
As the conservative Howard government came to abandon its rhetorical use of 
“multiculturalism” in the late 1990s, civic integrationist notions such as 
citizenship, social cohesion and integration were touted as viable alternatives 
for government focus. This manifested as the “New Integrationism” (Poynting 
& Mason, 2008) under Howard, which focussed on “an assumed core culture 
that saw it as binding the nation together – western civilization, English 
language and Anglo-Saxon cultural roots” (Schech & Rainbird, 2013; Tate 
2009). Poynting and Mason argue that there was a “shift from multiculturalism 
as a state assisted and demanded by immigrant communities to ‘new 
integrationism’ as a state imposed and demanded of immigrant communities” 
(Poynting & Mason, 2008, p. 232). In this spirit, a socially conservative civic 
integrationist agenda was pursued. This culminated years later in 2006 with 
the introduction of a citizenship test - an internet-based multiple-choice quiz of 
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thirty questions testing migrants’ knowledge of Australian history, culture, 
values and government in order to obtain citizenship. For a number of 
commentators, this was a throwback to the dictation tests of the WAP, 
representing what some describe as an attempt to tie a national character to the 
prerogatives of government and “dictate the cultural choices of Australians in 
civil society in the name of ‘our values’” (Brahm Levey, 2007, 10).  It was 
becoming more clear throughout the late nineties and early 2000s in Australia 
that despite previous political leadership and policy developments, race and 
racism, or at the least a certain nationalistic, culturally-defined parochialism 
did not cease to exist on a prescriptive level in all of Australia’s policies and 
social institutions, nor at the normative level of the national ethos (Pardy & 
Lee, 2011, p. 298).    
 
It was during Howard’s tenure, too, that the issue of forced migration became 
more than just a “sleeper issue” in the Australian public sphere, but arose to 
take centre stage. This situation crystallised from late 1999 onwards, as a 
number of boats began to arrive carrying mostly Iraqi, Afghani and Iranian 
asylum seekers. Between 1999 and August 2001 more than 12,000 asylum 
seekers arrived to Australian waters, either to Christmas Island or Ashmore 
reef, by way of a newly established smuggling route from Iran to Indonesia by 
way of Malaysia. Howard was faced with a challenge. While the indefinite 
mandatory detention of the 700 odd Cambodians by the state was cruel, the 
detention of 12,000 Iraqis, Afghanis, Iranians and also many stateless 
Palestinians represented a new set of contingencies. Indeed, this state of affairs 
renewed tensions between the civic and legal guardians of human rights 
principles, which called for full respect of refugee law and the immediate 
processing of the arrivals’ asylum claims, and a conservative executive 
adamant to defend the sovereign state prerogative to “decide who comes to 
this country and the circumstances under which they come” (Howard 2001).  
 
Howard chose to detain the arrivals in various detention centres across 
Australia - Villawood, Maribyrnong, Port Hedland, Curtin, Woomera, Baxter. 
The centres filled quickly and were soon overcrowded. The detainees were 
treated punitively – despite the ostensible “administrative” purposes of 
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mandatory immigration detention (Nethery 2011) – and desperation and 
depression began to bubble over. Manne (2013) notes, 
“[detention centres] became the sites of riots and break-outs, of occasional 
suicide attempts and hunger strikes, and of almost routine instances of severe 
depression or self-harm.” In the fashion of the Hawke and Keating 
governments, Howard’s immigration minister, Philip Ruddock, deftly 
characterised the detainees as “not merely queue jumpers seeking hotel-style 
treatment” but as “cunning manipulators of people’s natural sympathy, seeking 
to morally blackmail their way out of detention” (Manne 2013). As the 
detained asylum seekers became more restive and desperate in their protests 
during 2000-2001, “the less sympathetic public opinion appeared to become” 
(Manne, 2013). Indeed, there was popular consensus that such unrest was case 
in point for the incompatibility of these new arrivals with an “Australian way 
of life” and respect for the rule of law. This is despite the existence of 
significant mental health issues and legitimate legal grievances among the 
detainees, and the fact that well over 90 per cent of these new arrivals were 
found to be UN Convention refugees (Betts, 2009).  
 
It was not until August of 2001, however, when the Tampa incident occurred, 
that the Australian public became far more engaged with the issue of forced 
migration policy, and asylum policy in particular. Howard’s refusal to allow 
the Tampa, a Norwegian fishing vessel carrying 438 Afghani asylum seekers, 
to enter Australian waters was met with polarised responses, the majority of 
which backed Howard’s nationalistic stance. Fatefully, just three weeks after 
the Tampa incident, the September 11 attacks on the US occurred, which set 
Western nations such as Australia on a course of securitisation, militarisation 
and heightened nationalistic and racialized rhetoric around the issue of 
immigration more broadly (Gauthier et al 2011). This chain of events 
solidified Howard’s resolve, as well as populist support for his stance on 
forced migration.  
 
In this post-September 11 atmosphere, national security, border protection and 
the ‘war on terror’ were linked and touted as urgent national priorities, integral 
to any effort to assuage the Islamic terrorist threat that had proven it could 
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strike at the heart of America, the bastion of western civilization and liberal 
democracy. The asylum seekers that had been picked up by the Tampa were 
taken to a makeshift detention centre on the small, impoverished Pacific island 
state of Nauru. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was “mobilised for a quasi-
military operation to prevent any further boats of asylum seekers reaching 
Australian territory” (Manne 2013). For good measure, Christmas Island and 
Ashmore Reef were “excised” from Australia’s migration zone, and thereby 
excluded form the country’s Migration Act. After the Tampa incident, 13 
boats left Indonesia for Australia: one (SIEVX) sank, drowning 353 people 
(146 of whom were children); four were pushed back to Indonesia by RAN; 
the rest were intercepted, and the asylum seekers on board were sent to 
detention on Nauru or a new detention centre on Manus Island, Papua New 
Guinea. Howard’s new policy suite was called the Pacific Solution, and it 
enjoyed bipartisan political support and the majority support of the Australian 
public. 
 
The Pacific Solution stuck, despite inviting condemnation from the UN, 
causing chagrin among human rights defenders in Australia, particularly 
organisations working in refugee settlement, and being duly tested in the 
Australian courts. Illustrative of this is the High Court’s 4:3 Al-Kateb decision 
in 2004, which confirmed the executive’s prerogative to indefinitely detain 
onshore maritime arrivals. The Al-Kateb decision came to the disappointment 
of human rights activists, while several legal experts, including the three 
dissenting judges, critiqued the legality of the policy and prompted calls for a 
bill or rights in Australia (Prince, 2004).  
 
Since this time, too, the bipartisanship that had characterised forced migration 
and asylum seeker politics since the arrival of the Vietnamese in 1976 began 
to slowly erode. Labour’s gumption to do what it takes to defend Australia’s 
sovereignty was regularly called into question by the incumbent Liberal 
government. Manne (2013) argues, “For the Coalition, the plight of asylum 
seekers came to represent not so much a tragedy or even a problem as a 
wonderful vote-garnering opportunity.” Labour tended to argue that Howard 
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was opportunistic and tapping into the latent xenophobia in the Australian 
populace (Crabb, 2012). The issue became politicised. 
 
The establishment of extraterritorial immigration detention facilities on Nauru 
and Manus Island entrenched the shift “from legal frameworks of protection to 
more politicized and securitized practices of exclusion… (Using) geography to 
suspend access to asylum” (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008, p. 269). The 
deployment of such an innovative technology of governance, the 
‘externalisation of asylum’ (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008), was in line with 
(though not identical to) actions taken by the US at Guantanamo Bay a decade 
earlier (Dastyari & Effeney, 2013). After the Pacific Solution was in place, 
almost no asylum seekers arrived to Australian shores by boat. Manne argues, 
“Simple common sense suggested that the government’s post-Tampa asylum 
seeker policies… ‘worked’ as a deterrent” (Manne 2013). This policy 
remained in place until 2008, when the newly elected Labor PM, Kevin Rudd, 
dismantled it to a significant extent, signalling a complete loss of 
bipartisanship on the issue. Rudd not only dismantled the Pacific Solution but 
also attempted to humanise forced migration rhetoric and asylum seeker policy 
in the country. He reaffirmed the federal government’s commitment to 
multiculturalism, and appeased refugee and human rights advocates. 
 
In terms of its asylum policy, the Rudd government disbanded many of 
Howard’s apparently effective deterrence measures – not least the threat of 
naval interception and offshore processing on Nauru. By the beginning of 
2008 Nauru was empty. The first boat of the new wave of asylum seekers 
arrived on 29 September 2008. By the end of 2009, some 678 boat arrivals 
applied for asylum. According to parliamentary library figures, this rose to 
4597 in 2009-10, then to 5166 in 2010-11, up to 7373 in 2011-12 and reached 
a peak of 18 365 in 2012-13 (Philips, 2015). Along the way, many were dying. 
Between 2000-2007, under John Howard, some 363 asylum seekers died en 
route to Australia, while 350 went missing at sea and their status is unknown, 
though they are presumed dead. The death toll of asylum seekers at sea 
between 2008 and 2013 was 877, though a figure of more than 1000 dead 
stuck in the public mind. Tellingly, “no official records are kept by any 
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government agency as to how many people trying to reach our shores to seek 
asylum are dying en route” (Davies & Reily, 2013), and both sides of party 
politics, and their attendant media mouthpieces, tended to beef up the number 
of deaths witnessed under the opposition’s lead. Either way, the Australian 
public was outraged at the images of people drowning off Christmas Island, 
yet paralysed. Many lamented the dismantling of the Pacific Solution, which 
they perceived as having opened the proverbial floodgates to people smugglers 
peddling “human misery” and causing the deaths at sea. Still others lamented 
the harsh and the dehumanising rhetoric about asylum seeker arrivals and 
warned that extraterritorial detention was not a viable and humane solution. 
 
By 2009, the issue of asylum seekers had again become the central political 
issue in Australia, exhibiting a propensity for partisanship and politicking. As 
a WikiLeaks State Department cable revealed, in November 2009 a key 
Liberal Party strategist told the American ambassador that the more boats 
arrived, the happier his party would be (Manne 2013). Shortly afterwards, 
Tony Abbott, a staunchly conservative politician with an unabashedly 
combative style, won the leadership of the Liberal Party. He immediately 
made it clear that at the next election he would promise to “stop the boats” by 
reinstating all the Howard government’s asylum seeker policies, including 
temporary protection visas, naval escort of boats back to Indonesia and the re-
opening of Nauru. Rudd’s perceived inability to protect Australia’s borders, 
prevent death at sea, as well as a range of internal issues in the Labour party, 
contributed to his final demise; he was removed from the party leadership in 
June, 2010. 
 
So entered a pragmatic political operator in Labor’s new leader, Julia Gillard. 
Pursuing a tweaked political logic for Labor – a tougher policy aimed at 
stopping the deaths at sea, and subverting the people smugglers’ business 
model – Gillard attempted a number of new manoeuvres, including the 
establishment of an offshore processing centre on East Timor, and once 
negotiations for that failed, a refugee swap with Malaysia. The “Malaysia 
Solution” was promptly thrown out by the high court (High Court of Australia, 
2011). Accepting defeat, and with ever more onshore maritime arrivals and 
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vocal political opposition from the LNP, which enjoyed majority public 
support at the time, Gillard succumbed to her most immediate domestic 
political considerations and in August 2012 moved to reinstate Howard’s 
Pacific Solution, reopening the offshore processing camps on Nauru and 
Manus Island.  
 
Forced migrants entering Australian territory by boat were now given “no 
advantage” in terms of processing. In fact, they were deliberately given the 
lowest priority, having their claims for asylum suspended, thereby sending a 
signal to people considering making the perilous journey that they would gain 
nothing from the risk. Despite this, and as may be expected under the 
circumstances, the new decision did not act as an effective deterrence 
mechanism straight away. Most likely because many thousands of protractedly 
displaced were stranded in Indonesia, and had committed to the asylum 
journey to Australia no matter the odds (Hoffman 2012). Among them were 
thousands of Iraqis and Afghanis who were stuck in Indonesia with little hope 
for resettlement - between 2001 and 2010, Australia accepted only 56 refugees 
from Indonesia per year.  
 
In the immediate wake of Gillard’s announcement, thousands more asylum 
seekers arrived to Australian waters. Of these, roughly one in 18 were sent to 
Nauru or Manus. Several hundred Sri Lankan asylum seekers were repatriated. 
“The remainder of these asylum seekers are either in detention centres on 
Christmas Island or the Australian mainland” (Manne, 2013) or due to 
overcrowding of detention centres were released into the community on 
bridging visas, with a diminutive government stipend and no study or work 
rights. Gillard announced that no IMAs who arrived after August 13, 2012, 
would have their asylum claims processed by Australia. They could either 
repatriate to their origin country, or wait in detention on Nauru or Manus, 
before being resettled in a third country. This is despite their apparently legal 
claims for asylum under international law.  
 
In September 2013, conservative LNP leader Tony Abbott came to power on 
the back of disarray in the Australian Labor Party (Rudd deposed Gillard from 
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the party leadership in a counter-coup in 2013), as well as his three word 
slogan; “stop the boats.” Within days of taking office, the Abbott government 
renamed the Department of Immigration and Citizenship the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection, suggesting a rhetorical shift back to the 
rubric of Howard’s Prime ministership; from viewing arrivals to Australia as 
potential citizens, to viewing arrivals as unwanted intruders that must be 
repelled at the border as a matter of national priority. Abbott and his 
immigration minister Scott Morrison immediately made key changes, which 
mirrored the urgent rhetoric and militaristic approach characteristic of the 
Howard years.  
 
Since 2013, Australia has deployed its navy to turn back boats with migrants, 
including asylum seekers, before they could get close to its shores.  This 
defence force operation is known as “Operation Sovereign Borders,” and its 
objectives are portrayed as dire issues of national security. As such, all 
“operational matters,” which include the arrival of unauthorized boats to 
Australia, are deliberately withheld from the public, leaving Australian 
citizens unaware of actions being taken in their name. This is a significant 
deliberalization and securitization effort. Furthermore, Abbott has remained 
unaffected by calls, particularly from the Australian Human Rights 
Commission (AHRC) to address the issue of indefinite detention and the 
incarceration of children. The government labelled an AHRC national inquiry 
into children in immigration detention, and its subsequent “Forgotten 
Children” report, as a partisan political effort to undermine the Liberal 
Government. This is despite the report highlighting major human rights abuses 
against children under Australian state care, including incidences of assault 
and sexual assault under Labor’s watch, as well as having its findings 
corroborated in a report released in August 2015 by an Australian Senate 
committee (Commonwealth of Australia 2015).  
 
Another significant securitization and deliberalization measure that has been 
introduced under the Abbott LNP government is the Border Force Act, which 
took effect July 1, 2015 and makes it a crime punishable by a two-year prison 
sentence for employees at detention camps to publicly discuss the conditions 
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found there (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). More than 
40 detention centre staff, including medical personnel and social workers, 
wrote a public letter to senior government officials in July 2015 saying they 
would rather risk arrest than stay quiet. “If we witness child abuse in Australia 
we are legally obliged to report it to child protection authorities,” they wrote. 
“If we witness child abuse in detention centres, we can go to prison for 
attempting to advocate for them effectively” (Sanggaran et al, 2015). The 
tenor of legislation such as the Border Force Act suggests that Australia’s 
border protection policies resonate well within the borders, socially and 
politically, and may be seen to significantly curtail the rights not just of 
asylum seekers, but Australian citizens, too. The democratic legitimacy and 
legality of such a move is moot. 
 
It is something of a twist of fate that urgent foreign policy and security 
concerns emanating from the Middle East and intimately related to Islam – the 
jihadist group, IS - came to the fore of public attention at the same time Abbott 
became Prime Minister. Such a contingency is similar to September 11, which 
boosted John Howard’s political ratings amongst the electorate, as the polity 
became aroused and looked to their political representatives to stem the 
perceived rising tide of Islamist threat, as per the “war of terror” narrative. The 
rise of IS favoured Tony Abbott’s hard line, nationalistic ideological and 
policy approach, and sparked renewed national security fears and counter-
terrorist measures. Such a political atmosphere bodes well for the executive’s 
ability to institute restrictive immigration and other legal measures, as well as 
the public’s ability to palate such incursions upon not just human rights 
principles, but their personal rights and liberties as citizens.  
 
Although counter-terrorism and national security measures dominate current 
political discussion, as per the post-September 11 environment, there are a 
variety of distinctions. In the political mix this time, for example, is the issue 
of what was quickly dubbed “home-grown terrorism” – the radicalisation of a 
very small minority of Australian Muslims who were and are travelling 
overseas to join jihadi forces, or, worse, planning attacks on Australian soil. 
Rhetoric about urgent national security threats, terrorism and counter terrorism 
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were once again plausibly linked to issues of migration, Islam, Muslims, 
Muslim migrants and Muslim boat people in the public imagination. Indeed, 
such political issues have become the axiom upon which opaque policy was 
and continues to be developed largely behind closed doors.  
 
Interestingly, as Abbott moved to put in place counter-terrorist measures, 
including a number of legally questionable federal police operations against 
Australian Muslims suspected of terrorism or of having terrorist intentions, he 
simultaneously dropped his election promise to repeal section 18C of the racial 
discrimination act. Section 18C makes it unlawful “to offend, insult, humiliate 
or intimidate another person or a group of people” on the basis of “race, colour 
or national or ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the people 
in the group” (RDA, 1975). Abbott had previously, continuously argued that 
Section 18C was an attack on freedom of speech, which is a fundamental 
liberal freedom. This assertion and his decision to repeal Section 18C, 
however, was widely unpopular amongst the Australian public, particularly 
migrant communities. Shrewdly, Abbott found in the new context of insecurity 
and counter-terrorism measures, an opportunity for capitulation. He backed 
away from his election promise to repeal section 18C, framing the decision as 
a counter-terrorism strategy. As Waleed Aly noted at the time,  
“To draw a specific connection between 18C and counter-
terrorism requires a long bow. But the mere attempt to do so has 
intriguing philosophical consequences. By presenting divisive 
politics as a security concern, the government is implicitly 
accepting the social dimensions of terrorism. It suggests that 
terrorism gathers around feelings of alienation and social 
exclusion…This, as it happens, accords with the best research we 
have on the psychology of radicalisation and effective counter-
terrorism policing. It accords far less well, however, with the way 
that governments tend to talk about terrorism” (Aly 2014). 
 
With such an admission implicit in the move to keep Section 18C, Aly further 
questions Abbott’s previous decisions to abandon the state’s Countering 
Violent Extremism program in June 2014. In particular, its grants for 
 70 
community programs aimed at “Building Community Resilience.” The Liberal 
government has not reinstated any such measures. Rather, the counter-
terrorism strategy pays lip service to “engaging” the Muslim community, but 
expounds no substantive plan moving forward (CTS, 2015). Furthermore, new 
citizenship laws before parliament propose to strip dual nationals of their 
Australian citizenship, should the relevant minister, not the Australia courts, 
have due cause for concern over said individual. The bill is not yet passed and 
its draft form has been publicly condemned as unconstitutional and a path to 
law enforcement based in no small part on racial and religious profiling  
(Chalmers, 2015). Nonetheless, Abbot appears steadfast, and enjoys majority 
public support on the issue of forced migration, defence and foreign policy. 
 
To recap, Australia is at the vanguard of the trend in the global north, whereby 
wealthy states respond to the growing phenomenon of south to north migration 
with the “imposition of increasingly restrictive immigration laws and 
regulations… intensified border controls, carriers’ sanctions, deterrent policies 
and return migration policies” (de Haas 2007, 824). A loss of bipartisanship 
that occurred since 2001 is lamentable as the politics of forced migration in 
Australia displays a propensity for politicking, rather than genuine democratic 
and legal process and presentation and appreciation of facts, such as the 
driving factors of displacement and irregular migration (Dunn 2007; de Haas, 
2011). Since the Tampa incident, the question of asylum seekers arriving by 
boat, and Australia’s obligations to the global population of human displaced, 
including the country’s intake quotas, have been fiercely contested and 
politically explosive. Indeed, as Manne suggests, in 2001 the issue helped John 
Howard win an election. In 2010 it helped loosen Kevin Rudd’s grip on the 
Australian prime ministership. In 2013 Tony Abbott’s “Stop the boats” policy 
proposals contributed to the defeat of the Gillard government. Border 
protection and sovereign prerogatives trump humanitarian refugee protection 
in the privileged Australian political context. 
 
 
2.7 Contentious Political Discourse - Socio-political 
Implications for Forced Migrants Settling in Australia 
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In recent years Australia has witnessed tightening immigration rules alongside 
a growing body of formal anti-discrimination legislation at both state and 
federal levels. Regulation of migration, and especially symbolic attempts to 
display control over forced migration, has grown up in dialogue with a 
discourse of securitization and deliberalization. Such a discourse has tended to 
posit and naturalise ideas in the political realm that select people belong in 
Australia, a status of membership most commonly legitimised in terms of 
citizenship. The dialogical counter fact of this discourse is that select people 
do not belong. Indeed, Muslim immigrants to Australia, most particularly IMA 
arrivals, are increasingly constructed and perceived as “national outsiders” and 
“enemies to the nation” (Abu el-Haj, 2007, p. 30; Yuval-Davis et al., 2005). 
Since 2001, contentious debate about asylum seekers in Australia has 
“polarised large sections of the Australian community and paralysed 
politicians of most persuasions from engaging in a constructive policy 
dialogue” (Gauthier et al. 2011, 5). Furthermore, Australia’s actual intake of 
forced migrants, when viewed relative to the alarmist controversy surrounding 
the politics of forced migration, as well as considering the country’s global 
status as the vanguard of anomalous and expensive approaches to border 
restriction and detention may be seen as even more diminutive. This domestic 
situation in Australia highlights that attempts to create adequate global 
response mechanisms for forced migration tend to fall victim to the 
expediencies of national politics, which predominantly manifests in a rubric of 
“crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2007) and opaque national security policies. 
 
The populist discourse surrounding asylum seekers and refugees in 2015 
should be seen, to an extent, as an iteration of what Fear has dubbed “dog-
whistle politics” characteristic of the Howard era (Fear 2007).  As noted 
above, the Howard government came to frame the debate surrounding asylum 
seekers and refugees with stock phrases such as “We will decide who comes to 
this country and the circumstances under which they come” (Howard 2001). It 
is to be conceded, however, that the politics of belonging promulgated by 
Howard was less an innovation unique to his leadership, and more a 
conservative political effort to tap into a strain of identity politics and planned 
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immigration programs that characterized most of Australia’s history, and was 
exemplified by the WAP. Hage has dubbed this ongoing trend in the 
Australian psyche ‘paranoid nationalism’ (Hage, 2003). In pursuing such an 
approach, a culture of politics re-emerged in Australia that saw appeals to 
xenophobia and, in this historical moment, post-September eleven insecurity, 
sanctioned as legitimate grounds upon which immigration and a large part of 
Australia’s foreign policy – such as the war in Iraq - were contextualized and 
justified.  
 
Integral to the overall discussion of national cultural selectivity in the politics 
of responding to asylum seekers is empirically demonstrated undercurrents of 
xenophobia that prevail in the Australian community. Most pertinent to the last 
decade has been manifestations of “Islamaphobia” that have circulated 
throughout society. Indeed, the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bali bombings in 
2005 and now the violent and heavily publicised rise of IS in Iraq and Syria, 
are the latest in a string flashpoints that bring Muslims into the limelight of 
global geopolitics, and reify the position of Muslims as the other in relation to 
secular, Western liberal democracies (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman, 
2005; Dunn et al 2007).  
 
In tandem with increasing xenophobia across Australia (Scanlon Foundation 
2015), the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of strident, culturally 
framed nationalism within Australia. This nationalist sentiment has found its 
way into the popular lexicon with statements like “Fuck Off We’re Full”, 
“Speak English or Piss off!!!”, “We Grew Here You Flew Here,” “Australia: 
Love it or leave it”, ‘Ban the Burqa’ and “Stop Immigration”. More recently, it 
has culminated in public protests by a group called “Reclaim Australia,” a 
mostly Christian-based anti-immigration and anti-Islam group (Irfan, 2015), as 
well as “White Pride,” a neo-Nazi civic group. These groups have met their 
own resistance with anti-racism protests, “Islamaphobia Watch Australia,” and 
other public measures aimed at showing solidarity and support for Australia’s 
Muslim community in particular. 
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The extent of Islamaphobia, or anti-Muslim sentiment, has been well recorded 
in Australia (Dunn et al 2007; Akbarzadeh & Roose, 2011; Rane, Nathie, & 
Isakhan, 2011). This sentiment has been shown to be reproduced through a 
process of racialization that utilizes political tools such as stereotypes of Islam, 
perceptions of threat and inferiority, as well as fantasies that the other (in this 
case Muslims) do not belong or are absent” (Dunn et al, 2007, p. 564). Fekete 
and Sivanandan describe this ongoing phenomenon as “xeno-racism” (Fekete 
& Sivanandan, 2009, p. 19). This term describes a form of racism “toward 
otherness, toward the different outsider who is not seen to belong or could be a 
potential threat” (Dawes et al, 2010). Morphing from its conceptually 
exhausted antecedents, “old” or “colour-based racism”, xeno-racism in 
contemporary Australia may be seen as “a complex pattern of dislike based on 
a range of qualifications around difference” (Mansouri et al 2009, p. 12).  
 
Research into Islamaphobia tends to solidify the link between threat perception 
and constructions of otherness, and highlights a clear racialization process in 
relation to Muslims. Such research also tends to highlight that “negative media 
treatment is strongly linked to antipathic government dispositions” (Dunn et al 
2007). More specific to this study, is the finding that “Islamic asylum seekers 
have been constructed as less (than) human, incompatible and threatening, and 
considered deserving of inhumane treatment. Government and media 
discourses regarding asylum seekers have been a key means of racialization.” 
(Dunn et al, 2007, p. 582). Such negativity sponsors a more widespread 
Islamaphobia and (mis)informs xenophobic attitudes in the public domain and 
ever more restrictive asylum seeker policies. Ultimately, it has been shown 
that “the racialization of Islam corrupts belonging and citizenship for Muslims 
in Australia”, a purportedly tolerant and multicultural nation (Dunn et al 2007, 
p. 564).  
 
There has been a clear racialization of political discourse surrounding asylum 
seekers and refugees in Australia over the last decade – not necessarily on the 
basis of different racial or ethnic origins but on the basis of different culture, 
traditions and religion, as well as legal status. Like any form of racialization 
and “other’ boundary construction, this expresses a politics of belonging and 
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should be seen in the Australian case as a discourse of indigeneity (particularly 
ironic given the brutal history of colonization in Australia). It is used by 
purportedly democratic majorities to justify exclusionary measures to limit 
migration, prevent citizenship rights, call for repatriation and in the most 
extreme extrapolation of this logic, ethnic cleansing. Such a discourse 
formulates national political communities in their most racialized form and 
their least democratic form; it imagines the nation as ethnos, not demos. Such 
a politics does not reflect a realistic anxiety of a hegemonic ethnic majority, as 
Australia is not going to be swamped by immigrants and their cultures or 
religions (de Haas 2008). Furthermore, it imperils the potential for the liberal 
democratic political system to remain reflexive, and for the structures of state 
to reflect the needs of the society to which it is theoretically and legally 
supposed to be subject.  
 
Nationalistic sentiments are exacerbated further by the ongoing state of war 
and conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as media attention to the spread 
of images from IS, such as public beheadings. These images are readily 
available on the Internet and are morally repugnant to the vast majority of 
Australians, Christians and Muslims alike. Indeed, Muslim leaders in Australia 
publicly denounce IS and other extremist, jihadist movements. The Australian 
National Imams Council released a statement after Australian teenager 
Abdullah Elmir left Australia to join IS: “We condemn in the strongest 
possible terms any threat against Australians … It is utterly deplorable for 
violent extremists to use Islam as a cover for their crimes and atrocities” 
(AAP, 2014). At the same time, Muslim leaders in Australia point out the 
potential appeal of such extremist movements among alienated and disaffected 
Muslim youth particularly. Such arguments tend to be sociological, rather than 
made for political, systemic ends. They point out that debates playing out in 
the public sphere reflect and shape the relationships and tensions that exist in 
society at large. In this way, political rhetoric about transnational geo-politics, 
in concert with harsh asylum seeker policies, and new laws and policies that 
give state bodies unprecedented powers over citizens’ liberties and privacy in 
Australia, have coalesced to significantly contribute to a hostile political and 
social climate for Muslims in the country. This is particularly the case for 
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young Muslims who are trying to understand their place in a country to which 
they belong to officially, but in which they feel misrepresented, 
misunderstood, and from which they feel substantively and socio-
psychologically disconnected (Hassan, 2010).  
 
This point about alienation and social disconnection among Australian 
Muslims goes back to the point made by Waleed Aly about the psychology of 
radicalisation; “terrorism gathers around feelings of alienation and social 
exclusion; that [counter-terrorism] intelligence flows best from communities 
that feel valued and included rather than surveilled, suspected and 
interrogated” (Aly, 2015). Wilner and Dubuonoz corroborate this assertion, 
saying, “the most commonly cited precursor of radicalization and homegrown 
terrorism is the lack of socio-political integration particular Western Muslim 
communities have with their broader society, and, relatedly, their experiences 
of discrimination, victimization, and xenophobia” (Wilner & Dubuoloz, 2010, 
p. 38). As David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith suggest about the process of 
radicalization of alienated individuals who are recruited by extremist causes: 
“alienation is replaced by identification with the group, powerlessness is 
replaced by potency derived from being involved in group operations, while 
humiliation is mitigated by participation in actions” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 
2009, p. 95). Some scholars go further, contending the greatest threat to 
Western democracies is not terrorism from the outside, but the sustained 
marginalization of citizens and residents from within their political system 
(King & Taylor, 2011; Gest, 2010).  
 
The sociality of forced migrants, and particularly Muslim refugees and asylum 
seekers in societies like Australia is deeply affected by such normative and 
political discussions, in an instrumental and discursive sense. Within an often 
top-heavy, political melodrama the refugee is often represented as a 
dehumanised other; yet, sociological scholarship is premised on and repeatedly 
demonstrates refugees’ “capacity for agency at all odds” (Soguk 1999, p. 5, 
Cited in Turton 2003, p. 12). Refugees and asylum seekers exist as ordinary 
people, purposive actors whose very flight and arrival to Australia is 
representative of contextualised and active decision-making and behaviour. 
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Having arrived in Australia, refugees, as purposive actors, may not integrate 
without regard for the sociality of locals (Kateb, 2006). 
 
The key finding of a recent government commissioned report on the settlement 
outcomes of newly arrived refugees to Australia was that “government 
perspectives differ from Humanitarian entrants’ perspectives on settlement” 
(DIAC, 2011, p. 1). DIABP (previously DIAC), like other agencies, defines 
successful outcomes in terms of systemic outcomes - social participation, 
economic wellbeing, level of independence, and personal wellbeing. Contrary 
to this, newly arrived refugees define settlement in terms of life outcomes, 
such as personal happiness and community connectedness (DIAC, 2011). Four 
key items that were found to best predict the level of comfort felt by 
humanitarian entrants were: “How happy a person feels about him/herself; 
Confidence about making choices about living in Australia; Being treated well 
by the local community since coming to Australia; Ease of finding a place to 
live in Australia” (DIAC 2011, p. 1) The report also found that refugees are 
significantly less happy than family and skilled migrants to Australia, and less 
likely to report they felt they were treated well by their local community. The 
most common reasons cited by refugees for such unhappiness were: 
discriminatory statements or rude treatment; that they were not involved with 
the local community; or, the local community was not aware of them (DIAC, 
2011). 
 
Such empirical findings suggest that “positive refugee settlement” may only be 
understood and services developed in light of the qualitative experiences of 
refugees themselves. The key finding of DIAC’s report is representative of a 
gulf that has open up between the way the government in Australia 
conceptualizes not just the phenomenon of forced migration, but the settlement 
needs of forced migrants and the way forced migrants’ themselves 
conceptualize their situation. Indeed, every discourse requires a minimum 
level of internal coherence; “otherwise, it loses its ability to make the world 
meaningful and therefore knowable” (Turton, 2003). Refugee settlement may 
be seen as an area of socio-political life in which the potential for coherent 
dialogue between state and subject (structure and agent) is imperiled, and the 
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establishment of shared meanings is imperative if democratic ideals are to be 
upheld. 
 
Overall, it may be seen that under current political arrangements in Australia, 
the human rights of people are more often respected if these people have 
formal state citizenships. In light of the macrostructural and discursive 
changes associated with globalization, the articulation of a politics of 
belonging that has conventionally legitimated the institution of citizenship 
(nationalism) has grown more constrained in space and time by current 
cultural arrangements. That is, various political arrangements legitimated 
through constructions and discourses of belonging have been significantly 
affected by the rise of a global consciousness that has in turn acted to sensitize 
value conflicts. The perceptions and actions of forced migrants in particular 
socio-political locales, may be seen to embody the most important 
anthropocentric challenge to political systems in the contemporary age 
(especially those of the Global North who are the key stakeholders in a self-
legitimating global political order) to articulate ethical arrangements that seek 
to reconcile notions of value and human agency in a culturally plural world.  
 
 
 
2.9 Iraqi Refugees in Australia 
 
This section briefly outlines the key immigration patterns and demographic 
features of the Iraqi population in Australia. First it looks at the Iraqi 
population in general, before looking at the Iraqi refugee population more 
specifically. It is worth noting that this profile of the Iraq-born population was 
based upon statistics available in 2012-13, when the research instruments were 
being designed and the fieldwork was being conducted.  
 
The Iraq-born population in Australia includes Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, 
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, Turks, and Turkmens. Religions followed include 
Islam, Christianity – predominantly Chaldean and Assyrian – and Judaism 
amongst others. The Iraqi population in Australia has been rising at a steady 
rate since the Gulf War of 1991-2. At the time of the 1991 census there were 
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5,186 Iraq-born in Australia. By the 1996 census this population had risen to 
14,005. By the 2001 census, this population had again dramatically grown to 
24, 832, representing a 77.3% increase, a much higher growth rate than the 
Australian population as a whole (see Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 below). The 
2006 census recorded 32,520 Iraq-born people in Australia, which then 
increased by 48.1 per cent to 48,170 Iraq-born in 2011. That is, between 1991 
and 2001 the Iraq-born population increased almost five-fold, and between 
2001 and 2011, this population more than doubled. Among the total Iraq-born 
in Australia at the 2011 Census, 25.5 per cent arrived between 2001 and 2006 
and 26.9 per cent arrived between 2007 and 2011 (DIAC, 2013a).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Iraq-Born Population Growth in Australia, 1976-2011 (Source: 
ABS Census, 1976-2011)  
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Figure 2.2. Population Growth in Australia, 1976-2011 (Source: ABS 
Census, 1976-2011)  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Iraq-Born As a Percentage of Australian Population, 1976-2011 
(Source: ABS Census, 1976-2011)  
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global Iraqi refugee, asylum seeker and resettlement numbers, and Iraq-born 
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humanitarian arrivals continued to rise at a steady rate, and then gained 
slightly more momentum from 2006 onwards. Overall, a total of 18,066 Iraqi 
refugee visas were granted between 2006 and 2013 (see table 4.1 for a 
breakdown of Iraqi arrivals via the humanitarian pathway since 2006). That is, 
the vast majority of Iraqi arrivals to Australia were refugees; between 2006 
and 2011, 74 per cent of Iraqi arrivals came via the humanitarian pathway, and 
it may be assumed that a bulk of the remaining arrivals came via the family 
migration pathway as the result of applications made by Iraqi refugees already 
in the community as permanent residents or citizens.  
 
In terms of the breakdown within the humanitarian stream, significantly more 
offshore humanitarian visas than onshore humanitarian visas have been 
granted to Iraqis since 2003. From the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2013, 
DIABP granted offshore visas to 15,881 Iraqis. In that same period, 2,185 
onshore visas were granted - 1076 non-IMA onshore visas were granted, and 
1109 IMA visas were granted (it is to be noted that DIABP’s data for onshore 
arrivals and visas granted for the years 2006-08 are “incomplete”). That is, 
almost eight times more displaced Iraqis have arrived to Australia as refugees 
for resettlement, than those arriving by boat or plane to claim protection upon 
arrival. 
YEAR OFFSHOR
E VISA 
GRANTS 
ONSHOR
E VISA 
GRANTS 
TOTAL 
HUMANITARIA
N VISA GRANTS 
OFFSHOR
E AS % OF 
TOTAL 
ONSHOR
E AS % 
OF 
TOTAL 
2006-07 1443 154* 1597 90.36% 9.64% 
2007-08 2202 204* 2406 91.52% 8.48% 
2008-09 2866 172 3038 94.34% 5.66% 
2009-10 1683 323 2006 83.90% 16.10% 
2010-11 2147 368 2515 85.37% 14.63% 
2011-12 1476 493 1969 75.00% 25.00% 
2012-13 4064 471 4535 89.61% 10.39% 
TOTA
L 
15881 2185 18066 87.91% 12.09% 
* Statistics INCOMPLETE – no data available for IMA arrivals over these two years 
 
Table 4.1. Iraqi Humanitarian Arrivals to Australia 2006-13 
 
In terms of Australia’s contribution to Iraqi resettlement, it has given particular 
attention to the Iraqi crisis. Of people lodging offshore protection visa 
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applications for Australia, Iraqis have occupied one of the top two places by 
country of birth for the past five years.  In line with this, Iraqis have also 
remained in the top two countries of origin for people granted offshore 
protection visas in the five years between 2007-12 (DIAC, 2013).  In 2012, 22 
per cent of offshore visas were granted to Iraqis (See Table 2.x).  However, on 
average, 82 per cent of Iraqis’ applications were refused in the same period. In 
2007-2008, in the wake of the darkest and most violent period in Iraq’s 
modern history, a time when Australian troops were still engaged in the 
country, the grant rate was 10 per cent.  The Australian Government did make 
a concerted effort in 2008-2009, granting a one-off allocation of 500 refugee 
places for the Iraqis who worked as interpreters and translators for the 
Australian Defence Forces during their deployment in Iraq. These are positive 
contributions made by the government, yet hardly cause a ripple amongst the 
millions who are displaced. 
 
Year Number 
Offshore 
Visa 
Applications 
Lodged 
Percentage 
of Total 
Application
s Lodged 
Number 
Granted 
Grant Rate 
– Percentage 
of 
Applications 
Percentage 
of Total 
Visas 
Granted 
 
2007-2008 
 
21 698 
 
45.6 
 
2193 
 
10.1 
 
20.6 
 
2008-2009 
 
12 527 
 
17.6 
 
2866 
 
22.9 
 
26.4 
 
2009-2010 
 
7558 
 
16.0 
 
1685 
 
22.3 
 
18.3 
 
2010-2011 
 
8433 
 
15.5 
 
1443 
 
17.1 
 
24.0 
 
2011-2012 
 
7682 
 
17.9 
 
1472 
 
19.2 
 
21.9 
 
Table 2.4: Iraqi Offshore Visa Applications and Visas granted. 
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012). 
 
Iraqis have consistently been in the top five countries of origin for onshore 
entrants into Australia over the past five years, most arriving as Irregular 
Maritime Arrivals. However, the numbers are relatively small, with status 
determination commencing for 566 people in 2010-11 and 368 people in 2011-
12. The protection visa grant rate was 95 per cent in 2010-2011 and 96.1 per 
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cent in 2011-2012 (DIAC 2013).  Those Iraqis who arrived to Australia as 
Irregular Maritime Arrivals, have spent upwards of three months in mandatory 
detention, some remaining in detention indefinitely. Iraqis who were issued 
with temporary protection visas reported an ongoing protraction of their 
displacement (Leach and Mansouri 2004). Since August 2012 a cohort of more 
than one thousand Iraqis have been released into the community on bridging 
visas, given basic welfare provision, no working rights and no indication of 
when their applications will be processed. Many others are doubtless in 
detention on Nauru and Manus Island, but statistics about these populations 
are not available. 
 
As mentioned above, having arrived in Australia, Iraqis cannot integrate 
without regard for the sociality of locals (Kateb, 2006).  A 2011 DIAC report 
shows that newly arrived Iraqi refugees in Australia have relatively poor 
settlement outcomes compared to other humanitarian groups. Iraqi 
humanitarian entrants resident in Australia and on a path to citizenship were 
found to have the highest levels of unemployment and report feelings of social 
isolation and a loss of agency. Indeed, Iraqis, along with Iranians and Afghanis 
were found to have the poorest mental health. Iraqis were also reported as 
having the poorest physical health and were more likely to indicate that they 
are ‘not happy’. While humanitarian entrants from Iraq are more likely 
(compared with all other countries of birth) to have university qualifications 
before arriving in Australia, Iraqis are the least likely to be employed. They 
tend, instead, to be part of households that are most likely to receive 
Centrelink payments (DIAC 2011, p. 28). These findings are supported by 
other research into Iraqi refugees resident in Australia, which indicate adverse 
psychological well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression (Hoffman 
2012; Slewa-Younan et al, 2012).  
 
A report published by Wise and Ali (2008) from the Centre for Social 
Inclusion about grassroots strategies to improve relations between Muslim and 
non-Muslim Australians highlighted that issues existed particularly among 
people of Iraqi background that manifest in their lack of ‘integration’ with 
others people in Australia, especially people of Anglo-Celtic background.  
 83 
 
Such findings specific to Iraq-born individuals, combined with research into 
Islamaphobia and alienation in Australia, and the negative findings on the 
settlement outcomes for humanitarian entrants more broadly (DIAC, 2011) 
indicate the need for more research into newly arrived Iraqi refugees, who are 
on a path to Australian citizenship, to better understand their outlook on the 
experience of settlement in Australia. Such research may explore whether their 
socio-political attitudes and behaviors suggest that they are engaged with the 
socio-political, democratic community in Australia, or whether they are 
disaffected or alienated in their current context. In light of the more general 
findings of the settlement outcomes for refugees, it may be seen that research 
into this group must be qualitative in nature and afford individuals total 
agency, so as to elicit a meaningful understanding of their experiences and 
perceptions of the politico-social fabric in Australia, and their place within the 
national community. 
 
2.11 Conclusion and Research Questions 
 
The issue of forced migration is far from esoteric and theoretical, it has very 
real, grassroots causes and implications that are tightly woven into the 
increasingly hyper connected globe upon which humans must attempt to 
orchestrate their social lives. Issues that crop up in any attempt to manage 
forced migration tend to expose the ineffectiveness of current global 
institutional arrangements. This highlights the precariousness of social and 
political institutions in general, and a need for constant reformation. 
Reformation, in liberal democracies such as Australia, may only occur on the 
back of public debate and genuine attempts to engage with perspectives from 
across the political spectrum of democratic political community. 
 
Given the impasse that has been reached between party politics in Australia 
and the highest courts of the land on particular legal and ethical aspects of 
forced migration, it is clear that a shift in the choice/equity balance between 
citizens and forced migrants is essential for the future. None of the conditions 
known to play a role in the politicization of international migration - unequal 
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distribution of symbolic and material resources, market failures, labor market 
segmentation, and the expansion of social networks, global transportation and 
communication—is likely to end soon (de Haas, 2007). Nor is the concomitant 
racialization of forced migrants in nationally framed political discourse (Dunn 
et al 2007). Indeed, the asylum seeker as the ‘deviant other’ is well 
documented – Marfleet (2006) argues that the state needs to be called into 
account for responses to asylum and refugee issues.  
 
Some scholars argue that the greatest threat within Western democracies is not 
terrorism, as has been argued by nation states of the global north particularly 
after September 11 and the rise of IS and “homegrown terrorism”, but the 
sustained marginalization of citizens from their liberal democratic political 
system. In this way, violent extremism is understood as a manifestation of the 
same outlook that informs individuals who choose to withdraw from the public 
sphere, rather than attack it. In other words, both the alienated and the 
destructive defect from the political system and hinder its capacity to facilitate 
change. The former reacts by living outside of it, while the latter chooses to 
disrupt it. Neither of these political behaviors reproduces the democratic 
political system or contributes to the process of responsive claims making 
which is championed as the guiding principle and foundational strength of 
manifestations of Western political systems (Benhabib 2004).  
 
With this in mind, this research proposes to explore the tensions between the 
rights claims of asylum seekers and refugees and the prerogatives of national 
democratic political systems (and the communities they purport to represent) 
as they play out in the lives of Iraqi refugees settling into and navigating the 
socio-political system in Australia. It explores the extent to which newly 
arrived refugees are substantively included into the socio-political fabric in 
Australia during their first years of settlement, an important time in their 
acculturation and a critical, formative period as their understandings about 
their role within their new society, and their attendant socio-political behaviors 
and habits are beginning to take shape. 
 
 85 
There is little detailed qualitative research that has focuses specifically on the 
settlement experiences of humanitarian entrants from Iraq, despite their having 
displayed relatively poor “settlement outcomes” (DIAC, 2011). Furthermore, 
there is limited qualitative data regarding settlement processes and outcomes 
of Iraqi refugees who arrived since the Iraq War of 2003. The needs of a 
multicultural society such as Australia may only be gauged through inter-
subjective recognition, dialogue and understanding (Lobo et al 2011; Lobo and 
Mansouri 2011). More empirical research is required into refugees’ qualitative 
experience of socio-political membership in Australia. In so doing, their 
capacity to engage democratically, and participate in political, economic, 
social and cultural life in Australia; their ability to act substantively as 
members in their new democratic community such that their interests are 
represented, as per democratically grounded theories of cosmopolitanism. 
 
After completing a multi-disciplinary Literature Review covering both 
empirical and theoretical aspects of the research topic, the following research 
questions were proposed, and will be addressed throughout the remainder of 
this thesis: 
 
1. What are the socio-political behaviours and attitudes of individuals in this 
sample group of Iraqis refugees? 
 
2. Are individuals within the sample group of Iraqi refugees engaged with the 
socio-political system in Australia, or are they alienated from or disaffected by 
the very system that is meant to be their primary means of inclusion?  
 
3. In light of the results of the first two research questions, to what extent does 
the Australian political system, as perceived by the sample group, foster 
conditions that progress a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism? 
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Chapter Three 
 
Theoretical Approach 
 
This study seeks to elucidate data about the socio-political attitudes and 
behaviors of a sample group of Iraqi refugees who have been granted 
protection in Australia since the Iraq War began in 2003. The data is then 
analysed in order to explore whether one of the macro-level assumptions of 
democratically grounded cosmopolitan theory – that members of the demos 
are engaged with, and therefore potentially represented in democratic 
institutions and processes - are founded in their context. To do so, a critical 
theoretical approach is employed in order to bridge the normative issues raised 
by the study’s research questions and its empirical findings.  
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical approach that underpins this study. It 
begins with a brief explanation of the broad aims of critical theory as a mode 
of social scientific enquiry, particularly the work of Jürgen Habermas. It goes 
on to briefly review and then outline the theoretical approach taken to 
conceptualising central notions in the research questions, so that they may be 
operationalized in the research design and meaningfully reflected upon in the 
final discussion. Firstly, taking cues from Habermas’s theory of 
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communicative action, it outlines a broad theoretical understanding of the 
liberal democratic political system in Australia. Building upon this, it goes on 
to explain the particular understanding of democratically grounded 
cosmopolitanism - as theorised by scholars like Habermas and Seyla 
Benhabib, and much of which was touched on in the Literature Review 
chapter - which it seeks to explore. Finally, it outlines the approach taken to 
conceptualising humans’ socio-political attitudes and behaviours, drawing 
from the theories of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, whose 
works foreground the notion of individual agency in social scientific enquiry. 
It also draws upon the work of sociologists concerned with alienation in 
modern societies, and the work of political scientists such as Robert Putnam, 
who have formulated empirical measures for civic participation/non-
participation that are, to an extent, apposite to this study.  
 
 
3.1 Critical Theory 
 
Despite the value of macro-level theories developed by sociologists, political 
scientists and philosophers, their abstract nature tends to preclude or obscure a 
behavioral link to the micro level. That is, they do not make explicit the 
behavioral assumptions underpinning the macro-level correlations they assume 
or describe, and therefore lack explanatory and critical power (de Haas, 2011). 
Cosmopolitanism is a case in point for this critique, often called out for being 
too abstract and out of touch with, or having only anecdotal grounding in 
empirical studies and therefore lacking any practical aspect. This study seeks 
to bridge this gap between the normative and empirical by employing a critical 
theoretical approach, which generally attempts to fulfil two requirements: “to 
maintain the normativity of philosophical conceptions”, and at the same time 
“examine the contexts in which they have developed and may best be 
promoted practically” (Bohman, 2005). That is, a critical theoretical approach 
is employed in this study in order to use the project’s empirical findings - data 
about the socio-political attitudes and behaviours of Iraqi refugees settling in 
Australia – to explore the normative issues raised by the research questions – 
whether the theorised mechanisms of democratically-grounded 
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cosmopolitanism, which presume engagement with democratic processes and 
discourse, are founded for this sample group.  
 
Specifically, this study takes a cue from the work of Jürgen Habermas, a 
second-generation scholar of the Frankfurt School (the home of critical 
theory). Habermas is concerned with facilitating cooperation between 
philosophy and the social sciences through the rational reconstruction of 
practical knowledge, which is to inform a normative conception of “real 
democracy” (Habermas 1985, 1987; Bohman 2005). In other words, to 
develop an empirically informed conception of democracy that may be 
harnessed as an alternative to political practices that engender anti-democratic 
trends.6  
 
Such an approach is primarily concerned with democratic processes and 
institutions - the sum of civic and political processes, bodies and forums for 
dialogue and discourse in which members of the demos can represent their 
interests and cooperate with one another - as the locus where ideals of freedom 
and equality are to be realised. For Habermas, democratic mechanisms are 
ideally to operate inclusively and exhibit deliberative capacity. Failure to 
facilitate such inclusive deliberation, according to Habermas, potentially gives 
rise to anti-democratic trends, in which the interests of all those affected by 
law and policy are not taken into account. Rather, policy and law are 
formulated in a more top-down process, according to the rationale of political 
elites and power holders. As such, for Habermas, the way in which members 
of the demos relate to and reason with one another in democratic forums – 
which may be seen as the micro-level, empirical aspect of normative 
democracy - is particularly relevant for study and critique in socio-political 
                                                
6 Indeed, much of the first-generation Frankfurt School/critical theoretical research was borne 
of concern with antidemocratic trends, including increasingly tighter connections between 
states and the market in advanced capitalist societies, the emergence of the fascist state and the 
authoritarian personality. The sociologist and philosopher Max Horkheimer, for example, 
came to view antidemocratic trends as gradually undermining the realization of an expressive 
whole, with the consequence that the autonomous liberal individual is a “hopeless fiction,” 
(Horkheimer ,1982, p. 211) that the subjective conditions for exercising freedom and 
achieving solidarity were being eroded by an increasingly totalizing social reification 
(Bohman, 2015).  

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contexts that exhibit anti-democratic tendencies. Such an approach may be 
harnessed as a means of exploring the limits of democracy as a sustainable 
system of political governance.  
 
Indeed, Habermas's basic philosophical endeavour from his work, Knowledge 
and Human Interests (1972) to The Theory of Communicative Action (1985), 
to Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (1996) and beyond, has been to develop a more unassuming, 
empirical account of philosophical claims to universality and rationality (and 
universal rationality). These notions are central to his understanding of 
democratic political systems, yet are often criticised as sociologically 
uninformed or overly simplistic (Bourdieu, 1992; Popeau, 2001). As such, 
Habermas’s theoretical approach (or philosophical endeavour) is apposite to 
this research, which seeks to elucidate an empirical, first person account of the 
social and political lives of Iraqi refugees in Australia. It analyses these 
accounts in order to reflect upon whether the assumptions of democratically 
grounded cosmopolitanism– a political philosophy with universality at its core, 
yet is regularly criticized as ungrounded, privileging unfounded rationalism 
over substantive empiricism - are founded in their context.  
 
3.2 Discourse and the Liberal Democratic Political System in 
Australia 
  
In conceptualising the liberal democratic political system in contemporary 
Australia, this thesis follows Habermas in accepting that universal human 
rights and popular sovereignty are currently two indispensable foundations of 
the democratic constitutional state (Habermas 1998; Benhabib 2004). Such a 
starting point recognises that there is a “fatal tension” (Cole 2000, p. 2) 
inherent in Australia’s political system; tension between the expansive and 
inclusionary principles of moral and political universalism (as anchored in 
human rights principles) and the particularistic and exclusionary principles of 
popular sovereignty and democratic closure (as anchored in 
national/citizenship rights principles). For the case study at hand, and as was 
highlighted in the Literature Review, this tension is perhaps most clearly 
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manifest in the disjuncture between the successive findings of the judicial arm 
of the Australian state, which uphold the human rights claims of forced 
migrants, and the preferred nationalistic policies and politics of the executive 
arm, particularly regarding onshore arrivals, which tend to circumvent 
international legal obligations to subject, non-citizens seeking humanitarian 
protection.  
 
This research is based on the view that the manifestations and trajectories of 
this foundational “tension” – that is, whether the constitutional state is oriented 
more toward universal than particularistic approaches to policy and law, or 
vice versa, in various areas of governance – need not be understood as “fatal,” 
or destructive of one another. Instead, universal and particular approaches are 
to be understood in the contemporary moment as mutually constitutive, part 
and parcel of ever-present dialectic processes. Such dialectic processes are 
understood in terms of Habermasian discourse ethics, which situates the moral 
point of view within the communication framework of a community of selves 
and calls for individuals to participate in discourse where all are aware of 
others’ perspectives and interpretations (Habermas 1990).  
 
For Habermas, democracy is procedural and discursive, grounded in an inter-
subjective structure of communication that ideally is to exhibit reflective and 
reciprocal communication, or discourse, in which members of the public 
deliberate, test claims to validity and thereby facilitate practical cooperation 
with one another. Discourse emerges in contentious political situations in 
which new solutions must be sought in order to ensure and maintain social 
cooperation and ongoing democratic reproduction (Pensky, 2009). Such 
contentious situations are usually socio-political manifestations of anti-
democratic trends or emerging deficits in democratic legitimacy, where 
individuals or groups feel disenfranchised or unrepresented by the political 
system and decisions to which they are subject. In these problematic 
situations, democratic institutions are, ideally, to operate discursively, such 
that they have the proper reflexive structure and mechanisms to accommodate 
and represent a plurality of viewpoints. This political discourse and dialogue, 
then, can provide a consensual rationality that should inform and thereby 
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legitimise policy formulation and enforcement. That is, democratic institutions 
and processes are, theoretically, to provide a forum for citizens to deliberate as 
free and equal persons, for whom the legitimacy of the decision is related to 
the achievement of a “rational consensus.” A “consensus is rational to the 
extent that it is based on a norm that could under ideal conditions be justified 
to all those who are affected by a decision” (Bohman, 2005; Habermas, 1996; 
Gutman & Thompson, 2004). 
 
Habermas notes that this is a dynamic ideal, and that the realization of 
democratic norms must account for and be a function of ever-changing, varied 
social facts, including pluralism (Habermas, 1996, p. 474). Democratic 
discourses are to be recognised as mixed and complex, including various 
asymmetries of knowledge, information, interests and power (and their 
attendant socio-cultural stratifications - such as gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, sexuality and more). Democratic deliberation is thus not a special 
case of moral judgment with all of its idealizing assumptions and black and 
white logic – what Weber referred to as the struggle between “gods and 
demons” (Turner, 2002, p. 92) - but a complex discursive network with 
various viewpoints and modes of argumentation, bargaining, bartering and 
compromise (Habermas, 1996, p. 286). What regulates the use of varied 
viewpoints and communicative styles, argues Habermas, is the public use of 
practical reason, which is ideally to be “self-referential and recursive in 
examining the conditions of its own employment” (Bohman, 2005).  
 
Given the complex social circumstances of pluralistic modern societies such as 
Australia, democratic deliberation requires the “medium of law,” such that the 
results of deliberation are expressed through law (Shelly, 2007, p. 68). The 
more specific principle of democracy states “only those laws may claim 
legitimacy that can meet with the agreement of all citizens in a discursive 
lawmaking procedure that is itself legally constituted” (Habermas, 1996, p. 
110). This is, in effect, a reiteration of one of the founding principles of 
democracy, that all those who stand under the law also be its authors. Indeed, 
the word democracy comes from the ancient Greek meaning “rule by the 
people” - demos meaning “the people” and kratia meaning “power or rule.” 
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Habermas argues that such a principle aims primarily to “establish a discursive 
procedure of legitimate law making” (Bohman, 2005), and is a necessary 
standard of agreement for a democratic polity. He posits that democratic 
legitimacy is achieved in an uncorrupted public sphere, where active citizens 
of the demos participate in discourse, and cooperate with one another to 
influence political decisions and contribute to legitimate law making.  
 
This principle of democratic legitimacy is idealistic and demanding, in that it 
requires the agreement of all citizens. Habermas admits that in the case of 
cultural values, for example, we need not expect such agreement, and he 
introduces compromise as a possible discursive outcome of democratic 
procedures. That is, he warns that it would weaken the democratic principle if 
cooperation were to be substituted for consensus and the outcome of the 
procedure. Bohman notes, “a law then would be legitimate only if it could be 
agreed to in a fair and open deliberative process in which all citizens may 
freely continue to participate whatever the outcome” (Bohman, 1996, p. 89). 
In this way, what is crucial is not the agreement as such, but how citizens 
reason together within a common public sphere. The democratic principle in 
this form expresses an ideal of citizenship and highlights the importance of the 
qualitative experience of socio-political membership for individuals within a 
polity - rather than a standard of liberal legitimacy. In other words, such a 
democratic principle emphasizes the importance of the qualitative experience 
of citizenship, such that members of the national polity feel included and 
involved in public discourse and reasoning, and perceive themselves as 
capable and willing to cooperate with fellow members of the demos in an 
ongoing fashion. 
 
In Mubarak’s case, he talked about racism and Islamaphobic interactions 
encountered by his daughter at school, saying, ‘this thing, [Islamaphobia], I 
can feel it… I felt discrimination against Muslims. Now my younger daughter 
refuses to wear any hijab. She’s saying ‘the kids will hate me’… And I think a 
lot about that’ (Author interview with Mubarak). One racist encounter faced 
by his daughter at school imperilled the respondent’s perceived ability to 
remain true to his cultural and religious identity. Though resilient in the face of 
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what he interpreted as a clear case of anti-Muslim sentiment, and adapting his 
behaviours so as to protect his young daughter from an apparent social stigma, 
this incident caused him great stress and engendered resentment of the 
mainstream society, and ultimately a sense of alienation from it. 
 
In light of this inclusive and dynamic conception of liberal democratic 
political systems, which is contingent on the ideal, active and substantive role 
of members within such systems, it is worth noting here that this thesis rejects 
more populist, liberal egalitarian discourses of political systems. Such 
egalitarian discourses tend to render the social - the lives, rights, choices and 
interests of members of the demos - a passive recipient of political largesse 
qua ‘fairness,’ instead of the social having a life and potentiality of its own, as 
it has repeatedly been demonstrated to do in empirical, sociological studies 
(Robinson & Tormey, 2009).  Instead, it is premised on the logic that  
“Statist sanctions are the least accessible, the least ‘democratic’ so 
to speak, of all the forms of sanctioning activity. They create the 
possibility of arbitrary power, despotism and tyranny; the danger 
of so-called outlaw states is built into these kind of sanctions… 
Concentrated formal sanctions are clearly the least compatible 
with diversity, and the least likely to entail listening to others; 
their very concentration disempowers the other” (Robinson & 
Tormey 2009, p. 1401).  
That is, this study approaches legitimate democracy as a bottom-up political 
process in which active members of a demos are to cooperate with one another 
to represent their interests, not a top-down formulation of the “political class” 
that eschews and/or corrupts effective public deliberation and potentially gives 
rise to anti-democratic or authoritarian tendencies.   
 
In summary, this research employs a theoretical understanding of the liberal 
democratic political system in Australia in which the participation, cooperation 
and sanctioning activity of diverse socially situated agents, members of the 
demos, is a necessary element of any legitimate democratic process.  It 
advocates an assumption of diffuse sanctions in democratic systems, whereby 
an account from a range of social actors must be sought, especially in contexts 
 94 
of political contention or anti-democratic, non-transparent policy and law-
making, in order to both discuss and understand socio-political discontents. It 
contends that such discussion facilitates the potential for cooperation and the 
innovation of new political spaces and arrangements, and thereby allows 
democratic polities to remain apace with dynamic, diverse social facts and 
interests. Like Habermas, it contends that no normative conception of 
democracy or law can be developed independently of an adequate model of 
contemporary society. Without this empirical and descriptive component, 
democratic norms become merely empty ideals and not the reconstruction of 
the rationality inherent in actual attitudes and practices of members of the 
demos (Bohman, 2005).  
 
 
3.3 Democratically Grounded Cosmopolitanism  
 
This thesis is based on a conception of the liberal democratic political system 
that is contingent on the effective participation of political members. It argues 
that such a system offers potential for being both inclusive and expansive (or, 
conversely, in line with the foundational tension discussed above, potential to 
be exclusive and restrictive). Indeed, an extrapolation of its fundamental logic 
along an inclusive trajectory, into various fields of study, sees Habermas 
placed under the broad category of “cosmopolitan” thinkers. In particular, his 
work on democracy is drawn upon to develop theories of democratically 
grounded cosmopolitanism, which views the democratic nation state as 
something that can be harnessed in the process of “cosmopolitanisation” 
(Benhabib, 2004, 2007; Held, 1995). Although covered in the Literature 
Review, it is worth reiterating here that cosmopolitanism expresses the idea 
that all humans beings – regardless of national, religious, cultural, or political 
affiliation – should be seen as members of the same community, and that this 
community should be cultivated. In crude terms, human rights principles and 
their expression in international law and domestic legislatures are an 
institutional manifestation of cosmopolitan ideals.  
 
Scholars interested in cosmopolitan theories tend to take impetus from 
unprecedented empirical conditions surrounding contemporary states, 
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governments and national communities now forcibly enmeshed in 
international and regional networks. They recognize that individuals are no 
longer seen as simply citizens of their respective states but as persons, bearing 
universal human rights and enjoying multiple citizenships and having a sense 
of belonging to a multitude of communities (Benhabib, 2007; Held, 1995). 
Indeed, some scholars view cosmopolitanism as an empirical imperative; 
“with the globalization of national societies, cosmopolitanism has now become 
something of an urgent reality” (Arendt, 1968, p. 82) and “an actual social 
condition of many today” (Mazlish, 2005, p. 106; Cited in Ossewaarde 2007, 
p. 384). Whether it is imperative or not, in the face of such globalized 
conditions, the inclusive potential of normative, democratically grounded 
cosmopolitanism renders it a highly attractive notion for philosophers and 
scholars concerned with reconciling new socio-political phenomena and 
conditions with existing structures of governance and power.7  
 
While the empirical realities of international migration and human mobility, 
increasing socio-political diversity and the proliferation of mechanisms of 
global justice, such as the integration of human rights principles into domestic 
legislatures, mark a move along a cosmopolitan trajectory, it far from 
engenders a wholesale adoption of the normative principles of 
cosmopolitanism into the socio-political frameworks of nation states such as 
Australia. For, even as we see an ever more globally integrated economic 
system, issues of substantive social and political integration repeatedly tend to 
lag behind (Kendall et. al. 2009). In other words, there is an ongoing ‘lack of 
fit between the material interconnectedness brought about by global capitalism 
and the degree of formation of global solidarities’ (Cheah, 2006, p. 491). 
Indeed, cosmopolitanism is often criticized for its affinity with neo-liberal 
globalization, unchecked capitalism, elitism and its tendency for utopian 
                                                
7 There are a number of critiques of this claim for a cosmopolitan “imperative.” Such critiques 
tend to take a more realpolitik approach to global socio-political arrangements, rather than an 
ethical approach, and view current conditions as grounds for a retreating internationalism (and 
its counterpart, a resurging cultural nationalism), which may manifest in various ways such as 
the erection of tougher border protection mechanisms and an overall protectionist approach to 
the globalized social world and international political engagements. Notably, protectionist 
arguments tend to crop up more commonly around issues of immigration - that is they are 
critical of the movement of human beings across national borders - rather than the global flow 
of goods and capital or environmental deterioration. 
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abstraction that ignores anthropological and sociological literatures and in so 
doing whitewashes complexity, privilege and inequality. In light of this 
disjuncture, the connection between normative cosmopolitanism and its 
empirically demonstrable counterpart deserves exploration. 
 
From a sociological perspective, the macrostructural and discursive changes 
associated with globalization, such as the propagation of universal rights 
principles and governance mechanisms, and their attendant cultural plurality in 
countries like Australia, constrains and reconfigures the articulation of a 
politics of belonging that have conventionally legitimated the institution of 
citizenship (typified by nationalist discourse) (Yuval Davis, 2011a; 2011b). In 
the context of this study, international human rights (as has been noted, in 
crude terms, may be seen as a top-down manifestation of cosmopolitan ideals) 
are increasingly invoked in refugee and asylum debates and territorially 
delimited nations such as Australia are challenged not only in their claims to 
control their borders but also in their prerogative to define the boundaries of 
the national community. In other words, forced migrants seek certain 
entitlements based on international legal precepts that only national 
governments and their local partners are in a position to render. This leads to a 
situation that challenges and transforms entrenched political narratives of the 
nation state system, as members of the demos must deliberate and cooperate to 
define, exactly, who can and who cannot claim rights to the entitlements of 
membership within the liberal democratic political system.  
 
As was touched on in the Literature Review chapter, such changes are not only 
making the previous characterizations of national communities obsolete, but 
also provide a framework for rethinking the nation state, both in terms of its 
internal legitimacy (that is, the extent to which it represents its various citizens 
as bearers of civic or cultural/racial/religious attributes or interests) and its 
capacity to cosmopolitanize in the context of global affairs (the extent to 
which a national community opens its proverbial doors to individuals seeking 
protections under international legal precepts). By way of an example that is 
relevant to this study, the popular characterization of “White Australia” and its 
attendant suite of culturally and racially exclusive immigration policies that 
 97 
had prevailed since 1901, became obsolete in the context of labor shortages 
and the need for mass, non-European international migrations post-World War 
Two. It was further significantly constrained by the popular, counter-cultural, 
civil rights movements of the sixties and seventies. These economic and socio-
political circumstances eventually ushered in a new rhetoric of “multicultural 
Australia” in the early 1980s, which represents a significant reconfiguration of 
the articulation of a politics of belonging in the country and is testament to the 
potential dynamism of liberal democratic political systems. 
 
Critical thinkers, such as Habermas and others, articulate this phenomenon not 
as the “death” but the erosion of the nation state’s traditional prerogatives 
(Archibugi & Held, 1995; Castles, 2001, 2003; Held, 1995; Benhabib, 2004,  
2007). This may include phenomena such as lost autonomy in cases where the 
state can no longer effectively protect its citizens from processes beyond its 
borders, emerging deficits in democratic legitimation in cases where there is a 
clash between state policy and international agreements, and restrictions on the 
capacity for intervention in cases where the state cannot intervene in global 
markets (Bohman, 2015). Such conditions, which see the state not only 
integrated into, but also increasingly dependent on the external environment, 
in turn change the established institutional pathways of state-citizen 
relationships and the nature, not just of state sovereignty but of political 
membership, too. The previously strong and proscriptive relationships between 
citizens and the state, although still significant, are now increasingly impacted 
by regulatory mechanisms outside the aegis of the state.  
 
Research surrounding the concepts of cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1995; 
Archibugi & Held, 1995) and constitutional patriotism and the public sphere 
(Habermas, 2001; Calhoun, 2002), which may be seen as variations of 
democratically grounded theories of cosmopolitanism, can assist in navigating 
these new socio-political conditions and dilemmas, and contribute to the 
innovation of existing structural arrangements to meet unprecedented social 
needs. Such scholarship utilizes social scientific conceptions of democracy, 
the state, the public sphere, and law to ground cosmopolitan ideals within the 
context of existing social structures. Democratically grounded cosmopolitan 
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theories tend to be predicated neither on the relegation of the state to a 
secondary actor in societal affairs - the state remains the only widely accepted 
“coercive negotiator [that] presides over a community” (Brennan 2001, p. 82 
in Kendall et. al. 2009) - nor on the complete reinvention of democratic 
political processes and institutional frameworks. Such an approach is anti-
utopian and sociologically and politically realistic or, more accurately, 
empirically explorable, because it engages with key suppositions that are 
contingent to a sociologically grounded cosmopolitan project.  
 
Indeed, there is a range of democratic cosmopolitan thinkers, scholars who 
present relatively optimistic accounts of the role of the liberal democratic 
political system in the context of the cosmopolitan project (Benhabib 2007; 
Buzan and Held 1998; Archibugi & Held, 1995). Whether such scholars think 
of the nation state as something that needs to be developed and eventually 
superseded, or as something that provides direct grounding for cosmopolitan 
sentiments, sociologists tend to view it as enabling and constraining at the 
same time. That is not to depict the nation state as ‘good’ or ‘necessary.’ 
Instead, such an approach opts to account for the state given that it has been, 
and continues to be, the dominant institutional form and organizational 
principle of social and political life at least since the seventeenth century 
(Kendal et.al. 2009). Two democratic cosmopolitan theorists, Buzan and Held 
(1998, p. 394), contend that “...the contemporary world is one in which we 
need to re-invent the idea of democracy — not surrender it. The project of 
cosmopolitan democracy — involving the deepening of democracy within 
nation-states and extending it across political borders — is neither optimistic 
nor pessimistic with respect to these developments. It is a position of 
advocacy.” Seyla Benhabib, among others, engages with this democratically 
grounded perspective, which sees the democratic nation state as something 
that can be, as noted above, harnessed by active members of the polity in the 
process of cosmopolitanization (Benhabib 2007, 2007; Held 1995; Habermas 
2001b). 
 
Within this field of scholars, Habermas takes a somewhat measured view of 
the role of the modern democratic state under conditions of globalization, 
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emphasizing its capacity to create constitutionally binding communities 
(Habermas 2001). In line with his theory of communicative action, he argues 
that the nation state and democracy have a capacity to stabilize each other and 
have “jointly produced the striking innovation of a civic solidarity that 
provides the cement of national societies” (Habermas, 2001, p. 16). He credits 
the constitutional state with the legal capacity to tame “political power on the 
basis of the recognition of the sovereignty of the collective subjects of 
international law” (Habermas, 2006, p. 24). That is, Habermas’s model for a 
democratically grounded cosmopolitan trajectory relies on established 
mechanisms of interaction between the state and its citizenry and the ability of 
the state to promulgate a sense of participatory political culture, secured by 
laws and workable systems of representative democratic government (Kendal 
et. al 2009). This reliance on a legally framed capacity for deliberative politics 
and the assumption of the primacy of universally rational attitudes and actions 
of social actors makes Habermas one of the staunchest defenders of the 
centrality of rationalist discourse among contemporary social commentators 
(Bohman, 2015).  
 
A number of scholars critique Habermas’ reliance on rationalist discourse, 
which they say is a central yet abstracted assumption that downplays issues of 
cultural plurality and socially constructed power differentials. For scholars 
such as Calhoun and Fine, Habermas provides only a weak, sociologically 
unsubstantiated account of participation that ignores key issues such as 
belonging and solidarity (Calhoun, 2007; Fine, 2003). Habermas counter 
argues that a strong account of solidarity and belonging is unnecessary, and 
emphasises the role of citizenship (institutionalized, national political 
membership) as a fundamental legal document that is about solidarity and 
belonging, and therefore addresses the issue (Habermas, 2006, p. 100). 
Habermas’s vision is of a constitutionally bound citizenry: “the strength of the 
democratic constitutional state lies precisely in its ability to close the holes of 
social integration through the political participation of its citizens” (Habermas, 
2001, p. 76).  
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Craig Calhoun’s critique of Habermas’s approach goes to the heart of the 
latter’s emphasis on discursively legitimated constitutional arrangements and a 
resulting constitutional patriotism. In Calhoun’s view, Habermas relies too 
heavily on the assumption that the public’s sense of belonging and solidarity 
will result from the strength of an adherence to a legal framework. He argues 
that such a suggestion is insufficient because it places too much emphasis on a 
bare inclusion into the legal-political framework afforded by the constitution: 
“Citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not merely included by law” 
(Calhoun, 2002, p. 153). Basically, it is Calhoun’s charge that Habermas, and 
thinkers like him, such as Seyla Benhabib, display a lack of attention to the 
complexities of culture, such as entrenched socio-economic variance and 
power differentials across a range of popularised cultural, religious and class 
stratifications. Instead they tend to gloss over the pertinence of inter-group or 
inter-cultural distinctions, inequity and contestations and provide only a weak 
account of solidarity. Neither explores this issue of solidarity closely enough 
to satiate the culturally-oriented critics. Instead, thinkers like Habermas insist 
that it is the role of modern law, in concert with the availability of “actionable 
individual rights” (Flynn, 2003, p. 431) to ensure social integration in complex 
societies. And yet, sociological scholarship often runs counter to such 
assertions, and certainly the tenets of critical race theory are in large part 
antithetical to such claims. The need for a “thick” account of social solidarity 
is, according to Calhoun and others, especially relevant for a nation-state 
preoccupied with internal legitimacy crises rather than its place in a broader 
global community, desirous of maintaining outcome-oriented communicative 
processes (Kuraswa, 2004; 2009). The theme of solidarity and concern with 
the question of the strength of social ties have constantly entered and re-
entered social and political science vocabularies under different names, 
recently as social capital (Putnam 2000).  
 
To recap, the underlining ambition of Habermas’s project of “constitutional 
cosmopolitanism” is to harmonize cosmopolitan institutions while 
simultaneously re-affirming national identity (Fine 2003, p. 462; Calhoun 
2007; Kendall et al 2009). Political philosopher Seyla Benhabib furthers this 
theoretical approach, if in a slightly different way (Benhabib, 2004, 2007). 
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Indeed, Benhabib has gone further in extrapolating Habermas’s theoretical 
orientation (both scholars draw heavily upon the work of Immanuel Kant and 
notions of universal justice deriving from the categorical imperative) - refining 
the normative issues at play, responding to the “cultural critics” and even, in 
some cases, grounding her arguments in anecdotal case studies (Benhabib 
2007 and 2010)8. Her theorisation, which was touched on in the Literature 
Review and is outlined below, is logically sound at an abstract level, and her 
approach is particularly relevant to the study of forced migrants. Before 
discussing her precise approach, which this study seeks to explore, it is worth 
revisiting the issue of forced migration in the contemporary moment, 
especially as it is playing out in Australia. 
 
As was noted above, forced migrants seek certain entitlements based on 
international legal precepts that only national governments and their local 
partners are in a position to render. This leads to a situation that challenges and 
transforms entrenched political narratives of the nation state system. That is, 
contingent to the articulation of legitimate democratic closure – defining who 
is and who is not welcome in the national community - in the contemporary 
age, is the special claim that forced migrants make on citizens’  
“…Concern. They require us to consider issues of membership, 
citizenship and democratic liberalism. They require us to ask what 
our responsibilities are to the stranger in distress, the stranger 
amongst us, on our doorstep, who is seeking a better life for 
himself or herself and for his or her children, and the stranger 
halfway around the world who is brought into our homes by 
satellite TV channels. They require us, in other words, to consider 
who we are – what is or should be our moral community and, 
ultimately, what it means to be human ” (Turton 2003, p. 8).    
 
As such, the stateless and/or the asylum seeker or refugee may be seen as one 
of the most important anthropocentric challenges to the liberal democratic 
                                                
8 Benhabib has been industrious in responding to the weaknesses of the rationalist approach 
(maybe a footnote about her book with Kymlicka and Jeremy Walden) and progressing 
Habermas’ claims (if not purposefully) (which despite his ontological orientation, often lack 
an empirical element) 
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political system to articulate legitimate democratic closure in an era of 
increasingly popular and legislated human rights norms. For in a culturally 
diverse and technologically advanced society like Australia, people are less 
and less able to feign ignorance about what happens to strangers. As 
Ossewaarde (2007, p. 376) argues, “Ignorance no longer provides an alibi: to 
remain silent is to plead guilty.” He goes on, “cosmopolitanism proposes to 
cultivate the goodwill of locals or nationals to become engaged with strangers, 
to cultivate a sense of global responsibility for the fate of strangers in distress, 
regardless of their group identity or social distinctions” (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 
376).  
 
Further to this discussion, and as was touched on in the Literature Review, it is 
well-documented that particularistic approaches to the issue of forced 
migration (such as policies based on restrictionism, deterrence, security and 
detention) fail to recognize forced migration as a complex and historically 
entrenched social phenomenon (Crock & Ghezelbash, 2010; Hein de Haas, 
2011). Therefore, they tend to fail to approach and deal with the phenomenon 
as a whole and in a sustainable manner, in effect allowing it to become more 
intractable while, in some cases, violating the legitimate human rights claims 
of individual forced migrants. Testimony to this is the number of forced 
migrants globally, in particular from war-torn countries such as Iraq, which 
continue to increase each year, more and more living in unprecedented social 
conditions of protracted displacement, such as exhibited in the distinctly urban 
nature of the Iraqi displacement in the Middle East region. Such phenomena 
are occurring even as Australian and other “elected leaders and bureaucrats 
increasingly [turn] to symbolic policy instruments to create an appearance of 
control” over the phenomenon (Massey et al., 1998, p. 288). While perhaps 
politically expedient for the short term, Hein de Haas argues, “‘harsh political 
discourse on immigration which systematically obscures the real demand for 
migrant labor can be a catalyst for the very xenophobia and apocalyptic 
representations of a massive influx of migrants to which they claim to be a 
politico-electoral response” (de Haas 2007, p. 826). That is, harsh rhetoric 
from political elites in counties like Australia toward forced migrants should 
be seen as both a self-serving and self-perpetuating discourse. It is a rhetoric 
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that fails to appreciate the entrenched social process of migration, feigning its 
impermanence and thereby dehumanizing forced migrants themselves; a 
vicious cycle that stagnates legitimate democratic reproduction and denies 
political membership to many individuals legitimately seeking protection 
under international law. 
 
This thesis argues that the phenomenon of forced migrants seeking protection 
in Australia is one such context where the current political arrangements 
exhibit what Seyla Benhabib refers to as a “democratic dilemma”. That is a 
situation where those subject to the law are not represented in the democratic 
processes that constitute policy and law making (a manifestation of an anti-
democratic trend). The approach adopted in this thesis concurs with 
Benhabib’s argument that the underlying political issues in debates 
surrounding forced migration are concerned with defining the boundaries of 
belonging and determining the extent to which constructions of “us” and 
“them” continue to be naturalized. Benhabib views such controversies as 
reenacting in practice the theoretical “dilemma” of discursive scope: 
Universalist norms are mediated with the self-understanding of local 
communities. 
 
Benhabib takes this “democratic dilemma” up in her examination of the 
boundaries of political community in the contemporary age by focusing on 
political membership (Benhabib 2004). Benhabib defines political membership 
as “the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, 
immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers, into existing 
polities” (Benhabib 2004, p. 1). She argues that “we have entered an era when 
state sovereignty has been frayed and the institution of national citizenship has 
been disaggregated or unbundled into diverse elements. New modalities of 
membership have emerged, with the result of the political community, as 
defined by the nation-state system, are no longer adequate to regulate 
membership” (Benhabib 2004, p. 1). Concerned with the logic of democratic 
representation, rather than any social identity-based link between a 
government and its territory, Benhabib argues for a moral universalism and a 
cosmopolitan federalism. She has supplemented this call with the idea that, 
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“certainly, identification and solidarity are not unimportant, but they need to 
be leavened through democratic attachments and constitutional norms” 
(Benhabib 2004, p. 221). While this research does not extrapolate so far as to 
call for “cosmopolitan federalism”, it draws heavily upon Benhabib’s concern 
with various and emerging modalities of political membership, as it is 
concerned with reconciling the vision that stands behind human rights 
principles “with the institutional and normative necessities of democracy, as a 
form of government based upon public autonomy, namely that those subject to 
their laws also be their authors” (Benhabib 2004, p. 221).  
 
This research acknowledges that there has never been a perfect overlap 
between the circle of those who stand under the law’s authority and the full 
members of the demos, yet, as per Habermas, advocates an understanding of 
democratic political communities and socio-political agents as reflexive (this 
is outlined further in the next section). As such, this thesis is grounded in a 
theoretical approach to democratic political systems that conceptualizes the 
political community foremost as demos, not ethnos, wherein peoplehood is 
regarded as a dynamic and not a static reality. It engages with Benhabib’s 
argument that “demos can alter its own understanding of citizenship, which in 
turn will alter the ethnos, understood as a shared community of fate” 
(Benhabib 2007, p. 69) (bearing in mind that such a claim remains highly 
speculative). That is, qualitative understandings and experiences of political 
membership, such as citizenship, necessarily change over time and in line with 
the social realities and needs of the shared democratic community. For the end 
of the unitary model of citizenship does not mean that its hold on our political 
imagination or its normative force in guiding our institutions have grown 
obsolete. It does mean, however that we must be ready to imagine forms of 
political agency and subjectivity that anticipate new modalities of political 
membership. In the era of cosmopolitan norms (instituted as human rights), 
new forms of political agency have emerged that challenge the distinctions 
between citizens and long-term residents, insiders and outsiders (Benhabib 
2007), and the structural arrangements designed to govern these communities 
must too change if they are to maintain democratic legitimacy. 
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As stated above, this thesis contends that, broadly, the perceptions and actions 
of forced migrants in particular socio-political locales may be seen to embody 
one of the most important anthropocentric challenge to political systems in the 
contemporary age (especially those of the Global North, such as Australia, 
who are the key stakeholders in a self-legitimating global political order) to 
articulate ethical arrangements that seek to reconcile notions of value and 
human agency in a culturally plural world. The destiny of intensified global 
interconnectivity is far from manifest. The extension of political space and the 
redistribution of political power, seen through a lens of cosmopolitanism, are 
not only constraints “but also an open field of opportunities for innovative, 
distributive, and multi-perspectival forms of publicity and democracy” 
(Bohman in Turner et al, 2007, p. 732). Any attempt to realise a 
democratically grounded cosmopolitanism must consider social facts as 
problematic situations from the point of view of variously situated agents.  
 
This democratically grounded brand of cosmopolitanism argues for individual 
and collective activism, or at the least, for members of a polity to engage with 
discursive processes in order to facilitate democratic iterations that lead to 
learning, innovation and the juridification of the outcomes of such normative 
contestations. Rather than seeing the outcomes of political universalism as 
undermining democratic sovereignty, we can view it as promising new 
political configurations and new forms of agency, inspired by the 
interdependence – never frictionless but ever promising – of the local, the 
national and the global (Benhabib 2007, p. 74). If Benhabib’s theory that 
“identification and solidarity are… to be leavened through democratic 
attachments and constitutional norms” has any empirical bearing upon the case 
of forced migrants in Australia, then agents from throughout the political 
community, such as forced migrants themselves, must a priori be involved in 
democratic processes. That is, agents must identify with and be engaged with 
the democratic political system for this dialectic process to even exist. So, in 
order to empirically explore the extent to which Benhabib’s brand of 
democratically grounded cosmopolitanism is relevant to the politics of forced 
migration in Australia, it is necessary to ascertain the extent to which forced 
migrants, who have been shown to stand at the political margins in the 
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country, view themselves as entitled political members and are participating in 
the political system, and to account for their choices.   
 
 
3.4 Socio-Political Attitudes and Behaviours – Identification & 
Alienation, Engagement and Disengagement 
 
As has been noted, the macro-level discussions of political philosophers such 
as Habermas and Benhabib, have greater explanatory and critical power if they 
are grounded in empirical research. Following Habermas, this study is based 
on the idea that no normative conception of democracy or law can be 
developed independently of a descriptively adequate model of contemporary 
society. Without an empirical and descriptive component, democratic norms 
become empty ideals and not the reconstruction of the rationality inherent in 
actual attitudes and practices of members of the demos.  
 
This study, then, is an empirical exploration of the lives of Iraqi refugees who 
have been granted protection and some form of socio-political membership in 
Australia (if not immediately becoming citizens they do so eventually, as not 
only do the vast majority of humanitarian arrivals tend to become citizens, this 
category have the lowest rates of emigration from Australia of all migrant 
groups (Hugo 2011a)). The aim is to gauge whether they identify and engage 
with the democratic political system, no matter the content of their activism - 
that is, even if they are cynical of the democratic process and act to agitate the 
status quo within legal bounds – and thereby contribute to democratic 
reproduction. Alternatively, it looks at whether they do not identify with the 
democratic political system in Australia, but feel disaffected or alienated by 
the very system that is supposed to be their primary means of inclusion, and 
thereby remain passive, choose not to engage, or even defect from the system 
and act to disrupt it.  
 
To achieve its aim, the study seeks to elucidate first-hand accounts from Iraqi 
individuals who have been granted humanitarian protection in or after 2003 
and are residents in the Australian community. The accounts relate to their 
socio-political attitudes and practices, and as such will allow for an exploration 
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of the salient attitudes and experiences that inform their socio-political 
behavioural choices. In other words, the study seeks to gauge a qualitative 
understanding of the participants’ experiences of socio-political membership 
in the country, and gauge their subjective orientation to the socio-political 
system. Such an empirical focus leads to a nuanced picture of whether people 
in the sample, who are the subject of contentious discourse and vigorous 
debate and are subject to contentious policy and law, identify with and are 
engaged with the democratic political system in Australia, and therefore have 
“democratic attachments” which see them being involved in discursive, 
democratic processes. Alternatively, it looks at whether they do not identify 
with the polity in Australia but are instead alienated from or are disaffected by 
it, and are therefore not involved in democratic processes. In simplistic terms, 
their engagement with democratic processes lends credence to (not proof of) 
one of the key tenets of Benhabib’s cosmopolitan theory; that “identification 
and solidarity are… to be leavened through democratic attachments and 
constitutional norms.” While their alienation or disaffection from democratic 
forums and processes suggests that Benhabib’s assumption about identification 
and solidarity does not hold in their particular case (and, as a corollary, 
perhaps the logic of her claim should be reversed for this particular sample 
group).   
 
The task of conceptualising micro-level, individual socio-political attitudes 
and behaviours so as to draw inferences about identification and engagement 
or disaffection and apathy, alienation and disengagement (or the nuanced in-
betweens) and render their study meaningful is, in itself, complex. To do so, 
this section begins with a brief review of approaches formulated by political 
scientists, such as Robert Putnam, who tend to be concerned with civic 
participation. It goes on to review approaches formulated by sociologists 
concerned with alienation in modern, complex societies. It then moves on to 
argue that both these formulations in their current usage tend to be incomplete, 
and that merging these approaches may allow for a more substantive and 
nuanced understanding of individuals’ relationships with the socio-political 
system in Australia. To do this, it outlines an approach to conceptualising how 
individuals’ attitudes and behaviours are embedded within broader socio-
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political structures or frameworks. It highlights the importance of individual 
agency and an individual’s sense of self-identity relative to such structures as 
determining identification with and belonging to a socio-political system. It 
then outlines the study’s specific approach to identification/engagement, 
disaffection/apathy and alienation/disengagement, which are viewed as 
subjective orientations toward the socio-political system in Australia - 
orientations that are at once constructive of and contingent to the attitudinal 
and behavioural patterns present in the sample - such that they may be 
meaningfully reflected upon and linked back to the normative issues raised by 
the research question: to what extent does the Australian political system 
foster conditions that progress a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism for 
the sample group? 
 
Many considerations of political attitudes and behaviours9 by political 
scientists are primarily concerned with understanding and predicting 
individuals’ civic activity. In order to achieve such a feat, a range of 
scholarship has dichotomized behavioural outcome variation by utilising 
observational criteria for active participation and passive non-participation 
(Woshinsky, 2008; Gest, 2011). Other variants divide notions such as 
“empowered” (Robinson & Tormey, 2009), “mobilised” (Davies, 1970) or 
“engaged” (Dahlgren, 2009) individuals from “apathetic” (De Luca, 1995), 
“disillusioned” (MacCallum, 2010) or “disadvantaged” (Foster, 2007) 
counterparts. In such formulations of active participation and non-
participation, all forms of activity and passivity tend to be treated as 
homologous. Putnam’s study of associational membership, for example, 
considers the causes of specific activities that qualify as activism in the scope 
of democratic claims making (Putnam 1993). Such a formulation as Putnam’s, 
which has received and continues to receive much attention, may be seen as 
incomplete, insofar as it is more concerned with the quantitative degree rather 
than the qualitative nature of civic engagement or disengagement. In other 
                                                
9 It is worth noting that this research posits that socio-political behaviours tend to issue out of 
attitudes, but comprehensive discussion of this distinction is outside the scope of this study.  

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words, it largely ignores the qualitative nature of political membership as 
experienced and played out by agents themselves.  
 
Putnam’s major contribution from his study on why some people participate 
more than others in liberal democratic political systems has been the finding 
that resource possession is the most determinant variable affecting people’s 
behaviour. He buttresses this central determinant with sociologically informed, 
more qualitative determinants such as “trust”, “local connectedness” and 
“reciprocity” to formulate his notion of social capital. While a step in the right 
direction perhaps, this research posits that such a formulation is incomplete 
and presents only a mechanistic notion of individual agency, failing to account 
for subjective interpretations of sociality. Other scholarship conducted in much 
the same way to Putnam has explained political engagement or disengagement 
in a similar fashion, arguing that behaviours are determined by socio-
economic status, education, civic skills, social networks and access to 
communication technology, such as internet usage, among others (Woshinsky 
2008). While important, these factors are not wholly determining of an 
individual’s choice of socio-political activity. More subjective notions, such as 
perceptions of the polity, or expectations of social life, for example, are 
potentially more powerful informants of socio-political attitudes and 
behaviours than social background variables (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Appiah, 2005). 
 
If political scientific accounts of participation/non-participation are 
circumspect, sociological accounts of alienation (or related ideas of 
marginality and estrangement) have been hindered by an ambiguity that 
prohibits the concept’s application as a meaningful term of empirical reference 
(Dahms, 2011; Kalekin-Fisher & Langman, 2006; Israel, 1971; Pascoe, 1990). 
The concept’s use in the humanities and social science literature in recent 
history tends to be informed by Karl Marx’s historical materialist analysis of 
“social alienation”, a social phenomenon central to his critique of capitalism. 
Marx argued that “capitalism was not only exploitative when buying labor 
power and extracting ‘surplus value,’ but its very structure promoted 
alienation.” (Langman, 2006, p. 179).  Marx’s legacy informed the critical 
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theory of the Frankfurt school, which “reframed the understanding of 
alienation from the factory labour experienced by industrial workers to an 
inherent structural condition of bourgeois society” (Langman, 2006, p. 180). 
The work of critical theorists developed further the category of alienation as 
central to the modern condition – to illuminate precisely those contradictory 
and paradoxical features of culture, politics, and society which non-critical 
traditions implicitly presume (Dahms 2006, 2011). 
 
In the post-world war two years, there was a surge in interest around the 
concept of alienation. Scholars like Etzioni (1968) saw alienation as resulting 
from nonresponsive social systems that do not cater to basic human needs. 
Another crop of scholars tried to formulate empirical measures of alienation. 
The most notable among these attempts is the work of Melvin Seeman, who 
sought to shore up historical interest in alienation - his work is imbued with 
ideas of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim - with the “modern empirical effort” 
(Seeman, 1959, p. 783). His efforts then informed later attempts to clarify the 
concept and develop a theory of alienation, such as in the work of David 
Schwartz who tries to define the concept of political alienation (Schwarz, 
1973). Melvin Seeman’s “On the Meaning of Alienation,” though, has been 
generally accepted as the classic clarification of the concept. Seeman’s review 
of the literature revealed six analytically separable usages of the word: 
normlessness, meaninglessness, powerlessness, social isolation, cultural 
estrangement and self-estrangement.  Some writers have argued that alienation 
is an umbrella concept covering these six issues, which constitute a generally 
integrated network of negative attitudes toward society that tend to occur 
together (Geyer, 2011). 
 
Much about society and politics has changed since Seeman’s work was 
published - computerization, television, internet-based media and the network 
effect, and the domination of current forms of neoliberal globalization – and 
there now exist radically different forms of alienation, reaction and 
emancipation. In more recent decades it has been particularly the works of 
Felix Geyer, Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman that address the 
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issue of alienation in the contemporary western world. Geyer (2011, p. 389) 
notes,  
“In much of the Western world, the average person is 
increasingly confronted, on a daily basis, with an often 
bewildering and overly complex environment, which promotes 
attitudes of political apathy, often politically dangerous 
oversimplification of complex political issues, and equally 
dysfunctional withdrawal from wider social involvements.”  
It is in line with such observations that alienation has come to be used in 
empirical literature almost exclusively in a social-psychological sense, which 
views it as a subjective individual state or process; individuals, rather than 
societies (as per Marxian and earlier understandings) are now seen as 
alienated. Yet, the object from which the individual is alienated remains 
confused and so does the operational meaning of the term. That is, alienation, 
though still largely used as an umbrella concept, denotes a relationship 
between a subject and some – real or imaginary – aspect of his environment, 
such as different social structures, processes and institutions.   
 
Alienation, for the purposes of this study then may be seen as “an attitude of 
separation or estrangement between oneself and some salient aspect of the 
social environment” (Schwarz, p.7) and stands in contrast to an attitude of 
identification. This research follows the view of David Schwarz that alienated 
attitudes are “likely to be adopted when individuals perceive a fundamental 
conflict between their basic politicized values and those exhibited in the polity, 
under the conditions that they perceive both themselves and the political 
system to be inefficacious to reduce this conflict” (Schwarz, 1973, p. 14). For 
example, if the individual withdraws self-identification (and possible 
attention) from part of the polity and finds that this is successful in reducing 
such threat, he is likely to remain in that orientation – in this study, such a 
participatory choice may be viewed as informed by an attitude of disaffection 
or apathy. If, however, the threat continues, perhaps because his basic values 
are still not realised in the polity, we may expect the individual to adopt 
attitudes and behaviours oriented toward influencing the political institutions 
from without– again, for this study, such a process may be described as 
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alienation with a disruptive behavioural element. It must be noted here that, in 
accordance with contemporary social psychological research into 
radicalisation, some alienated people can feel their subjective state of 
disconnection and inefficacy so intensely and chronically that they may choose 
to engage in behaviours aimed at disrupting socio-political stability and the 
status quo, leading to subversion, revolution or radical change (Duffy, 2009). 
Research into radicalisation, however, does suggest that by and large, 
alienated actors tend to defect from engagement with discourse and the socio-
political system and hinder its capacity for democratic reproduction, and, as 
noted above, thereby reify their unrepresented, marginalised and alienated 
position within the polity (Baker-Beall et al, 2014). 
 
In light of these discussions about political scientific understandings of 
engagement and sociological conceptions of alienation, it is posited that any 
approach to exploring how refugees encounter and navigate their experiences 
within the liberal democratic political system in Australia must be based on the 
understanding that individuals are never empty vessels. Every human makes 
social and political choices according to instilled paradigms of morality, felt 
sentiment, and principal understandings about the structure of society - origin, 
host and anywhere in between. In other words, it is based on the notion that 
political attitudes and behaviors, like all attitudes and behaviors, are connected 
and contextualized by surrounding factors and environments. The way 
individuals reflectively observe and constitute their personal realities is in part 
sui generis. In light of this argument, there is no such thing as abstract 
vulnerability, only conditioning. Human agency must be seen as is pivotal. 
 
To garner a substantive perspective on Iraqi refugees’ attitudes and behaviours 
within the political system in Australia, then, a conceptual framework 
anchored in the notion of political agency is employed. In order to substantiate 
frequently simplified participation decisions, this study proposes to approach 
political behaviour as a choice of a particular type of political activity among a 
range of potential acts, and that these behaviours tend to issue out of attitudes 
(Leighley 1995, p. 198). As such the conventional tendency in scholarship to 
dichotomize political behaviour may be problematized and a more nuanced 
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understanding of engagement and alienation may be formulated. The vantage 
point proposed here is oriented toward making sense of the realities, attitudes 
and behaviours of individuals from the sample group, and the meanings they 
ascribe to such behaviours, thereby accounting for nuance inherent to 
subjectivity.  
 
Such a conception of political agency is in line with the theories of Pierre 
Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, who seek to navigate the middle ground 
between structural determinism and voluntaristic subjectivism (Bourdieu 
1977; 1990, Giddens 1984; 1993). Political behaviours, derived from notions 
of agency, are to be understood as both structuring and structured (see Figure 
3.1). An individual’s choice to engage or withdraw cannot be reduced to 
adherence to a norm or rule, as cognitivists would have it, nor to the 
mechanistic execution of a pre-existing structural code (Bourdieu, 1977 & 
1990; Taylor 1995). Sociological discussions now link individual selfhood, 
motives, and consciousness to shared self-referential narratives that together 
constitute ‘self-identity’ (Giddens 1991). In order to understand the 
relationship of identification/alienation and engagement/disengagement with 
identity, it is to be noted that self-identities are more than personal narrative 
scripts for social or political action, they are channels through which 
individuals attempt to find emotional gratifications in everyday routines 
(Giddens, 1991; Bourdieu, 1977). Alienation and engagement have social-
psychological consequences, or experiential aspects. Thus, to explore the 
characteristics of alienated or engaged identity, we need to take into 
consideration the expectations, interpretations and perceptions of the 
embodied subjects under exploration (Langman, 2006).  
 
As stated, integral to a comprehensive examination of what informs some 
individuals’ decisions to engage democratically and others to withdraw from 
modern civic life is an emphasis on the roles of individual perceptions, 
interpretations and expectations. Alongside this, is the reality that political 
agency is shaped by the structural context of agents. As Anthony Giddens has 
argued in his theory of structural relations, agents are knowledgeable and as 
such reflexively constitute their respective realities, but ultimately they are 
 114 
always bounded by structural conditions and unintended consequences 
(Giddens, 1984; 1993). Notions of agency and subjectivity based on the idea 
that individuals reproduce their surrounding social conditions, as structures are 
never wholly determining, underpin this research (see Figure 3.1).   
 
 
                             
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Simple Diagram of Theoretical Approach of this Study 
 
 
To sum up, this research is based on the idea that individuals who have a 
positive, subjective experience of political membership and identify with the 
socio-political system in Australia are likely to be engaged with democratic 
processes and discourse, or at least content with the status quo. That is, those 
who relate to and identify with (not to be confused with agreeing with) the 
social and cultural values, discourses, policies and laws that make up this 
system, as it is understood by said individual. While individuals who feel 
disaffected by the socio-political system in Australia - that is, who feel 
dissatisfied with or unrepresented by the social and cultural values, discourses, 
policies and laws that make up this system as it is understood by said 
individual – are likely to be apathetic and largely disengaged from democratic 
processes. And finally, an individual with a particularly negative, subjective 
experience of political membership and who feels alienated from the socio-
political system in Australia – that is, not only feels unrepresented, but perhaps 
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misrepresented or exploited – is likely to disengage, and in extreme cases 
radicalise to disrupt the socio-political system. Neither of these two latter 
subjective orientations toward the socio-political system and their behavioural 
outcomes contributes to legitimate democratic reproduction, the innovation of 
new political spaces and cosmpolitanisation, as per the tenets of 
democratically grounded theories of cosmopolitanism. Instead, they tend to 
foster social and political disintegration, inhibit meaningful discourse and act 
to foster and, at times, legitimise anti-democratic trends.  
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The Habermasian critical theoretical approach used in this research employs 
empirical social scientific inquiry to explore new potentials for evolving 
democracy, such that its institutions and processes remain apace with the 
needs and interests of the demos. Taking a cue from a procedural and 
discursive conception of democracy, this study seeks to explore the extent to 
which Iraqi refugees, subject to contentious national policy, law and rhetoric, 
engage with democratic processes in Australia and are therefore represented in 
the political discourse and rationalisation of the resultant policies and laws to 
which they are subject. This study is premised on an understanding that the 
limits of democratic ‘closure’ are fluid, constantly contested and redefined 
through dialectic processes. It follows Seyla Benhabib in arguing that, 
“although all democracies require borders, because every democracy must 
define very specifically who may vote and who may not, these boundaries are 
fixed by positive law and are therefore subject to the force of democratic 
iteration” (Benhabib, 2007, p. 33). As such, this thesis is informed by the 
notion that in the contemporary era, the style of democratic political system 
such as exists in Australia is witnessing not the necessary decline or “erosion” 
of citizenship, but the “reconfiguration of citizenship” through democratic 
iterations (Benhabib, 2007, p. 69). As such, the sample group under study 
must theoretically be involved in discursive processes if their interests are to 
be represented and the laws and policies to which they are subject are to be 
democratically legitimate in a Habermasian sense.  
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This study builds on the body of literature concerned with democratic 
participation in Australia (Denemark & Niemi, 2012). Given that newly 
arrived refugees are popularly constructed as non-integrated guests of the 
welfare nation-state host, a social group that inevitably exists on the margins if 
not outside the unitary model of citizenship, they are often overlooked in the 
discussion of democratic participation. Such an omission of a highly 
politicised group, who are subject to domestic law and contentious policy, as 
well as the daily scrutiny of the popular media, potentially operates to further 
entrench and sustain their marginalization. Given that “it has been 
demonstrated that difficulties and challenges faced by refugees are particularly 
salient in the first years of settlement” (Hugo 2011), and that an important 
aspect of political attitudes and behavior is the timing and process by which 
individuals develop identifications, feelings and participatory habits 
(Denemark and Niemi 2012), the accounts given by the respondents in this 
study shed light on the salient understandings and attitudes of these new 
residents at this particularly formative juncture in their lives.  
 
This thesis posits that identification and alienation are of basic importance to 
the functioning of political systems as a whole and to a broad range of public 
institutions and processes. It is vital to legitimate democratic reproduction to 
account for variously situated social agents’ identification with, or 
estrangement from, political systems and to take note of the behavioural 
consequences that flow from different levels of socio-political identification 
(Schwarz 1973). Individuals orient themselves to the political system because 
of their personal relationship to it. If a person feels she can influence society 
and politics, then she is more likely to engage with the political system, to feel 
that participation and government policy are beneficial and to give her diffuse 
support and identification to the polity; engagement. Alienation, then, is 
employed to refer to the estrangement or disconnection that occurs in the 
relation between an individual and that to which he or she is relating. It 
accepts that such a break in relations occurs in a variety of forms, such as the 
“estrangements between an individual and his or her social community, natural 
environment, own self, or even God,” and in this case will focus on the 
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participants’ relations within particular realms of democratic activity/socio-
political interaction. Namely, the respondents’ interactions with Australian 
state and settlement services and service providers, their relations with non-
Iraqi citizens, their personal involvement in political activity, and their overall 
socio-political interactions in civil society as political members. This will be 
expounded further in the following methodology chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides details of the research methodology, its purpose and 
how it was designed and implemented. It is worth restating the study’s 
research questions, as they are the foundation upon which the research design 
was formulated: 
 
1. What are the socio-political attitudes and behaviours of individuals in this 
sample group of Iraqis refugees? 
2. Are individuals within the sample group engaged with the political system 
in Australia, or are they alienated from and disaffected by the very system that 
is meant to be their primary means of inclusion?  
3. In light of the results of the first two research questions, to what extent does 
the Australian political system, as perceived by the sample group, foster 
conditions that progress a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism? 
 
The basic research design formulated to execute a research project that 
explores these questions is shown in Figure 4.1. The theoretical framework 
(Step One in Figure 4.1) was elucidated in the previous chapter and will not be 
reiterated here. It is worth noting, however, that one of the key functions of the 
theoretical framework is to inform the choice of research methods and the 
design of the research instruments. That is, the nature and content of the 
research instruments were designed with the theoretical framework in mind - 
the general philosophical ideas behind the enquiry - such that the data elicited 
by these instruments is relevant to, and may be related back to the central 
theoretical concerns of the study (this is discussed in greater detail in section 
4.2 of this chapter). 
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Figure 4.1 Basic Research Design 
 
 
The aim of the fieldwork component of this project is to elicit data that can be 
used to gauge the socio-political attitudes and practices of the sample group of 
Iraqi refugees (research question one). Beyond this, it seeks to analyse the 
respondents’ various expectations, interpretations and perspectives about their 
lives in the Australian socio-political context, so as to explore the meanings 
and significance behind their attitudes and behaviours, and their subjective 
orientations to the socio-political system. Based on the trends and patterns of 
answers among the sample as a whole, it discusses the extent to which 
individuals in the sample group employ their practical knowledge and 
normative attitudes to engage with the democratic political system in Australia 
(research question two). It then draws inferences about the extent to which the 
socio-political system in Australia may be seen foster conditions that progress 
a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism in their case (research question 
three). In order to achieve this, the study adopted a mixed methods approach. 
 
This chapter firstly gives a brief overview of mixed methods research. It goes 
on to outline the development of the two research instruments used - 
quantitative surveys and semi-structured, qualitative interviews - and how the 
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concepts in the research questions are operationalized in these instruments, 
such that they elicit meaningful data. The overall structure of the research 
instruments is outlined so as to inform the following analysis chapter. It goes 
on to outline the sampling criteria and strategies employed to recruit 
participants for the study, as well as noting the ethical considerations and 
safeguards put in place by the researcher. It then outlines the data collection 
methods, followed by the data analysis methods used in the study. It finally 
discusses the limitations of the research design and methodology before 
summarising the methodology chapter as a whole.  
 
 
4.2 Research Methods: Mixed Methods 
 
As stated, this study employed a mixed methods approach. Mixed methods 
research allows for the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative methods 
of data collection and/or analysis to achieve a range of outcomes (Creswell 
2003; Harwell, 2011). Specifically this research sequentially used quantitative 
surveys, and then semi-structured, qualitative interviews to elicit data. The 
results from the surveys were analysed first, then used not to inform the entire 
design of the interviews, but to refine the content of the interviews and the 
subsequent analysis of the qualitative data (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham 
1989).  
 
Two methods of data collection were employed in order to maximise the 
explanatory and interpretive potential of the final analysis. As Rocco et al, 
argue, studies that use mixed methods in order to fulfil such an aim are 
“explicitly seeking a synergistic benefit from integrating both the post-
positivist and constructivist paradigms. The underlying assumption is that 
research is stronger when it mixes research paradigms, because a fuller 
understanding of human phenomena is gained” (Rocco et al 2003, p. 21). It is 
in light of such assertions that mixed methods research has gained traction in 
recent years (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
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In the case of this study, the two methods used complemented one another, 
and their use in concert overcame the weaknesses of a single design. The 
surveys elicited data pertaining to a larger sample size, and gave an indication 
of the demographics of the sample group, as well as initial data on their socio-
political attitudes and behaviours. The data was then analysed, and the salient 
findings noted and purposefully pursued in the interviews, such that 
unexpected, unclear or very clear findings about the respondents’ attitudes and 
behaviours were revisited so as to substantiate the meanings that the 
participants themselves ascribe to these findings. In other words, the 
quantitative results assisted in explaining, interpreting and substantiating or at 
least lending further meaning to the findings from the qualitative interviews. 
This is what Greene et al (1989) classify as “developmental” utilisation of 
mixed methods. Creswell categorises such an approach as a “two-phase 
approach” (Creswell, 1994). Throughout much of this chapter, the quantitative 
and qualitative methods used in this study are described separately and in that 
order. At the end of this chapter, a brief description is given of how the dataset 
is treated as a whole towards the end of the analysis.  
 
 
4.3 Research Instruments: Quantitative Surveys and 
Qualitative Interviews 
 
The research instruments were designed to elicit data that could be analysed so 
as to reflect upon the research questions of this study. This section will firstly 
explain the design of the quantitative surveys, and the rationale and 
significance of its questions. It goes on to explain the design of the semi-
structured qualitative interviews.   
 
4.3.1 Socio-Political Practices and Attitudes Surveys 
 
Firstly, a Socio-Political Practices and Attitudes Survey was designed by the 
researcher to elicit data that gives a broad picture of the socio-political 
behaviours and attitudes of the sample group. The survey was made up of 55 
questions, which were either formulated by the researcher or borrowed from 
extant empirical studies. The questions were then translated into Arabic. 
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Specifically, the survey was designed to elicit data that addresses the first 
research question: What are the socio-political behaviours and attitudes of 
individuals in this sample group of Iraqi refugees? The data was analysed to 
explore the quantitative degree and nature of socio-political engagement 
among the sample.  
 
In designing the survey, the researcher included questions/empirical indicators 
commonly used in refugee settlement research, social capital research, as well 
as questions that elicit data about the level of interaction between respondents 
(micro) and Australia’s democratic socio-political structures (macro). It is 
worth noting that in all cases for this study, empirical indicators were 
conceptualised subjectively, in that they are based on the individual reflexive 
insights of the participants rather than any measurable indices. Specifically, 
and in order to draw useful comparisons in the analysis, the survey used 
questions from the Settlement Outcomes of New Arrivals (SONA) survey and 
report, which was commissioned and released by DIAC in 2010, as well as the 
Australian Humanitarian Settler Survey (AHSS), also commissioned by the 
Government (Hugo 2011a; 2011b). The broad purpose of the SONA and 
AHSS studies were to obtain a better understanding of how newly arrived 
humanitarian entrants are faring and what variables contribute to them settling 
successfully, and as such a number of questions raised in the surveys were 
relevant to this study. 
 
In terms of the survey’s structure, the questions were set out to elicit data on 
six broad themes or areas of socio-political interaction. To neatly reflect this, 
the survey was divided into six sections (see figure 4.2 for an overview of the 
survey structure). It is worth outlining each of these sections and explaining 
the area of social-political interaction or theme that it addresses, as well as the 
questions, either borrowed or formulated by the researcher, that were 
specifically included to explore them.  
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Figure 4.2 Basic Structure of the Political and Social Practices and Attitudes 
Survey 
 
 
The first section presents questions (1-15) that were designed to elicit 
demographic data about the sample, in order to establish an overall picture of 
the social backgrounds of respondents. This first section was modelled loosely 
on the demographic questions asked in the SONA survey, though such 
questions are commonly used in all manner of social scientific, empirical 
research. The researcher formulated and included the more specific questions 
relating to visa status and time spent in immigration detention, as they are 
relevant to participants in this study and their experiences of political 
membership.  
 
The second set of questions (16-22) were designed to elicit data about 
respondents’ formal political status in Australia and their perspectives on this 
status. The questions in this section of the survey were included so as to 
ascertain the proportion of the sample that are already Australian citizens, as 
• Demographic data to establish an overall picture of the social 
backgrounds of respondents and current employment and education 
status. This section employs empirical indicators used in Human Capital 
and Social Capital research 
SECTION 1.  
Demographic Profile 
• Data about respondents’ formal political status in Australia and their 
perspectives on this status 
SECTION 2. 
Formal Politcal Status 
• Data about respondents’ interaction with Australian State services since 
their arrival in the country  
SECTION 3. 
Instrumental Interactions with 
institutions/state 
• Data about individual socio-cultural behaviours and perspectives on 
social life in Australia.  
SECTION 4. 
Socio-cultural perspectives and 
behvaiours 
• Data about individual political behaviours and perspectives on political 
life in Australia and transnationally.  
 
SECTION 5. 
Political perspectives and 
behaviours 
• Data about individual perspectives on human rights in Australia, 
particularly vis a vis forced migration. 
SECTION 6. 
Perspectives on human rights  
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well as their initial views on the process of becoming a citizen. 
 
The third set of questions (23-26) were designed to elicit data about 
respondents’ interactions with Australian state services and service providers 
since their arrival in the country. The questions in this section were modelled 
on a line of questioning in the SONA survey (2010). They sought to gauge the 
proportion of the sample that has accessed government and/or government-
funded services in Australia, and which services they were accessing at the 
time they completed the survey. It went on to ask the participants to assess the 
ease with which they have accessed services, and to rate the overall quality of 
government services.   
 
The fourth set of questions (27-40) were designed to elicit data about 
individual socio-cultural behaviours and perspectives on social life in 
Australia. This section employed empirical indicators commonly used in social 
capital research, such as questions that elicit data about respondents’ 
frequency of interaction with various types of informal and formal networks, 
so as to gauge connectedness. It also included questions probing rates of 
volunteering and attitudes towards volunteering, as well as membership in 
formal associations/groups, which are viewed as behavioural outcomes of 
norms of trust and reciprocity. It included questions taken from the SONA 
study relating to the participants’ confidence in navigating Australian society, 
and questions from the AHSS about their happiness levels and whether they 
feel welcomed by the national community in Australia. Such empirical 
markers are often used in sociological studies to assess the individual’s sense 
of comfort in and belonging to community. This section also included 
questions that probed the importance that respondents place on maintaining 
their particular form of Iraqi culture and heritage, a line of questioning found 
in the Social Cohesion Survey (Mapping Social Cohesion 2014). Such 
questions probe issues of intercultural understanding, and the respondents’ 
values and attitudes towards their own cultural and social life, and how these 
play out in their new context.  
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The fifth set of questions (41-51) were designed to elicit data about individual 
political behaviours and perspectives on political life in Australia and 
transnationally. This section employed empirical indicators used in social 
capital research, such as membership in formal political associations and/or 
desire to for membership or involvement in such groups, either inside or 
outside Australia. The researcher designed questions about the respondents’ 
degree of interest in following politics, both in Australia and internationally, 
that elicit data comparable to the findings of the Australian Election Study 
(McAllister and Cameron 2014). Further questions were asked about the 
respondents actual behaviours in terms of how often they access information 
relating to politics.  
 
The sixth set of questions (52-55) was designed to elicit data about individual 
perspectives on human rights in Australia, vis-à-vis forced migration and 
forced migrants generally, as well as in light of their particular case and 
experiences since arrival. The researcher formulated these questions to gauge a 
preliminary idea of the respondents’ understanding and opinions about human 
rights principles.  
 
4.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
The qualitative data analysed in this study came from semi-structured 
interviews. While also addressing the first research question, the interview 
questions were designed primarily to elicit data about the meanings that 
individuals ascribe to their socio-political behaviours and attitudes, in order to 
answer the second research question: Are individuals within the sample group 
of Iraqi refugees engaged with the political system in Australia, or are they 
alienated from and disaffected by the very system that is meant to be their 
primary means of inclusion? Given the sequential nature of the research 
design, a general structure was devised for the interview and certain questions 
were formulated and translated into Arabic, bearing in mind that the content 
might change, should the findings from the quantitative survey demand it.  
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Semi-structured interviews were chosen as an appropriate research instrument 
to elicit data on the understanding that  
“through qualitative research we can explore a wide array of 
dimensions of the social world, including the texture and weave 
of everyday life, the understandings, experiences and imaginings 
of our research participants, the ways that social processes, 
institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance 
of the meanings they generate… this means it has an unrivalled 
capacity to constitute compelling arguments about how things 
work in particular contexts” (Mason 2002, p. 1).  
This type of qualitative approach is useful as it permits a fuller expression of 
refugee experiences in their own terms, minimizing the potential of treating 
respondents as data-generating objects, and facilitating the active involvement 
of refugees in the construction of data about their experiences and lives.  
 
The interview was structured around three sections. The first part of the 
interview included questions formulated to elicit demographic information 
about the interview sample. The second section included questions about the 
respondents’ personal narratives, their backgrounds and stories up until arrival 
in Australia. The third and final section included questions about the 
participants’ expectations, interpretations, and perceptions of their experiences 
and socio-political attitudes and behaviours in the Australian context. The 
interview aimed to get a snapshot of the meanings the respondents ascribe to 
their socio-political attitudes and behaviours, such that a substantive 
understanding of their experiences of political membership in Australia and 
their subjective orientations toward the Australian liberal democratic socio-
political system may be inferred (at least, as it stood at the time of the 
interview). See Figure 4.3 for the basic interview structure, and a more in 
depth explanation of the themes and issues explored in the interviews. 
 
 127 
Figure 4.3 Basic structure of the qualitative interview 
 
  
4.4 Sampling Criteria and Recruitment 
 
All the participants in this study were born overseas, self-identified as ‘Iraqi’ 
and were granted refugee protection in Australia after 2003. The study aimed 
to survey 100 individuals and interview 30 individuals. That is, the study did 
not seek to recruit a representative sample. Instead, it employed a “purposive 
sampling” strategy, which focused on conceptually relevant cases, rather than 
representativeness, as a means of drawing wider conclusions. 
 
Section ONE:  
Demographic Information 
Section TWO:  
Personal narrative up until arrival in Australia 
 
 
Section THREE: 
Perceptions, Interpretation, Expectations 
OF 
Migration Experience 
Current social life/habits/routines/networks 
Challenges of settlement in Australia 
Positive aspects of settlement in Australia 
Nature and quality of Australian Government services 
Social support from the wider community in Australia 
Cross-cultural networking in Australia 
Personal transnational networks 
Happiness 
Employment 
Politics in Australia 
Personal political/civic life/activity 
Political debates about asylum seekers and refugees 
Australian society’s understanding of refugee issues 
Human Rights 
Democracy   
 

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Purposive sampling is a type of non-probability sampling, which is used to 
select respondents based on the particular purpose of the study (Teddlie & Yu, 
2007). This method enables researchers to develop broader understandings of, 
in the case of this study, the Iraqi refugee migratory and settlement 
experiences through surveys and in-depth interviews with a small number of 
select individuals - a more intimate knowledge of a smaller cross section of 
reality - rather than through ambitious data collection and generalization 
(Teddlie & Yu, 2007; Korac, 2003; Mansouri et al, 2006). 
 
Before recruiting participants, a clear picture of the Iraq-born population in 
Australia was formed. This was covered comprehensively in the Literature 
Review chapter, and only those points relevant to sampling and recruitment 
are repeated here. It is worth noting that this profile of the Iraq-born 
population was based upon statistics available in 2012-13, when the research 
instruments were being designed and the fieldwork was being conducted.  
 
The Iraqi population in Australia has been rising at a steady rate since the Gulf 
War of 1991-2. At the time of the 1991 census there were 5,186 Iraq-born in 
Australia. The 2006 census recorded 32,520 Iraq-born people in Australia, 
which then increased by 48.1 per cent to 48,170 Iraq-born in 2011 (DIAC 
2013a). In 2011, the distribution of the Iraq-born population by state and 
territory showed New South Wales had the largest population with 29,341 
people (61 per cent of Australia’s Iraq-born population), followed by Victoria 
with 12,795 Iraq-born people (27 per cent of Australia’s Iraq-born population). 
It is also worth noting that according to 2011 census figures there were 24,851 
males (51.6 per cent) and 23,317 females (48.4 per cent) in the broader Iraq-
born community in Australia. That is, 106.6 males for every 100 females 
(DIAC 2013a) (whereas the Australian population as a whole has a slight 
female majority). 
 
In terms of Iraqi arrivals via the humanitarian program since 2003, DIABP has 
not made available clear statistics specific to Iraq-born humanitarian arrivals 
for the years 2003-06. However, it may tenuously be assumed, in light of 
global Iraqi refugee, asylum seeker and resettlement numbers, and Iraqi-born 
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immigrant numbers in Australia more generally, that the growing number of 
humanitarian arrivals continued to rise at a steady rate, and then gained 
slightly more momentum from 2006 onwards. Overall, a total of 18,066 Iraqi 
refugee visas were granted between 2006 and 2013 (see table 4.1 for a 
breakdown of Iraqi arrivals via the humanitarian pathway since 2006). That is, 
the vast majority of Iraqi arrivals to Australia were refugees; between 2006 
and 2011, 74 per cent of Iraqi arrivals came via the humanitarian pathway, and 
it may be assumed that a bulk of the remaining arrivals came via the family 
migration pathway as the result of applications made by Iraqi refugees already 
in the community as permanent residents or citizens.  
 
In terms of the breakdown within the humanitarian stream, significantly more 
offshore humanitarian visas than onshore humanitarian visas have been 
granted to Iraqis since 2003. From the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2013, 
DIABP granted offshore visas to 15,881 Iraqis. In that same period, 2,185 
onshore visas were granted - 1076 non-IMA onshore visas were granted, and 
1109 IMA visas were granted (it is to be noted that DIABP’s data for onshore 
arrivals and visas granted for the years 2006-08 are “incomplete”). That is, 
almost eight times more displaced Iraqis have arrived to Australia as refugees 
for resettlement, than those arriving by boat or plane to claim protection upon 
arrival.  
  
 
YEAR OFFSHOR
E VISA 
GRANTS 
ONSHOR
E VISA 
GRANTS 
TOTAL 
HUMANITARIA
N VISA GRANTS 
OFFSHOR
E AS % OF 
TOTAL 
ONSHOR
E AS % 
OF 
TOTAL 
2006-07 1443 154* 1597 90.36% 9.64% 
2007-08 2202 204* 2406 91.52% 8.48% 
2008-09 2866 172 3038 94.34% 5.66% 
2009-10 1683 323 2006 83.90% 16.10% 
2010-11 2147 368 2515 85.37% 14.63% 
2011-12 1476 493 1969 75.00% 25.00% 
2012-13 4064 471 4535 89.61% 10.39% 
TOTA
L 
15881 2185 18066 87.91% 12.09% 
* Statistics INCOMPLETE – no data available for IMA arrivals over these two years 
 
Table 4.1. Iraqi Humanitarian Arrivals to Australia 2006-13 
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The Iraq-born population in Victoria (12,795 individuals at 2011 census, or 
0.23 per cent of the state’s entire population), like in Australia more broadly, is 
culturally diverse, with settlers from many ethnic and cultural backgrounds 
including Arabs, Kurds, Chaldeans and Assyrians and Turkmens. Although 
Islam is the dominant religion in Iraq, only 28 per cent of the Iraq-born people 
living in Victoria are Muslim, and 60 per cent are Christian. Roughly in line 
with this religious profile, nearly half of the Iraqi community speaks Arabic at 
home, the rest speaking Assyrian, Kurdish and other languages. In terms of 
age structure, according to statistics from the 2011 census, over half of Iraq-
born Victorians are under 35 years old, and only 19 per cent are aged over 
fifty. This represents a young age structure in comparison to Victoria’s (and 
Australia’s) ageing population.  
 
Looking at statistics from the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, ABS data, local government reports, as well as conversing with 
colleagues working in the settlement services sector, it was ascertained that 
newly arrived Iraqi refugees tend to live in three main areas or hubs in 
Victoria. Melbourne’s Hume-Broadmeadows local government area in the 
city’s North/North-West has an Iraq-born population of 3,650 (6 per cent of 
the total population in this area) (ABS 2012b), who tend to live in suburbs 
such as Roxburgh Park, Broadmeadows, Campbellfield and Coolaroo. Almost 
1000 Iraq-born people lived in suburbs of Greater Dandenong in Melbourne’s 
east, an area with among the highest overseas-born population numbers in the 
state. Others lived in the Greater Shepparton region in Northern Victoria, most 
particularly in the towns of Shepparton and Cobram.  
 
These local areas all have disadvantaged socio-economic profiles compared to 
other areas of Victoria. At the 2011 census, 55.3 per cent of the population of 
Hume-Broadmeadows spoke a language other than English at home, and the 
local government was ranked as the most disadvantaged local area in 
Melbourne. In 2014, Hume-Broadmeadows had an unemployment rate of 26.4 
per cent, the highest in the city and approximately five times higher than the 
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Victoria and Australia wide average of 5. 2 per cent. Greater Dandenong was 
ranked the third most disadvantaged local area in Melbourne at the 2011 
census. Greater Shepparton also has high unemployment rates - in December 
2012 unemployment was 8.6 per cent, not as high as Hume-Broadmeadows, 
but significantly higher than the unemployment rates for Victoria and 
Australia, which were 5.8 and 5.5 per cent respectively at that time. Between 
2006-11 more than 500 humanitarian migrants settled in the Greater 
Shepparton area, accounting for 32 per cent of its total migrant intake, 
compared with only 7 per cent for Australia overall. A report by the 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations on the 
Greater Shepparton local government area (DEEWR, 2013) noted that the 
unemployment rate for people with no or poor English language proficiency in 
Greater Shepparton is four times that for people who speak English only 
(20.7 per cent compared with 5.2 per cent). Overall, it is clear that newly 
arrived Iraqi refugees tend to be resettled in socio-economically disadvantaged 
areas in Victoria, and compounding this, tend to have the highest 
unemployment rates in those areas. 
 
As stated above, all the respondents in this study were born overseas, self-
identified as ‘Iraqi’ and were granted refugee protection in Australia after 
2003. Despite the fact that more offshore humanitarian visas than onshore 
humanitarian visas have been granted to Iraqis since 2003, a roughly even 
distribution between individuals that arrived as refugees (via the offshore 
pathway) and those that arrived as asylum seekers (via the onshore pathway) 
was sought for this study so as to potentially compare, if deemed necessary as 
the analysis progressed, the various experiences and outcomes related to these 
distinct migratory pathways, which are viewed and/or portrayed as markedly 
different – one dubbed “the right way” the other erroneously dubbed “illegal” - 
by successive Australian governments and in the Australian mainstream media 
and popular debates (as was covered in the literature review).  
 
Religious and ethnic identities were not taken into strict account when 
recruiting the sample.  In this regard, given that the Iraqi Christian population 
residing in Australia is larger than the Muslim population, a majority of 
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Christians in the sample may be expected. However, the immigration pathway 
taken by Iraqis is clearly delineated along ethno-religious lines. Of those Iraqis 
who arrived to Australia via the offshore pathway, the vast majority were 
Christian Iraqis (both Assyrian and Chaldean), not Muslim (both Shia and 
Sunni). While the vast majority of onshore arrivals were Muslims, most 
particularly Shia Muslims. This is in contrast to Iraq itself, which as stated 
above is a majority Muslim nation. The upshot of this phenomenon, in light of 
this study’s concern with recruiting an even ratio of onshore and offshore 
arrivals, is that a relatively even distribution of Muslims and Christians might 
be expected.  
 
A snowball technique was used to recruit participants. That is, participants 
were generally contacted and recruited through professional contacts of the 
researcher, particularly through caseworkers from non-governmental 
organizations in the settlement sector, who worked in organizations either in 
Melbourne (specifically in the Dandenong and Broadmeadows areas), or in the 
regional towns of Shepparton and Cobram. With the exception of two of the 
settlement workers engaged by the researcher, they were Iraq-born, Arabic-
speakers who volunteered their time to act as third parties on behalf of the 
researcher. They approached Iraqi individuals who met the study’s criteria, 
explained the project’s aims with the help of a plain language statement 
provided to them by the researcher (discussed in the section below) and asked 
if they would like to participate, and/or if they would spread the word around 
their communities to ask if others may like to participate. It is worth noting 
that the settlement workers engaged by the researcher tended to deal mostly 
with IMA arrivals, as they are more heavily reliant upon settlement services 
and their needs tend to be greater and more complex than non-IMA and other 
arrivals in the initial months and years of settlement. Furthermore, the Iraqi 
community members engaged perceived IMA arrivals’ narratives as 
particularly relevant to the study being undertaken. 
 
The recruitment process took some time, and the researcher remained in 
regular contact with the settlement workers, so as to keep abreast of 
developments and record the details of those individuals who were interested 
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in participating in the research. Then, the researcher organised to meet the 
interested individuals in the presence of a familiar caseworker or interpreter, 
usually at the offices of the settlement service providers, and further explained 
the aims of the project. Upon gaining their consent to be involved in the 
quantitative part of the study, the researcher administered the surveys to 
participants in the presence of the case worker/interpreter. The participants 
then chose if they would like to meet at a later date, unconfirmed at that stage, 
in order to be involved in the qualitative component.  
 
The quantitative data collection component of the fieldwork lasted almost one 
year.  Once it was complete, the analysis was performed (this is outlined 
below), and the initial findings were looked at so as to inform and refine the 
interview content. The interviews were then conducted in much the same 
manner as the surveys were administered. That is, the settlement workers and 
the researcher got in touch with those individuals who had earlier indicated 
that they would participate in the interviews, and arranged a time and 
appropriate place for the interviews to take place. The qualitative component 
took another six months to complete.    
 
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations and Approval 
 
Prior to recruiting participants and collecting data for this study, an ethics 
application (National Ethics Application Form) was submitted to the Deakin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (DU-HREC). The ethics 
application outlined the purpose of the study, and illustrated how it 
communicated its purpose to organisational contacts to be engaged to help 
recruit participants, as well as to participants themselves. This was done in line 
with the requirements of the Human Research Ethics Committee that each 
participant be given a plain language statement, which outlines in English and 
modern standard Arabic, the aims of the study and the requirements for 
participation. Each participant, then, after reading and agreeing to the terms 
upon which the research was undertaken, signed a consent form. At all times it 
was made clear to participants that they could withdraw their participation at 
any time.  
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Given that newly arrived refugees have been shown to suffer from mental 
health issues, often relating to trauma and/or issues related to flight and/or 
immigration detention, research studies requiring their involvement are seen as 
high risk by DU-HREC. It was noted that for the participants, reflecting upon 
their own stories and circumstances might have caused them anxiety or 
distress. As such, provisions were put in place so as to ensure no harm to the 
participants, particularly emotional or mental distress. Firstly, the researcher 
was introduced to participants by familiar third parties, such as settlement 
workers, translators/interpreters or friends, and therefore the participants felt 
relatively comfortable with candid conversation. Secondly, participation was 
fully voluntary, and prior to administering surveys or conducting interviews, a 
verbal conversation was had, reiterating the study’s aims and intentions (after 
the plain language statement was given). And finally, an immediately 
accessible qualified caseworker and/or mental health professional was 
identified prior to the interviews in the event that any mental disturbance 
among the participants arose. These services were not used, even though they 
were available in each case.  
 
Furthermore, full confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed to each of 
the participants. All interviews were digitally recorded and were then 
translated and transcribed using pseudonyms. The pseudonyms were allocated 
to the individuals by the researcher and these identities were maintained in a 
secure location. All participants were also ensured that all audio files and 
surveys were saved without any details or references that may identify the 
individual participants. This anonymity extends into the dissemination of the 
research findings in publications. It was made clear to the participants that 
they would not be compromised in any way – legal, political or social – for 
their participation in this study, and that they were free to withdraw at any 
stage without recrimination or incident. The project was granted ethical 
approval by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Project ID 2012-024). 
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4.6 Data Collection  
 
Data was collected in two phases over a total period of two years, from the 
beginning of 2012 and ending in late 2013. The first, quantitative phase 
involved a pilot study of five participants to ensure the efficacy of the survey. 
After minor adjustments to the survey, it was then administered to all 
participants in the quantitative sample group. In the second, qualitative phase, 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with 30 individuals that 
made up the qualitative sample. In both phases, a National Accreditation 
Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) accredited interpreter was 
present.  
 
Phase One: Quantitative 
 
Socio-political Practices and Attitudes Surveys were administered to 79 Iraqi 
humanitarian arrivals. The original target of 100 surveys was not met due to 
difficulties in recruiting willing participants and time limitations. In 
accordance with ethical guidelines, the surveys were administered on an 
individual basis by the researcher in the presence of an interpreter and/or 
caseworker. The surveys were administered in a range of institutional and 
public locations, including Deakin University Library (Burwood campus), 
Dandenong Public Library, the Land of Refuge Arabic Church in 
Broadmeadows, the office of Spectrum Migrant Resource Centre in 
Broadmeadows, the office of Victorian Arabic Social Services in 
Broadmeadows, the office of Uniting Care in Shepparton, the home of a 
NAATI-accredited interpreter and settlement caseworker in Cobram, and in 
four cases, and at the request of the participants themselves, at the homes of 
the participants.  
 
As explained above, the participants were, in the first instance, given an 
explanation of the purpose of the research, along with the plain language 
statement by the third party employed in recruiting them. After giving their 
verbal consent, a meeting was arranged with the researcher present. The 
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researcher briefed the participants once more, so that the participants knew 
unequivocally what they were being asked to participate in. Certain points 
were highlighted by the researcher, such as the fully voluntary nature of their 
participation and the lack of direct benefits or remuneration that the project 
and the researcher could give participants. Each participant was then given the 
option to only fill in the Socio-Political Attitudes and Practices Survey, or to 
complete the survey and then also be involved in a qualitative interview at a 
later date. It must be noted that a vast majority of respondents did not wish to 
be interviewed, and the researcher had to go to lengths to meet the 30-person 
target for the interview sample (discussed further in the following section). 
Once each participant had decided to be involved, and in the presence of the 
researcher signed the consent form, he/she was given a copy of the survey to 
fill in.  
 
Initially, a pilot study was performed with five participants, so as to verify the 
relevance and comprehensibility of the survey itself, and gauge the level of 
help needed by the respondents in answering the survey questions. It was 
deemed that the content of the surveys was largely fine but three formatting 
issues and one translation issue were flagged and resolved. Furthermore, three 
of the pilot respondents asked for clarification of the meaning of some of the 
survey questions. In light of this, the wording of these questions was tightened, 
with the help of a translator, so as to maximise comprehensibility. It was also 
understood from the pilot study that the administration of surveys required the 
presence of a third party and/or the researcher in order to ensure the whole 
survey was completed and incomplete surveys were not the norm. Overall, 
these first five respondents found the survey very long and one commented 
that most “Iraqis” would lose interest. The researcher chose not to cut the 
length of the survey, but found that remaining present while the survey was 
being filled out was a way of mitigating the length issue and ensuring the 
majority of surveys were completed. Often, the researcher and the interpreter 
provided explanations of the questions and explained how to fill in the survey. 
However, neither the researcher, nor the third party gave any direction, nor 
intimated expectations about the content of their answers. That is, participants 
answered the survey at their own discretion and without coaching. 
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Phase Two: Qualitative 
 
After the quantitative surveys were administered and analysed, the researcher 
conducted qualitative interviews with 30 Iraqi refugees residing in Victoria. 
The interviews were conducted in Arabic with the help of an interpreter and 
were digitally recorded. All the interviews were then translated into English 
and transcribed by one NAATI-accredited translator (note that the same 
translator was used for all the interview transcripts, so as to maintain 
consistency across translations, ensuring a single linguistic style and lexicon). 
The same collection procedure was used for the qualitative data collection as 
for the quantitative, in that the interviews were conducted on an individual 
basis in the same, safe locations outlined in the section above.  
 
Given that the interview respondents had all previously been involved in the 
quantitative element of the study, the researcher did not re-state the study’s 
purpose. Prior to the interviews, however, the researcher highlighted salient 
points about the process. The participants were assured anonymity and 
reminded of the fully voluntary nature of their participation. The researcher 
also encouraged the respondents to be candid and honest in their answers, and 
invited them not to feel shy or embarrassed about any element of their 
responses (of course such assurances were taken on board subjectively by the 
participants and certainly does not ensure the provision of frank, unguarded 
responses – discussed further below). Furthermore, the researcher asked if the 
respondents had any questions prior to the commencement of the interview, 
and fielded those before starting the process officially. 
 
As may be expected, each participant engaged with the interview questions 
slightly differently. Some respondents spoke at length on all or a number of 
issues, while some spoke at length about certain topics broached by the 
interview questions – such as the circumstances that led to their flight, their 
migratory experience, and their experiences of mandatory detention – and 
were more succinct, or in some cases unsure of their opinions about other 
topics – such as their views on human rights, or questions about Australian 
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refugee policy. A number of respondents were very brief in their answers and 
appeared weary of the aims of the researcher (this is discussed further below in 
relation to weaknesses of the research design). To an extent, the researcher 
was guided by the respondents’ answers, as per the semi-structured design of 
the interviews, allowing the respondents to express those opinions they felt 
most intensely, and in cases where the questions were poorly understood, 
working with the interpreter to rephrase the questions such that the 
respondents could relate to the content.   
 
4.7 Data Analysis 
 
Overall, the dataset was analysed using a three-stage approach. The first stage 
involved analysis of the quantitative data, and the second stage was analysis of 
the qualitative data. These analyses are presented separately in the following 
data analysis chapter (chapter five). The analysis then progresses to the third 
stage, a conceptual analysis, which is presented in the subsequent discussion 
chapter (chapter six). The third stage, then, is where the dataset will be looked 
at as a whole. This final discussion presents the most pertinent empirical 
findings of this study in light of the research questions and theoretical 
approach of the study and informs the conclusion (chapter seven). 
 
4.7.1 Quantitative 
 
Seventy-three of the 79 surveys were deemed viable for use in the analysis. 
Incomplete and incomprehensible surveys were omitted.10 The quantitative 
analysis was broken down into two distinct phases. The first stage was a 
descriptive analysis, which produced the raw survey findings for the sample. 
That is, data collected in the surveys was entered into a database and then 
analysed using SPSS and Microsoft Excel software. Given that the survey was 
                                                
10 It must be noted that this is a relatively small cohort for the purposes of quantitative 
analytic work and the quantitative results in this study are not generalizable. As 
mentioned above, this was a purposive, not a representative sample. The small sample 
size was deemed acceptable in light of existing, larger scale (and therefore, 
generalizable) quantitative studies into the newly arrived humanitarian immigrant 
cohort, the timeframe for this project’s completion, recruitment difficulties, and the 
project’s stronger emphasis on the data adduced in the qualitative interviews. 
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designed to elicit data that can complement/augment the qualitative data, and 
was not looking at a representative sample nor aimed at generating statistical 
comparisons and correlations, basic statistical analysis was deemed sufficient. 
Basic frequencies and cross-tabulations, which provide a basic picture of the 
interrelations between two variables and to explore interactions between them, 
were performed and a table of overall quantitative findings was generated (see 
Appendix Four), as well as graphs, tables and/or figures, which represent the 
findings for each question.  
 
This initial descriptive analysis was then followed by a comparative analysis, 
which contextualised the raw data in terms of existing statistics and empirical 
findings. Specifically, comparisons were made with empirical findings and 
statistics from those studies that were drawn upon in the design of the survey. 
That is, the data was contextualised in terms of the relevant data from the final 
report from the 2011 SONA study, “Settlement Outcomes of New Arrivals” 
(DIAC 2011), along with Graeme Hugo’s final summary and comprehensive 
report from his DIAC-commissioned study, “Economic, Social and Civic 
Contributions of First and Second Generation Humanitarian Entrants” (Hugo 
2011a; Hugo 2011b), which also draws upon the AHSS, also used in Hugo. It 
also uses ABS census data from both 2006 and 2011, as well as DIAC’s 
annual and other reports relating to recent humanitarian arrivals. To a lesser 
extent it drew upon findings from the Australian Election Study and the Social 
Cohesion Survey (Mapping Social Cohesion 2014). Although carried out in 
two distinct phases, the analysis is presented as a whole. Specifically, the 
analysis is presented in subsections; each subsection corresponds with the six 
themes and topics that the survey was designed to address (this design was 
comprehensively outlined above).  
 
4.7.2 Qualitative 
 
The interviews were digitally recorded, then translated and transcribed. The 
interview transcripts were then subjected to systematic thematic content 
analysis using NVivo software. Thematic content analysis is defined as “a 
research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data 
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through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1278). Or, more simply, Patton states 
it is “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a 
volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and 
meanings” (Patton, 2002, p.453). This method of analysis was deemed 
appropriate for the interpretive and critical paradigm used in designing this 
study. The goal of the analysis was to identify important themes and categories 
within the qualitative dataset – the body of interview transcripts – so as to 
provide a description of the social and political reality created by those 
themes/categories as they are lived out for the respondents. That is, the 
analysis aimed to provide “thick descriptions” of the particular socio-political 
experiences, attitudes and behaviours that were present in the sample as a 
whole. The analysis went beyond counting words or extracting objective 
content from the interview transcripts, but examined meanings, themes and 
patterns. 
Pre-Set CODES 
 
Meanings 
Push Factors Main reasons for leaving origin 
country 
Pull Factors Reasons for choosing to come to 
Australia 
Pre-arrival 
expectations 
Expectations of Australia/have they 
been met 
AS Journey Narrative of Asylum (on-shore 
protection) 
Refugee Journey  Narrative of refugee (off-shore 
protection) 
Camp Life Perceptions/Interpretations of life in 
Camp 
Settlement Experience Perceptions/Interpretations of 
Settlement 
Government Services Perceptions of Government services 
Social support  Perceptions of support from 
society/community 
Transnational Network Contact with people overseas 
Personal Social life Social activities/habits/networks 
Social milieu Perception of social milieu in 
Australia 
Cross-cultural 
networks 
Cross-cultural Social activity/Contact  
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ble 4.3.2 Pre-set Codes used to initially organise the data 
 
The interview transcripts were collated, and then subjected to three rounds of 
coding and interpretation. The coding scheme was formulated in both a pre-set 
and open manner. Initially, pre-set codes, or a-priori codes, that derive from the 
research questions, theoretical framework, and more directly from the design of 
the qualitative interviews (structure and content) are used (these are set out in 
Table 4.2). These pre-set codes were used so as to organise the data in the first 
instance.  
 
After the interview transcripts were broken down according to these pre-set 
codes, an open coding process was initiated. This took place in multiple stages, 
over a year. Overall, the researcher closely read and annotated with “emergent 
codes” each interview transcript. During this process, the texts were unitized 
into concepts (not physical linguistic units, such as recurrent singular words or 
phrases), which were highlighted and labelled. Initially, a pilot thematic analysis 
was performed on data collected in five interviews so as to verify the 
applicability of the pre-set codes, formulate a set of emergent codes, as well as 
gauge an early and superficial understanding of themes apparent in the dataset. 
Based on this initial analysis, the researcher identified those pre-set codes that 
were either irrelevant or could be brought under another code, and then began 
the first full round of analysis. Three rounds of coding were then conducted on 
the qualitative dataset as a whole. NVivo software was used to support the 
coding process. As mentioned above, coding consistency in this study was 
Employment Status and perception 
Happiness Perception/interpretation of current 
emotions 
Political milieu Perception of political milieu in 
Australia 
Personal Political life Political activities/habits 
Politics Asylum Perceptions/Interpretation of Politics 
Asylum etc. 
Society Asylum Perceptions of understanding from 
society 
Human Rights  Perception/Interpretation of Human 
Rights 
Democracy Perception/Interpretation of 
Democracy 
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addressed by conducting three rounds of systematic coding conducted over a 
period of one year. 
 
Figure 4.7 Qualitative analytic activities arranged in a general order of 
sequence 
 
The deeper qualitative analysis - the dominant themes in the data - was 
presented in four subsections, or categories. Each category represents a period 
in the life story of the respondents, from their personal history through to their 
current circumstances.  The categories are labelled, “Personal stories up until 
arrival in Australia,” “Settlement in Australia,” “Current social life” and 
“Current political life.” The most significant themes (and a contextualised 
presentation of the most poignant interview responses that demonstrate and 
validate these themes arrived upon by the researcher) are presented under each 
of these categories (see figure 4.7). That is, the dominant patterns and themes 
Data 
collected, 
translated 
and 
transcribed: 
made into 
text 
(transcripts) 
Pre-codes 
developed 
and affixed 
to transcript 
pages 
Emergent 
codes are 
analytically 
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to transcript 
pages 
Codes are 
transformed 
into themes 
Materials 
sorted by 
these 
themes, 
identifying 
patterns, 
relationship
s, and 
commonalit
ies or 
disparities 
Sorted 
materials 
are 
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to isolate 
meaningful 
patterns and 
processes 
and sorted 
into 
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Identified 
patterns are 
considered 
in light of 
previous 
research 
and 
theories, 
and a small 
set of 
generalizati
ons are 
established. 
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that became evident in the data after three rounds of coding and analysis. 
These themes highlight the prominent ideas, perceptions, interpretations, 
expectations, behaviours, relationships and meanings that were raised by 
respondents, thereby giving an overall understanding of each of the broad 
categories being addressed, as well as linking them to one another in some 
cases. The data was also analysed and presented, to an extent, in light of the 
quantitative finding of this study. That is, it highlighted and interpreted the 
meaning of consistencies and inconsistencies between the quantitative and 
qualitative dataset. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Four Main Categories used to present the qualitative analysis  
 
 
4.7.3 Converging the quantitative and qualitative: Discussing the complete 
dataset 
 
Given the size of the sample and the length of the surveys and interviews, the 
complete dataset elicited for this study was extensive and wide ranging in 
terms of content. With this in mind, and in order to discuss the findings 
meaningfully both in light of the major themes to come out of the analysis and 
the research questions that inform the study, the dataset was broken down into 
• Salient trends and patterns among the sample regarding 
their personal backgrounds 
Personal stories up 
until arrival in 
Australia  
• Salient trends and patterns among the sample regarding 
their first year of settlement Settlement in Australia 
• Salient trends and patterns among the sample regarding 
their current social lives Current Social Life 
• Salient trends and patterns among the sample regarding 
their current political lives Current Political Life 
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four specific “areas” for the final discussion. That is, it looks at four realms of 
socio-political interaction and action with which the participants have 
experience and which were shown in the analysis to have significantly 
informed their understandings about their role as social and political actors in 
the Australia context. Such an approach to presenting the final discussion, 
which seeks to present the quantitative and qualitative findings in concert and 
in a meaningful way, simply breaks down the respondents’ socio-political 
attitudes and behaviours into discernible categories/sites for study.  
 
The first site of socio-political interaction looked at concerns data about 
respondents’ interaction with Australian state services and other settlement 
service providers since their arrival in the country. Secondly it looks at data 
about individuals’ socio-cultural behaviours, and specifically their 
perspectives on their social interactions with non-Iraqi individuals and 
communities in Australia. Thirdly, it analyses data about individual political 
behaviours and perspectives on political life in Australia. Finally, it reflects 
upon respondents’ attitudes and activities as citizens, or soon to be citizens, of 
the national polity. That is, it looks at data about their civic-oriented activity, 
their interactions as civic agents, and whether they identify themselves as 
entitled members of the society and polity and therefore involve themselves in 
activities to forward their particular interests. This realm is to be understood as 
more socially substantive than a strictly political or electoral meaning of civic 
activity.   
 
After collating the relevant survey findings and further refining the major 
thematic findings of the study, the discussion presents the dominant theme 
relevant to each of these four areas of socio-political interaction. Under each 
of these overall thematic headings, the dominant findings are discussed in 
terms of the theoretical concerns of the study. Superficially, positive 
perceptions and interpretations of these various areas, will lend to an argument 
that individuals identify with the socio-political system in Australia and are 
‘engaged’ with democratic processes, while negative perceptions and 
interpretations will lend to the notion that individuals are ‘alienated’ or 
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‘disaffected’ in their current socio-political context and as such are disengaged 
from or do not contribute to democratic processes in the Australian context.   
   
 
 
4.8 Limitations of the research design 
 
There are a number of noteworthy limitations to the research design. Firstly, as 
with any qualitative research methodology aiming to probe the real world 
attitudes and behaviors of individuals, it is necessarily limited by the contrived 
nature of interviews, and the role of the interviewer/researcher who bring their 
own set of values, normative understandings and biases to the interview 
design, conduct and analysis. This is a classic issue in any interpretive, social 
scientific endeavor, such as that put forward by scholars like Habermas. 
Indeed, the social scientist, the interpreter, is in “a peculiar epistemic 
predicament,” in that, in any endeavour to see things from another’s point of 
view “there is no getting around the fact that ethnography or history is our 
attempt to see another form of life in the categories of our own” (Geertz, 1971, 
p. 17). In other words, “when faced with interpreting others' behaviour we 
quickly run into the limits of first-person knowledge simpliciter” (Bohman 
2005).   
 
By way of an example that is relevant to this study, alienation is a subjective 
phenomenon, and the methodological implication of this is that the individual 
is not always fully aware of his or her alienated state, and is not always able to 
verbalize it. And so it is up to the external observer, the researcher, to ascribe 
alienation to the subject’s attitudinal and behavioural outputs at the time of 
data collection. As Felix Geyer notes,  
“there are many clear-cut cases where the ascription of alienation 
by an external observer—even if used as a critical and normative 
rather than as a descriptive and merely diagnostic concept—is 
clearly warranted, even though the persons concerned may deny 
their alienation because of repression or false consciousness: 
childhood abuse, clearly traumatizing experiences, living under 
conditions of extreme economic deprivation or an abject political 
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system, exploitative working conditions, etc. But there are many 
not quite so appalling, but still undesirable situations in the 
Western world nowadays where it seems less useful to ascribe 
alienation to persons or groups out of a missionary drive to cure 
others of something they are either blissfully unaware of, or 
perfectly content with” (Geyer 2001, p 390).   
One way to mitigate this, is to acknowledge this limitation, accept the 
complexity of inter-subjectivity - that there are various forms of practical 
knowledge - and for the social scientist to be cognisant of her own subjectivity 
and presumed values, as well as particularly careful not to overstate findings, 
infer generalizability, nor confuse inference with objective fact.  
 
Another major limitation to this research design was the use of purposive 
sampling, which is a non-probability or selective sampling technique critiqued 
as having an inherent tendency for researcher bias. Mack, et al (2005) note that 
the application of purposive sampling entails categorizing subjects in 
accordance with ex ante identified criteria based on the research problem. As 
such, decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are 
taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may include 
specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to 
participate in the research, which introduces issues of researcher bias; the 
sample is based on the judgement of the researcher, who is concerned with a 
specific point. This is assuaged to an extent by recognition that the sample in 
this study is strictly non-representative, and by the researcher implementing 
strict sampling criteria, and remaining analytically objective, so as not to 
pursue certain participants or certain sections of the data set that may be seen 
to best support their theory. 
 
In terms of the recruitment process, there is a growing sense of fatigue with 
academic researchers who are attempting to undertake qualitative, purposive 
or theoretical sampling and research, coming into community organisations 
and/or refugee communities seeking to survey and interview individuals. 
Firstly, the researcher was not adequately acquainted with the Iraqi community 
in Victoria, or with caseworkers in the settlement sector before attempting to 
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recruit participants. As such, the process took longer than planned. For the 
group under study, and particularly for IMA arrivals, there was a growing 
sense that, since arriving in Australia, they were being endlessly interviewed – 
several times upon arrival by Federal Police and immigration officials, several 
times after arrival by caseworkers and others in the settlement sector – with no 
tangible benefits to their lives, such as the outcomes of their visa applications. 
There was a sense that many in the newly arrived Iraqi refugee community 
were no longer willing to participate in interviews, particularly where they 
could see no practical use or personal benefits for their involvement. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi refugee community members encountered by the 
researcher were wary of the researcher’s aims and could not readily relate to 
the aims of the study or did not wish to become involved. As such, recruitment 
took far longer than anticipated as a sense of trust and accommodation needed 
to be fostered between the researcher and settlement workers engaged to help 
recruit participants, as well as between the researcher and participants 
themselves.  
 
Another issue was encountered trying to recruit females to participate in the 
study. The biggest issue was that of access as the initial point of contact with 
any newly arrived family tended to be the eldest male of the household. A 
number of male respondents explained that they did not wish their wives to be 
involved in the study, and furthermore, that they were not able to make contact 
with another man’s wife, and as such had no way of asking women to become 
involved. Most commonly, the males explained this in terms of their wife’s 
lack of language skills – despite the presence of an interpreter – or a lack of 
knowledge about the questions being asked. This is despite the fact that 
women, just like men, and no matter what level of formal education they have 
attained, are knowledgeable social agents capable of expressing reflective 
insights about their own life. The researcher did make contact with one Iraqi 
woman who agreed to help her recruit a group of women to be involved. After 
four moths of communication, however, the third party said that the women 
she spoke with did not wish to be involved. Given the time restrictions, further 
effort to recruit female participants was not made, though this issue could have 
been mitigated if the researcher had greater familiarity and therefore trust with 
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potential participants. It is important to keep this in mind throughout this 
study, as the final analysis is significantly gendered, and represents largely 
male perspectives. 
 
 
4.9. Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the research methods designed and employed to pursue 
this research project. The study employs a mixed methods approach, involving a 
two-stage data collection strategy. Namely, data is collected using quantitative 
surveys administered to 100 individuals, followed by semi-structured, 
qualitative interviews with 30 individuals. The data is then subjected to basic 
statistical analysis and thematic content analysis respectively. The findings of 
the analysis are then used to reflect upon the research question of this study. The 
following chapter presents the quantitative data analysis.  
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    Chapter Five 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the quantitative data set. The data 
analysed was elicited by Socio-political Practices and Attitudes Surveys, 
which were administered to 79 Iraqi humanitarian arrivals. The original target 
of 100 surveys was not met due to difficulties in recruiting willing 
participants. Seventy-three of the 79 surveys were deemed viable for use in 
this analysis. Incomplete surveys were omitted. Data collected in the surveys 
was analysed using SPSS and Microsoft Excel software. Given that the survey 
was designed to elicit data from a non-representative, purposively selected 
sample group so as to complement/augment the qualitative data, and is not 
aimed at generating statistical comparisons and correlations, only basic 
frequencies and cross-tabulations were performed. 
 
 
5.2 Demographic Profile 
 
As per the sampling criteria, the entire sample was born overseas and all 
respondents identified themselves as “Iraqi.” Given the multiple pathways 
offered under Australia’s humanitarian program, and the significantly diverse 
experiences that each pathway may represent or engender for the migrant, it is 
worth understanding the sample in terms of their mode of arrival and the legal 
and administrative category under which they were granted protection. A 
concerted effort was made to achieve an even ratio of individuals who arrived 
via the offshore and onshore migration pathways. This was roughly achieved 
with 39 respondents, or 54 per cent of the sample, indicating that they arrived 
to Australia as refugees via the offshore humanitarian program. Thirty-three 
respondents, or 45 per cent of the sample arrived to Australia as asylum 
seekers, and were granted protection under the onshore component of the 
humanitarian program. Notably, and consistent with the recent displacement 
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patterns of Iraqis, who comprise the “world’s largest urban refugee 
population” (Harper 2008, p. 172), only one of the 39 respondents who arrived 
via the offshore program stayed in a UNHCR camp before arrival (see Figure 
5.1).   
 
 
Figure 5.1: Respondents by Arrival – Onshore/Offshore 
 
Thirty-two of the 33 respondents arrived to Australia as IMAs and stayed in 
mandatory detention. While the presence of more IMAs in the sample is to be 
expected given that, over the past decade, there have been slightly more Iraqi 
IMA arrivals than non-IMA arrivals, there is still an overrepresentation in the 
sample. Such an overrepresentation may be due to the snowball sampling 
technique used and the particular community networks tapped into by the 
researcher.  
 
Most commonly, the survey respondents arrived to Australia in 2012, with 19 
individuals or 26 per cent of the sample indicating as such. Eighteen 
respondents, 25 per cent of the sample, arrived to Australia in 2008 (see Figure 
5.2). This is reflective of broader Iraqi displacement patterns; the deterioration 
of security in Iraq and the Middle East region led to an upsurge of 
Humanitarian visas being granted to Iraqis around these times. It may also, in 
part, be due to the sampling technique used, whereby respondents were 
contacted through a limited number of community contacts. In any case, the 
54% 
45% 
1% 
Did you arrive to Australia as a Refugee 
or Asylum Seeker? 
 
As a Refugee 
Seeking Onshore 
Protection (Asylum 
Seeker) 
Missing 
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sample represents a group of relatively new arrivals to Australia. In light of 
Graeme Hugo’s assertion that the first years - and for the sake of 
categorisation, the first five years - are particularly salient in determining 
settlement outcomes of newly arrived humanitarian migrants, it is worth 
noting that 70 per cent of the sample surveyed are within that initial period 
(Hugo 2011) (see Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.2: Year of Arrival to Australia 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Time Period of Settlement in Australia
 
In terms of the age structure of the sample, 35 respondents or 48 per cent of 
the sample were born between 1971 and 1980. That is, 48 per cent of the 
sample is between the ages 31 and 40 at the time the survey was administered. 
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The next largest age group, representing 26 respondents or 36 per cent of the 
sample, are those born between 1981 and 1990, making them between 21 and 
30 at the time the survey was administered (see Figure 5.4). The sample’s age 
structure is approximately consistent with the age structures present among 
Australia’s humanitarian intake more broadly (DIAC, 2013b).  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Respondents by Age Groups 
 
The median age of the survey sample is 33. Considering that this study did not 
include any persons less than 18 years of age, and that the median age for the 
Australian population is 37 years (a figure which accounts for those 18 years 
and younger) (ABS, 2010), this cohort is relatively young. Furthermore, the 
median age for this sample is significantly younger than the median age for all 
overseas-born people in Australia, which is 45 years (DIAC, 2013a). This is 
consistent with Graeme Hugo’s findings that “people coming to Australia 
through the humanitarian program are substantially younger than the national 
Australian population and arrivals under other migration categories” (Hugo 
2011b, p. 14). Such demographic dynamics are set to have a growing 
importance in light of Australia’s progressively ageing population, the median 
age of which “has increased by 4.8 years over the last two decades, from 32.1 
years at 30 June 1990 to 36.9 years at 30 June 2010” (ABS, 2012). 
 
Although the survey was administered to adults aged 18 years and over, it is 
worth noting that a large proportion of people arriving to Australia under the 
humanitarian program are children. Iraqi arrivals in general (Hugo, 2011b) and 
1% 15% 
48% 
36% 
What year were you born? 
1951-1960 
1961-1970 
1971-1980 
1981-1990 
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this sample in particular reflect this pattern. Sixty of the 73 respondents, or 82 
per cent of the sample indicated that they are married with children. Given the 
young age structure of respondents, it may be presumed that those dependent 
children who have arrived to Australia are relatively young, and will receive 
the bulk of their primary and secondary education in Australia (for some IMA 
arrivals, their children are still in countries of first asylum awaiting feedback 
on their claims for family reunification – refer to the qualitative data analysis 
section for further discussion of this dominant trend). Although the survey did 
not ask respondents to indicate how many children they have, Iraqi women 
tend to have higher levels of childbearing than Australian-born women, and 
tend to bear children at a younger age. These factors set this intake apart from 
the demographic dynamics of the resident Australian population as well as 
other migrant groups in Australia.  
 
Forty-eight participants, or two thirds of the sample are male. The remaining 
third are female. One person did not answer this question (see Figure 5.5). 
This is a slight over-representation of males when compared with the gender 
ratio of all Iraqis arriving to Australia through the humanitarian program; 
110.5 males to every 100 females (Hugo 2011, p. 74). The offshore refugee-
humanitarian intake to Australia is more balanced between males and females 
than any other visa type or migration pathway, such as family and skilled 
(Hugo 2011). The IMA onshore component, on the other hand, is a more 
gendered process, with males significantly over-represented among onshore 
arrivals. For example, in 2012-13, 88 per cent of IMA humanitarian visas were 
granted to males and 12 per cent to females (DIBP, 2013, p. 30), which is a 
significant over-representation of males, and a disparity that was relatively 
consistent across the preceding five years. This is linked to the patriarchal 
nature of most Iraqi family structures; it is deemed most appropriate for the 
father – or the oldest male figure – to undertake the dangerous and relatively 
expensive maritime journey to Australia and arrange for his family to come 
out subsequent to his arrival.   
 
 
 
 154 
 
Figure 5.5: Respondents by Gender 
 
In terms of the respondents’ current living arrangements, 43 individuals or 59 
per cent of the sample indicated that they live with their husband/wife as well 
as their children. Given that, as noted above, 60 of the 73 respondents, or 82 
per cent of the sample indicated that they are married with children, it may be 
deduced that 17 respondents arrived to Australia without their partner and 
children. This is tenuously backed up by the fact that 17 respondents, or 13 per 
cent of the sample indicated that they live with friends. It is common for new 
arrivals, especially onshore arrivals, to come without their immediate family 
only to apply for family reunification after being granted protection in 
Australia. This phenomenon deserves exploration in the qualitative interviews. 
 
Fifty-seven respondents, or 78 per cent of the sample indicated that they are 
Muslim, and 16 respondents or 22 per cent indicated that they are Christian 
(see Figure 5.6). This is at odds with the religious profile of the broader Iraqi 
community in Australia; at the 2011 Census 47.6 percent of Iraq-born 
individuals in Australia identified as Christian, and 32 per cent identified as 
Muslim (DIAC, 2013a, p. 3). The over-representation of Muslims in this 
study’s sample may be due to the sampling process, whereby a majority of the 
researchers’ community contacts happened to be Muslim. Another factor is 
that the vast majority of onshore humanitarian entrants from Iraq are Muslim. 
Again, given that the researcher made a concerted effort to survey an 
66% 
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approximately even mix of onshore and offshore humanitarian entrants, 
prioritizing these administrative/legal categories over any religious 
identification of respondents, it was assumed that at least roughly half the 
sample was going to be Muslim from the outset.   
 
 
Figure 5.6: Respondents by Religion 
 
It is worth noting that although some respondents indicated their particular 
religious sect within these two broader religious traditions - for example, Shia, 
Sunni, Catholic or Assyrian Apostolic - these responses have been brought 
under the broader categories of “Islam” and “Christianity” in order to reflect 
the nature of the majority of respondents’ answers to the question.  
Furthermore, none of the respondents indicated that they had “no religion”, 
which is in stark contrast to figures from the 2011 Census, in which 22.3 per 
cent of the total Australian population stated “No religion” (DIAC, 2013a).  
 
In line with the religious profile of the sample, 60 respondents, or 82 per cent 
of the sample indicated that Arabic is their native language and the language 
they speak at home. The remaining 13 participants, 18 per cent, indicated that 
their native language, and the language they speak at home is “Assyrian” (or 
Assyrian Neo-Aramaic). When compared with the broader Iraq-born 
community in Australia, there is an over-representation of Arabic speakers in 
this sample (DIAC, 2013a, p. 2). This may be explained by the same factors 
that influenced the religious profile of the sample (as discussed directly 
above). 
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5.3 Education Levels, English Language Proficiency and Labor 
Force Engagement and Participation 
 
The most frequent “highest level of education” among the sample is high 
school level, which was attained in Iraq by 32 respondents or 44 per cent of 
the sample. Eleven respondents, or 15 per cent of the sample reached primary 
school level and one person received no formal education at all (see Figure 
5.7). According to DIAC’s 2011 SONA report, “close to 75 per cent of 
Humanitarian entrants arrived with high school level education or lower 
levels… Just over 17.3 per cent arrived in Australia with no education” (DIAC 
2011, p. 17). Only 60 per cent of this sample has high school level education 
or lower, and, as stated, only one respondent received no education at all. Such 
figures indicate that the Iraqi respondents in this study have attained higher 
levels of education than other birth country groups of humanitarian arrivals to 
Australia. 
 
As for tertiary education, just over a quarter of the sample, or 19 respondents, 
have an under-graduate university degree or diploma. Six respondents, or eight 
per cent of the sample have post-graduate qualifications (either Masters or 
Doctorate) (see Figure 5.7). Taken together, that means that 34 per cent of the 
sample has higher education qualifications. These figures compare favourably 
with ABS 2011 data, which indicates that 25 per cent of the Australian 
population have higher education qualifications (Norton, 2012, p. 6).  That is, 
the respondents surveyed have higher levels of tertiary level attainment than 
the Australian population more broadly. 
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Figure 5.7: Respondents by Highest Level of Education 
 
In addition to traditional education is vocational training. Four respondents, or 
five per cent of the sample indicated that they have some variety of trade or 
technical qualification. Taking university and technical degrees together, 39 
per cent of the sample holds such qualifications. This is similar to ABS 2006 
Census data, which indicates that 39.4 per cent of the Australian population 15 
years and older has a technical or university qualification (DIAC 2011, p. 2). 
This sample is consistent with the finding from DIAC’s 2011 report that 
“people from Iraq… are more likely (compared with all other countries of 
birth) to have university qualifications before arriving in Australia” (DIAC, 
2011, p. 18). Quantitatively, the sample has more formal education 
qualifications than other humanitarian arrivals, and the Australian population 
more broadly. 
 
In terms of ongoing education in Australia, 23 respondents or 32 per cent of 
the sample were engaged in study at the time they were surveyed. The 
remaining 50 respondents were not. It is difficult to compare these with 
existing figures for the Australian population as the type of study being 
pursued was not asked of the respondents, and therefore useful comparisons 
cannot be made. Comparisons may be made, however, for English language 
education. Thirteen respondents or 12 per cent of the sample indicated that 
they have accessed or are accessing English language tuition. This stands in 
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stark contrast to findings for humanitarian entrants more generally, 72 per cent 
of which have studied or are studying English in Australia (DIAC, 2011, p. 
14).  It also stands in contrast to the ostensible needs of the sample; the most 
common response, given by 33 respondents, or nearly half of the sample, was 
that they have low or “beginner” level proficiency in English. Eighteen 
respondents or 25 per cent indicated that they are fluent in English, and 21 
respondents or 29 per cent of the sample indicated that they are at an 
“intermediate” level. One respondent did not answer this question (see Figure 
5.8).  
 
Low proficiency in English is common among new humanitarian arrivals. 
Research shows that proficiency levels increase over time, with “a majority of 
Humanitarian entrants indicat[ing] that they can speak English well or very 
well after 4 years of settlement” (DIAC, 2011, p. 12).  Given that 70 per cent 
of the survey respondents have been in Australia for less than five years (see 
Figure 5.3 above), low English proficiency may be expected among this 
sample. Yet, the finding that only 12 per cent of the sample is accessing 
English language tuition is certainly worth further exploration in the 
qualitative interviews, to elucidate the reasons for non-attendance.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: English Language Proficiency 
 
In line with low English language proficiency, though not definitively 
correlated to it, the sample displays relatively low levels of employment and 
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labour force participation. Twenty-two respondents, or 30 per cent of the 
sample, are employed (they have jobs). A majority of 50 respondents, 69 per 
cent of the sample, are unemployed (see Figure 5.9). It must be noted that the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, when calculating official unemployment 
levels, classifies people aged 15 years and over “unemployed if they satisfy 
three criteria: they are not employed, they are available to start work and they 
are taking active steps to find work” (ABS, 2012). Complying with these 
official standards, 26 per cent of the whole sample is “unemployed” as per the 
definition used to calculate official unemployment rates in Australia.  This is 
significantly higher than national unemployment levels, which were 5.2 per 
cent in 2012 (ABS, 2012b) and 5.8 per cent over 2013 (ABS, 2013b). It is also 
significantly higher than the unemployment rates of other migrants who have 
recently arrived to Australia under different visa types. The high 
unemployment rate for this sample supports previous research, which posits 
that the disruptive effects of settlement for new humanitarian arrivals lead to 
poor labour market outcomes (DIAC, 2011; Hugo, 2011a; 2011b).  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Respondents by Employment 
 
Another way of framing these findings is to say that a majority of 41 
respondents, or 56 per cent of the entire sample, are engaged with the 
Australian labour force (the “labour force” being all those who are either 
employed or actively seeking employment). This is lower than the national 
average of 64.8 per cent calculated over the year 2013 (ABS 2013a). For the 
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overall sample, then, this means that a slight minority of 32 respondents or 44 
per cent are not in the labour force at all; they are unemployed and not looking 
for work. This finding is high when compared with DIAC’s 2011 study, which 
found that 3.3 per cent of their sample was unemployed and not looking for 
work, while 11.5 per cent were unemployed but looking for work (DIAC 
2011, p. 27). According to this report, Iraqis are one of two birth country 
groups who are least likely to be employed and also part of households that are 
most likely to receive Centrelink payments. This low labour force participation 
rate among the sample – despite the sample’s relatively high education levels - 
is explored further in the qualitative interviews.  
 
Figure 5.10: Unemployed Respondents by Labour Force Participation 
 
5.4 Perspectives on Formal Political Status in Australia 
 
Twenty-nine respondents, or 40 per cent of the sample are Australian citizens.  
A majority of 60 per cent are not (see Figure 5.11). Given that 40 respondents 
or 55 per cent of the sample have been in Australia for four years or more, and 
are therefore eligible to become citizens11, there is a discrepancy between 
those that are eligible to obtain citizenship, and those that have obtained 
citizenship. That is, 11 respondents who are eligible for citizenship are yet to 
obtain it, which may indicate a lack of intention or a low level of intention or 
motivation to do so.  
 
                                                
''Protection visa holders are required to have lived in Australia for a minimum of four years 
before they are eligible to become an Australian citizen.
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Figure 5.11: Respondents by Australian Citizenship. 
 
Exploring the respondents’ intentions, it is found that, of those respondents 
who are not yet citizens, 29 respondents or 66 per cent of this portion of the 
sample, plan to become Australian citizens. Fifteen of those respondents, or 34 
per cent of non-citizens in the sample, indicated that they did not know 
whether they would eventually become a citizen. Notably, zero respondents 
indicated “no” or expressed a complete lack of intention to become an 
Australian citizen (see Figure 5.12). These results are in line with those found 
for humanitarian entrants in the SONA study, which reports, “Nearly all 
respondents indicated that they were or intended to be citizens (No but hope to 
be category). Very few were not intending to become citizens [just one per 
cent of the sample]” (DIAC, 2011, p. 44).  
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Figure 5.12: Respondents by Aspiration for Australian Citizenship 
 
 
  
5.5 Interaction with official Government and Non-government 
Institutions 
 
This section looks at which government and/or government-funded 
humanitarian settlement services (HSS) the respondents most commonly 
access. It also gauges the respondents’ ideas about the accessibility of these 
services and the quality of service provision and content.  
 
Forty-four respondents or 60 per cent of the sample indicated that they are in 
receipt of Centrelink payments (see Figure 5.13). This is lower than figures 
obtained for humanitarian entrants generally, which indicated that around 85 
per cent of humanitarian entrants’ households are in receipt of Centrelink 
payments (DIAC 2011, p. 19). Findings specific to Iraqis in DIAC’s 2011 
study found that 93.2 per cent of Iraqi households received Centrelink 
payments, which was the highest among all other countries of birth. Notably, 
the number of respondents receiving Centrelink payments is lower than the 50 
respondents, or 69 per cent of the sample that currently do not have a job. This 
raises the question of how respondents are supporting themselves financially. 
While this is explored in the interviews, the formatting or layout of the 
question in the actual survey may, in part, explain this result. The respondents 
were asked to indicate which services they access from a list of services, and 
asked to mark all that apply. A number of respondents marked only one 
service from the list, suggesting that there was a misunderstanding in 
comprehending the question.  
 
Nine respondents or 12 per cent of the sample indicated that they use 
translation and interpreting services. This rate is relatively low compared to 
the 44.4 per cent among humanitarian entrants more broadly who access these 
services (DIAC, 2011, p. 21). It is also relatively low when compared with 
level of English language proficiency of the sample – 45 per cent of the 
sample has a “beginner” level. This suggests a discrepancy between the 
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ostensible needs of the respondents and their actual accessing of the attendant 
service, which is similar to the pattern observed for the respondents’ 
attendance to English language tuition. Such a trend is worth further 
exploration in the interviews. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Government Services Currently Accessed 
 
Fifty-four respondents or 74 per cent of the sample indicated that they access 
health services in Australia. This is in line with findings for humanitarian 
entrants in the 2011 DIAC report. This report does note, however, “a majority 
of all streams who use health and medical services find them easy to use. 
While around 50% of Humanitarian entrants who use medical services find 
them easy to use, relatively more Humanitarian entrants find health and 
medical services harder to use than the two other streams.” (DIAC, 2011, p.
24). This is explored further in the interviews.  
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In order to probe the respondents’ perceptions about the accessibility of 
government services, they were asked to rate how easy accessing government 
services has been in their experience. The most common answer, given by 27 
respondents or 37 per cent of the sample, was “easy”. The second most 
common answer, given by 22 respondents or 30 percent of the sample was “A 
Little difficult.” Six respondents or eight per cent of the sample indicated that 
accessing government services has been either “difficult” or “very difficult” 
(see Figure 5.14). While a majority of the sample appears happy with the 
accessibility of settlement services, it is worth exploring the nature of the 
difficulties encountered by the other 38 per cent of the sample. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Ease of accessing Government Services 
 
In regards to the respondents’ perceptions about the quality of government 
services, the most common response given was that they are “good”, with 32 
respondents or 44 per cent of the sample indicating as such. Twenty-three 
respondents or 32 per cent of the sample indicated that government services 
are “excellent.” Fourteen respondents perceive government services as 
“adequate”, and no respondents indicated that they were of a “poor” or “very 
poor” quality (see Figure 5.15). Overall, the respondents have a very positive 
perception of government services, despite the previous finding that, overall, 
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28 respondents or 38 per cent of the sample found accessing services either a 
little difficult, difficult, or very difficult.  
 
 
Figure 5.15: Quality of Government Services 
 
 
5.6 Socio-cultural behaviors and perspectives on social life in 
Australia 
   
This section explores the socio-cultural attitudes and behaviours of the 
respondents. It begins by gauging the respondents’ frequency of interaction 
with particular types of socio-cultural networks. Overall, the respondents tend 
to interact mostly with their own cultural community. In particular, most of the 
respondents indicated that they spend the bulk of their time with their family. 
This is followed by time spent with the Iraqi refugee community more 
broadly. This is in line with Graeme Hugo’s finding that “new and emerging 
refugee communities have a strong desire to promote the development of their 
own communities” (Hugo 2011a, p. 48). In contrast, the respondents display a 
low level of interaction with groups that are socio-culturally distinct from their 
Iraqi refugee community. The respondents indicated they spend the least 
amount of time interacting with “white Australian citizens”. It is worth having 
a closer look at the sample’s frequency of interaction with each group 
specified in the survey.   
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As stated, the respondents spend most of their time with their immediate 
family. Forty respondents, or 55 per cent of the sample indicated they 
“always” spend time with their immediate family, while eight respondents or 
11 per cent indicated “often” (see Figure 5.16). This is roughly consistent with 
the findings above, which show that 53 respondents live with members of their 
immediate family.  Seven respondents or 10 per cent of the sample indicated 
that they “rarely” spend time with their family, while 16 respondents or 22 per 
cent of the sample responded “never”. Again, these figures are compatible 
with the findings about the living arrangements of the sample; 21 respondents 
indicated that they lived with friends or on their own.   
 
 
Figure 5.16: Amount of Time Spent with Immediate Family 
 
Overall, respondents whose immediate family are in Australia tend to spend 
most of their time with them; indeed, it appears to be something of a socio-
cultural expectation or norm. Extrapolating from this result, it may be seen that 
the vast majority of respondents prefer to spend most of their time with this 
close-knit network. This then leads to a potentially problematic situation for 
those whose family is not in Australia, by causing or compounding feelings of 
loneliness and estrangement. This is a point worth exploring in the interviews, 
in order to gauge how the respondents perceive and feel about their situation, 
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and what their expectations are for seeing/reuniting with their family in the 
future.     
 
The respondents spend markedly less time with their extended family than 
their immediate family. The most common response, given by 31 respondents 
or 42 per cent of the sample was that they “never” spend time with their 
extended family (see Figure 5.17). The next most common response, given by 
17 respondents or 23 per cent of the sample was “rarely”. Thirteen respondents 
or 18 per cent of the sample indicated “often”, and six respondents or six per 
cent of the sample said “sometimes”. Given that Iraqi households tend to be 
extended, rather than nuclear households, the overall tendency of the 
respondents not to network with their extended family may be explained by a 
complete lack of such family members being in Australia, particularly as they 
are part of a relatively new migrant cohort. 
 
 
Figure 5.17: Amount of Time Spent with Extended Family 
After immediate family, the respondents spend most of their time with the 
“Iraqi refugee community.” Twenty-six respondents or 36 per cent of the 
sample indicated that they “often” spend time with the Iraqi refugee 
community, while 23 respondents or 32 per cent of the sample indicated 
“sometimes”. Not one respondent indicated that they “rarely” or “never” spend 
time with the Iraqi refugee community (see Figure 5.18). Again, this is in line 
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with the findings of Hugo, who states, “Humanitarian settlers reported that 
they felt well-connected to their local community—to a greater extent than 
other categories of migrants. This indicates they have a strong attachment to 
the immediate communities in which they live.” (Hugo 2011a, p. 48). As well 
as corroborating his assertion that new refugee communities have “a very 
strong identification with ethnic networks and communities and this is a major 
element of their social capital” (Hugo 2011b, 227). The quantitative data from 
this study corroborates Hugo’s point, but is worth further exploration in the 
interview in order to explore the meanings that Iraqi respondents ascribe to 
their behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 5.18: Amount of Time Spent with Iraqi Refugee Community 
 
The respondents were asked “How often do you spend time with people 
outside the Iraqi community?” The most common responses were 
“sometimes” and “rarely”; 17 respondents or 23 per cent of the sample 
indicated each of these answers. Altogether, 48 respondents, a majority of 66 
per cent, have a low frequency of interaction with non-Iraqis, indicating 
“occasionally”, “rarely” or “never” (see Figure 5.19). This is significant as it 
suggests a measure of socio-cultural isolation for this sample group, or at the 
least a significant social gap between the respondents and others in Australia. 
While this may be expected for new arrivals to Australia with low proficiency 
in English, this phenomenon deserves further attention in the interviews so as 
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to account for the respondents’ perceptions of social networking with non-
Iraqis, and to explore the attitudes that inform their behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 5.19: Amount of Time Spent with People Outside the Iraqi 
Community 
 
Going beyond the very general “non-Iraqi” categorisation, the respondents 
were asked how much time they spend with three socio-culturally distinct 
groups; people from a “different religion”, those from a “different cultural 
background”, and “white Australian citizens”. In terms of spending time with 
people from a different religion and people from a different cultural 
background, the respondents’ answers were approximately equivalent to the 
previous question about “non-Iraqis”. Altogether, 50 respondents, a majority 
of 68 per cent, have a low frequency of interaction with people from a 
different religion, indicating “occasionally”, “rarely” or “never” (see Figure 
5.20). Slightly more respondents indicated that they spend time with people 
from different cultural backgrounds, yet the frequency of interaction is still 
low for the majority, with 41 respondents of 57 per cent indicating that they do 
so “occasionally”, “rarely” or “never” (see Figure 5.21). 
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Figure 5.20: Amount of Time Spent with People of a Different Religion 
from your Own 
 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Amount of Time Spent with People From Different Cultural 
Backgrounds 
 
The respondents indicated that they spend the least amount of their time with 
“white Australian citizens”.  The most common response, given by 23 
respondents or 32 per cent of the sample, was “rarely”. Taken together, 32 
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respondents or 44 per cent of the sample indicated “rarely” or “never,” which 
suggests a significant actual and/or perceived social gap between these two 
demographic groups, in that they do not interact and network with one another 
(see Figure 5.22). The respondents’ networking preferences and practices are 
explored further in the interviews, so as to gauge the attitudes that inform the 
low levels of social interaction between the respondents and “white Australian 
citizens”.
 
 
Figure 5.22: Amount of Time Spent with White Australian Citizens 
 
In addition to questions about the respondents’ preferred and most frequently 
engaged with inter- and intra-cultural social networks, the survey presented a 
more general question about whether they participate in social activities 
outside of the Iraqi community. A slight majority indicated that they do 
participate in social activities outside the Iraqi community, with 32 
respondents or 44 per cent of the sample indicating that they “agreed” and six 
respondents or eight per cent of the sample indicating that they “strongly 
agreed”. Twenty-five respondents or 34 per cent of the sample indicated that 
they “disagree”, and three respondents or four per cent of the sample indicated 
that they “strongly disagree”.  Six respondents or eight per cent of the sample 
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indicated “neutral”, and one respondent indicated, “I don’t know” (see Figure 
5.23).  
   
 
Figure 5.23: Respondents’ Participation in Social Activities Outside Iraqi 
Community 
 
It is significant that almost half of the sample have such low levels of 
interaction with non-Iraqis. This finding lends further evidence to the 
suggestion that this sample is relatively socio-culturally isolated. In order to 
explore substantive reasons for such behaviours, this issue deserves further 
exploration in the interviews - to gauge the respondents’ perceptions and 
attitudes towards non-Iraqis, and their reasons for not engaging with broader 
socio-cultural networks.  
 
As a precursor for such an exploration, the survey posed questions that probe 
the respondents’ attitudes about the social milieu in Australia. Firstly, the 
respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement, “It is important to me to maintain my Iraqi 
culture and heritage.” Almost the entire sample indicated that they agree that 
maintaining their Iraqi culture and heritage is an important, personal priority. 
Forty respondents or 55 per cent of the sample indicated that they “strongly 
agree” with the statement, while 25 respondents or 34 per cent “agree.” Eight 
respondents or 11 per cent indicated that they are neutral. Notably, none of the 
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respondents “disagree”, which shows that their origin or “native” culture and 
cultural identity is important to the entire sample (see Figure 5.24).   
 
 
Figure 5.24: Importance of Maintaining Iraqi Culture and Heritage 
 
Such findings are in line with data collected in the Australian Humanitarian 
Settler Survey and presented in Hugo (2011b, p. 246). When asked in the 
AHSS to select the particular characteristics of their living situation that they 
value, the most common response, given by 76.4 per cent of the sample, was 
“cultural or ethnic practices respected”. This sample appears to place a similar 
value on their cultural identity, and implicitly value the notion that their 
culture be respected so that they are able to maintain and continue to practice 
their specific ethnic, cultural or religious routines, habits and norms. This is 
explored further in the qualitative interviews.   
 
Further to this issue of intercultural respect and tolerance, and the capacity for 
cultural maintenance in the Australian socio-political milieu, it is notable that 
findings from the Australian Social Cohesion Survey (ASCS 2011) indicate 
that Australians more broadly feel the same way about their cultures. 
Respondents were asked, “Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement. In the modern world, maintaining the Australian way of life and 
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culture is important.” The results show a similar pattern to the answers 
provided by Iraqis in this study’s sample (note that the questions posed to the 
respondents in this study was worded differently, but the overall meaning was 
very similar and as such may be used for comparison); 60 per cent of the 
sample indicated “strongly agree,” (compared to 55 per cent of Iraqi 
respondents), 31 per cent indicated “Agree,” (compared to 34 per cent of Iraqi 
respondents), three per cent indicated “Neither agree nor disagree,” which is 
slightly lower than the 11 per cent for he sample who indicated that they were 
“neutral.” The only significant difference is that six per cent of Australian 
respondents in the Social Cohesion Survey answered, “disagree” and one per 
cent indicated, “strongly disagree,” while no Iraqi respondents indicated either 
“disagree” or “strongly disagree.” It may be seen that the Iraqi sample in this 
study, and Australians more broadly display similar attitudes to cultural 
identity maintenance. Both groups place value on this aspect of their life and 
seek to maintain their particular cultural norms and practices in the broader 
plural society.  
 
Having established that the maintenance of Iraqi culture is important to the 
respondents, they were then asked to assess their own level of understanding 
of the wider Australian society, the milieu into which they are settling. The 
most common answer, however, is “neutral”. That is, the respondents’ neither 
agree nor disagree but seem dispassionate or detached about their personal 
understanding of the socio-cultural milieu in Australia (see Figure 5.25). This 
neutrality, in concert with nine respondents indicating, “I don’t know,” 
suggests that they are, at the least, not confident of their own understandings 
about life, culture and politics in their new context. Despite the fact that the 
sample are relatively new arrivals, and their understandings will invariably 
develop over time, the particular barriers to understanding Australian society, 
as perceived by the sample, deserves further attention in the qualitative 
interviews.    
 
 175 
 
Figure 5.25: Respondents’ Understanding About Life, Culture and Politics 
in Australia 
 
Despite a relatively poor self-assessment of their levels of understanding about 
life in Australia, the sample displays a strong intention to learn about life, 
culture and politics in the country. Thirty-eight respondents, or slightly more 
than half of the sample, “agree” with the statement, “I am interested in 
learning about life, culture and politics in Australia.” Twenty-one respondents 
or 29 per cent of the sample indicated that they “strongly agree. Notably, none 
of the respondents indicated “disagree” or “strongly disagree”, which shows 
overall there is a strong intention to learn about the new society into which 
they are settling (see Figure 5.26). The respondents’ high level of intention to 
learn, and the low level of realisation of this intention is discussed with 
interview respondents so as to gauge their attitudes and perspectives about 
their understandings, as well as to probe any particular barriers they face.  
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Figure 5.26: Level of Interest to Learn about Life, Culture and Politics in 
Australia 
 
It is worth exploring not just the extent to which the respondents understand 
life, cultre and politics in Australia, but the extent to which they feel 
themselves, and their socio-cultural identifications and behavioural norms, 
understood by the broader Australian community. To this end, the respondents 
were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with the statement, 
“People I have met in Australia have a good understanding about life, culture 
and politics in Iraq.” A significant majority did not concur with this sentiment. 
The most common response is “disagree”, with 33 respondents or 45 per cent 
of the sample indicating as such.  Fourteen respondents, nearly one fifth of the 
sample, indicated that they “strongly disagree”, while 17 respondents or 23 per 
cent of the sample indicated “neutral”. Significantly, only 3 respondents or 4 
per cent of the sample indicated that they “agree” and no respondents indicated 
that they “strongly agree” (see Figure 5.27).  
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Figure 5.27: Australian society's understanding of life, culture and politics 
in Iraq 
 
Overall, the respondents do not perceive Australians as culturally literate and 
informed about Iraqi lifestyles, culture and politics (keeping in mind that 
‘Iraqi’ in itself denotes a number ethno-culturallly and religiously diverse 
communities). In light of the importance that the respondents place on their 
cultural identity, and maintianing their Iraqi heritage, and their apparent 
propensity to socialise within their relatively tight-knit Iraqi socio-cultural 
commnity, this perceived lack of reciprocity on behalf of broader Australian 
society invariably operates to foster socio-cultural isolation, rather than 
socialisation of this particular cultural group within the wider national, socio-
cultural community. In social capital terms, such attitudes and behaviours 
operate to build in-group bonding capital, but a perceived lack of intercultural 
reciprocity on behalf of Australia, operates to the detriment of bridging capital 
and wider socialisation into the national community.  
 
It is important, however, to look beyond the realisation of reciprocal 
intercultural understanding, and explore how the respondents’ perceive the 
intercultural intentions of the broader Australian society toward their particular 
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community. When asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with the 
following statement, “People in Australia are interested to learn about life, 
culture and politics in Iraq”, the respondents painted a different picture to the 
preceding question. Indeed, seven respondents or 10 per cent of the sample 
“strongly agree” and 13 respondents or 18 per cent of the sample “agree” that 
people they meet in Australia are interested to learn about Iraqi culture. The 
majority, however, still answered in the neutral or negative, with 21 
respondents or 19 per cent answering both “neutral” and “disagree” (see 
Figure 5.28). As such, despite the respondents indicating that people in 
Australia are not familiar with and don’t understand their native culture and 
context, there is a perception among approximately a quarter of the 
respondents that Australians are interested to learn about their origin culture. 
Issues around intercultural understanding and reciprocity are explored further 
in the qualitative interviews.        
 
 
Figure 5.28: People in Australia are interested to learn about life, culture 
and politics in Iraq. 
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political opinions. When asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed 
with the following statement, “People in Australia are very diverse and open to 
different cultures, religions and political opinions,” the respondents painted yet 
a different picture to that of the previous question. Indeed, 20 respondents or 
27 per cent of the sample “strongly agree” and 35 respondents, or nearly half 
of the sample, “agree” that people in Australia are very diverse and open to 
different cultures, religions and political opinions (see Figure 5.29). That is, 
three-quarters of the sample agreed with the statement. This is notable, 
because although the respondents indicated that Australians are open to 
different cultures and identities, they don’t perceive that Australians are 
interested to learn about Iraqi culture in particular. This tentatively suggests 
that they perceive a stigma attached to their particular socio-cultural identities 
in the popular Australian context. Such a suggestion, however, is inconclusive 
and requires further exploration in the interviews to understand the meanings 
the respondents ascribe to such attitudes. 
 
Figure 5.29: Australia’s diversity and openness
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(-2
*.2
-2 '2 '2
'+2
&2
'&2
(&2
)&2
*&2
+&2
,&2
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don't Know 
People in Australia are very diverse and open to different cultures, religions and 
political opinions? 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f S
am
pl
e 
People in Australia are very diverse and 
open to different cultures, religions and 
political opinions 

 180 
sample answered in the positive: 23 per cent indicating that they “strongly 
agree” and 42 per cent indicating that they “agree”. Seventeen respondents or 
23 per cent of the sample indicated “neutral” (see Figure 5.30). Only seven 
respondents answered in the negative, indicating that they “disagree,” and no 
respondents indicated, “strongly disagree.” This is in line, to an extent, with 
the findings of the Australian Humanitarian Settler Survey presented in 
Hugo’s 2011 report, which “shows that only a tenth of respondents did not 
“feel they are part of mainstream social and cultural life” (Hugo 2011, p. 232).  
Although “feeling welcome” and “feel they are part of mainstream social and 
cultural life” are not absolutely equivalent notions, they may be compared 
insofar as they represent the respondents’ perception that they belong to and 
are able to act as social agents in the broader Australian milieu.  
 
 
Figure 5.30: Feeling Welcome by Australian Society 
 
The results from this question stand in contrast to findings presented in Figure 
5.30, and suggest that “feeling welcome” is not necessarily a product of 
reciprocal cultural understanding, but perhaps a more abstract perception and 
feeling. That is, although the respondents have made it clear they do not feel 
that their socio-cultural identity is well understood by other Australians, they 
feel welcomed in a more abstract, and perhaps superficial sense. That is, they 
are comfortable to pursue their own socio-cultural agenda, because they are 
23% 
42% 
23% 
10% 
0% 1% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Don't Know 
I feel welcomed by most people I meet in Australia 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
I feel welcomed by most people I meet in 
Australia. 
 181 
‘welcome’ to do so, even in the face of insubstantial intercultural 
understanding between themselves and the wider community. It is therefore 
important to keep this distinction between substantive and abstract forms of 
intercultural understanding and belonging in mind during the interviews, in 
order to substantiate and explore these findings.  
 
When looking at the propensity for humanitarian migrants to adjust positively 
(or settle successfully) in the Australian context, it is important to assess how 
confident they are that they can make choices about their life and future. Most 
commonly, the respondents indicated that they are “confident” that they can 
make their own choices about their future in Australia, with 25 respondents or 
34 per cent of the sample indicating as such. The next most common response, 
given by 23 respondents or 32 per cent of the sample is “a little confident.” At 
the extreme ends of the spectrum, 16 respondents or 22 per cent indicated 
“very confident”, and 9 respondents or 12 per cent of the sample indicated 
“not confident at all” (see Figure 5.31). When compared with the results of the 
SONA study presented in Hugo (2011), this sample has lower levels of 
confidence than other humanitarian arrivals. Particular reasons for the 
respondents’ relatively low confidence levels is explored further in the 
interviews.  
 
 
Figure 5.31: Respondents’ levels of confidence in their ability to make their 
own choices about their future in Australia 
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Another empirical indicator used to explore the respondents’ attitudes towards, 
and sense of belonging to the broader Australian social milieu is happiness. 
The respondents were asked to rate the degree to which they agreed with the 
statement, “I am happy with my life in Australia.” The most common 
response, given by 24 respondents, or 33 per cent of the sample is that they 
“agree.” Twenty-three respondents, or 32 per cent of the sample indicated 
“neutral.” The third most common response, given by a quarter of the sample, 
is “strongly agree.” Six respondents or a tenth of the sample “disagree” and 
only one respondent indicated, “strongly disagree” (see Figure 5.32). The 
proportion among the Iraqi sample of this study indicating that they are 
“neutral” about their happiness, or are not happy is significantly higher than 
the findings of the AHSS survey, in which 47.9 per cent of the sample 
surveyed “strongly agree” with the statement “I am happy with my life in 
Australia” (Hugo, 2011, p. 245). Such findings specific to Iraqis is 
corroborated in DIAC’s 2011 report; “Iraqis are more likely [than other 
country groups] to indicate that they are not happy” (DIAC 2011, p. 54).  This 
is worth further exploration in the interviews to explore what aspects of the 
respondents’ lives lend to their unhappiness.  
 
 
Figure 5.32: Happiness of the Respondents 
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Volunteering is an empirical indicator used to gauge trust and measure social 
capital. A significant majority of the sample do not currently volunteer in an 
organisation or community group in Australia, with 64 respondents or 88 per 
cent of the sample indicating as such (see Figure 5.33). This is in line with 
Hugo’s finding that Iraqi-born humanitarian arrivals had the lowest rate of 
volunteering of all new-arrivals, with 5.8 per cent involved in volunteering, 
versus 21.6 per cent for the Australian-born population more generally (Hugo, 
2011, p. 222).  
 
 
Figure 5.33: Volunteering rates of Respondents 
 
While it appears that the sample have relatively low rates of volunteering, 
which theoretically suggests a lack of trust and therefore social capital and 
civic network engagement, this finding is problematic. For example, when it 
comes to measuring volunteering rates, socio-cultural nuances and 
understandings must be taken into consideration. As Hugo points out, “there 
are different meanings and ethnic-based understandings of the term ‘volunteer’ 
and this hides the fact that they engage in a large amount of ‘informal 
volunteering’’” (Hugo, 2001, p. 221). That is, the respondents may be 
involved in informal or simple civic engagement that is not perceived as 
“volunteering” by their ethno-specific group. This is explored further in the 
qualitative interviews. 
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Bolstering the argument that low formal volunteering rates do not necessarily 
indicate disinterest or low actual rates of volunteering, are findings about the 
respondents’ intentions or desire to volunteer. A slight majority of 38 
respondents or 52 per cent of the sample indicated that they would like to 
volunteer (see Figure 5.34).  Again, the relationship between the respondents’ 
intentions and their realisation of said intentions is revealing. This relatively 
high level of desire to volunteer suggests that a majority of respondents are 
mindful of and seek civic engagement, yet, for some reasons are yet to do so. 
The particular barriers to volunteering faced by the respondents are explored 
in the interviews.  
 
 
Figure 5.34: Desire to Volunteer by Respondents 
 
 
 
5.7 Political behaviours and perspectives on political life in 
Australia and Internationally 
 
This section explores the political attitudes and behaviours of the respondents. 
Firstly, the respondents were asked whether following politics in Australia is 
important to them. The most common response, given by 33 respondents or 45 
per cent of the sample was “somewhat.” The next most common response, 
given by 22 respondents or 30 per cent of the sample was “no.” A quarter of 
the sample, or 18 respondents, indicated “yes” (see Figure 5.35). The sample 
displays low levels of interest in politics compared to the Australian 
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population more broadly. Data collected in the Australian Election Study 
(AES) in 2013 shows 42 per cent of the Australia-wide sample indicated an 
answer equivalent to the “yes” given by a quarter of the respondents in this 
study (McAllistar & Cameron, 2014, p. 33). Notably, while only five per cent 
of the AES sample indicated that they have no interest in following politics, a 
far greater proportion of the Iraqi sample in this study – 30 per cent  - 
indicated as such. The tendency for almost a third of the Iraqi sample to 
remain aloof from Australian politics altogether deserves further exploration in 
the qualitative interviews to account for this choice.    
 
 
Figure 5.35: Importance of Following Australian Politics 
 
Next, the respondents were asked whether following international politics was 
important to them. The most common sentiment among the sample was 
“somewhat”, with 30 respondents or 41 per cent of the sample indicating as 
such. The next most common response, given by 23 respondents, or 32 per 
cent of the sample was “no.” A little over a quarter of the sample, or 20 
respondents, indicated “yes” (see Figure 5.36). As with the preceding finding, 
the tendency for almost a third of the Iraqi sample to remain aloof from 
international politics altogether deserves further attention in the qualitative 
interviews to explore the respondents’ reasons for this choice.    
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Figure 5.36: Importance of Following International Politics 
 
Having asked the respondents about their abstract perceptions of following 
politics, the survey then asked about their actual behaviours when it comes to 
accessing information about politics in Australia and internationally. Firstly, it 
asked the respondents to indicate how often they access information about 
politics, both in and outside of Australia. Contrary to the relatively similar 
answers given in the preceding two questions, the respondents’ actual 
behaviours – that is, how much they seek out and access information about 
politics – show that their political interests/curiosities are more oriented 
towards the international arena than the Australian context. Figure 5.37 shows 
this comparative picture.  
 
While a majority of 41 respondents or 56 per cent of the sample access 
information about international politics “most days,” only 19 respondents or 
26 per cent of the sample access information about politics in Australia at the 
same frequency. Further to this trend, 41 respondents, or 56 per cent of 
respondents indicated that they “rarely” or “never” access information about 
politics in Australia. Indeed, “rarely” was the most common response – given 
by 32 respondents, or 44 per cent of the sample - to the question “how often do 
you access information about politics in Australia?” In contrast, 19 
respondents or 26 per cent of the sample indicated that they “rarely” or 
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“never” access information about politics outside of Australia. This shows that 
the respondents’ political interests and/or orientations are transnational, rather 
than national. 
 
 
Figure 5.37: How frequently respondents access information about politics 
in and outside Australia 
 
The respondents’ involvement in political parties or civil activist groups is 
minimal. Ninety-seven per cent of the sample - all but two respondents - 
indicated that they were not involved in any political organisations in Australia 
(see Figure 5.38). Furthermore, this same vast majority – 97 per cent of the 
sample - indicated that they do not intend to be involved in such organisations 
in the future (see Figure 5.39). This lack of involvement in political 
organisations, and the complete lack of desire to be involved in the future, is 
noteworthy. Unlike previous questions, where there has been a disjuncture 
between the respondents’ desires for engagement and their realisation of these 
desires, their responses to these two questions suggest that their behaviours 
reflect their attitudes. For example, whereas respondents who are yet to 
socialise outside their immediate community do not rule out doing so in the 
future, it appears the respondents purposely remain aloof from political 
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involvement, politically oriented civic activities or political activism, and wish 
to remain as such in the future. This firm reticence toward political 
involvement deserves further attention in the qualitative interviews.  
 
Figure 5.38: Respondents’ involvement in a political party or civil activist 
group in Australia 
 
 
Figure 5.39: Respondents’ desire for involvement in a political party or civil 
activist group in Australia 
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The same behavioural and attitudinal patterns are evident in the respondents’ 
approach to political parties or civil activist groups outside of Australia. In 
fact, no respondents indicated that they were involved in political 
organisations overseas, and none indicated that they would like to be involved 
in the future. Again, this suggests a firm and purposive choice by all 
respondents to stay away from such organisations. This phenomenon deserves 
further exploration in the qualitative interviews.  
 
 
5.8 Perspectives on Human Rights in Australia 
 
This section explores the respondents’ understandings and perspectives of 
human rights in Australia, on a personal level and a more abstract, national 
and governmental level. Firstly, the respondents were asked whether they 
think that the human rights of all individuals are upheld in Australia. A 
majority of 64 per cent, or 47 answered “always”. Sixteen respondents, or 22 
per cent of the sample answered “mostly,” while 14 per cent answered, “I 
don’t know” (see Figure 5.40). No respondents answered “sometimes,” 
“occasionally” or “never.” While the majority of respondents agree that 
people’s rights are respected in Australia, it is worth exploring in the 
qualitative interviews why some respondents answered “mostly” and others, “I 
don’t know.”   
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Figure 5.40: Respondents’ opinions on whether human rights are upheld in 
Australia  
 
The respondents were then asked to reflect upon their own experiences in 
Australia, and whether they think that their personal human rights have been 
respected and upheld since arriving. A majority of 66 per cent answered that 
their human rights have “always” been respected and upheld since arriving in 
Australia. Eighteen respondents, or 22 per cent of the sample answered 
“mostly” while four respondents or 6 per cent indicated, “sometimes.” No 
respondents answered “occasionally” or “never” (see Figure 5.41). While the 
majority of respondents agree that their have been respected in Australia, it is 
worth exploring in the qualitative interviews why some respondents answered 
“mostly” and others, “sometimes.” Such answers suggest that there have been 
instances where their rights have not been upheld and it is worth understanding 
at what sites of socio-political interaction these perceived breaches have 
occurred, and whether there is a recurring pattern or area of concern for this 
particular group of Iraqi refugees.    
 
 
Figure 5.41: Respondents’ opinions on whether their human rights have 
been upheld in Australia
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The respondents were posed the question “In your opinion, is the Australian 
government’s treatment of asylum seekers in line with ideas of human rights?” 
a majority of the sample – 58 per cent or 42 respondents – answered “yes”. 
Twenty-five respondents or 34 per cent answered, “I don’t know.” While these 
findings are roughly similar to those for the previous question, one point of 
difference is that more respondents – seven individuals or 20 per cent of the 
sample – answered “no” (see Figure 5.42). That is, seven respondents think 
that Australian Government treatment of Asylum Seekers is not in line with 
human rights principles. This is worth further exploration in the qualitative 
interviews.     
 
 
Figure 5.42: Respondents’ opinions on whether Australian Government 
treatment of asylum seekers is based on human rights principles 
 
 
5.9 Brief Summary of Quantitative Analysis 
 
Overall, the survey sample represents a newly arrived, young demographic 
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religion,” which is in stark contrast to Australian population more broadly. 
The respondents are highly educated yet they have significantly high rates of 
unemployment and labour force participation and, as such, a majority are 
reliant on Centrelink and other welfare services. Compounding this, the 
respondents display low levels of proficiency in English and low levels of 
access to English language tuition, a service offered them by the Australian 
state.  
 
The respondents exhibit a desire for intercultural contact and understanding 
with the broader Australian society, yet this remains largely unrealised, as they 
tend to socialise exclusively within their immediate socio-cultural community. 
Notably, they appear to socialise the least with “white Australian citizens.” In 
line with this, the respondents place great value on maintaining their cultural 
values and practices, yet also have a strong desire to learn about and 
understand the dominant national Australian cultural and society into which 
they are settling. The sample displays relatively low rates or volunteering, and 
low levels of confidence and happiness when compared with other 
humanitarian entrants, and the Australian population more broadly. 
 
The vast majority of survey respondents are relatively politically apathetic, as 
is clear from the extremely low levels of engagement with civic or political 
groups. Despite this, the respondents appear to follow political news somewhat 
regularly, with their interest directed more to international than domestic 
concerns and events. With these key findings in mind, the next chapter 
presents the qualitative data analysis. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the qualitative data. To recap, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 30 Iraqi refugees who were granted 
protection in or after 2003, and currently reside in Australia. The interviews 
were conducted in Arabic with the assistance of interpreters, and were then 
translated into English and transcribed by a NAATI-accredited translator. As 
stated in the methodology chapter, the interview questions were designed to 
elicit data about the subjective meanings that individuals ascribe to their socio-
political attitudes and behaviours. The qualitative data was then subjected to 
systematic thematic content analysis with the initial help of NVivo software.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections, or categories. Each category 
represents a period in the life story of the respondents, from their personal 
history through to their current circumstances. The categories are labelled, 
“Personal stories up until arrival in Australia,” “Settlement in Australia,” 
“Current social life” and “Current political life.” The analysis presented under 
each category focuses on the dominant patterns and themes that became 
evident in the data after three rounds of coding and analysis. These themes 
highlight the prominent ideas, perceptions, interpretations, expectations, 
behaviours, relationships and meanings that were raised and articulated by 
respondents, thereby giving an overall understanding of each of the broad 
categories being addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the 
qualitative analysis, and an introduction to the theoretically integrated, 
conceptual discussion presented in the following chapter. 
 
 
6.2 A Brief Overview of the Qualitative Sample.  
 
Twenty of the 30 interview respondents, a third of the sample, arrived to 
Australia seeking onshore protection. One arrived by plane and nineteen 
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arrived by boat. The rest of the sample were granted offshore protection and 
were resettled in Melbourne, Perth, Sydney or regional Victoria. Those who 
were resettled in Sydney and Perth subsequently relocated to Victoria, either to 
Melbourne, or the regional towns of Shepparton or Cobram. Four of the 30 
respondents had family already living in Australia before they arrived and only 
two of the respondents were female. All but three respondents were married 
with offspring, ranging from one to ten children. On average, each respondent 
had three children at the time the interviews were conducted. 
 
All twenty respondents who arrived as onshore asylum seekers, and three of 
the respondents who were resettled via the offshore pathway, were in 
situations of protracted displacement before arrival. That is, 23 respondents 
were displaced for more than five years before arriving in Australia. Many 
were internally displaced, while others were living in countries of first asylum, 
most commonly in Iran and/or Syria. The most common route taken by 
respondents to Australia involved employing the help of people smugglers; 
most respondents procured a forged passport, travelled by plane to Malaysia, 
then travelled by boat or plane to Indonesia, and then onwards to Australian 
waters by boat. Those who arrived seeking onshore protection spent varying 
lengths of time in immigration detention, from three months to three years. 
The four respondents who spent the least amount of time in detention - 
between three and six months – arrived after August 2012, and were released 
into the community on bridging visas. Most commonly, the respondents in this 
sample were interred in the Christmas Island camp before being transferred to 
the Darwin camp, and then released into the community. Four respondents 
were held in the Manus Island detention facility, and one of the female 
respondents was interred with her children in the Broadmeadows camp in the 
northern suburbs of Melbourne. 
 
Four of the interview respondents worked as interpreters for the Australian 
Defence Force in Iraq (as “locally engaged employees”), and were 
subsequently provided “In-country Special Humanitarian Visas” for 
themselves and their families by the Australian state. In May 2008, an act of 
Parliament provided for 500 extra visas under Australia’s humanitarian 
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program, to be given to Iraqis who were employed by the coalition forces as 
interpreters. The four interpreters in this sample arrived to Australia as part of 
this cohort. 
 
 
6.3 Personal Stories 
 
Push Factors: Identity and Suffering  
 
It is well established in the forced migration literature that the majority of 
people applying for refugee status do so in order to escape persecution in their 
home country (indeed, such is the definition of “refugee” in the UN 
Convention and Protocol). That is, while forced migrants’ motivations are 
complex, informed by a variety of overlapping and even conflicting factors 
that cannot be neatly disentangled and placed under the definite categories of 
“push” and “pull factors,” research has shown that their desire to flee 
persecution and insecurity often outweigh “pull” factors – incentives that exist 
in destination countries - in their calculations at the time of flight (Marfleet, 
2006; Castles & Miller, 2009). Furthermore, the factors that motivate flight 
tend to involve traumatic and challenging experiences that are inextricably 
linked to a displaced person’s personal identity and safety. 
 
The forced migrant’s flight and struggle to find refuge/asylum in foreign lands 
is a formative socio-political experience, one that is central to their long-term 
physical and mental condition. It is important to explore the respondents’ 
stories of flight and to gauge the recurring patterns and experiences for this 
sample. To this end, the interview respondents were asked to describe the 
factors that led them to apply for resettlement through the UNHCR and/or to 
seek asylum in Australia. Most of the respondents shared their stories 
candidly, and did so with a fervour that suggests they are still deeply affected 
by their personal histories. Out of all the topics broached throughout the 
interviews, the respondents’ stories of flight and initial displacement were the 
most emphatic and detailed responses. 
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The overarching theme to come from the data about the respondents’ lives 
before arriving to Australia, and their reasons for fleeing Iraq, is a profound 
sense of suffering. All the respondents talked of suffering in a variety of ways: 
from mental and emotional suffering to physical abuse and trauma. In every 
case, their suffering was borne of politically-motivated violence or harassment 
that was justified in broad terms of identity; some respondents suffered abuse 
due to their own religious beliefs and practices, or their socio-political 
affiliations, actions and behaviours. In other words, the respondents’ suffering 
was a consequence of authoritarian and militant manifestations of identity 
politics that prevail in Iraq, and have, according to the respondents, intensified 
since 2005.  
 
A complex mix of religious persecution, militant sectarianism, and the 
political oppression of certain socio-cultural and political groups are key 
causes for all the respondents’ flight from Iraq. This is evident in a remark 
made by the respondent named Abu Bakr: “There are reasons. First of all, the 
fighting between the Sunni and the Shia [is a major factor]. Then there is the 
persecution from the rest of the political parties. Due to your background – if 
you’re Sunni, if you’re this or that - they will persecute you… so because I am 
Sunni they consider me to be a follower of Saddam Hussein, [and I was 
harassed by a Shia militia]” (Author interview with Abu Bakr). Another 
respondent named Akil, noted that the general socio-political situation 
prevailing at his time of flight was characterised by “no safety, and many, 
many other things…  Sectarian groups, Islamic parties and the general 
problem, like a lack of safety associated with them” (Author interview with 
Akil). These responses typify the perception conveyed by all respondents that 
a political culture of persecution and violence existed in Iraq at their time of 
flight.  
 
A secondary theme that came out of the interview data about the respondents’ 
decisions to eventually flee Iraq was the desire to protect their family, and to 
prioritise aspirations for the future of their offspring. Twenty-two of the 30 
respondents stated that their family was a main source of motivation to flee. 
As Husayn, explained, “So I was thinking about my family, my children… I 
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couldn’t imagine that one day they may kidnap my son or my daughter” 
(Author interview with Husayn). A desire to protect family members was 
present throughout many of the respondents’ stories of flight, and seems to 
have sustained their motivation to seek long-term safety. 
 
Across the majority of respondents’ stories were recurring claims about how 
their persecution manifested. Clusters of respondents suffered in similar ways, 
as they were members of, or were identified with certain socio-political 
communities or religious groups in Iraq that were persecuted at certain times 
by actors who had particular modes of operation. In order to present the 
patterns of persecution prevalent in the sample, this section is divided into two 
subsections. The first highlights the major patterns in the stories of 
respondents who were already displaced prior to 2003, and the second presents 
the stories of those who were displaced after 2003. 
 
Flight Before 2003 
 
A majority of 23 respondents were living in situations of protracted 
displacement before arriving to Australia. That is, 77 per cent of the sample 
was displaced for more than five years before coming to Australia. Of those, 
eleven were displaced even before the US-led occupation in 2003. Most 
commonly, these respondents were protractedly displaced in countries of first 
asylum in the region, most commonly in Iran, either as stateless guests or as 
asylum seekers. The dominant cohort or “vintage” (Kunz 1973) among the 
respondents is a group of seven individuals who were displaced and stateless, 
along with their families, since the Iran-Iraq War started in 1980. They are 
Shia Muslims, and identify themselves as coming from the “Middle (Business) 
class” (Author interview with Hassan). They were living in Southern Iraq 
when, in the early 1980s and into the nineties, they were displaced as part of a 
systematic attempt by the Ba’athist regime to subdue, disperse or eradicate the 
influential Shia majority – seen as coming from a Persian, or non-Arab 
background - in this region.  
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Four of this cohort were either deported or fled to Iran. One of these 
respondents was Hakeem, a Shia man from Southern Iraq, whose story 
captures many aspects of the narratives told by all the respondents; the 
powerlessness, humiliation and suffering he felt throughout his years of 
persecution and protracted displacement. Born and raised in Iraq, Hakeem’s 
family was deported to Iran in 1984 when he was fifteen years old. He 
explained that his family was deported when his brother had to join the army 
during the war between Iran and Iraq. He explained, “if he didn’t they would 
capture him and execute him. So he went to apply, and that was when the door 
opened for us.” The Sunni Arab Ba’athist regime imprisoned Hakeem’s 
brother immediately and went about locating and deporting the rest of his 
family.  
 
In Iran, Hakeem and his family were placed in camps and given limited rights. 
The Iranian government then offered them the option to leave the camp but 
added, “we [will] have nothing to do with you.” Taking this option, Hakeem 
and his family moved to Tehran where “there was a cemetery… that cemetery 
had a room [about five square metres in size]… we all lived in it, with my 
family, and the toilets [we used] were the ones for the people who come to 
visit the cemetery.” Hakeem and his family lived in this room in a cemetery 
for seven years. He reflected, “There was not even electricity; we had to use a 
lamp…. It very much exhausted us”. Hakeem was now the family’s only 
breadwinner. Under his charge were his chronically ill father, his mother and 
five sisters. Hakeem could not attend school and struggled to make ends meet 
in a context where “no one was supporting us” (Author interview with 
Hakeem).  
 
As Hakeem grew older, his “situation became worse and worse.” Due to his 
residency status, he was regularly exploited on the labour market and had no 
recourse to justice. He explained, “if my employer didn’t give me any money 
or [treated me unfairly], there was nothing I can do… I used to feel 
humiliated… but I cannot even say a single word back to them” (Author 
interview with Hakeem). Then, in the late 1990s, fed up with the vicious cycle 
of oppression, exploitation and alienation in which he was caught, Hakeem left 
 199 
Iran, forfeiting his Iranian residency papers as he did, and travelled to Syria 
with the express purpose of registering as a refugee with the UNHCR, so that 
he could be resettled elsewhere. He explained, “I tried to register with the 
United Nations … The timeline they gave me said within a year but I could 
not remain in Syria as my [papers that allowed me to stay in Syria] had 
expired.” Hakeem was again stuck due to his lack of identity papers - that is, 
the absence of official political membership in a recognised national polity - 
and was forced to return to his family in Iran via a smuggling route. Back in 
Iran, Hakeem was in a worse situation than before, facing immediate 
imprisonment should police find him. Hakeem continued to struggle to make 
ends meet and care for his family until 2005 when he heard of a smuggling 
route to Australia and decided to buy a forged passport and leave Iran. This 
story is characteristic of the chronic suffering, socio-political alienation and 
violent identity politics that have shaped the course of many of the 
respondents’ lives, particularly those living without status in Iran. 
 
Three other respondents in this cohort faced similar persecution in Iraq for 
their Shia and/or perceived Iranian backgrounds. They were not deported to 
Iran, but fled to Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where they were denied 
substantive social and political rights, were exploited and humiliated and, 
ultimately, remained protractedly displaced. This theme of suffering as a result 
of perceived identity is captured in the narrative of Haider, who was forced in 
the early 1990s to flee across the border into Saudi Arabia where he lived in a 
refugee camp. His narrative brings together many of the common anecdotes or 
stories of suffering that came up in the interviews, and is in many ways an 
exemplar of the patterns of socio-political repression, militant identity politics, 
physical and emotional trauma, displacement, flight, internment in refugee 
camps, protracted displacement and the search for a secure life and future, a 
“durable solution,” that were apparent in the sample more broadly.  
 
Haider shared his story in a solemn voice, with his face turned down towards 
the ground. He became increasingly upset as his tale went on. Before flight, 
Haider was imprisoned in the “general national security section, with 
Saddam’s secret intelligence services, for approximately six months.” His 
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family had no news of his whereabouts. He was subjected to persistent 
interrogation and suffered various forms of torture – including not being 
allowed to use the toilet, being hung from a window by his hands for several 
hours at a time, being whipped with hoses, beaten, and force-fed boiling water. 
Haider, touching his scarred eye, said, “one day I asked one of the officers [for 
some water to drink]… and he kicked me with his shoes right [in my face] so 
that my eyes became [damaged].” Around this same time, Haider’s brother 
and cousins had been taken from his neighbourhood by state forces – “from 
our suburb they had taken about 500 or 600 people that day” - and executed. 
Upon being released alive, and learning of these events, Haider immediately 
fled over the border to Saudi Arabia.  
 
Of his seven years living in a refugee camp in Saudi Arabia, Haider recalls, 
“they treated us like animals… they bring food and throw it on us. We didn’t 
see cities or towns for seven years… a life miserable to the maximum.” He 
notes that the camp was run by Saudi military men, who “were Sunni, so they 
considered themselves at war with us … they beat me up really well, one of 
them kicked me with his shoes on here and I stayed a whole week with my 
ears ringing from it” (Author interview with Haider). This story of 
demoralising persecution and ongoing physical abuse continues to define 
much of Haider’s perspective on life and struggle, even after he was smuggled 
to Australia and eventually granted humanitarian protection in 2005. He 
reflected on his life with a sad sigh: “I have not seen in my life something 
good… there has been nothing but torture. I have seen nothing else. … 4 years 
in jail, 2 years in the army, 7 years in Saudi, don’t know exactly how many 
years in Iran, and now I am in Australia” (Author interview with Haider). 
 
It is clear that systemic persecution of Shia in the South of Iraq and other state 
violence perpetrated by the ruling B’aathist regime under Saddam Hussein was 
prevalent from the early eighties, and was the cause of eleven respondents’ 
initial displacement, which then persisted until their arrival to Australia. 
Throughout this long period of time, the respondents were repeatedly 
oppressed and exploited, ostensibly due to their religious and/or perceived 
ethnic identity, and all suffered in turn, becoming highly disillusioned, 
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mentally affected, and alienated from the authoritarian systems to which they 
were subject. Eventually, all of these respondents sought a circuit breaker to 
the vicious cycle in which they were trapped, and worked outside the global 
governance system charged with managing forced migration, paying people 
smugglers to get them out of the region.    
 
Flight After 2003  
 
Nineteen respondents in the sample were residing in Iraq when the occupation 
started in 2003, and have subsequently fled the country. Of the 19 who fled in 
2003 or after, 12 lived in situations of protracted displacement before settling 
in Australia. A significant cluster among this group were seven Shia 
individuals who were harassed out of their neighbourhoods by local militias of 
various political and/or religious persuasions in Southern Iraq, as part of the 
escalating violence from 2005 onwards. Many among this group were 
internally displaced before fleeing to countries of first asylum; these 
individuals tended first to facilitate the passage of their families – wives, 
children and parents – to relative safety in Jordan or Syria and arranged for 
them to stay and live there. They themselves tended to remain mobile, 
travelling back and forth from Iraq.  As Ali explained “I kept moving from one 
place to another so I maintained seeing my family once or twice a month” 
(Author interview with Ali). These respondents engaged in circular migration 
as a coping strategy; to earn money, remain abreast of the security and 
political situation in Iraq (commonly with a mind for voluntary return), and to 
get their affairs in order should they be forced to leave more permanently.  
 
In many cases, the interviewees perceived themselves as being threatened 
because of their religious and ethnic backgrounds and identities generally and 
in light of the indiscriminate violence in Iraq at the time, and not necessarily 
because of explicit actions on their behalf, such as overt political opposition 
and activism or controversial/politically charged religious affiliations with 
certain militant groups or leaders. In fact, most of the respondents appeared 
politically apathetic and actively avoided being involved in any political 
movements in Iraq.  
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There is a discernible pattern among the sample of individuals being harassed 
because of their choice of vocation/profession or the way they carried out their 
jobs. Ali owned a shop and an Internet café in Iraq, and towards the end of 
2008 began to be harassed and threatened by a local Sunni Islamist militia. He 
recalled, “It was just this group’s mentality… the ones who [do not accept men 
who] shave their beard”. Ali explained that this fundamentalist group were 
ordering him to monitor and censor what his customers browse on the Internet. 
He explained his point of view, “When a person sits on the internet in my shop 
it is not my responsibility to monitor what they are looking at… I can’t have 
control over how people can use the Internet”. He added, “but there is no 
arguing with them, there is no discussion between you and this group, its only 
one way, its either yes or you get hurt” (Author interview with Ali). Ali was 
threatened and later stabbed in the face by a member of an Islamist militia for 
the manner in which he conducted his job, which was not to their taste.  
 
Further to individuals being persecuted in Iraq due to their professional 
vocation, four respondents in the sample worked as interpreters for the 
Coalition forces in Iraq, specifically with Australian troops, and felt their lives 
in danger as a result. When Australia withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2008, 
the interpreters feared that they would be targeted for having worked with the 
Coalition forces, and would no longer have the patronage and protection of 
said forces. They and their immediate families were offered Special 
Humanitarian Visas by the Australian Government, which granted them 
refugee status and resettlement in Australia. Many of the interpreters chose to 
move to Australia, though according to the respondents some remained in Iraq 
despite the danger.  
 
One of the interpreters, Abdur Rahman, spoke of the rising violence in Iraq, 
the growing prevalence of disparate fundamentalist, religious groups in the 
years leading up to 2008. He recalled, “It was very dangerous to live in Iraq if 
you are an interpreter because Al Qaeda and other groups, they attack many 
interpreters and they kill them because they are working with the coalition 
forces.” He relayed the following story: “There were about twenty 
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interpreters… working with the coalition forces in Basra airport.” He 
explained that as the interpreters were leaving their work, they were ushered to 
their bus by “people [that] were dressed as security forces, like police or Iraqi 
army, but they were fake.” Once inside the bus, the fake Iraqi security forces 
opened fire on the interpreters: Twenty-three persons… they killed all of 
them” (Author Interview with Abdur Rahman). In fear of his own and his 
family’s life, and despite reservations about leaving his home country, Abdur 
Rahman decided to leave Iraq. Each of the interpreters witnessed or suffered 
violent experiences and were characterised as “traitors” by certain groups in 
Iraqi society, which informed their decisions to resettle in Australia, where 
they hoped to find security and education for their family. 
 
Identity politics, Violence and Suffering 
 
The respondents were all targeted due to their religious and/or ethnic 
identities, or association with certain political groups or persuasions. They 
were threatened, scared and emotionally and physically harmed as result of 
their experiences within this system of socio-political relations. Most felt 
humiliated, traumatised and alienated, lacking any agency or control over their 
lives and futures. This is exemplified by Hakeem’s comment: “In Iran, they 
used to tell us ‘you are Iraqis.’ In Iraq they used to tell us ‘you are Iranians’”. 
He lamented, “So I could not stay. I didn’t have a country, I didn’t have the 
documents, so I decided to come to Australia just to belong to some country, 
to have proper documents, to have a proper identity” (Author interview with 
Hakeem). At the time of flight, none of the respondents could continue to 
abide the oppressive system of militant identity politics to which they were 
subject. Each maintained that physically removing themselves from their 
context at that time, and applying for refuge and political membership 
elsewhere (no matter the means of achieving such a goal) was their only 
option for ongoing survival. 
 
(ii). Pull Factors: Spatial Security Rights 
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The dominant theme that came out of the interviews about “pull factors” was 
the respondents’ desire and search for spatial security rights. In this context, 
“spatial security rights’ include “the right to enter a territory of a state, to 
remain there, to work and/or study there – in short, to plan a future in a more 
or less secure manner” (Yuval Davis, 2011, p. 57). All of the respondents cite 
personal, spatial security rights as the main drawcard to seek asylum in a 
country outside of Iraq and other countries in the immediate region, such as 
Iran Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria, who are not signatory to the UN Refugee 
Convention and Protocol. Most of the respondents answered the question 
simply and in few words: “I needed the refuge” (Author interview with 
Hafiza). 
 
As a corollary to this, the majority of respondents noted that along with 
security and safety they hoped their destination country would provide them a 
right to an official identity, such as residency or citizenship, and a concomitant 
respect for their identity and background, as well as an education and a future 
for their children.  “Here there is safety, and a future for my children” (Author 
interview with Malikah). Another, Abu Bakr, said, “Australia is good for my 
kids… that’s why I decide to come. It’s good for them, the education here is 
better” (Author interview with Abu Bakr). 
 
Few of the respondents were drawn to seek asylum in Australia by virtue of it 
being Australia per se. Rather, they sought asylum in any safe, stable country 
where their identity and rights would be respected and upheld. Interestingly, 
none of the interviewees who arrived to Australia by boat and applied for 
onshore protection, knew much about Australia, or knew anything substantive 
about the culture or the political system before arriving. They did, however, 
have a vague, positive impression of the country as democratic and respectful 
of human rights, regardless of a person’s background. As Ahmad noted, “You 
don’t know anything about the country. You don’t know about the culture. 
You didn’t know anything about the people. You didn’t know if you would 
live there safely or you would suffer like your country. So you didn’t 
understand what is going on. So it is not an easy idea or decision to make” 
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(Author interview with Ahmad). The decision to come to Australia, for the 
most part, was extremely difficult. 
 
It is apparent from the responses that smuggling networks to Australia were 
being advertised throughout the displaced Iraqi community after 2003. Yusuf 
noted that when he was in asylum in Syria, he would hear rumours; “I heard 
the people talk about Australia, the freedom in it, and the democracy in it, and 
the good living environment. All this talk made me think about it” (Author 
interview with Yusuf). Those respondents who mentioned that Australia was 
the specific end goal to their flight only did so in the context of smuggling. 
That is, they came to Australia because a smuggling route or passage to 
Australia was open to them. This is particularly true of those respondents who 
departed from Iran. Many of them mention the “rumours” they had heard 
about going to Malaysia and then Indonesia, and finally to Australia, and were 
convinced that this was a viable option for them to take when they saw or 
heard of acquaintances leaving on the journey. On this, Hakeem noted, “there 
was no available open route for me except this one to Australia. You go to 
Indonesia and then you come by boat… either you make it or you die…  some 
of my friends were leaving, or had left… from what their family told us, yes 
they left using this available route” (Author interview with Hakeem). it 
appears that, irregular migratory pathways, even to geographically distant 
place such as Australia, were being etched out in line with rising number of 
protractedly displaced in the region, people with fading hopes for a durable 
solution to their situation via UNHCR resettlement programs. This lends 
support to De Haas’s contention about irregular migration being a function of 
attempts to restrict human movement through border controls and other 
mechanisms, rather than a cause of migration per se. For most of the sample, 
smuggling provided a means to an end. The end, in this case, being spatial 
security rights, not necessarily an end based on any clear insight into the 
precise nature of socio-cultural and political conditions in the destination 
country.   
 
Five of the thirty respondents chose to come to Australia as they had existing 
networks here, whether they were family or friends. In these cases, the 
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existence of social networks in Australia complemented the existence of 
known smuggling networks. As Fazil said of his decision to seek asylum in 
Australia, “Why Australia? Because it was easier than the European countries 
and everyone in Iran was talking about, you know, going to Australia… so I 
just followed what everyone was talking about.” He adds that some people, 
including himself, had existing social networks in Australia. Through these 
social connections, they “had seen that their lives [in Australia] were different 
from the life they had in Iran and that’s why they were more focused on 
Australia than other countries… My relatives are here” (Author interview with 
Fazil). It is interesting to note that, despite their networks in Australia, they 
chose not to pursue more official channels – such as arriving through 
sponsorship. These respondents suggested that they knew it would be more 
expedient to be smuggled than to apply through the bureaucratic channels 
available to them.  
 
(iii) The Journey to Australia: Cognitive Dissonance 
 
The interview respondents who were granted offshore protection visas had 
little to say about their journey to Australia. In contrast, many of the interview 
respondents who arrived seeking onshore protection (only one onshore arrival 
in the sample came by plane and the rest by boat) spoke at length about their 
journey. Similar to the importance placed upon “push factors” by the 
respondents – that is, their enthusiasm and willingness to share a detailed 
account of the repressive conditions that forced them to flee their homes – the 
journey to Australia appears to have deeply affected many of the respondents. 
Their asylum seeking journey appears to be an extension of their stories of 
flight, in that it constituted a great personal, mental, emotional and, at times, 
physical challenge, and appears to remain fresh and relevant to their current 
state of mind.   
 
The dominant theme across the respondents’ stories about their asylum-
seeking journey is a strong cognitive dissonance. The respondents clearly 
expressed the sense that they lacked agency and therefore any control over 
their route to Australia. Indeed, each of them felt they overcame great fears 
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and unprecedented trials to reach Australian shores; many had never seen an 
ocean before, nor been in a boat, and put their safety in the hands of people 
(smugglers) who they did not know, and who, often, did not speak their 
language. Despite their fear, discomfort and stress about the risky journey they 
embarked upon, and the warnings they received along the way to not attempt 
the journey, they continued to pursue this course of action, denying the 
trepidations of the means to pursue the end; reaching safety in Australia.  
 
Hakeem, whose story of protracted displacement and exploitation in Iran was 
outlined above, recalled how his future was entirely in the hands of the 
smugglers. He said the smuggler in Indonesia gave him two route options for 
reaching Australia: “One is 16 days and the other four days,” the smuggler 
said. “But the four day route is dangerous. You will get there quicker but you 
have to go through the middle of the ocean. The 16 day one is a safe route, so 
if the ship was to sink or something, there would be mayday available.” 
Hakeem, not wishing to draw out his displacement any longer, and despite 
explicit warnings, decided to take the riskier “four-day” route to Christmas 
Island. He was more focussed on expediting the process and reaching the 
destination, than concerned for his safety.  
 
Such a sentiment was common throughout the sample. Haider noted that he 
felt he would inevitably die on the journey to Australia, yet still he went ahead 
and boarded the boat: “we saw death with our own eyes, we thought there was 
no way to escape death” (Author interview with Haider). Lutfi said of his own 
feelings of the journey from Indonesia, “On the boat, I considered myself 
dead… yes I can swim, but what good is swimming in the middle of the 
ocean?” (Author interview with Lutfi). Despite their acute fear and at the risk 
of death, each of these respondents pushed on towards Australia, feeling it was 
their only hope. 
 
Three respondents were stuck in Indonesia for many years, having been 
detained during or before making the journey by boat to Australia. While in 
Indonesia, they were given refugee status by the UNHCR, but effectively left 
marooned, with little indication of when they may be resettled. Faiz’s story 
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exemplifies a sense of cognitive dissonance and will to keep heading for 
Australia in the face of protracted displacement, poverty, a strong sense of 
alienation and a lack agency or hope, sentiments which were apparent 
throughout the entire sample, particularly among the onshore arrivals. Faiz 
explained how his boat was lost on the ocean for seventeen days, and ended up 
on an Indonesian island, where they were held for several weeks in a town 
hall-like building of a small village, waiting for the Indonesian authorities to 
come and deal with them. He explained, “That place was very filthy, with bugs 
and flies. We all got very ill… even one of my mates died there.” After two 
months spent living on the floor of this village hall, the group was relocated to 
Lombok where they were given accommodation in a small hostel and 
interviewed by UNHCR representatives to determine their applications for 
asylum. Most of the group were granted refugee status but not resettled.  
 
Faiz stayed in Lombok for five years, during which time he “suffered a lot...  
no one to help us, all doors in front of us were closed, we didn’t have money, 
and we can’t return to Iraq.” In 2006 the UN “transferred” Faiz and others 
from his boat to Jakarta. Faiz recalled, “they put us in hotels, two, three people 
in one room… we refrained from food[ in protest]. I was hospitalised for many 
days… some people even sewed their lips together.” Nothing came of their 
protest and Faiz said he “gave up and thought ‘I may as well live in this 
country because going overseas is not going to happen, and I can’t go back to 
Iraq,’” Finally, in 2009, after almost ten years in Indonesia, an immigration 
official rang Faiz and said, “‘in September you are going to Australia.’” He 
recalled, “I couldn’t believe it. It was a miracle” (Author interview with Faiz). 
After years of displacement, poor living conditions and suffering, Faiz arrived 
to Sydney and then moved to Cobram where he had a loose contact.  
 
Australia has a poor record of using official humanitarian channels to resettle 
the thousands of mandated refugees from Indonesia; from an annual intake of 
56 between 2001-10, the current intake now sits at zero per year (Sulaiman, 
2014). This is not so much a poor record, as a policy purposely designed to act 
as a supplementary deterrence mechanism for people seeking to use Indonesia 
as a launch pad to reach Australia. Immigration minister Scott Morrison 
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described the move, which took affect in August 2104, as “taking the sugar off 
the table”. As the sugar was being removed from the table, however, the 
Abbott government simultaneously reduced Australia’s humanitarian intake 
from 20,000 to 13,750, which only acts to further reduce the availability of 
viable “regular” migratory pathways available to forced migrants. Indeed, 
Indonesia, like Nauru and Manus Island, has become something of a legal 
sinkhole, where those found to be genuine refugees are trapped, potentially 
waiting years to have their resettlement location decided, if it happens at all. 
More asylum seekers on Manus have died since August 2012 than have been 
resettled elsewhere. The government’s approach to refugees in their immediate 
region has shifted from carrot and stick to mostly all stick. Respondents such 
as Faiz, who continue to be plagued by severe mental health issues as a result 
of their protracted displacement and punitive treatment in Indonesia are 
testament to the fallout of Australia’s deterrent approach to displaced humans 
at its border; the real world manifestations of the Australian state no longer 
providing the sugar. 
 
To recap, all of the respondents who arrived to Australia by boat expressed 
feelings of ongoing uncertainty throughout their journey, yet remained 
dedicated to the end goal; they all expressed a powerful cognitive dissonance. 
Many spoke of not having any other choice but to undertake such risky 
actions. It was either that or remain displaced and in perpetual fear for their 
safety. Abdul Aziz exemplifies this in his remark, “I thought it was death 
either way, whether I stayed in Iraq or came to Australia” (Author interview 
with Abdul Aziz). Despite the respondents’ immense fear and, at times, sense 
of outright futility, they were motivated by a vague promise of a better life, 
and a hope of reaching long-term safety. 
 
(iv) Camp Life: Punishment and Mental Health  
 
For all 19 respondents who arrived by boat, immigration detention was their 
first experience of the socio-political system in Australia. The vast majority 
perceived their detainment and their treatment by staff in detention as punitive. 
As such, many of them quickly formed the impression that they were 
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characterised as unwanted outsiders by the Australian polity. That is, their first 
impression of their place in Australian society was one of exclusion; they were 
alien, outsiders, punished for seeking asylum. Some felt that such treatment 
was unwarranted, given their lawful intention of seeking asylum in Australia. 
As a consequence of their detention, and the perception of their treatment as 
punitive, a number of respondents developed feelings of isolation and 
alienation, which in many cases manifested as mental illness, from anxiety, 
stress and depression to extremely passive behaviours or more aggressive and 
reactive behaviours. 
 
All 19 respondents felt their freedom was unjustly curtailed while in detention. 
Ali said simply, “Six months I stayed in the camp… from all aspects it wasn’t 
good. We were treated like prisoners…” (Author interview with Ali). Yasin, 
who was living in the community on a Bridging Visa at the time he was 
interviewed, noted that the camp staff were friendly, but that his experience in 
the camp, nevertheless, felt punitive and was a contributing factor in his 
developing mental health issues. He explained, “I felt like I was really inside a 
prison… [I developed] emotional problems and stress, depression and then 
things [got] worse … when I was released I felt better because I feel more 
freedom” (Author interview with Yasin). Though still frustrated that his 
application for asylum has not been resolved, Yasin was more emotionally 
stable outside of detention and in the community, where he felt the freedom to 
move around and have some control over his day to day life. 
 
Four respondents mentioned that they perceived camp administrators’ 
treatment of the detainees as unfriendly. Hakeem was among these 
respondents, and perceived the administrators as providing services, yet also as 
patronising and at times manipulative. He said, “Despite the care, they used to 
play with our head... I think that they were playing, you know, with our mental 
capacity, just in order to break us or to give us a lesson to punish us…” 
(Author interview with Hakeem). It is clear that Hakeem interprets his 
experiences in detention as a purposeful effort to denigrate and punish him, 
which suggests he was feeling very much alienated throughout this time. Ali 
expressed a similar alienated sentiment, and felt that this punitive approach 
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caused and/or compounded the detainees’ sense of hopelessness and related 
mental health issues. He said, “[the employees at the camp] cause nervousness 
[anxiety]… they drain your nerves… they play on your mental health” (Author 
interview with Ali). Such perceptions suggest the respondents were not only 
dissatisfied with their treatment, but alienated by it; they felt personally 
targeted, misunderstood and rejected, many developing mental health issues as 
a result.  
 
Hassan also interpreted his experiences in detention as punitive and further 
perceived the existence of racism in the administration of the camp – “you 
have to face it on a daily basis,” he said. In particular, he perceived that the 
camp administrators had a strong Christian-bias and lacked intercultural 
understanding, or enough intercultural literacy to provide culturally sensitive 
and/or religious-based services for non-Christians. He said that there was a 
clear sense that Christians received more favourable treatment from camp 
administrators and staff, and that some Muslim asylum seekers claimed to be 
Christian in order to improve their chances of good treatment, as well as a 
faster application processing time. He explained his point of view,  “The most 
damage caused by the camp is the racism that occurs within… it was the 
people working there, they lacked full understanding about all the religions..” 
He perceived that “Christian people have more freedom than us, in the sense 
that if we wanted to conduct any religious or cultural activity, they are 
basically useless…. they don’t have that understanding in order to help us.” He 
went on, “they humiliate the Muslims by use of the Sijada [prayer mat] to play 
cards on, or drawing degrading pictures and comments on their shirts against 
Muslims. Many of these kinds of instances occurred and no one could assist 
us.” Hassan interpreted these actions as deeply offensive to his religious 
beliefs. 
 
Hassan felt disaffected, uncared for by the camp administrators, and acted in 
order to rectify this by organising meetings with the camp administrators. He 
explained, “I organised three meetings with the head of immigration on 
Christmas Island… I told him you have to stop the humiliation of Muslims, if 
you lack any idea of Islam that is your problem, but there should remain 
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respect for the Muslims” (Author interview with Hassan). That is, he engaged 
democratically with the camp administrators and appealed for more Muslim-
sensitive behaviours and services. Ultimately, though, he felt his voice was not 
valued nor listened to, and his concerns were left unaddressed, which cause 
him mental distress and led him to feel alienated. This manifested in Hassan’s 
case as extremely passive behaviours, as he began to sleep some 20 hours per 
day, “prayed” for the remain four. He said, “This is in addition to the 
estrangement from one’s homeland and loneliness, and the way you’ve had to 
travel and the current environment in which you’re forced to live”. He notes it 
was difficult to be openly humiliated and then have your complaints ignored, 
but ultimately “didn’t want to cause trouble”(Author interview with Hassan). 
Hassan’s attempt to engage the camp administrators to further his substantive 
rights fell upon deaf ears and contributed to Hassan developing more intense 
feelings of alienation and exclusion, and leading him to spend his life 
medicated and asleep, so as not to deal with the waking realities of his 
situation. 
 
Muhammad noted that life in detention on Christmas Island “destroyed” him 
mentally. He said, “What we were not expecting when we arrived here was the 
island… which had a negative impact on us and destroyed us mentally. We 
were completely mentally destroyed…” (Author interview with Muhammad). 
Abdul Aziz explained that they had no clear idea of where their life was 
headed, and what would be the likely outcome of their applications for asylum. 
This uncertainty caused mental stress and anxiety. As he explained, “they 
started to bring us the news on the island, saying, ‘you will not stay in 
Australia and we will take you back to Iraq.’ My circumstances, my life 
flipped upside down” (Author interview with Abdul Aziz).  It appears that 
detainees commonly suffered from depression and other mental illnesses while 
in the camp, and were medicated regularly with psychoactive drugs, such as 
anti-depressants.  
 
There were dissenting voices in the sample, with two respondents reflecting 
positively on their time in detention. One of them, Yusuf identified with and 
understood the Australian state’s approach to immigration detention, saying, 
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“it’s true that you start to consider yourself in detention if it’s over a long 
period, you feel like you have been imprisoned and restricted, but the reality is 
that it’s their right to check the person and whether they will let him into 
Australia… They have to check you. It’s their right.” He was happy with the 
facilities available, saying, “there was some [activities], there was gardening, 
exercise and gym and sports activities… and Internet…” (Author interview 
with Yusuf). Yusuf adopted a very rational approach to interpreting his 
treatment in detention and understood it in terms of what he saw as the 
Australian state’s legitimate prerogative. 
 
Overall, detention significantly disrupted the migration pathways and 
negatively affected the mental health of many of the respondents. Not always 
detention in and of itself, but the length of detention and the treatment received 
inside detention centres made these respondents feel that they were unjustly 
detained; treated like criminals for seeking asylum and dehumanised, which in 
many cases made the respondents recall the injustices with which they were 
familiar in Iraq. In turn, it appears to have corrupted the participants’ capacity 
to readily develop of a sense of belonging or potential belonging to Australian 
society, as they felt imprisoned, isolated and to an extent, unwanted. Moving 
on from this, these respondents who had a hard time in detention find it 
difficult to eschew the “Asylum seeker’ or even the “refugee” label, which 
they view in a negative light; a label that brings them shame and makes them 
feel stripped of agency and entitlement to act as empowered individuals in the 
Australian context. They have internalised this stereotypical identity, and act 
as passive subjects, unwanted guests and/or victims, with little motivation or 
sense of entitlement to seek redress for the injustices they feel they have 
suffered under the Australian legal system. 
 
6.4 Settlement/Re-settlement Process 
 
 
 214 
(i) Pre-arrival expectations: Ongoing struggle  
 
Research has shown that, generally, refugees have high expectations about 
their new life, especially regarding their economic and occupational 
adjustment (Stein, 1981). Many humanitarian migrants do not expect to lose 
anything because of their migration, but instead expect to find opportunities to 
recover their lost social status and life. In light of this, the respondents were 
asked about their expectations before arriving to Australia, and whether their 
expectations have been met. The majority of the respondents indicated that 
they had no idea about Australia, or what to expect, and therefore feel neither 
acutely vindicated nor disappointed, but an ongoing sense of struggle. The 
second largest group among respondents said they held high expectations for 
their life in Australia, but that their expectations were subsequently 
disappointed. It is this group of interview respondents who provided the most 
detailed responses on this topic, and whose responses tended to dominate the 
analysis.  
 
Overall the major theme to come out of this section of the data is one of 
ongoing struggle - a clear sense of chronic frustration as the respondents try to 
navigate an unfamiliar and daunting society. Their efforts largely leave them 
feeling restless yet exhausted, uncertain and lacking a sense of control over 
their lives. This is in line with the quantitative findings, which found that the 
Iraqi sample surveyed has significantly lower levels of confidence about their 
lives than other humanitarian arrivals in Australia. This lack of confidence 
appears to be related, in part, to a sense of disappointed or failed expectations, 
which have caused the respondents to revise their understanding of their 
position in their new society, and realise that recovering their lost social status 
will require ongoing struggle. This is made all the more difficult given the 
sense of exhaustion and embattlement that many of the respondents feel. 
 
A majority of respondents took the opportunity to reiterate that they were more 
focused on getting away from Iraq - or wherever they formerly resided – than 
concerned with where they would end up. Even many of those who set out on 
a long and dangerous asylum-seeking journey said that they weren’t overly 
 215 
concerned with what, exactly, they would find in Australia, and were content 
to know that the country offered the prospect of spatial security rights. This is 
typified by the following remark from Abdullah; “I wasn’t expecting much, 
we were just trying to flee… We didn’t know what, for instance, is and is not 
in Australia” (Author interview with Abdullah). Ahmad noted how his lack of 
knowledge about Australia made the decision to leave all the more difficult. 
 
Many respondents said that before arriving, they heard amazing things about 
Australia, platitudes about rights and freedom that painted a picture of a 
somewhat utopic or idealistic society. These rumours tended to build up their 
expectations of the life they would realise in Australia. To their 
disappointment, their expectations were not met, as they arrived to a very 
different scenario to the one they had imagined. Notably, many of those who 
expressed the greatest sense of disappointment were those among the sample 
who had never been displaced before. These respondents still had a strong 
sense of having a lot to lose by leaving their homes in Iraq, and expected that 
they would have a greater sense of control over how their lives panned out. 
After arriving, they felt let down in various ways, with some simply suffering 
from a strong feeling of homesickness, a sad nostalgia for their past, and 
others struggling with finding work, being on bridging visas, and applying for 
family reunification.  
 
Across the board, the ADF-employed interpreters had high expectations for 
their lives in Australia, and all but Ibrahim felt as if their expectations have not 
been met. This lends to a sense that they lack control over their lives in 
Australia specifically, and their (and their families) longer-term future more 
broadly. In light of his experiences with Australian military personnel in Iraq, 
Husayn expected to settle in Australia easily.  He said, “I expected maybe at 
least I’m going to settle very easy here. And maybe that I’m going to get more 
support, more than any other refugees because we felt that the Australian 
government was indebted to us.” He was disappointed, however; “But the 
tragedy is that here they regard us as equal to other refugees… They refused 
even to write a reference for us” (Author interview with Husayn). It is 
noteworthy that this respondent felt himself more entitled than “any other 
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refugees,” which indicates there is a social stigma attached to the refugee 
identity/legal status that constructs them as less entitled to rights and services 
than others in society. Furthermore, it is clear that Husayn felt alienated by the 
Australia society after arrival, which was in stark contrast to his former 
perceptions of Australians he met and worked with in Iraq, and his 
expectations of Australian society. 
 
Others in the sample had high expectations for their futures in Australia, 
looking forward to finding good jobs, safe and affordable homes and education 
for their children. For many of these respondents, their expectations have not 
been met as they struggle to deal with a lack of cultural literacy, difficulties in 
the job and housing markets, and the culture of settlement service providers 
and social support more broadly. Ahmad, for example, was looking for a job 
for four years before securing a low paid position. Such circumstances have 
led some to feel disappointed. While in many cases this may be a case of 
culture shock, the effects of which may wear off over time, it is felt intensely 
by these respondents, and has contributed significantly to the impressions they 
are forming of Australia’s socio-political system, and the community  
 
The analysis showed that the respondents whose expectations have been 
disappointed most dramatically were those still on Bridging Visas at the time 
they were interviewed, and those whose applications for family reunification 
are yet to be finalised. They feel they are in an ongoing state of limbo and 
therefore remain relatively unsettled, unsure of their futures and in many 
cases, anxious and depressed. Abu Bakr, who was on a Bridging Visa, living 
in abject penury in a house he shares with several other Iraqi men on bridging 
visas said, “Since we have been released from the camp, it’s been all 
suffering… I expected a different life to the one I live now,” Of arriving in the 
community he recalled, “I was completely shocked… when I left Iraq and 
risked my life, and crossed an ocean, I did it first for myself but mostly not for 
myself but for my family” (Author interview with Abu Bakr). All the 
respondents on bridging visas, or awaiting the outcomes of their applications 
for their family to come to Australia, expressed an acute sense of 
disappointment, which informs their self-perceptions as excluded or alien in 
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Australian society and lends, in most cases, to disaffected or alienated 
attitudes, and passive behaviours. 
 
Those respondents whose expectations about their lives in Australia have been 
disappointed are struggling to orient themselves in society, feeling dissatisfied 
and disaffected, or in a number of cases, alienated and unwanted. For those 
who arrived with low expectations, their attitudes are more upbeat as they tend 
not to feel disappointed or let down by the socio-political system. Even so, 
many of the respondents’ expectations have not been met and this adds to their 
sense of ongoing struggle and disenfranchisement by yet another socio-
political system. 
 
 
(ii) Settlement Experiences: Culture Shock, Disconnection and Adaptation  
 
The first five years of settlement are challenging and potentially dislocating 
for refugees. Throughout this time, their first impressions of their new polity 
take shape, and their socio-cultural preferences, habits and routines begin to 
develop out of these impressions. All of the interview respondents expressed 
conflicting emotions about their experiences in the first year of settlement. 
Their perceptions of their new context, their reactions and attitudes to 
unfamiliar socio-cultural norms and phenomena, and their behaviours tended 
to evolve over time and in line with their understanding of their particular 
place, or social status, in their new country. The dominant themes from this 
section of the data set were an initial culture shock and disconnection, 
followed by what may be described as a relatively one-sided effort at 
acculturation and adaptation.  
 
Common among all of the respondents’ testimonials was the perception that 
the first months, even years in Australia were very sad and alienating. Many of 
the respondents reflected deeply on what they had left behind; from having 
social and occupational status, and a network of family and friends who 
socialised and related to one another in recognisable and comforting ways, to 
perceiving themselves as having relatively little, if any, job prospects or social 
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support, as well as a poor understanding of how they were supposed to engage, 
communicate, and socialise with people beyond their familiar Iraqi 
community. For many there was nostalgia for the familiar world in Iraq – 
despite its current turmoil – made more acute by a feeling that they had lost 
this familiarity for good; they may never return permanently to their “home”.  
 
Each of the respondents, in turn, developed perspectives and behaviours – 
coping mechanisms - that were oriented to alleviate this sense of disconnection 
and culture shock; they acculturated. Most sought out fellow Iraqis and lived 
in solidarity with them. A majority of the respondents appeared to internalise 
the sense that they lacked a valued identity in the new, Australian context and 
became passive and disaffected, recoiling from contact with people outside of 
their familiar and comforting, close-knit Iraqi community. Many of these 
respondents struggled in their day-to-day lives, and became anxious and 
depressed, while others seriously contemplated going home, even at the risk of 
death. Overall, their acculturation was perceived as non-reciprocal, in that they 
lacked substantive social relations and connections with non-Iraqi 
communities in Australia, and they felt the onus was on them alone to 
understand and work within the available parameters of the dominant 
Australian culture. 
 
Upon arrival in the community in Australia, all of the respondents quickly 
confronted the feeling that they had lost their culture. Indeed, it is clear from 
the data that many of the respondents had previously overlooked the 
importance of their culture and its associated norms, or at least taken it for 
granted as an important source of support and comfort in their day-to-day 
lives. They felt they had lost a clear sense of quotidian aspects of their identity, 
that their habits and routines were obsolete or misunderstood, or in some cases 
frowned upon and derided in the Australian context. Indeed, their arrival to 
such a starkly new and unfamiliar socio-cultural context caused the vast 
majority of respondents to feel like aliens marooned in a strange, unfamiliar 
and at times, hostile environment. Most of them adopted an “us” and “them” 
scenario, where “they” were the dominant and unfamiliar Australian 
mainstream. The respondents regarded themselves - “us” - as relatively 
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powerless guests of this dominant Australian host community. This tended to 
reinforce their sense of dislocation, estrangement and powerlessness which 
caused many to reflect on what the content of their native culture means to 
them in their daily lives, and come to terms with how their cultural 
preferences, habits and routines provide meaning to their social relations.  
 
In the new Australian context, where the respondents felt poorly understood or 
misunderstood, if not invisible, each of them suffered and struggled to find 
dignity and meaning in their life. Ali spoke plainly of the difficulty he 
encountered when he first arrived in the Australian community. He said, 
“[When I first came] it was the most difficult time in my life… the life I 
suffered at the beginning in Melbourne was more difficult than the suffering I 
experienced in Iraq” (Author interview with Ali). Malikah noted the loneliness 
she felt when she first arrived, and how this was compounded by a loss of 
agency and entitlement, a feeling of alienation and a sense that her struggle to 
exist in a positive frame of mind, to have a happy life, was ultimately futile. 
She said, “The loneliness of being away from home in a foreign land [is 
indescribable]. Al-gurba kurba… Al-gurba is feeling like a stranger, away 
from home, like homesickness... kurba means heavy burdens. I am struggling. 
But I get nowhere because I am a stranger here” (Author interview with 
Malikah). Most respondents recalled similar feelings of dislocation, sadness 
and alienation. 
 
A majority of respondents spoke of their initial culture shock in their first year 
in Australia, and lamented how disconnected, and even inadequate or 
humiliated, they felt during this period. Husayn said it made him and his 
family feel as if they were in a play, acting out or improvising unfamiliar 
roles; “My children were shocked first. My wife was shocked. I was 
shocked… A new life. A new culture. Everything was new. Now we are cut 
off from our roots. So we felt that this is not our life at all, we are just playing 
a role…” (Author interview with Husayn). Jihad, thinking about the most 
challenging aspect of initial settlement, said simply and without hesitation 
“First thing is the culture. The culture is different. Even if Australia is a 
multicultural country, but still the major culture here is the Australian culture. 
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I didn’t know about the Australian culture” (Author interview with Jihad). 
Ahmad expressed his perceptions of the difference between his native socio-
cultural norms and the norms he has found in Australian society. He said, “It is 
not easy because the Iraqi community are very connected to each other.  We 
are very sociable… our lives were totally different from Australians’, because 
our community is very connected to each other and we have social lives. Also, 
we participate in each other’s happiness and sadness and so on. We share. Not 
here. We don’t have this now” (Author interview with Ahmad). This comment 
gives a clear sense that the respondent perceived himself as an unknown 
outsider, standing at the margins of Australian society, looking in on a 
relatively individualistic cultural mainstream to which he does not easily 
identify and relate. Among all of these responses is a sense that the 
respondents feel their culture is lost in the Australian context. 
 
This deep culture shock made the respondents acutely aware of their own 
cultural illiteracy in the Australian context and, for most, drew attention to 
their lack of English language proficiency. Half the sample, or 15 of the 
interview respondents, explicitly mentioned their struggle with issues relating 
to language. This compounded an acute sense that they lacked agency or any 
sort of control over their lives in Australia. Indeed, a lack of cultural literacy 
and linguistic proficiency were overwhelmingly the most commonly cited 
problems that the interview respondents encountered during their initial 
settlement, as it affected all aspects of their life: from procuring employment 
to socialising. Yasin spoke of the disconnection he felt, saying, “The most 
difficult is the isolation and loneliness of being a foreigner. And the language, 
it’s an essential aspect and it’s difficult when a person cannot speak, cannot 
communicate” (Author interview with Yasin). Many noted how a lack of 
English made even menial tasks, such as grocery shopping, a significant 
challenge.  
 
In line with the results of the quantitative survey, most of the respondents who 
highlighted their difficulty with language were not attending English language 
tuition (10 of the 15 who spoke of language as their most intensely perceived 
challenge). Most said that they simply don’t have the mental capacity to attend 
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classes and study the English language. That is, they are mentally ill or feel too 
exhausted to do so. Muhammad noted, “[Language] is the most difficult issue I 
am facing [now]… it’s like a nightmare for me… I would like to take classes 
but, like I told you, I’ve just barely got my life to settle. I just wanted to settle 
in life so that my brain can be clear and when I get into school I can benefit 
from it” (Author interview with Muhammad). This provides meaning to the 
disparity in the quantitative data between the aspiration to learn and the actual 
number of respondents attending English classes. It appears that many would 
like to, but as stated above, do not feel they are in a sound mental state to do 
so.  
 
Many respondents brought up the issue of family separation, and how this has 
hindered their capacity to settle in various ways. Hakeem was particularly 
forceful on this issue. Indeed, the complexity of Hakeem’s answer is typical of 
the issues faced by many in the interview sample, with one issue compounding 
the next, and the respondents themselves feeling unable to understand or 
disentangle their various problems, and begin to try and find a positive 
outcome. Hakeem has dealt with numerous lawyers and migration agents, and 
paid fees for multiple family reunification applications, yet still his 
applications are not resolved. He said, “[my family] are still in Iran, and it will 
take merely a match stick to light the situation over there on fire.” He added, 
“All my thinking is constantly worrying about them, until the early morning I 
cannot sleep…  this is the biggest challenge to ever face me…. what am I 
supposed to do? I have no ability to do anything. That’s why I am taking 
tablets [anti-depressants] to calm me down” (Author interview with Hakeem). 
Hakeem’s testimony shows that his efforts to engage with the mechanisms and 
institutions supposedly designed to support him - both in the camp and now 
his dealings with the immigration department, agents and lawyers – have 
consistently failed. He internalises this - as is clear in his remark “we 
wondered what we had done” - and interprets it to mean that he and his 
interests are not valued and supported by the system to which he is subject, 
leaving him feeling as if he lacks agency and control over his life.  
 
 222 
Other areas of social life that the majority of respondents encountered and 
struggled with are the labour and housing markets, and tertiary education 
(many of the respondents continue to struggle with these aspects of their lives, 
beyond the first year of settlement). In most instances where these topics were 
raised, the respondents’ remarks expressed a strong sense of hopelessness and 
at times humiliation. Ahmad felt that there were not enough jobs in Australia 
available to people of different cultural backgrounds, and that bureaucratic 
systems in Australia are overly complicated, to the point where it precludes 
people such as himself from participation. Ali was left feeling deeply 
humiliated and powerless after not finding any housing, and being left 
homeless in Melbourne. He explained, “I was degraded, I would reside with 
one [friend] for two days and then go back to another for two days… it was a 
humiliation process” (Author interview with Ali). Ali’s struggle in the housing 
market was echoed by a number of respondents, and may be seen as yet 
another problematic area of social life, along with employment and education, 
which adds stress and, at times disaffection, into the mix of mental burdens 
weighing upon many of the respondents in the sample. Ironically, and to the 
detriment of humanitarian arrivals to the country, popular discourse in 
Australia, and many Australians’ actual contention is that refugees are taking 
“Australian” jobs and “our houses” (Spinney & Nethery, 2013). 
 
Overall, the data about the respondents’ initial year of settlement shows they 
suffered from culture shock and perceived themselves as disconnected from 
Australian society. This culture shock and disconnection compounded their 
struggles to settle comfortably, which manifested most obviously in issues 
with cultural literacy and language proficiency, difficulty in the job and 
housing markets, and mental health issues related to family separation and 
bridging visas. The respondents’ experiences led many to recognise that being 
culturally literate potentially facilitates a sense of successful socialisation, and 
affords a measure of social privilege. In practice, however, they perceived 
themselves as lacking agency or any social mobility in their new context, and 
most of the respondents felt overwhelmed and ill equipped to engage with the 
dominant Australian society. As such, they felt their acculturation and 
adaptation to their new socio-cultural world was one-sided. That is, they didn’t 
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interact so much with the mainstream Australian society or other socio-cultural 
communities, but acted inwardly, towards their own, familiar community to 
alleviate the alienating potential of initial settlement.  
 
 
(iii) Government/Government-funded Settlement Support Services: 
Gratitude  
 
The provision of settlement support services is a major element of the 
Australian state’s refugee policy suite. Administered through Human 
Settlement Services (HSS), it is a primary means of facilitating inclusive 
settlement of newly arrived refugees. As such, and in line with the survey 
results, all of the respondents have accessed government services in some 
capacity. Overall, all but two of the respondents expressed heartfelt gratitude 
for the welfare provided them through various organisations, such as migrant 
resource centres, other social service providers and Centrelink. In line with the 
quantitative findings, most respondents found accessing services relatively 
straight forward, and were humbled to receive such support from the state, 
which they felt they could not have survived without. 
 
In terms of expressions of gratitude, many of the respondents compared what 
they may expect of the state in Iraq with the generosity they found from the 
Australian and Victorian governments. One such respondent was Mubarak, 
who said, “[The Australian government] treatment has been very good and 
much better than our own country. With much respect, sometimes I wonder to 
myself, ‘why are they doing what they do?’” (Author interview with 
Mubarak). This comment is noteworthy in that Mubarak conveys a sense that 
he is not entitled to such provisions, and feels genuinely heartened to receive 
what he perceives to be a great generosity afforded him by the state. Haider, 
too, was thankful for the support provided him, saying, “Australia has 
provided many paths for people… we don’t find this in our own countries” 
(Author interview with Haider). Welfare support seems to be welcomed and 
genuinely appreciated by the respondents, and to a degree has facilitated a 
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means by which the respondents can identify with and relate to the objectives 
of the Australian state in this particular area of policy.  
 
Seven of the 30 respondents, including all but one of those respondents still on 
Bridging Visas, were somewhat conflicted about their perception of 
government services and support. Negative perceptions tended to crop up 
around issues of family reunification, poor relations and communication with 
caseworkers. Indeed, Ali perceived a complete failure of settlement service 
providers to register his existence. Ali said that after leaving detention “The 
[immigration officials escorting us] said nothing, they offered us no 
accommodation. Basically they left us at the airport and said wherever you go, 
go… As for like any assistance from a nation or organisation to have assisted 
me to help myself or provided me with assistance, none.” (Author interview 
with Ali). Since this initial experience, Ali managed to register with 
Centrelink, but his perception of government services by that time was 
decidedly negative. According to Ali he wished to work as a truck driver, and 
even procured a truck license, but the staff at Centrelink told him he would not 
get work and that he must apply for the pension or he could get work as a 
cleaner, but was provided no further explanation. Ali felt stripped of agency 
and social choice, degraded and patronised, being treated as if he was 
incapable of making choices and conducting his life; “They make you feel 
humiliated… All what they want, no thought to our situation” (Author 
interview with Ali). Ali’s comments are particularly interesting in light of 
popular and political rhetoric in Australia that characterises refugees as drawn 
to Australia by generous welfare provisions and economic incentives, and 
generally having high unemployment rates at the expense of Australian 
taxpayers. To the contrary, Ali does not wish to be dependent on welfare, nor 
on the pension, but wishes to pursue a vocation of his choosing, yet continues 
to be told his choice is not valid, and he must go on the pension or work as a 
cleaner. Welfare in this case appears to have been provided in such a way as to 
disempower not empower the individual. 
 
Ali was clearly developing a negative orientation to the socio-political system 
in Australia at this time, feeling out of control of his life, and went on to 
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explain that his applications for his family to join him in Australia were taking 
so long, and appeared so futile, that he took matters in his own hands, and 
worked outside of the official systems to bring them here. He explained, 
“After that, I brought my family but most of what happened to me was from 
god’s willingness…” [yes but how did you make that move. For example, god 
wouldn’t have just given you the housing?]  “No it was from god, he told me 
to enter here…” [Where did you enter?] “I’m not telling…. but as for like any 
assistance from a nation or organisation to have assisted me to help myself or 
provided me with assistance, none.” (Author interview with Ali). It is clear 
that this Ali felt alienated by the socio-political system, and defected from the 
official channels to pursue his desired ends on his own – presumably nefarious 
– terms.  Like Ali, Husayn also felt so acutely let down by his caseworker that 
he came to reject settlement service provisions altogether. Both Ali and 
Husayn felt alienated and acted to assuage this feeling by disengaging from 
service providers all together, which placed them in a situation of further socio 
economic uncertainty and disadvantage. 
 
One respondent, Rashid, reflected on his feelings about government services 
more broadly, observing that what they provide for people like himself is not 
designed for the long term. He said, “What was provided was merely to get us 
through the day.” He added, “They never endeavoured to help us with our 
future…. they are only concerned with what we are facing at the day that we 
are presenting our problems…  so there was no like broader vision to our 
situation.” (Author interview with Rashid). This highlights a disjuncture 
between the aims of refugees in the community, trying to build a life, and the 
aims of the social welfare system and its staff, which are to achieve systemic 
outcomes. Similar to the previous theme, the respondents’ impressions of 
government services and support  - ranging from deep gratitude, and feeling 
supported, to feeling unsupported - informed their subsequent behaviours. 
Most were grateful for the support and passively subsisted on welfare. 
Significantly, those who did not feel supported by the system of settlement 
services defected from it by rejecting services or pursuing alternative means to 
achieve their settlement needs.  
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(iv) Social Support: Lack of Community Awareness and Support – 
Isolation  
 
This section looks at the respondent’s perceptions and interpretations of the 
more social, or community-derived support they received throughout 
settlement. Overall, the participants did not feel supported by the wider society 
or their local communities in Australia. Indeed, there were only two 
respondents who provided anecdotes about times they felt supported by non-
Iraqis. Instead, the respondents tended to rely almost exclusively on their 
connections with other Iraqis, comforted by a sense of in-group solidarity and 
understanding. In particular, the respondents turned to family and/or those that 
arrived in the same cohort. This dominant theme is in line with the quantitative 
findings, which painted a definitive picture of the respondents networking and 
interacting almost exclusively with their fellow Iraqis, and spending little time 
with people outside their immediate ethno-cultural or religious groups.  
 
Most commonly, the respondents perceived their behaviour – which in social 
capital theory equates to a reliance on fostering bonding capital, or relations 
within their own cultural group, rather than looking to establish or develop 
bridging capital with socio-culturally distinct groups - as related to the 
language gap and cultural differences between themselves and other 
Australians. They pointed to a lack of shared understandings and recognisable 
cultural norms between themselves and the Australian community, and an 
inability of most Australians to fully appreciate and empathise with the 
respondents’ situation - an insurmountable “us” and “them” scenario. Many of 
the respondents felt invisible in Australian society, and did not feel entitled or 
confident to approach people outside of their immediate community for 
friendship, support or even conversation. Others perceived the lack of social 
interaction, and certainly any form of support from members of the Australian 
public, as an outcome of prejudice and discrimination. Despite the 
interpretation or justification arrived upon by the respondents, their 
disconnection left them feeling isolated and at times bored.  
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In many cases the respondents felt invisible in Australian society, and did not 
feel that people had much interest in them or their situations. This is in line 
with the quantitative data analysis, which showed that the respondents did not 
perceive Australians to have a good understanding of the Iraqi identity, nor a 
significant desire to learn about it. Yusuf said, “the Australian society does not 
know much about me… it is the Australian government who helps, not the 
people” (Author interview with Yusuf). Said felt bored and lonely after 
arriving to Australia, and felt that they were placed in Dandenong as a means 
of keeping them isolated from the rest of Australian society. He said, with 
conviction, “As refugees [we] should see more support to help us to settle into 
social life. Especially in social life. We were kept isolated” (Author interview 
with Said). Said felt left out of society, disaffected from the dominant mode of 
social relations, which manifested not in alienation so much as boredom. He 
acted to alleviate this feeling of isolation, engaging in study and trying to 
establish a more social routine. 
 
Malikah, whose husband was kidnapped in Iraq and missing, relayed a story in 
which she lamented her lack of family, friends and female social networks in 
Australia, and expressed a deep sense of isolation and loneliness. She said, “I 
came here pregnant, for the first months [of my pregnancy] I was [in Iraq] 
with my mother, and she was caring for me and my children… and here, there 
is no one”. She recalls her child birth, saying,  
“I was lost; I didn’t know where to take my kids. I didn’t have 
anyone [to help me]. I went to the hospital by myself and saw 
death in my own eyes, and there was no one next to me… So I 
wished that my mother, my sisters, or even my husband, or just 
for someone, someone, to be there next to me because I didn’t 
know, maybe I will live through it, maybe I will die” (Author 
interview with Malikah).  
This is a clear moment of alienation, loneliness, sadness and desperation at 
such a seminal and potentially traumatic moment as childbirth. Malikah 
maintained a feeling that she was alone in Australia, trying to raise her 
children with no support. 
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The accounts given by the former ADF employees were poignant. It appears 
they felt particularly unsupported after arriving to Australia, as they had high 
expectations that they would be well looked after by the ADF. They expected 
and were sure that they would remain in contact with the soldiers with whom 
they were working in Iraq; this did not eventuate. Kadeer noted that in reaction 
to their lack of social networks, they started a civic organisation designed to 
encourage solidarity amongst Iraqis in Australia. He said, “Actually we don’t 
[feel supported by the community in Australia] … now we have the 
Iraqi/Australian solidarity association … this is our community… we don’t 
have a direct connection or a strong connection with the wider community” 
(Author interview with Kadeer). In this case, Kadeer responded to his feelings 
of isolation by establishing a representative, civic organisation for himself and 
his Iraqi friends. This is a clear case of actively engaging with democratic 
processes to further his interest in cultivating a sense of belonging and 
solidarity for his community in the broader Australian context, and suggests 
the conditions for a democratically grounded cosmopolitanism did exist from 
Kadeer’s perspective.  
 
Some perceived a lack of community support in Australia as an outcome of 
prejudice and discrimination, yet remained unsure of exactly why they were 
being discriminated against. One female respondent, and a male respondent 
speaking about his wife, speculated that perhaps people in Australia don’t like 
their Islamic head coverings. Another, Abdullah, who encountered 
discrimination on the housing market, did not offer any basis for the 
discrimination per se, but definitely felt himself as the outsider. He said “not 
all of the community [supports us to settle]. For instance, in relation to 
Shepparton, if you look for a rental property, it’s very difficult to obtain one.” 
He expressed his perceptions that it is easy for “Australians” – “them” - to rent 
a house, “whereas with us, they won’t give us any properties for rent as easily” 
(Author interview with Abdullah). This is a recognised issue in the Shepparton 
local government area, where the unemployment rate for people with no or 
poor English language proficiency in Greater Shepparton is “four times that 
for people who speak English only (20.7 per cent compared with 5.2 per cent)” 
(DEEWR, 2013). In turn, this negatively affects new arrivals’ prospects of 
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securing leases on the housing rental market, which further entrenches their 
socio-economic disadvantage.  
 
Overwhelmingly, the respondents’ perceptions of the social conditions in 
Australia, and their understanding of their own role or place within this 
society, led them to pursue social connection and solidarity with their own 
cultural group. As stated, not just with Iraqis, broadly, but often the same 
ethno-religious groups and the same immigration cohort. This behavioural 
tendency is compounded by a lack of intercultural understanding, which 
precludes intercultural dialogue and inhibits their ability to try and establish 
and build social relations with people from the Australian community. 
Thereby, it inhibits their capacity to readily develop cultural literacy and 
belonging in the Australian national context. 
 
 
 
6.5 Current Social Life 
 
(i) Social Milieu: Disconnected Community Relations  
 
The respondents were asked about their views on the social milieu in 
Australia, including their perception of socio-cultural norms in the society, and 
any impressions of how members of Australian society relate to one another 
and cooperate. Unsurprisingly, many of the respondents reflect on the society 
in Australia in light of their own experiences within it. As such, the dominant 
theme for this section of the data was one of unfamiliarity and disconnection, 
reiterates many of the findings thus far.  
 
The respondents spoke about their perception of disconnected social relations 
in Australian society in a number of ways. Some spoke of society in Australia 
as guided by individualist norms, rather than people having interest in and 
looking out for the collective and enacting more communitarian values. The 
respondents tended to perceive people in Australian society as pursuing their 
own individual interests and affairs, remaining aloof from others in their 
community who they don’t directly know, or whose interests are not aligned 
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with their own. This observation was made in contrast to their experiences of 
Iraqi society, which they perceived as far more community-focused. Akil 
shared his observations about relations between neighbours in Australia, which 
highlights this sentiment. He said, “I don’t even know my neighbours’ 
names… I lived in [that] house for three years.” After several attempts over 
the years to engage his neighbours in conversation, and a number of occasions 
where he felt snubbed by his neighbours, he gave up – “I felt that those people 
are not friendly… I didn’t say hello anymore, I stayed silent with them” 
(Author interview with Akil). Akil was genuinely surprised that it was possible 
to live so close to another human and never interact or get to know them. This 
captured for him the individualistic and aloof manner that he has come to 
associate with Australians more broadly. Said said in a similar vein, “The 
culture [in Australia] is very challenging… Individualistic culture… we are 
disconnected from neighbours, from everyone. Even from organisations. We 
are disconnected.”” (Author interview with Said). It is clear that Said, along 
with others in the sample, feels disconnected from what he perceives as an 
individualistic Australian mainstream society. He interprets such cultural 
differences as a significant barrier to inclusive socialisation. 
 
A number of respondents pointed to the existence and propagation of popular 
stereotypes, and a concomitant discrimination against certain ethno-cultural 
groups as informing the disconnection they observe in the Australian milieu. 
Five respondents explicitly mentioned that they perceive a sense of racism in 
Australian society, particularly a widespread prejudice against Islam and 
Muslims. One respondent, Mubarak, spoke of how his daughter experienced 
racism at school.  “This thing, [Islamophobia], I can feel it and even my 
daughter, who started to wear a hijab last year, was abused by children at 
school. And she was only in grade one.” Mubarak’s daughter would cry after 
school saying to her father, “the kids did that, they pulled my hijab, they said 
you are bald.” Mubarak spoke with his daughter’s teacher who said she knew 
nothing of the bullying. Mubarak explained, “then we gave up because she 
was young… just to let her feel settled.” The next year, Mubarak decided to 
send his children to a private “Islamic” school but, not being able to find a job, 
could not afford the expenses and sent them back to public school. “So I felt 
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discrimination against Muslims,” he explained, adding with a shake of the 
head; “Now my younger daughter refuses to wear any hijab ever. She’s saying 
the kids will hate me… And I think a lot about that” (Author interview with 
Mubarak). Mubarak was deeply affected by this incident, and though he 
adapted his behaviour significantly, aligning with what he interpreted as 
“Australian” standards in order for his daughter to fit in and feel like she 
belongs at her school, he was disappointed and disturbed to have done so, 
however. The episode gave him a sense that he cannot practice his religion in 
the Australian context, and felt he was forfeiting an important aspect of his 
identity; which, ironically, was a factor in his seeking refuge in Australia in 
the first place – to seek respect for his identity. This was not lost on Mubarak, 
who has developed a bitter and somewhat angry and defensive attitude toward 
the Australian mainstream, as he perceives hypocrisy in public rhetoric about 
multiculturalism and liberal freedoms. He feels the social reality for migrants 
in Australia is more akin to assimilationist, or conformist,  “love it or leave it” 
style, xeno-racial ideals. 
 
One respondent, Ahmad, noted that a lack of intercultural understanding 
fuelled the existence of negative stereotypes, especially about Muslims and 
Iraqi culture. Negative stereotypes, in turn, perpetuated the dearth of 
intercultural understanding and contact between him and Australians in the 
community, as if trapped in a vicious cycle. He also interpreted intercultural 
ignorance and popular stereotypes as informing Australians’ lack of curiosity, 
will or interest in interacting with and learning about newly arrived Iraqi 
migrants like himself. This observation is in line with findings of the 
quantitative survey, in which a majority of 64 per cent of the sample disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with the statement, “People I have met in Australia have 
a good understanding about life, culture and politics in Iraq.”  
 
Ahmad said, illustrating the ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario he has come to perceive 
in his new context; “There is not a good understanding between my culture 
and Australian culture… we don’t have one way, we have two ways… There 
is two ways and they are not meeting with each other. They are separate.” He 
goes on to remark that the onus is entirely on new migrants to learn about 
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Australian culture and society and fit in accordingly, saying,  
“we live in this community and we did the citizenship test… but for them they 
didn’t know about us… Australians they are not aware of other cultures. This 
is what causes negative stereotypes” (Author interview with Ahmad). Ahmad 
argued that without reciprocity, interest from both sides of the socio-cultural 
divide, notably from more settled/privileged Australians towards newly 
arrived Iraqis, the onus is on the Iraqis alone to adapt to Australian norms 
(again, akin to assimilation), rather than building genuine bonds across the 
cultures and celebrating difference, as is supposed to be the credo of a 
multicultural, liberal democratic society.  
 
(ii) Personal Social Life: Social Aspirations, but no Inter-Cultural Social 
Life  
 
Analysis of the data about the respondents’ own social attitudes and 
behaviours in Australia shows that while most in the sample have aspirations 
to socialise beyond their immediate community, they do not yet do so. Indeed, 
and as has already been stated, all of the respondents tend to socialise 
exclusively with their particular network of Iraqi friends, as well as 
maintaining strong transnational ties with their family and friends overseas. 
The respondents’ social networks or friendship groups are most commonly 
formed around families and people who arrived to Australia at the same time 
and by the same means. It is worth noting that many of the respondents did not 
elaborate on this question, indicating that they spent most of their life at home 
with their immediate family, and while not adverse to socialising more and 
with various networks, they did not actively seek this out. These findings are 
in line with the findings of the quantitative analysis.  
 
The respondents raised four dominant reasons for their relatively isolated 
social behaviour. For most, it was a matter of the language barrier - their lack 
of proficiency in English. The next most common reason given was their 
mental health and wellbeing; in many cases the respondents were under mental 
pressure as a result of their unresolved applications for asylum or efforts at 
family reunification. A few in the sample pointed to their perception of 
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negative stereotypes and discrimination as informing their behaviour. And, 
finally, some respondents’ tendency to socialise only with their Iraqi in-group 
was a strategy of cultural and religious identity maintenance.  
 
For a number of respondents, their lack of social interaction with non-Iraqis in 
Australia was justified as a case of a language barrier. Abdullah said, “If I feel 
I can talk with them in full English then I’ll have a chance to make friends… 
but I haven’t studied it because the circumstances restrained me” (Author 
interview with Abdullah). Yasin said, “I have not had this opportunity [to 
socialise with non-Iraqis] because I am not able to communicate with them” 
(Author interview with Yasin). Notably, all of the respondents who said that 
the language barrier precluded them from inter-cultural networking in 
Australia are not studying English in an official capacity, either because they 
are on bridging visas and not allowed to study, or for most, because they feel 
too mentally exhausted and preoccupied to undertake study. 
 
Many respondents were facing various mental health challenges, from anxiety 
and stress to depression, and felt incapable of engaging with people outside 
their immediate ad familiar ethno-cultural and linguistic group. These 
respondents tended to aspire to develop social relations with others in 
Australian society, but ruled it out at the current moment due to their own 
feelings of mental exhaustion. Yusuf said, “I am not involved in any social 
activities, although I wish to do so, but I don’t have the motivation just yet… I 
would like to participate for instance in a sports activity or intellectual 
seminars, I like all this… but I can’t now” (Author interview with Yusuf). For 
most of the respondents who cited mental health issues as precluding them 
from engaging in various social networks, their mental stresses were related to 
issues with their applications for family reunification. Faruk, for example, was 
in a state of despair about being separated from his family, who were in Syria 
at the time of the interview. He said, “No [I do not participate in social 
activities]… a person who thinks of his family, even if you put him in heaven 
he will not be comfortable or happy” (Author interview with Faruk). This 
estrangement from family is negatively and profoundly affecting all aspects of 
the affected respondents’ lives. 
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Six respondents mentioned that they felt that some people in Australia had 
negative stereotypes about Iraqis or certain types of Iraqis, and were 
prejudiced against them. Other respondents were unsure whether non-Muslims 
in Australia would want to be friends with people of Islamic faith, such as 
themselves. This perception led to them turning toward their fellow Muslims 
for social solidarity. Three respondents spoke of their desire to maintain their 
Iraqi identity, and socialised exclusively with their Iraqi community as a 
strategy of cultural maintenance. Ahmad, for example, explained that he 
wanted his kids to maintain their Iraqi and Muslim identities, and was worried 
about the effects that acculturation and adaptation would have on their 
outlooks. He said, “As you know we are Muslims. And we want for our 
children to maintain their identity.” He perceives this desire as disfficult to 
achieve in the Australian context, as “the environment is totally different from 
over there in Iraq”. He argues, “If we want our children to maintain their 
identity, their origin, it is very hard here… We can’t control our children when 
they are growing up here… So it is very hard” (Author interview with 
Ahmad). Ahmad is mindful of the challenges of maintaining his native cultural 
identity in the Australian context, and the potential for a future 
intergenerational cultural conflict or disconnect between himself and his 
children who will have spent most of their life in Australia. He expresses 
trepidation, and even sadness, at the thought that his “traditional” cultural 
values will not be maintained in the next generation.  
 
Nearly all of the respondents maintain strong transnational ties with family 
and friends back in Iraq, or in the Middle East region. Indeed, many of the 
younger male respondents who arrived by themselves seeking onshore 
protection spend much of their time online, and do not socialise much outside 
of that. Some of those whose family is still in Iraq or the region toy with ideas 
of returning in order to be with them, even at the risk of death. Hassan said, 
“My wife is in Syria… I have two children, two daughters, eight years and 
three years of age, also in Syria… my wife and children need to see me as the 
situation is deteriorating there, they feel unsafe” He added, “I am intending to 
go in [December].  Maybe I won’t come back. Maybe we will all just die there 
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and it will all be over. You know a grenade or an explosion” (Author interview 
with Hassan). There was a sense that many of the respondents often think of 
returning to be with their families, but ultimately choose to remain in safety 
despite missing their family to distraction. 
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Overall, the tendency for the majority of respondents to socialise exclusively 
with their family and close Iraqi networks is mostly a function of the 
understanding and care they find with in these groups. The following 
statement exemplifies this, “I just have my immediate family in Australia… 
and Iraqi friends. We visit each other. We support each other… Just to check 
whether everything is good or not. So we depend on our social network”  
(Author interview with Said). Despite this behavioural tendency to rely on 
“bonding capital”, nearly all of the respondents expressed attitudes of 
openness, and at times aspiration, to the idea of socialising outside of their 
communities.  
 
(iii) Accessing Labour Market: Unemployment 
 
In line with the findings of the quantitative analysis, a vast majority of the 
sample – twenty-seven respondents - are unemployed. Interestingly, most of 
them were silent about the reasons for their inability to find work, yet under 
that silence was a sense of disappointment and for some, humiliation. First, it 
is worth noting that the four respondents on bridging visas do not have the 
right to work in Australia. The two female respondents said they do not work, 
as they are the primary caretakers for their young children. For those who did 
elaborate, they most commonly cited mental or physical health issues as the 
main reason for being unemployed. Indeed three respondents were on the 
pension as a result of physical disability. For others, their unresolved 
application for family reunification impinged on their ability to do anything 
else, and many noted that until they are together with their family, they 
couldn’t concentrate on much else, including employment. As Hassan noted, 
“I am not working… I do have the intention to work as soon as my family 
arrive. Until then, I cannot” (Author interview with Hassan). 
 
The three respondents who are employed spoke about the practical challenge 
that seeking a job entails; from being unable to access and read job 
advertisements to the unfamiliar process of recruitment. It took Ahmad four 
years to secure a low-paid, unskilled job. Another issue was the occupational 
and social status that respondents had in Iraq, but felt they lost when moving 
 237 
here to Australia. Recognizing this, these three respondents  - all of whom had 
advanced English language skills prior to arrival, and therefore were at a major 
advantage to the rest of the sample - adapted their behaviour in order to get by, 
taking jobs they perceived as underemployment. All of these respondents 
thought it unfair that their qualifications and experiences seem to have no 
value or credit in the Australian context. As Ibrahim said, “Looking for the job 
is one of the most difficult things… if I want to get a job with my 
qualifications it is hard… So I changed my position, I did some courses, 
security courses, so this can get me an easy job, like part time” (Author 
interview with Ibrahim). While Ibrahim’s adaptive behaviours represent social 
mobility, he appears to have lowered his expectations for work and taken a job 
below his self-assessed skill level: it may be seen as downward mobility.  
 
While the majority of the sample does not work, those that do are employed in 
unskilled labour or work in the refugee settlement sector. For many in the 
sample, their silence on the issue of their unemployment seems to be informed 
by a sense of shame about their lack of employment and social status, but 
nonetheless they feel ill equipped to address this situation to meet their desires. 
Under such circumstances, the vast majority are receive ongoing welfare 
payments. 
 
 
(iv) Happiness: Conflicted  
 
Overall, the respondents were conflicted about whether they are happy in 
Australia (happiness here being treated as a subjective, descriptive concept, 
rather than an empirically measurable one). All of the respondents perceived 
their safety in Australia as relieving, to some extent, the fears and tensions of 
their life in Iraq and so derive a certain amount of happiness from this. 
Furthermore, they are deeply grateful to the Australian state for providing 
them legal protection and welfare services, which gives them a sense that they 
should feel happy. Despite this, the respondents do not equate safety and 
material welfare with substantive emotional satisfaction and happiness per se. 
Many were quick to note that they are happy to be safe, but that there are 
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various conditions for their happiness, which are yet to be fulfilled. In most 
cases, the respondents expressed feelings of being in limbo; estrangement 
from their home culture and loved ones, as well as lamenting their lack of 
belonging in Australian society and ongoing feelings of anxiety and longing 
for the social status and cultural literacy, which they feel they have left behind.  
 
The pattern of answers given by respondents about their happiness in Australia 
is similar to the survey findings. That is, most of the interview respondents 
expressed that they were happy, just as 58 per cent of the survey sample 
marked “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” to the statement “I am happy with my 
life in Australia.” As state above, the interview respondents tended to cite 
security in Australia as a significant source of happiness. Ibrahim noted, “I am 
happy because sometimes when I watch the news on the TV, or the gulf news, 
or the Iraq news, I feel I am lucky to be here… we are safe” (Author interview 
with Ibrahim). Faiz, who was asked “Do you feel happy here in Australia” 
didn’t reflect on his own feelings per se, but simply stated, “It’s a safe 
country” (Author interview with Faiz), as if it was self-explanatory that a 
sense of security alone was enough to make him happy.  
 
One difference between the quantitative and qualitative findings, however, 
was that more of the interview respondents admitted feeling of unhappiness. 
This may be due to the qualitative nature of the interviews, which gave the 
respondents more of an opportunity to reflect upon their conflicting emotions, 
and the reasons for unhappiness, and thereby give a more nuanced answer than 
that demanded by the survey question. Many of the respondents were 
conflicted about how they feel in Australia, indicating that they sit somewhere 
in the middle of happiness and unhappiness. Indeed, twelve of the interview 
respondents (almost half the qualitative sample) expressed that they were 
substantively unhappy in some aspect of their lives. This is in contrast to only 
12 per cent of the survey sample indicated feelings of unhappiness. The 
respondents’ tend to feel conflicted because of a perceived lack of belonging 
to the Australian community, and in some cases, the respondents feel 
somewhat unwelcome in the country. Hassan noted that he has not met or ever 
felt welcomed or supported by other Australians in the community, “I am 
 239 
happy because I have arrived safely, in this sense am happy but as I have said 
before I haven’t seen anything from Australians” (Author interview with 
Hassan). 
 
As mentioned above, nearly all of the respondents premised their expressions 
of unhappiness or dissatisfaction with expressions of gratitude for the safety 
they have been afforded since arriving to Australia. This is likely so that they 
do not feel or appear to feel ungrateful for what they have received in the way 
of protection, rights and welfare from the Australian state. Yet, still, Lutfi 
noted that his separation from his family caused him unhappiness, saying, “I 
feel like there is a good law, that make me a little happy… that is the thing that 
mostly makes me happy. But I am happy and not happy… unhappy because I 
am far away from my family (Author interview with Lutfi). Overwhelmingly, 
the respondents are conflicted about their feelings of happiness; relieved and 
happy to be safe yet they feel estranged in Australian society and lack 
belonging to the socio-cultural community at large.  
 
 
6.6 Current Political Life 
 
(i) Political Milieu: Respect 
 
The respondents were asked about their perceptions of the political milieu in 
Australia. That is, their perceptions of the political system in Australia and the 
culture of politics, from political debate to policy. Overall, the respondents 
expressed respect for the political system in Australia, as it promotes human 
rights and is governed by the rule of law. A minority of respondents pointed to 
hypocrisy in the political system, particularly in regards to their applications 
for family reunification, and express a sense of alienation from it. Many 
mention that although they respect the political system in Australia they do not 
view themselves as active agents within it, and instead are somewhat 
disengaged (this point will be taken up in the next section). 
 
A majority of respondents expressed a sense of respect for the political system 
and community in Australia. Most commonly, this perception that the system 
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is worth “honouring” stems from the gratitude they feel for having been 
granted refugee protection and spatial security rights in Australia. They tend to 
perceive the system from the vantage point of guests, outsiders or non-
members of the polity. Other common elements of the political system that 
they mention are the existence of rule of law, and a functioning democracy in 
which people are able to claim their rights. Yusuf expressed a sense of 
patriotism towards Australia, saying, “I love this country and respect it 
because it’s a country that respects humanity… In Arab countries, a person’s 
opinion is not respected. How can you not respect this country when it 
deserves all the respect and honouring?” (Author interview with Yusuf). This 
statement resonates with Benhabib’s contention that solidarity and belonging 
can be fostered through the democratic, politico-legal framework. Yasin said, 
conveying a clear sense that he was an outsider looking on, and not an actual 
part of the Australian polity itself, “In Australia they have an administration 
and rights… yeah they are better than us, they have, you know, democracy” 
(Author interview with Yasin). Such comments suggest Yasin identifies with 
the political system and views it as positive, yet does not feel included in it, as 
an active member of the Australian polity. 
 
All but one of the respondents who expressed positive attitudes about the 
political system in Australia took a comparative approach when evaluating and 
expressing their perceptions. That is, they frame their positive attitudes 
towards the Australian political milieu in terms of what they lacked as member 
of the Iraqi polity, which was viewed as authoritarian and corrupt. Abdur 
Rahman noted, “you know, if you have a right here, you can get it. It’s better 
than in Iraq.” He went on, “It’s messy [in Iraq]. No laws and corruption. 
Corruption is spread all over the country, so anybody can take your right and 
pay money to take your right. Buying people…. It is different [in Australia]” 
(Author interview with Abdur Rahman). The respondents across the board saw 
virtue in the rule of law and the availability of “actionable individual rights” 
(Flynn, 2003, p. 431), suggesting they identify with this system of governance. 
 
A minority of four respondents did not identify with the political system in 
Australia but expressed feelings of alienation from it. Ali noted that the trials 
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that the system in Australia has put him through have left him feeling 
exhausted and unable to even follow the political situation. He suggests that 
immigration policy, in particular, is designed to exhaust him, “They give us no 
opportunity to even follow their politics, as much as they have exhausted us 
with their decisions” (Author interview with Ali). Hassan explained his 
perceptions of Australia’s responsibility to protect displaced people such as 
himself and his family, and feels that the Australian state does not provide 
substantive solutions, expressing particular discontent about policies and 
bureaucratic processes for family reunification. He provided the following 
analogy about himself and his interaction with the Australian political system:  
“If a person’s house is on fire… when he runs and picks up the 
phone, he doesn’t call, for instance, the supermarket owner or the 
nightclub owner… he would call the fire brigade, knowing that 
the brigade is the only one that can save him. So, for instance, if 
someone calls the fire brigade, and they tell him, ‘we don’t have 
time, you just sit there and wait, drink your tea and drink 
something,’ and, for instance, his family is in the fire burning, 
shouldn’t they go and help him? This is similar with our situation 
now. We went out to Australia, first of all because we knew 
Australia would practically save us, but they got us and put us in 
camps. Our families are in bad situations… in bad circumstances, 
and [the Australian officials] say to us, ‘why are you so 
concerned? You have made it to safety. Sit, [eat] food - you have 
been fed, you have been given drinks, and you are making 
telephone calls. But what about our families?” (Author interview 
with Hassan).   
Hassan clearly states that he feels estranged from the aims of the Australian 
state, and his politicised values are in stark contrast to the values of Australian 
policies to which he is subject. Furthermore, he feels inefficacious to reduce 
this conflict, as per Schwarz’s theory of political alienation (Schwarz 1973).  
 
Overall, many of these respondents framed their ideas about the Australian 
political milieu in light of their experiences in Iraq. They tended to speak of 
the Australian political system as something honourable yet unknown and 
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foreign to them; a polity they respect, but to which they do not personally 
belong. Many respondents appear disillusioned as a result of their experience 
of politics in Iraq, and as such remain purposefully disengaged from even 
following debates in the political sphere. 
 
 (ii) Personal Political Life: Apathy  
 
The overall theme from data about the respondents’ personal involvement in 
politics is a clear sense of political apathy and disengagement. The majority of 
respondents do not involve themselves in political processes, and many do not 
follow political news and developments, nor do they wish to do so in the 
future. This is in line with the survey findings, which showed that 75 per cent 
of the sample were either “somewhat” or not at all interested in following 
Australian politics. Of those respondents who do follow politics, they tend to 
focus on the situation in Iraq and the Middle East region or on any 
developments to refugee and migration policies in the Australian domestic 
setting. Notably, the respondents who worked as interpreters for the ADF were 
the only respondents who have been actively involving themselves in political 
processes in Australia; a type of civic activism, in order to claim and receive 
what they perceive as their due rights.  
 
A majority of 19 respondents explicitly indicated that they have no interest in 
politics. Their answers were often short and direct. Many justified their lack of 
engagement in terms of being a personal choice or preference, claiming that 
they don’t like politics. Haider said simply that he doesn’t like politics and 
therefore remains purposely disconnected from it. He said, “I don’t like 
politics… I just like to watch the news… but I don’t like politics. I don’t talk 
about politics. I have nothing to do with it. I don’t want to get involved in 
politics” (Author interview with Haider). Similarly, Akil said, “No, I don’t like 
politics…  Me and politics, never” (Author interview with Akil). These 19 
respondents are purposefully disengaged from politics in Australia and view 
this as a personal behavioural choice that reflects their dislike of political 
affairs.  
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Four respondents said they do not follow politics, as they do not have the 
headspace to do so. That is, they feel mentally consumed by their current 
situation - in most cases, these respondents were either on bridging visas or 
tying to arrange for their families to come to Australia, and felt their future 
was insecure and that they lack substantive control to determine their desired 
outcomes. Hakeem said, “We’re all at home drowning in our problems and 
don’t really have anything to do with the television, and we really don’t want 
to get into the politics on top of what we have because these things have really 
exhausted us” (Author interview with Hakeem). These respondents are 
preoccupied and burdened with stress and uncertainty, and do not have the 
capacity to engage with politics. 
 
There was a tendency among other respondents to justify their lack of political 
activity in terms that suggested they did not perceive it as being their role or 
entitlement in Australian society. That is, there was a sense among many of 
the respondents that politics was the remit of politicians and governments 
alone. They perceived their voices as irrelevant in that context. Many were 
bemused or laughed slightly upon being asked questions about their civic 
and/or political activity in Australia, as if it was not their right to get involved. 
One such respondent, Abdullah, said, “I don’t have any opinion. I don’t have 
any opinion…. It’s really up to the government. I have no opinion” (Author 
interview with Abdullah). While Yusuf said, “I have nothing to do with it… In 
terms of politics and things like that, why would I discuss it? I am nobody. It is 
their jobs” (Author interview with respondent 3). Theses respondents perceive 
their position in Australian society as being passive subjects, outside of 
politics and political debates. 
 
Nine respondents said they followed the political situation in Iraq and the 
Middle East region. Rashid said that even though watching what is happening 
in Iraq makes him feel anxious, he couldn’t help but follow events. He said, “I 
follow the situation in Iraq, in the Middle East in general… Even the doctor 
advised me that I have to stop because it makes me anxious… But I can’t” 
(Author interview with Rashid). Most of the respondents who follow political 
news in Iraq do so out of concern for their family and loved ones who are still 
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living there, many of them displaced. Others noted the political situation in 
Iraq, explaining that it is difficult to be effective if you are involved in politics 
there, and offered this as a significant reason why Iraqi civilians do not engage 
with political issues; as they have been victim of politically-driven repression 
their whole lives. 
 
Two respondents, who formerly worked as interpreters for the ADF in Iraq, 
actively engaged with the political sphere in Australia in one particular 
instance. They involved themselves by taking their story to the media, in order 
to claim public recognition, which they felt they did not receive after leaving 
Iraq and arriving to Australia as refugees (bearing in mind that “refugee” is a 
pejorative in Iraqi society). It is clear that these respondents feel like veterans 
of the war, given their contact with Australian troops and their support of the 
Coalition’s intervention in Iraq. They perceive themselves as literate in all 
aspects of life in Australia and entitled to more than what they found after 
arriving. Yet, after arrival, they lost all contact with the ADF. Husayn said 
plainly, “So that’s why we started claiming for our rights. We can because we 
know the system here.” A journalist from The Age newspaper picked up their 
story interviewed a number of these former-interpreters and published their 
story. Husayn made such points as – “We didn’t expect [the Australian 
Government] to bring us and just keep us in a house and that’s it… To start a 
life means not to come here and just to stay at home watching the children” 
(Author interview with Husayn). Such activism suggests that these 
respondents are engaged with democratic mechanisms – in this case engaging 
the media - and feel entitled to act as full members of the Australian polity in 
order to address their discontents. 
 
Their story got some traction in the media and Husayn and his friends were 
contacted by ADF and immigration department representatives and asked to a 
meeting to discuss their situation. They attended the meeting but felt that many 
officials in the room were “sarcastic about us. They were not serious. They 
even made some jokes. So we gave them our demands … they refused every 
point.” Feeling dejected, Husayn and his friends asked for a reference from the 
ADF so they could rent a house on the private housing market, and apply for 
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jobs. Their request was initially denied. Husayn was “very angry”.  “I started 
shouting,” he said. “Saying ‘you let us down.’ And that officer was looking 
like this… like amused.” They left the meeting feeling unvalued and 
disappointed. A few months later, however, the ADF sent them each a 
reference letter. The letters were “signed by [ADF] Chief [Angus] Houston.” 
As Husayn recalled, “he signed a paper of appreciation, saying that we are 
very grateful for your support and help… And that paper was so useful… To 
rent a house in the private sector.” Husayn and his friends used the letter to 
rent themselves homes on the private property market, so that they did not 
have to rely on government housing but could not use it for a job reference. 
 
It is clear from this story that Husayn felt invisible in Australian society and 
short-changed for his work for the ADF in Iraq. Even as he tried to talk with 
the Defence force representatives, to claim what he felt entitled to, he felt 
mocked and humiliated, as if his cause was not legitimate. Although this 
respondent was satisfied to an extent by the reference letter he received, he 
still faced what he perceived as the society’s discrimination against people 
with “refugee” status in Australia. He remained angry about his situation, and 
after this affair very much turned into his own close-knit community for 
solidarity, no longer wishing to seek help from elsewhere. It may be seen here, 
that his sense of entitlement in the Australian context led him to engage the 
system to further his own interests. In the long run, though, he has not been 
substantively recognised and has become somewhat alienated from the socio-
political sphere in Australia. Indeed, he was angry. Overall, the respondents’ 
experiences with the political realm both in Iraq and Australia have informed 
disaffected, at times alienated attitudes, which manifest as politically apathetic 
behaviours. 
 
(iii) Politics of Forced Migration: Over-simplified and Exclusionary 
 
The respondents were asked about their understandings of the politics of 
forced migration as it plays out in the Australian context. Despite a distinct 
sense of political apathy and disengagement among respondents, as has been 
found thus far, the answers to this part of the interview tell a different story. 
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That is, although a vast majority of the respondents indicated a lack of interest 
in politics, a majority of the respondents expressed relatively complex political 
understandings of the issue of forced migration, particularly in light of their 
experience as forced migrants. They reflected critically on Australian 
government policies in the area.  
 
Overall, the respondents perceived many of the Australian government’s 
policy decisions as over-simplistic, and as having chronic or unwanted affects 
that the government chooses to ignore. Many of the respondents recognised 
the complexity of political issues in this area, with a few teasing out issues 
commonly associated with the “liberal paradox” or the inherent tension 
between the inclusionary nature of universal rights, and the exclusionary 
nature of particular, nationally framed rights. Most of the respondents felt the 
Australian government takes an exclusive approach to the issue of forced 
migration, which has a corollary of negative effects for refugees themselves. 
Those respondents who expressed such an opinion tended to point to negative 
stereotypes of refugees, asylum seekers and Muslims, and issues they are 
personally having with certain areas of policy, especially the nature of 
immigration detention and issues associated with family reunification. Despite 
a range of measured responses and reasoned opinions about this topic, most of 
the respondents appear to have internalised the refugee or asylum seeker 
identity, which they perceive as having a relatively low status in Australian 
society. They perceived themselves as unentitled to contribute to the debate, or 
be politically active on this issue. This is despite their first-hand, unique 
knowledge of the practical effects of forced migration policy and legislation as 
they play out in the lives of refugees themselves. 
 
A number of respondents perceive that the Australian government purposely 
simplifies or misrepresents the phenomenon of forced migration to the public 
as it lacks the political will to address the issue comprehensively and find 
durable solutions for displaced persons globally. They view the Australian 
government’s approach towards forced migration as inadequate. Hassan said,  
“I think [the politicians] know about the situation about asylum 
seekers globally and locally but because they don’t have an 
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answer and don’t come out and say, ‘you are welcome,’ they 
make themselves not knowing what is happening, as if they are 
not expecting this large number of people coming over and 
things like that. But they know that is happening in the world, 
they just pretend they don’t” (Author interview with Hassan).  
Mubarak, who arrived to Australia by boat, noted how governments from both 
sides of Australian politics take the same approach to the issue. Of Julia 
Gillard’s election win against Tony Abbottt in 2010, he said, “We used to refer 
to her as our Aunty Julia… but then she turned out to be on the other side 
anyway” (Author interview with Mubarak). He suggested that the issue is used 
for political points scoring, and represents a sort of political apathy on the part 
of the political elite, a lack of will to find comprehensive policy solutions for 
the displaced.  
 
Many respondents made the argument that people would not try to reach 
Australia by boat if they did not have reasons to do so – pointing out that it is 
an act of desperation and hope. Hakeem said in this vein, but specifically 
about onshore maritime arrivals, “I wish that the Australian government would 
recognise the real problems - these people are obvious, crossing the ocean is 
crossing death, you can’t imagine, this should be evidence for them” (Author 
interview with Hakeem). These respondents lamented the state’s portrayal of 
refugees as unwelcome guests or economic migrants; depictions that tend to 
understate the reasons for refugees’ flight and instead focus on the burden they 
represent to the Australia national community. This, according to a number of 
respondents, serves to preserve refugees’ suffering and creates a popular-level 
misunderstanding of the motives of displaced people. 
 
Six respondents explicitly pointed to negative stereotypes surrounding the 
asylum seeker and refugee identity in Australia. Most argued that the 
government propagates such negative perceptions, whether it is intentional or 
not. Ali said, “well we know that now they detain asylum seekers for seven 
years on an Island… they are definitely not giving a good picture of refugees.” 
(Author interview with Ali). Yasin spoke at length of the consequences that 
the government’s approach has on forced migrants themselves, indicating that 
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government treatment amounts to dehumanisation and persecution, and 
ultimately causes mental stress for forced migrants trying to settle into 
Australian society. Indeed, Yasin was on a bridging visa at the time he was 
interviewed, and said, “I feel like Canberra is waging an emotional war on us”. 
He goes on, “they see that this person has come here after suffering and abuse 
but don’t provide humanitarian support… it caused us a great deal of 
depression, not on a small scale” (Author interview with Yasin).  Yasin was in 
a state of indefinite limbo, unsure if he can stay in Australia or even where he 
will be next month, leaving him feeling thoroughly depressed, unwanted, 
alienated, yet powerless to redress his discontents. 
 
Despite a general interpretation of Australia’s forced migration debates and 
policies as inimical to the demands of universal rights and refugee law, many 
respondents nonetheless noted that it is a nation-state’s prerogative to protect 
their borders and try and control who enters. That is, they point to a political 
dilemma for the Australian state. One such respondent was Husayn, one of the 
interpreters, who said, “It has two different directions here. Maybe they have 
the right to protect their homeland. I mean the Australian politicians… They 
need to protect their economy, to protect their society from being invaded by 
those refugees let’s say.” From the refugees’ perspective, he contends, “they 
have the right to look for a better life” (Author interview with Husayn).  
Husayn perceives the issue as complex and hard to approach, and clearly 
empathises with both the prerogatives of state and the rights of forced migrants 
who have no control over their displacement. Husayn is one of three 
respondents who sympathise with the Australian state and side with its current 
approach, having internalised popular rhetoric and believing that those who 
arrive to Australia by boat are “illegal”. Nevertheless, they tend to sympathise 
to a degree with those trying to seek asylum.  
 
As stated above, although the respondents are personally familiar with the 
various issues of forced migration policy, most of the respondents appear to 
have internalised the “refugee” or asylum seeker identity, as it is perceived in 
popular political debates. That is, they have internalised an “other” identity 
relative to the Australian mainstream socio-political community. They 
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perceive themselves as having a relatively low social status in Australian 
society. Yusuf exemplified this feeling among the majority of respondents, 
saying of political debate about refugees, “I don’t follow it… besides, what 
difference will my opinion make? It will not make any difference. This is a 
country with its own flag and government; it provides therefore it determines. 
I am just an asylum seeker.” (Author interview with Yusuf). This statement is 
a strong indication that this respondent – along with most of the respondents - 
felt unwelcome to contribute to political debates, and lacked a sense of 
entitlement and agency in the Australian political context. This informs their 
disengagement from political processes. 
 
 
(iv) Societal Understandings of Forced Migration: Ill informed and Biased 
 
The respondents were asked what they thought of the Australian community’s 
perceptions of forced migration. Overall, the respondents perceive the 
Australian community, generally, as having a lack of contact with forced 
migrants themselves, and therefore are ignorant of the actual social conditions 
that lead to displacement and the real-world ramifications of lacking 
membership in a secure polity. That is, the respondents think that most people 
in Australia lack the knowledge and understanding needed to empathise with 
the plight of refugees and asylum seekers. According to the respondents, this 
lack of contact between Australian citizens generally and forced migrants 
allows people to believe negative, racist stereotypes and form their opinions 
based on incomplete, politicised information.  
 
A majority of respondents, whether they thought people in Australia had good 
or bad intentions towards forced migrants, felt that there was a distinct lack of 
understanding amongst mainstream Australians about the suffering the 
respondents experienced before arriving to Australia. As Akil said plainly, “I 
don’t think people in Australia understand where refugees come from… I 
think they have not mixed with them enough, and just don’t know (Author 
interview with Akil). Fazil was more cynical in his interpretation; he perceived 
the Australian community’s approach to the issue of forced migration as based 
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on a feigned ignorance. He says people “play dumb” so that they don’t need to 
grapple with a complex and politically contentious issue. In doing so doing, 
they ignore the root issues and act to protect and galvanise their privilege 
within Australian society; “I think [people in Australian society] understand 
but they act like they don’t understand… it is easier for them if they don’t see 
the problem, because then it is not theirs and they can stay as they are” 
(Author interview with Fazil). Such cynicism speaks to a measure of 
disaffection. Overall, there was a tendency for respondents to site a lack of 
social contact between refugees and mainstream Australians as a key factor 
driving a lack of understanding or misunderstandings in the Australia 
community. 
 
Similar to Fazil’s point above, Rashid perceived that unless the issue of forced 
migration affects Australians directly, they are happy to ignore it. And, in the 
case that the issue is perceived to affect them directly, it is usually framed such 
that refugees or asylum seekers are problematic for Australian citizens and 
residents. He suggested that refugees resident in Australia are used as political 
scapegoats for a number of larger, usually macro-economic or infrastructure 
issues. As he explained, “The people in the street, they have no opinion, none 
of them have an opinion unless they are confronted with problems that flow 
from the refugees.” He illustrated his point, saying, “If [a person in Australia] 
was not able to obtain employment and the government or employer or 
something tells him ‘it’s the number of the refugees’…  he will think that the 
refugees have a negative impact on him” (Author interview with Rashid). 
Rashid has a keen perception that mainstream and government rhetoric in 
Australia tends to label and stigmatise refugees such that they may 
legitimately be used by political elites as scapegoats for other issues.  
 
Like Rashid, a number of respondents pointed to stereotypes and stigmas 
attached to the refugee identity as obscuring understanding amongst people in 
the community, as well as inhibiting their capacity to empathise with the 
situation of the respondents. According to Yusuf, a lack of substantive 
intercultural contact, or an effective channel of communication between forced 
migrants and members of the mainstream community allows misperceptions 
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and negative stereotypes to persist, particularly amongst everyday Australians. 
He said, “[Everyday Australians] don’t know. They don’t even ask what 
happened to me.” Yusuf interpreted his treatment by others in Australia as 
superficial, and felt he is judged on his “Arab” appearance. He further 
perceived few opportunities to create contact with others in the Australia. It is 
clear that Yusuf interprets the lack of communication between refugees 
resident in the country and Australians more broadly as facilitating ignorance 
about the issue of human displacement. 
 
Four respondents pointed specifically to popular negative stereotypes about 
Islam and Muslims, saying that such stereotypes foster discrimination and 
perpetuate social division. As Said put it, “One of the main misunderstandings 
is against Muslims. They think all Muslims are fanatics and terrorists.” He 
goes on, “I think media is playing a motivating role here. They motivate the 
community to view Muslims as fanatics or as terrorists. This is one of our 
sufferings in this country,” Said goes on to point to common, explicit identity 
markers that invite negative treatment from others in Australia; “if they know 
your name is Mohammad, for example, or your wife’s wearing a hijab, they 
will see that you are Muslim and treat you bad. It is those people who are 
fanatics” (Author interview with Said). Said here interprets Islamaphobia as a 
form of fanaticism or extremism in itself, an unjust use of identity markers to 
justify political violence and exclusion, a stigma that operates to cause 
suffering among Muslims in Australia.  
 
Overall, the respondents perceive a lack of social contact between the majority 
in Australia and refugees as informing a lack of understanding between these 
two groups. They further perceived this lack of contact as perpetuating the 
existence of negative stereotypes, against refugee and Muslim identity 
markers, which in turn inhibits the facilitation of communication and contact.   
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(v) Human Rights: Not Universal in Practice – A Political Tool  
 
The respondents were asked to share their perspectives on human rights and 
how they function in global and domestic politics. The main theme to come 
out of this discussion was the idea that human rights, for the most part, are not 
inherent nor universal, but are granted by powerful states and bodies 
selectively and in line with their political interests; not universal in application 
and political practice. Most respondents felt, giving different anecdotes or 
experiences to back up their view, that human rights were most often used as 
political tools by developed, wealthy and politically powerful states to 
manipulate socio-political conditions globally.  
 
Hassan best summed up this dominant attitude of the sample, taking the 
Australian state as an example. He said the Australian government “uses 
human rights in a way - everyone does not just have them - in accordance with 
their motives, and what they desire. They take the aspects that are most suited 
to them.” Hassan then points to the illusion of universality associated with 
human rights principles, saying, “This is a very illusive concept. Government, 
I think, in dealing with this concept do so according to the way they like.” He 
points to Australia’s detention facility at Nauru, which the Australian state use 
despite “the United Nations, in respect of human rights, has placing a red line 
on Camp Nauru” (Author interview with Hassan). Hassan is cynical about the 
real world application of human rights principles by powerful states. 
 
A slight majority of respondents pointed to instances where countries like 
Australia have been complicit in actions that are out of line with human rights 
principles, though they are, ironically, waged in the name of said principles. 
Most poignantly, they pointed to the occupation of Iraq and foreign policy 
toward the Middle East region generally, as cases in point. The respondents 
argued that these actions are taken in the national interest, and are geo-political 
manoeuvres, not human rights campaigns. As Husayn said, “If you are talking 
about the war in Iraq, human rights are biased.” He went on to illustrate his 
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point further by speaking about Western governments distinct approaches to 
issues in Syria and Bahrain (as it stood in 2012). His remarks speak to the 
existence of IS-like groups in Syria at the time, saying, “ 
So [Western states] support the Syrian demonstrators and even 
those people from [Islamist groups]. [People from this group] are 
very fanatical; they are using bombs, they are using suicide 
bombs, you know. But the rich countries keep supporting them, 
calling for human rights.”  
Shaking his head as he talks, Husayn goes on to say that the West does not 
intervene in places like Bahrain, even though peaceful democracy protestors 
are being killed by the Bahraini state. He states unequivocally “the reason is 
very clear. It’s not a matter of human rights. Human rights have been modified 
in a way [so as] to be side by side with some agendas… it’s not really a 
humanitarian thing going on” (Author interview with Husayn). In the same 
vein, pointing to the selective approach taken by global political elites to the 
actual enforcement of human rights, Jihad said, “the governments in the 
western countries, they give the human rights to the people they like. They 
don’t give human rights to the people they don’t like.”  A majority of the 
sample expressed this attitude that human rights are often used as a rhetorical 
and political tool by wealthy states rather than being guided by a commitment 
to a universalistic political philosophy. 
 
The respondents also pointed to transgressions in the human rights of people 
supposed to be protected under Australian law. They noted experiences in 
detention camps and the plight of people being held in community detention 
on bridging visas. Of a protest on Christmas Island, during which a fire broke 
out and the Australian Federal Police intervened and brought the protesters 
into submission, Hassan said, “they justified Christmas Island… saying that ‘if 
the army had not intervened the refugees would have occupied Christmas 
Island, they would have occupied it in its entirety.’” Hassan, who was in the 
detention facility when this occurred, contended that despite the government’s 
public justifications for the fire it was the federal police officers that started 
the blaze. He said,  
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“The police were not able to contain [the protest] without the use 
of live bullets. I have made a collection of the bullets… this in 
itself is a violation of the laws of human rights, I think... the 
Federal Police caused the fire. They fired live bullets, which hit 
the wires of the [electric] fence and it caused a spark which 
caused the fire” (Author interview with Hassan).  
It is worth noting here that the tenor of much of the media reporting of this 
incident placed the blame for the fire on the actions of the detainees, not the 
police. Hassan perceived that the detainees were unfairly scapegoated, which 
contributed to negative stereotypes about asylum seekers, and renewed support 
for the state’s detention policies. 
 
All the respondents were deeply sceptical about the use of human rights 
rhetoric by powerful global political elites to justify certain aggressive 
international, geo-strategic policies – policies that in practice, they felt, rescind 
the human rights of civilians in various countries – was evident among the vast 
majority of the respondents. Yasin captured this best, and without care to 
elaborate, “Human rights are a dream that is impossible to come true” (Author 
interview with Yasin). Overall, the respondents reflected on the positive ideal 
that human rights principles represent, but lamented that such rights do not 
really exist under the current socio-political conditions. Instead they perceive 
human rights to operate in political practice as a rhetorical and political tool 
used selectively by powerful, wealthy countries such as Australia to pursue 
parochial interests. 
 
(vi) Democracy: Positive about potential for representation  
 
The respondents were asked to reflect on their views about democracy as a 
system of governance. Overall, the respondents were positive about 
democracy in societies where the rule of law is respected, as it allows activism 
and political representation for individuals and/or communities. Many take a 
comparative perspective to make their point, saying that democracy in Iraq is 
farcical - a mask for tyranny - as there is no rule of law. While most think that 
Australia’s democracy functions relatively well, a number of respondents point 
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to instances where democracy masks tyranny in the Australian context, too. In 
saying that, the respondents’ sceptical attitudes towards democracy were far 
less pronounced that their overall attitudes of cynicism about human rights. 
 
The vast majority of respondents – 28 of 30 - saw democracy, when 
functioning under socio-political conditions where the rule of law thrives, as a 
positive and desirable system of governance. They tended to equate a well-
functioning democracy with respect for human rights, such as freedoms of 
speech and association, and the availability of safe channels for activism, 
through which individuals can lawfully claim rights to which they are entitled. 
This is reminiscent of Benhabib and Habermas’s discursive and inclusive 
conception of democracy. Like a vast majority of respondents, Ahmad said 
that in a democratic system people are able to express “ideas and opinions 
legally.” He noted the importance of representation in democracies – “you 
choose your people who are to act or represent you at government fairly, and 
when you live, practice your religion and culture freely, this is democracy” 
(Author interview with Ahmad). The key principles of democracy pointed to 
by most respondents are freedom of expression and association within a 
system that strives to represent citizen interests and is ruled by law. 
 
A number of respondents mentioned the importance of the rule of law to 
mitigate corruption and ensure the ideal functioning of democracy. Many 
made this point by comparing the political system in Iraq (where, they argue, 
rule of law is non-existent and state practices tend to be corrupt) and Australia. 
As Jihad put it, almost mimicking the work of democratic theorists such as 
Habermas and Benhabib, “Democracy is good, but it needs laws to arrange the 
relationships between the people and the government.” He goes on to apply 
this principle to analyse the situation in Iraq saying, “Not like what happened 
in Iraq…For example [one group] cut off the roads, and they said ‘this is a 
democracy, and we have a right and we need this right, so we didn’t open the 
road until we get our right.” Jihad perceives such interpretations of democracy 
as problematic, as the rights claims of one group significantly curtail the rights 
of others in the society. In this case, the right to use the public road. He said, 
“Actually, if you want to get your right just make a demonstration, don’t go to 
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the public services and cut the entire road, damage the building and say, I have 
a right. I need my right” (Author interview with Jihad). Ibrahim noted that any 
democratic claims making or activism must be premised on lawful intentions 
and behaviour, saying, “You should respect the laws of this country and then 
[you] can talk and can do, and say anything in the newspaper, on the TV, even 
against the government… This is democracy… always within the law” 
(Author interview with Ibrahim). The respondents have an acute appreciation 
of the role of law and legal principles in ensuring the functioning of 
democracy. That is, the respondents value the same liberal democratic 
principles that have been characterised in popular discourse about migration as 
“Australian values”. Such a characterisation erroneously lends this notion a 
culturally parochial aspect, which is problematic for culturally “distinct” 
groups who, in reality, adhere to the same values yet are depicted otherwise. 
 
Hassan focussed on a more specific aspect of democracy as it functions in 
Australia and pointed to immigration as a particular area of Australian 
government policy that is disconnected from democratic processes. He said,  
“[Democracy] is good… unless it reaches the mafia. When it gets 
to the mafia there is no democracy… now, don’t you think the 
immigration is like a mafia? Outside the control of the 
government? I think that the way the migration officials operate is 
like the mafia. They are the only ones who have [control] over 
decisions … you ask any organisation, and they say we will help 
with anything but the immigration issues... And all the other 
organisations, the same, they’ll help with anything but the 
immigration. No one will go near it… It’s almost a non-accessible 
organisation” (Author interview with Hassan).   
Hassan perceived this area of policy as being is handled in an undemocratic or 
“mafia-like” fashion and points to the importance of rule of law, which is 
supposed to ensure that democratic processes are not corrupted. His argument 
is reminiscent of Mary Crock’s  “secret immigration business” (Crock & 
Ghezelbash, 2010) and is even more relevant in light of recent legislation in 
Australia, not least the Border Force Act, which effectively gags immigration 
and detention centre officials and staff. 
 257 
 
Overall the respondents have positive attitudes about democracy as a system 
of governance but are aware of the ideal conditions under which a democracy 
must operate for it to be functional and legitimate. None purported to believe 
that democracy exists in their home country of Iraq, but see it functioning 
more fully in Australia despite some pitfalls, such as a populist level stigma of 
Muslims and the secret, non-transparent function of the immigration 
department.  
 
 
6.8 Summary 
 
The meanings the respondents ascribe to their various socio-political attitudes 
and behaviours were complex and varied. Generally, all the respondents were 
deeply affected and traumatised by their flight from Iraq (and surrounds) and 
were profoundly grateful for the protection afforded them by the Australian 
state. However, the vast majority have struggled to identify with and feel 
included in the Australian socio-political system after arriving into the 
community. Issues tend to crop up around practices of the Australian state, 
such as immigration detention, slow family reunification procedures and issues 
with the immigration department. Further problematic aspects are related to 
unfamiliar cultural norms and political rhetoric associated with forced 
migration discourse, which they interpret as propagating negative stereotypes 
about forced migrants. Furthermore, there were persistent issues of poor 
mental health, perceived racism in the Australian milieu and issues of 
entrenched socio-economic disadvantage among the sample, all of which 
compounded a sense among respondents that they lacked entitlement and 
social status. The following discussion discusses the large dataset 
meaningfully, so as to reflect on the theoretical concerns of the study and 
address the research questions. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the major themes to come out of the data analysis and 
discusses them in terms of the theoretical approach of the study so as to 
reflect upon the project’s research questions. It is worth reiterating that this 
project sought to elucidate data about the attitudes and behaviors of a 
sample group of Iraqi refugees in Australia in order to explore whether the 
macro-level assumptions of democratically grounded cosmopolitan theory 
are founded in their context. More specifically, it seeks to reflect upon 
their qualitative experiences of political membership in Australia. It looks 
at whether, overall, their subjective orientation to the democratic socio-
political system lends to the argument that they identify with this system – 
with all its social and cultural values and norms, discourses, policies and 
laws - and therefore engage with democratic processes and discourse, and 
contribute to legitimate democratic reproduction. Alternatively, it explores 
whether they feel disaffected or alienated in the Australian socio-olitical 
system and do not engage with democratic processes. Such an orientation 
may be seen to sustain their position at the margins of the political 
community, relatively unrepresented and included only by name. 
 
In order to meaningfully discuss the findings from the data analysis, and 
reflect on the respondents’ subjective orientation to the socio-political 
system in Australia, the discussion is broken down into four categories, 
each of which represents a particular site of socio-political activity and 
interaction, or space in the public sphere. Firstly it discusses the major 
theme to come from data about the respondents’ experiences and 
interactions with government-funded organisations and service providers. 
This is followed by a discussion of the major theme to come from the data 
pertaining to the respondents’ interactions and experiences in the social 
milieu in Australia. Thirdly, it looks at the major theme to come from 
analysing the respondents’ interactions and experiences of the political 
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milieu in Australia. And finally, it discusses the major theme to come from 
the respondents’ experiences as rights-bearing members of the Australian 
polity – either as citizens or soon to be citizens in Australia – which 
represents a culmination of the previous three themes and provides a 
meaningful segue to the conclusions of this research, which are presented 
in the subsequent and final chapter.  
 
 
6.2 Welfare without Welcome 
 
This section discusses the respondents’ experiences and interactions with 
state-funded institutions, services and service providers, particularly upon 
arrival to the country and within their first six months of living in the 
community. It explores their perceptions and interpretations of the two 
distinct policy approaches that the Australian state has institutionalised to 
manage the state’s border protection objectives in the first instance, and the 
settlement needs of forced migrants in the second. These institutions may 
be seen as the state’s juxtaposed, two-pronged vanguard; frontline 
immigration defence, detention and processing institutions designed 
purposely to send a message of exclusion (for onshore humanitarian 
arrivals only); and the country’s social services and support institutions 
designed ostensibly for social inclusion, to orient and assist new 
humanitarian arrivals to settle into Australian society (for all humanitarian 
arrivals).  
 
The respondents’ experiences within these institutions are discussed in 
light of Seyla Benhabib’s concern with subjective claims making and 
political contestations that occur at the boundaries of political 
communities. It engages with Benhabib’s definition of political 
membership as “the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and 
strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers, into 
existing polities” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 1). It discusses how the “principles 
and practices” used to “incorporate” the respondents in this study were 
perceived by the sample, and how those perceptions, in turn, affected the 
respondents’ qualitative understanding of the new polity to which they 
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were arriving. The way a nation state treats people such as asylum seekers 
and refugees, who stand at the boundary of the democratic community and 
seek entry, acts as something of a litmus test for how that political 
community imagines and constitutes itself, how it defines membership 
within its polity, and, ultimately, what it deems an appropriate response to 
outsiders who make political claims for protection and entry based on 
human rights precepts (Benhabib 2004; 2007). In other words, how the 
national polity mediates universalist norms and expresses to new entrants 
the “principles under which it has constituted itself as a polity” (Benhabib, 
2013, p. 4). 
 
With this in mind, this section looks at the themes to come from the data 
about respondents’ experiences within state facilities or with public service 
providers upon arrival to the country. It reflects on how the respondents’ 
dominant experiences informed their first impressions of the liberal 
democratic political system into which they were being politico-legally 
included, as well as their perceptions of their personal socio-political role 
or place within their new polity. As such, this section looks at how the 
respondents’ reflexively reconstitute their own self-identity in light of their 
first experiences within state structures and with state representatives in 
Australia, and explores whether they, overall, identified with the state’s 
aims, and developed feelings of belonging to the national polity, or 
whether their experiences led them to feel disaffected or alienated. That is, 
it explores whether their experiences at the boundaries of Australia’s polity 
have led them to reconcile their individual motives and selfhood with the 
shared referential narrative of the Australian polity, as is manifested, to an 
extent, in the institutional arrangements that greeted them upon arrival. 
Alternatively, it explores whether their aims and personal political 
subjectivity stands in contrast to that of their new polity, leaving them 
feeling disaffected or alienated. 
 
As stated, the respondents’ experiences within the state’s institutions at the 
border – literally (detention) and figuratively (settlement services for those 
in the community) – gave them their first insight into the qualitative nature 
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of political membership in the Australian polity. It allowed them to form 
an impression of the popularly constructed boundaries of the demos, in a 
both a politico-legal and a socio-cultural sense. Firstly, the respondents’ 
experiences of mandatory detention indelibly shaped their first impressions 
of the socio-political system in Australia, as well as their reflexive 
understanding of how their politico-legal identity as “asylum seekers’ or 
“refugees” and aspects of their socio-cultural identities, such as “Iraqi” and 
“Muslim” are depicted and perceived in the Australian polity.  In turn they 
came to form a view of the social role, and attendant behaviours, that the 
national polity in Australia ascribes the bearers of such identity markers; 
that is, the role they felt they are expected to play within the Australian 
community.  
 
The majority of respondents perceived their politico-legal status as onshore 
asylum seekers, as conferring upon them a measure of criminality. Indeed, 
as the qualitative analysis showed, the majority of respondents felt they 
were detained by the Australian state as a form of punishment for seeking 
asylum in the country. Their detention immediately conveyed the 
impression that they were unwanted in Australia, and most perceived 
themselves as prisoners, being isolated from society and punished for a 
crime. Their perceptions of the conditions in detention and the treatment 
they received from camp staff and the Australian Federal Police further 
added, with the passage of time, to this dominant interpretation among the 
respondents that they were detained in the fashion of criminals; prisoners 
wholly subject to and restricted by the prerogatives of the Australian state. 
The respondents reflexively understood themselves as lacking any political 
or social agency in their new context. They perceived themselves as 
entirely subject to the state, rather than as effective, valued human actors 
within the system.  
 
Their qualitative experiences while in detention tended to further inform a 
clear impression among respondents that aspects of their socio-cultural 
identities – particularly their Islamic religious identity– were poorly 
understood or misunderstood in what they perceived as the predominantly 
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Christian Australian context. The respondents perceived their attendant 
social role in their new community, as ascribed by the Australian national 
milieu, as that of a culturally and religiously distinct, largely 
misunderstood and unwanted outsider. This impression was particularly 
present among those respondents who witnessed and experienced 
discrimination, racism and violence at the hands of camp administrators 
and staff. Such experiences led a majority of respondents to interpret that 
the Australian polity did not value them as capable humans with potential 
to make positive contributions to Australian society, or seek to invite them 
to feel welcome in their new context.  
 
None of the respondents who stayed in immigration detention, with the 
exception of Yusuf, understood their incarceration in terms of an 
administrative necessity. Instead, there was a clear perception among the 
respondents of a significant stigma attached to the asylum seeker identity 
in Australian society, which they viewed as justifying and perpetuating 
their lengthy detention and punitive treatment. This stands in stark contrast 
to the Australian state’s claims about the aims of mandatory detention 
policy, as they stood up to 2013. Even Yusuf, who identified with the aims 
of the state, and conceded “the reality is that it’s their right to check the 
person and whether they will let him into Australia” added a disclaimer in 
regard to lengthy detention periods. He noted, “it’s true that you start to 
consider yourself in detention if it’s over a long period, you feel like you 
have been imprisoned and restricted” (Author interview with Yusuf). Such 
punitive practices of the state affected not just the respondents’ qualitative 
experiences inside detention; it communicated to the respondents how they 
were being received, perceived and discussed in the Australian polity more 
broadly. Overall the respondents did not identify with the way they were 
treated inside detention; they felt their reception was unjust, and 
interpreted this to mean that the Australian polity deemed them deserving 
of such unjust treatment.  
 
Beyond the existence of mandatory detention for onshore arrivals, lengthy 
detention times and popularised stigmas associated with the asylum seeker 
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and Muslim identity markers, a number of respondents elaborated on the 
poor conditions and treatment inside detention facilities, which added to 
their sense of imprisonment and the dominant perception that their 
particular socio-cultural identities are not valued, or at least widely 
misrepresented and misunderstood in the Australian polity. Given that 
detention was an institutional arrangement designed with exclusion in 
mind, and sits embedded in Australian law and condoned by the majority 
of the Australian public, it may be seen that such legal arrangement met its 
aims: to exclude. The “state practice for incorporating aliens and 
strangers” (Benhabib, 2007, p. 1) made the respondents feel substantively, 
qualitatively excluded from the demos that lay inside the borders, beyond 
their reach. That is, their politico-legal attachment to the democratic polity 
via the state institution of immigration detention did not encourage 
identification, belonging and solidarity with the polity more broadly. 
Though it operated to eventually include them officially, as per the 
arguments of democratically grounded cosmopolitan theories, it 
simultaneously sent a strong, emotionally profound message that they had 
not been invited and thus should expect nothing, but simply take what they 
are given and be grateful. A paternalistic and, ultimately, dehumanising 
institutional arrangement from the perspective of the respondents 
 
To recap, for all the 19 respondents who arrived via the onshore 
humanitarian pathway, immigration detention was their first experience of 
the nature and quality of the socio-political system in Australia. As such, 
many of them quickly understood that they were characterised, by and 
large, as unwanted outsiders by the Australian polity, worthy of unjust 
treatment. That is, their first impression of their place in Australian society 
was one of exclusion; they were alien, outsiders, punished for seeking 
asylum, stripped of liberties and agency, and therefore unable to redress 
their concerns. In terms of social capital theory, the respondents’ first 
experiences with Australian state institutions acted to reduce trust, and 
deny respondents the opportunity for any sense of local connectedness or 
reciprocity. As a consequence of their detention, and their perception of 
their treatment as punitive and significantly curtailing their liberties and 
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social choices, a number of respondents quickly developed feelings of 
isolation and estrangement.  
 
Given the respondents’ backgrounds, many having suffered persecution 
and violence in the name of militant identity politics and the vast majority 
having lived in situations of protracted displacement, their experiences in 
detention became something of an extension of the persecuted life they 
already knew, but had been trying to escape. Detention was something of a 
last straw for many of the respondents, who described their experiences 
using disruptive metaphors, such as, “destroyed us mentally” (Muhammad) 
and “My life flipped upside down” (Abdul Aziz).  This tended to inform 
alienated attitudes among the respondents, who perceived their treatment 
by the Australian state as symbolic of “a fundamental conflict between 
their basic politicized values and those exhibited in the polity” (Schwarz 
1973, p. 14). Furthermore, due to their incarceration and lack of 
substantive membership to the national polity at this point, they perceived 
“both themselves and the political system to be inefficacious to reduce this 
conflict” (Schwarz 1973, p. 14). The respondents felt powerless to redress 
their concerns and the Australian state was unwilling to cease or improve 
their system of detention, even in the face of official complaints made by 
respondents via legitimate, communications channels such as several 
meetings with camp administrators. In many cases these feelings of 
powerlessness manifested as mental illness, from anxiety, stress and 
depression to extremely passive and despondent behaviours or more 
aggressive and reactive behaviours.  
 
Overall, immigration detention is a socio-political institutional 
arrangement that is sanctioned by Australia’s courts and the community at 
large, which acted to severely disrupt the migration pathway of the 
respondents in this study. Those affected perceived their incarceration by 
the Australian state as another chapter in their personal histories of 
protracted displacement and persecution, which had time and time again 
been waged on the basis of how aspects of their social identity were 
perceived by an external actor. Such symbolically violent and physically 
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coercive externalities were in stark contrast to their personal expectations, 
understandings, feelings, aims, and motives. That is, the Australian’ 
polity’s ascription of asylum seekers’ undesirability and illegal motives 
was at odds with their self-identity narratives. As a result, the attitudinal 
and behavioural outcomes of the respondents experiences in detention 
tended to be chronic disaffection and alienation, leading to entrenched 
mental health issues and a concomitant passivity associated with 
psychoactive medication, or disillusionment with what they viewed as their 
ongoing and unfair persecution and a concomitant withdrawal from 
interacting beyond their tight knit networks. Across the board, mandatory 
immigration detention adversely affected the mental health of the 
respondents and ultimately corrupted their capability and potential to 
readily develop a sense of identification, belonging and inclusion in 
mainstream Australian society.  
 
As alluded to above, the second prong of Australia’s institutional 
arrangements designed to “incorporate aliens and strangers” (Benhabib, 
2007 p. 1) is delivered through the Humanitarian Settlement Services 
(HSS) program. The framework of Australia’s refugee settlement sector is 
currently based on a welfare model (Hugo 2011). HSS aims to “provide 
initial practical support designed to build the independence of newly 
arrived refugees and humanitarian entrants, generally for the first six to 12 
months” (HSS 2015). It is worth noting again that the vast majority of 
Australia’s humanitarian intake is via the offshore pathway, and the 
country’s refugee settlement programs have been well established since the 
1980s. Indeed, the design of Australia’s resettlement program is such that 
services and service providers represent the frontline of Australian 
society’s relationship with most forced migrants arriving in the 
community, and are the primary means to facilitate initial orientation, 
settlement and inclusion. The institutional arrangements in place are seen 
as relatively progressive and effective models by global standards for the 
political management of newly arrived, culturally diverse migrants and are 
regularly touted by politicians (UNHCR, 2009).  
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All the survey and interview respondents accessed government-funded 
settlement services since arriving to Australia. The majority of respondents 
were still accessing welfare support at the time of research. Overall, the 
respondents were extremely grateful for the material support provided 
them by the Australian state and the logistical and emotional support 
provided by settlement sector staff, such as caseworkers. The gratitude felt 
by all the respondents was informed to a large extent by a sense of relief 
that they had found a safe place to live. Indeed, given that the vast majority 
of interview respondents – twenty-three of the thirty - were displaced for 
more than five years before arriving to Australia, and that all fled from 
their former life due to profound suffering as a consequence of 
authoritarian and militant manifestations of identity politics, their sense of 
relief at finding safety in the Australian community was profound. 
Furthermore, and counter to all their previous experiences of state 
beneficence, they received material, and for those with effective 
caseworkers, emotional support via government funded programs. This 
arrangement may be seen to have endeared the respondents to the socio-
political system in Australia, as they closely identified with the aims of the 
settlement sector, engaged with settlement service providers and tended to 
benefit directly from this institutional setup.  
 
The majority of respondents reflected positively on the welfare they 
received through settlement services, as it provided for their immediate 
material needs and allowed them to feel secure at a time in their lives that 
was otherwise characterised by dislocation and uncertainty. This seems to 
have built up among the respondents a significant level of gratitude and 
good will for the Australian socio-political system; heartfelt gratitude that 
an unfamiliar nation-state would provide them such support. Indeed, for 
some respondents, they felt genuinely surprised to find such levels of state 
support, as they had not held any expectations for such services to be 
provided them on arrival.  
 
This overall attitude of gratitude among the respondents saw them identify 
with the system, particularly because it was, in the view of many, their 
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only inlet to Australian society. In their initial months of settlement in 
particular, in lieu of social networks in their new and unfamiliar context, or 
any perception of the wider community caring about their arrival or 
settlement, it was visits to caseworkers and doctors and other such 
relatively instrumental activities that facilitated a sense of inclusion in the 
Australian milieu. This is captured in Yusuf’s remark, “the Australian 
society does not know much about me… I am thankful to… the 
community after the Australian government, because when you get out [of 
detention], it is the Australian government who helps, not the people” 
(Author interview with Yusuf). The settlement sector and the welfare 
services provided by the Australian state may be seen to have achieved the 
aim for which they were designed; to facilitate democratic attachments 
between new humanitarian arrivals and state institutions and 
representatives.  
 
Despite this overall positive impression of settlement services on a short-
term, material level, a deeper look into the substantive experiences of the 
respondents, particularly as their time in the country progressed, exposes 
two main points of contention with the settlement sector. Firstly, there are 
instances where settlement and government services and service providers 
explicitly failed, variously leaving respondents homeless, severely stressed 
and anxious, living in a state of economic desperation and unemployment, 
completely unaware of the progress and outcomes of their application for 
protection and/or family reunification visas, and conflicting with their 
caseworkers. According to the respondents affected, such instances 
contributed significantly to the development of attitudes and behaviours 
premised on feelings of disaffection and disillusionment, and in some 
cases complete alienation and disconnection from the socio-political 
structures that are supposed to be designed for their benefit and inclusion.  
 
One incident elucidated by Ali illustrated the deleterious effects that a 
breakdown in settlement service provision can potentially have on new 
humanitarian arrivals. Ali, after being released from his yearlong stay in 
detention on Christmas Island, was left homeless in Melbourne, reliant on 
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his few social acquaintances (people he had met in detention) for shelter. 
Ali perceived this period of his life intensely, noting, ‘the life I suffered at 
the beginning in Melbourne was more difficult than the suffering I 
experienced in Iraq’ (Author interview with Ali). His subsequent 
behaviours were deeply affected by this event, as he actively avoided the 
mainstream settlement system, and pursued other means in order to 
procure money as well as a passage for his family to come to Australia. He 
refused to elucidate the means by which he came to reverse his fortune, 
putting it down to “God’s willingness.” Yet, whatever his precise 
behaviour was, he indicated that it was premised on a feeling of alienation 
from the formal systems of settlement in the country. He felt alienated by 
the settlement system and anxious about his condition, which appears to 
have precipitated purposive behaviour that saw him withdraw from the 
public sphere and, though left unspoken, engage in behaviour that was 
probably nefarious in nature.  
 
The second major point of discontent to come from analysis of the data 
about respondents’ experiences with settlement services relates to a 
perception that the government pursues a short-term approach to welfare 
provision. A number of respondents felt frustrated that their cases are 
treated by service providers as yet another number being processed by a 
bureaucratic machine, instead of being approached as a long-term 
investment in their life and future. This perception was most commonly 
noted in relation to respondents’ interactions with various immigration 
services and agents, as they tried to understand complex, lengthy and 
bureaucratically rigid family reunification procedures and arrange 
applications for their families. Indeed, issues pertaining to family 
reunification and interactions with the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, or lack thereof, affected more than half of the interview 
respondents and were among the most intensely felt, stress-inducing 
discontents. Themes that persistently cropped up among the interviewees 
included severe anxiety about being separated from their family, having no 
indication of when they may be reunited with family and perceiving 
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themselves as unentitled to ask the Immigration department for more 
information than what they freely offered.  
 
 
Furthermore, there was a perception among some respondents that 
refugees generally are stigmatised in the Australian context. These 
respondents pointed to instances where the refugee label or social identity 
is used by government representatives and media commentators to justify 
wider macro-economic discontents. For some, they feel they are offered 
welfare and then maligned for taking welfare provisions. Rashid pointed 
out that, unless the issue of forced migration affects Australians directly, 
they are happy to ignore the issue. And, in the case that the issue is 
perceived to affect them directly, it is usually framed such that the refugee 
or asylum seekers are causing problems for Australian citizens and 
residents. He suggested that refugees resident in Australia are used as 
political scapegoats for a number of larger, usually macro-economic or 
infrastructure issues, which is backed up by research in Australia (Spinney 
& Nethery, 2013). Such observations made by the respondents suggest 
only an instrumental and superficial level of identification and engagement 
with the socio-political system – what Calhoun calls out as 
overemphasising bare inclusion into the legal-political framework afforded 
by the constitution. By highlighting the instrumental “rational 
bureaucratic” relationship between the respondent and the socio-political 
system more broadly, the state is able to fulfil its own systemic outcomes 
and thereby symbolically shoulders the burden of refugee settlement. Yet, 
in doing so, state policies and practices ignores and masks the disaffection 
and alienation that better characterises the respondents’ self narratives. 
That is, it disregards the way the respondents ascribe meaning to the 
practices of the Australian welfare state when trying to understand their 
personal position and options within this new system. That is, the state, by 
focusing on its own systemic outcomes for inclusion, ignores the fact that 
the respondents in this sample tend to feel wholly subject to the state 
system and constrained by it, rather than substantively included and able to 
pursue personal social choices. 
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What’s striking here is the marked disconnect between popular perceptions 
and mainstream depictions of forced migrants in Australia, and the 
perceptions the respondents have of themselves and their identity. It is 
worth noting, for example, that few of the respondents were drawn to seek 
asylum in Australia by virtue of it being Australia per se. Rather, they 
sought asylum in any safe, stable country where their identity and rights 
would be respected and upheld. Interestingly, none of the interviewees 
who arrived to Australia by boat and applied for onshore protection, knew 
much about Australia, or knew anything substantive about the culture or 
the political system before arriving. In light of this, populist claims that 
refugees such as the respondents in this study are purposefully seeking to 
milk Australia’s generosity and live their days out at the expense of the 
Australian taxpayer are unfounded; such widely held popular 
misperceptions nonetheless persist and add to the social stigma attached to 
the refugee identity in the Australian context.   
 
Overall, the attitudes and behaviours of the respondents’ in regard to state-
funded settlement support and welfare services, speak to a complex of 
positive interaction and engagement, largely driven by a sense of material 
need and a profound gratitude for welfare provisions and safety provided 
them. This is accompanied with a sense of disaffection that grew up over 
time among many respondents. In two cases there was a clear sense of 
alienation. These passive or negative orientations to the settlement sector 
are generally informed by experiences of perceived neglect on behalf of 
service providers, and the mechanistic and impersonal delivery of said 
support services. There was a distinct impression among the respondents 
that they felt fortunate to be the recipients of welfare, and that they, in turn, 
were expected by the mainstream society, the generous host, to accept 
welfare as sufficient in terms of what they feel they need to settle 
successfully. Yet, the more long term aims of the respondents, such as the 
intention to secure their families passage to Australia, or a desire for 
gainful and satisfying employment and a more genuine inclusion into the 
social fabric – often borne of a desire to plan an independent future, as per 
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the purported aims of HSS policy – seem elusive for most respondents, 
which feeds an ongoing feeling of social exclusion, political and legal 
discontents and an overall sense of disaffection among the sample. In 
short, they are profoundly grateful for the welfare provided them; yet feel 
substantively unwelcome in the Australian community despite it. They 
continue to struggle with mental health issues and are heavily reliant on 
state structures, which dictate what choices are available to them. The 
respondents express great difficulty breaking this situation. Such a socio-
political condition feeds a sense of ongoing powerlessness and an overall 
lack of entitlement to full, self-directed liberal democratic socio-political 
membership. 
 
The Australian state’s institutional arrangements – detention and HSS – 
sent a two-toned message that the respondents’ received loud and clear; 
they are provided for materially, but are not particularly welcome to act as 
full democratic members who feel they belong to the national community 
and are therefore entitled to claim the resources of the community and 
contribute to public discourse. Instead, they felt a popular level 
expectation, or opinion that it is befitting them to act as passive subjects. 
This resonates with the populist slogan, “Love it or leave it” and places the 
respondents in a bind. For although the respondents are hardly “loving it” 
and continue to battle with serious personal and political discontents, they 
can hardly “leave it” either, given their social and politico-legal reality as 
refugees. Indeed, material welfare and their protection, in a sense, operate 
to coerce the respondents, or to buy the respondents’ compliance to state 
and what they perceive as national, popular demands. This message is 
reminiscent of the age-old paradox built into the logic of highly controlled 
yet expansive immigration to Australia; highly controlled in terms of the 
type of migrants the countries wishes to receive. The immigration program 
and popular rhetoric about migration into the country continues to be built 
on this central axiom; a logic that says it is the role of the nation state to 
determine “who comes to this country and the circumstances under which 
they come” (Howard 2001). This rhetoric deems certain migrants as 
desirable, and others as undesirable. The fact that asylum seekers in 
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particular are “undesirable” in the Australia context was not lost on the 
respondents and corrupts their ability to identify with the socio-political 
system.  
 
In terms of the behavioural consequences of the respondents’ conflicted 
attitudinal disposition – gratitude mixed with discontent and disaffection - 
a majority of respondents have appropriated, to an extent, the role of an 
unwanted guest. They act as passive recipients of political largesse. Such a 
state of affairs suggests that more inclusive and dynamic conceptions of 
democracy, as expounded by Benhabib and Habermas, which are 
contingent on the ideal, active and substantive role of members within such 
systems, are trumped by a more populist, liberal egalitarian understanding 
of the democratic political system. For example, many in the sample 
perceive themselves as not entitled, or lacking the capacity to claim full 
substantive rights in the Australian context, despite the existence for some 
respondents of deeply felt discontents. Furthermore, many respondents did 
not feel they were given substantive support and encouragement to become 
economically independent, and in control of their own lives over the long 
term in Australia. Instead, there is a sense that they were provided the 
basic tools for survival in the short term, which given their backgrounds 
experiences of depravity and persecution, is more than many have been 
offered before. Such welfare, however, was provided with a dose of 
hostility and in effect does not go far enough to afford them full agency 
within the socio-political structures of the welfare state. Instead, the 
welfare system operates to locks them into an instrumental relationship 
with the state, playing the role of the passive recipient, socio-economically 
marginalized and feeling socio-culturally unwanted and isolated.  
 
Under such dominant socio-political institutional arrangements, the social 
and political lives of the respondents are rendered passive. As Robinson 
and Twormey argue, “ 
Statist sanctions are the least accessible, the least 
‘democratic’ so to speak, of all the forms of sanctioning 
activity. They create the possibility of arbitrary power, 
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despotism and tyranny… Concentrated formal sanctions are 
clearly the least compatible with diversity, and the least 
likely to entail listening to others; their very concentration 
disempowers the other” (Robinson and Tormey 2009, p. 
1401).  
The democratic system in Australia, as interpreted by the respondents in 
light of their experiences in detention and with HSS, appeared to function 
less as a bottom-up political process in which active members of the demos 
cooperate with one another to represent their interests, but a top-down 
formulation of the “political class”. According to Habermasian logic, then, 
such a situation eschews and/or corrupts effective public deliberation and 
potentially gives rise to anti-democratic or authoritarian tendencies, and, 
theoretically, controverts the inclusive potential of liberal democracy for 
this sample.   
 
Such a state of affairs lends credence to Calhoun’s contention that 
“citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not merely included by law” 
(Calhoun, 2002, p. 153). For although the country’s “boundaries are fixed 
by positive law and are therefore subject to the force of democratic 
iteration” (Benhabib, 2007, p. 33), the actors in this sample, who may be 
seen to present the state with new political subjectivity and challenge the 
imagination to go beyond unitary citizenship models, do not regard 
themselves as being in a position to throw down such politico-legal 
contestations. Indeed, outside an instrumental relationship with the welfare 
state, they are not directly participating in the polity’s democratic 
discourse at all.  
 
 
6.3 Culturally Distinct and Socially Isolated  
 
This section discusses the respondents’ social interactions and experiences 
since arriving in the Australian community. Before discussing the findings, 
it is worth briefly revisiting the relevant macro-level theoretical 
suppositions under exploration. Habermas posits, “the strength of the 
democratic constitutional state lies precisely in its ability to close the holes 
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of social integration through the political participation of its citizens” 
(2001, p. 76). Similarly, Benhabib (2004, p. 221) argues, “Identification 
and solidarity are… to be leavened through democratic attachments and 
constitutional norms”. These scholars emphasise democratic processes and 
legal frameworks – a symbiosis between the socio-political and the legal - 
as engendering a “constitutional patriotism” which acts as a key 
mechanism of social inclusion for individuals (Nickel 2009). That is, they 
insist that it is in particular the role of modern law in concert with public 
autonomy - the availability and use of “actionable individual rights” (Flynn 
2003, p. 431) – to ensure social integration in complex societies. Yet, as 
was discussed in the theoretical approach chapter, a number of cultural 
critics are not convinced by such legal-rationalist arguments, which are 
seen to whitewash the complexity and pervasiveness of cultural 
attachments, including stark power differentials across various cultural 
groups, and provide only a weak, secondary account of solidarity and 
belonging (Calhoun, 2002, Sen, 1992).  
 
In Calhoun’s view, for example, such arguments rely too heavily on the 
assumption that the public’s sense of belonging and solidarity will result 
from the strength of an adherence to a legal framework. He argues that 
such a suggestion is insufficient because it places too much emphasis on 
bare inclusion into the legal-political framework afforded by the 
constitution: ‘Citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not merely 
included by law’ (Calhoun 2002, p. 153). Both political scientific and 
sociological literatures, which have taken a “cultural” or “representative” 
turn in recent decades and empahsise the importance of human agency 
(Kurasawa 2007; Dahlgren, 2006; De Haas 2008; Tormey and Robinson 
2009, Castles 2001), tend to back up this view, suggesting that in plural 
societies such as Australia, intercultural understanding, trust and 
reciprocity are contingent to and constructive of strong social ties and 
networks within and across cultural groups (bonding and bridging capital, 
respectively). This lends to more engaged and inclusive socio-cultural 
relations and overall cohesion in a national society such as in Australia. In 
order to facilitate strong social ties, individual agents must identify 
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themselves as valued members of society and, to an extent, feel entitled 
and able to communicate in meaningful terms with the broader community 
to which they are supposed to be in positive relations with. This stands for 
all members of a community, newly arrived refugees or otherwise. 
 
The findings from this study lend credence to Calhoun’s critique of the 
Habermasian rationalist approach to social inclusion in democratic 
systems, as the respondents consistently cited issues pertaining to culture 
as informing their understandings of their social place or role in the 
Australian milieu and their subsequent social habits, routines and 
preferences. Overwhelmingly, it is found that the respondents’ identify 
themselves as culturally distinct from the broader Australian community 
and exhibit culturally isolated social behaviours. Indeed, the majority of 
respondents socialise exclusively within their Iraqi refugee community 
(and more specifically with the particular cohort with whom they arrived). 
They display low levels of cross-cultural formal or informal networking 
and interaction. Those that do socialise outside of their community, 
according to the interview data, tend to do so with colleagues during their 
working hours (though these relationships tend to be impermanent) or with 
other refugees with whom they have become acquainted throughout their 
journey (this is especially true of those who have spent time in 
immigration detention),  
 
The interview data found that most respondents admit to being 
substantively unfamiliar with and not identifying with the norms and habits 
of social life in the Australian community. In addition to the perception 
that they lack a certain cultural identification and literacy, most feel they 
do not have the linguistic or mental capacity to initiate social interactions. 
Indeed, the major theme to come from analysis of the qualitative data 
about the respondents’ settlement experiences, was ‘culture shock, 
disconnection and adaptation.’ That is, their qualitative experience of 
social membership in Australia is one of relative isolation. Indeed, the 
respondents perceived themselves as markedly, even insurmountably 
culturally different from others in Australia, and acted reflexively to 
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manage this sense of disconnection by engaging in culturally parochial 
social behaviours. The respondents further perceived a ‘lack of community 
awareness’ about their identities and their background stories of struggle 
and persecution. This led to and reinforced a sense that they lacked 
meaningful social support for their settlement into the Australian social 
milieu. This sense of a lack of reciprocity or interest in their self-identities 
engendered feelings of disaffection and alienation, as opposed to solidarity 
and belonging, which by and large reinforced their tendency to stick with 
their tightknit, familiar cultural networks.  
 
Furthermore, and in light of their experiences and observations since 
arriving, a majority of respondents view social relations in the wider 
Australian community as relatively disconnected and individualistic, which 
is distinct from their own social values, norms and habits which they view 
as far more communitarian. As Faiz said starkly, “there is no socialising 
here … it feels as though we live in a cemetery … there is no social life, 
only dead people” (Author interview with Faiz). Again, this dominant 
perception informed a sense of disconnection and social alienation among 
the group, which led the respondents to purposefully socialise within their 
own familiar cultural groups. They felt incapable and unwilling to 
cooperate or socialise with fellow members of the demos, which does not 
bode well for Habermas’s logic that democratic legitimacy is attained 
through a “fair and open deliberative process in which all citizens may 
freely continue to participate whatever the outcome” (Bohman, 1996, p. 
89). The social position of the respondents in this sample see them shy 
away from participating in social activities at all, let alone in an ongoing 
manner. 
 
Despite these socio-culturally isolated attitudinal and behavioural patterns 
explicit in the survey and interview data, a closer look at the respondents’ 
attitudinal patterns reveals a willingness and desire to socially engage with 
people from outside the Iraqi refugee community. This is backed up by the 
major theme to come from analysis of the data about respondents personal 
social life, which was “Social aspiration, but no inter-cultural life.’ In 
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exploring the disjuncture between respondents’ relatively isolated socio-
cultural networking behaviours and their apparent desire for cross-cultural 
engagement, understanding and socialisation, two patterns of justification 
became clear from the qualitative interviews. Firstly, a majority of 
respondents referred at some point in the interviews to their perception of 
popular stereotypes and stigmas associated with various aspects of their 
identity, and six interview respondents referred to instances of direct 
discrimination. In light of such instances, the respondents feel that they are 
deprived of agency in the Australian context, and are expected by the 
broader milieu to assimilate and conform to mainstream social behaviours. 
This perception tends to inform feelings of disaffection and alienation from 
the broader social milieu and informs isolated social behaviours, as the 
vast majority of respondents place great importance on maintaining their 
origin culture and heritage.  
 
Secondly, a number of respondents framed their decision to socialise 
exclusively within their cultural group as being their own, subjective, 
reflexive choice, which they nonetheless frame in terms of their perception 
of a lack of intercultural dialogue and understanding between their cultural 
group and the cultural norms and habits of the wider society in Australia. 
In a sense, they claim agency over their choice to remain relatively socio-
culturally isolated but still justify their choice in light of their broader 
structural concerns, which suggests a level of disaffection from the broader 
milieu and indicates low social reflexivity for these individuals in the 
Australian context (Giddens, 1991). It is in light of these perceptions that 
the respondents tend not to engage with other cultural groups, particularly 
mainstream white Australians, as they are reticent to believe their 
intentions will be welcomed, understood or reciprocated. 
 
As stated above, a majority of respondents referred at some point in the 
interviews to their perception of popular stereotypes and stigmas 
associated with various aspects of their identity, including their “refugee” 
or “asylum seeker” status, or their “Iraqi” or “Muslim” identity. According 
to two respondents, instances of direct discrimination have caused them to 
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significantly adapt their behaviours and pursue actions that they are 
culturally uncomfortable with. In other cases, a number of respondents 
pointed to a perception of discrimination against their refugee status in the 
housing and labour markets. All six respondents who perceived they were 
being discriminated against, on whatever grounds, immediately reacted by 
recoiling into their immediate socio-cultural group and pursuing social 
behaviours that were purposively directed away from engagement with 
non-Iraqis (some respondents conceded that this affect wore off with the 
passage of time). Such a subjective orientation to the social community in 
Australia may be characterised, to an extent, as one of alienation. These 
respondents perceived and in turn adopted “an attitude of separation or 
estrangement between” (Schwarz 2007) themselves and the national 
community at large. In addition, they felt themselves inefficacious to 
reduce this sense of disconnection and defected from further engagement 
with the socio-political system, so as to try and reduce this conflict.  
 
 
Many of the respondents interpret their choice to socialise within their 
Iraqi community as their own purposive behaviour, a strategy of cultural 
maintenance and social ease. Others justified their tendency to self-isolate 
variously as a personal social preference, a result of language barriers, 
mental health issues and other factors that made respondents’ feel ill 
equipped to successfully navigate an unfamiliar and daunting social world. 
Despite this, they tend to contextualise their personal choice in light of 
broader societal factors and difficulties associated with interacting with 
unfamiliar non-Iraqis, and non-refugees. They tend to essentialise their 
own and others’ identities into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary, which in turn 
naturalises this behavioural dissociation and reifies a sense and experience 
of socio-cultural disconnection and isolation. And, yet, their considered 
attitudes reflect a desire for openness and social engagement outside of 
their community. In light of such a perception of structural relations in the 
Australian context, the respondents tend to choose not to engage beyond 
their communities too readily, so as to assuage potential feelings of 
alienation, ongoing struggle, subjection and marginality. 
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In the scope of this study, it is significant to find that issues around culture 
were central to many of the perceptions and interpretations of the 
respondents, and were seen as informing the central social challenges 
faced by the majority; their perception that they did not substantively 
belong in the Australian context. That is, the respondents do not readily 
identify with the mainstream social milieu in Australia, but perceive 
themselves as culturally distinct from the majority in the country. This 
distinction is felt keenly by the sample as a whole. Such a deeply perceived 
socio-cultural distinction is contingent to and constructive of low levels of 
meaningful intercultural dialogue, interaction and understanding, 
consistently low socio-economic status within the sample group, as well as 
their perception of populist stigmas and concomitant discrimination 
associated with the refugee, Iraqi and Islamic identities in the Australian 
milieu. In light of this dominant perception, and despite openness for wider 
socio-cultural network engagement, the respondents’ reflexively engage in 
culturally isolated social behaviors, which, while fostering in-group 
belonging and solidarity, also act to perpetuate their cultural distinction 
from the mainstream and their ongoing social isolation. That is, they tend 
to act reflexively so as to remain purposefully aloof from public 
discourses, or “shared self-referential narratives” (Giddens 1991; Bohman 
2015) beyond their immediate socio-cultural networks, which they view as 
misrepresentative of or inimical to their own perceptions of selfhood, 
motives and consciousness, or their self-identities. That is, they are mostly 
disaffected or alienated by the broader social world in Australia and 
purposefully disengage from actively pursuing social relations outside their 
tight-knit communities.  
 
Such a state of socio-political affairs should be reflected upon critically by 
all actors in Australia, particularly in light of the state’s latest political 
commitments to “engage Australian Muslims” as expounded in the 
government anti-terrorism strategy. It is telling, if lamentable, that 
politically symbolic efforts to “engage” Australian Muslims are made in 
the rubric of counter-terrorism, but nonetheless accords with social 
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psychological research into alienation and radicalisation. Such research 
suggests that “the most commonly cited precursor of radicalization and 
homegrown terrorism is the lack of socio-political integration particular 
Western Muslim communities have with their broader society, and, 
relatedly, their experiences of discrimination, victimization, and 
xenophobia” (Wilner & Dubuoloz, 2010, p. 38). The process of reruiting 
and radicalizing individuals by extremist causes is effective among 
disenfranchised individuals as “alienation is replaced by identification with 
the group, powerlessness is replaced by potency derived from being 
involved in group operations, while humiliation is mitigated by 
participation in actions” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009, p. 95). Indeed, 
some scholars contend the greatest threat to Western democracies is not 
terrorism from the outside, but the sustained marginalization of citizens 
and residents from within their political system (King & Taylor, 2011).  As 
such, although it is theoretically in the nation state interest not just to 
facilitate inclusion in the legal framework of political membership, but to 
foster belonging and solidarity among pluralistic, and socio-economically 
variable populations through a more inclusive style of discourse and 
political rhetoric in the public sphere (Haberms; Benhabib). In light of the 
discussion above, which found the respondents struggling foremost with 
popular and systemic discrimination and socio-cultural marginality, such 
an effort may be orchestrated through intercultural and interfaith 
initiatives, discussions and learning across apparently disparate groups 
living in the national community, such that the dominant, essentialised, 
racialized and territorially linked political discourses in Australia are 
challenged and new political spaces may be developed that allow for the 
participation of new political subjectivities brought to the polity by actors 
like the respondents in this sample.  
 
Overall, the respondents’ official inclusion in the socio-political system does 
not appear to have leavened any particular sense of belonging and solidarity 
among the sample, as they look to their parochial cultural and family groups to 
assuage ongoing feelings of isolation and disconnection. The respondents are 
largely disengaged from democratic processes and discourses, and as such are 
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not represented in public deliberation and democratic reasoning, which 
suggests that, for this sample, the fundamental assumption of democratically 
grounded cosmopolitan theory remains unfulfilled.  
 
 
6.4 Political Apathy 
 
This section discusses the major theme to come from the respondents’ 
interactions and experiences in the political milieu in Australia. Whereas 
the section above was concerned with the respondents’ more social 
experiences and preferences, this section probes their political preferences 
and activities. It is worth briefly recapping the macro-level concerns in this 
particular site of analysis. Namely, that the tenets of a democratically 
grounded cosmopolitanism, as espoused by scholars like Seyla Benhabib, 
presume civic participation or individual engagement with democratic 
political processes, such that subjective interests are represented in 
political debate, and may be seen to contribute to the process of legitimate 
law making. That is, democracy ideally functions as a legitimate, 
representative form of government, and has the potential to 
“cosmopolitanise” under conditions where members of the demos are 
engaged with democratic discourse and political processes in order to 
facilitate democratic iterations that lead to learning, innovation and the 
juridification of the outcomes of normative contestations. Agents, such as 
those in the sample, who are a highly politicised group in the Australian 
context, subject to domestic law and contentious policy, as well as the 
daily scrutiny of the popular media, must theoretically identify with and be 
engaged with the democratic political system for a dialectic process that 
represents their viewpoints to even exist. 
 
Overall, the major theme to come from this particular site of political 
interaction and experience is one of political apathy. The respondents, 
apart from two notable exceptions, exhibit no desire to be involved in 
political activism, political processes or debates, or even civic-oriented 
associations, activism and debate in any form. The meanings the 
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respondents’ ascribe to an overall sense of apathy are various. They are 
made up of a complex of positive attitudes towards certain elements of the 
political system in Australia, such as the existence of the rule of law and 
widespread respect for individual rights and personal freedoms and 
security. This is alongside more negative, cynical or alienated perspectives 
on other aspects of the system. Explicitly negative attitudes tended to crop 
up around certain aspects of immigration policy in Australia, such as 
detention and family reunification, as well as the existence of stigmas 
associated with Islamic and refugee identities. Furthermore, the 
respondents tended to have sceptical attitudes about human rights rhetoric 
as used by wealthy states such as Australia and the US. Their scepticism is 
informed in large part by their experiences in Iraq where they witnessed a 
stark difference between altruistic rhetoric about human rights, which 
apparently informed Western foreign policies such as military intervention 
and economic sanctions, and their experience of these policies on the 
ground, which were characterised by a lack of human rights, ongoing 
conflict and authoritarianism, and mass displacement in Iraq.  Overall, the 
respondents have a deep dislike of politics and political discussions 
broadly, informed largely by their time living in Iraq and their overall 
mental and physical exhaustion from being displaced as a result of political 
violence and trying to resettle into an unfamiliar and daunting context.  
 
As noted above, the respondents expressed respect for the political system 
in Australia, as it promotes individual rights and, perhaps most importantly 
for the respondents, it is governed by the rule of law. Many saw 
Australia’s political system as a functioning democracy in which political 
members are able to claim their rights. They perceived the system in 
Australia as facilitating a political culture that tolerates and even represents 
various political viewpoints. Most commonly, this perception that the 
system is worth “honouring” stems from the gratitude the respondents feel 
for having been granted refugee protection and spatial security rights in 
Australia. In line with the democratic theories of Habermas and Benhabib, 
most of the respondents tended to frame their attitudes of respect in terms 
of the availability of “actionable individual rights,” which is exemplified 
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by their own legal inclusion into the political community by way of the 
humanitarian immigration program. They perceived citizens in Australia as 
endowed with political rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom 
of association, which they viewed as core democratic principles. Such a 
positive attitudinal trend suggests that the respondents value the liberal 
democratic attributes of Australia’s political system, and not only agree to 
live lawfully within these arrangements but do so with respect, or even a 
sense of patriotism to the fundamental theoretical principles informing 
such arrangements. In other words, they tend to identify with the 
theoretically inclusive aspects of democracy that Habermas and Benhabib 
consistently highlight (Habermas, 1996; Benhabib, 2007). 
 
Despite an overall positive perception of democracy as it functions in 
Australia, there were a number of respondents who expressed a level of 
scepticism about democracy and pointed to instances where democracy 
masks tyranny in the Australian context. Hassan, for example, felt that the 
immigration department in the Australian state functions outside the aegis 
of democratic mechanisms, saying, “now, don’t you think the immigration 
is like a mafia?” Relatively, however, it was clear in the data that the 
respondents held far more sceptical attitudes about human rights than 
democracy, which they viewed as granted by powerful states and bodies 
selectively and in line with their political interests, rather than being 
universal in application and political practice. They viewed human rights 
as a concept that does not exist per se, but is more of a pipe dream that is 
rhetorically exploited by politically powerful states. Much of this 
scepticism may be seen as borne of their own experiences living in Iraq, 
being put under UN sanctions and subject to various foreign policies 
waged in the name of human rights which they saw wreak destruction and, 
ultimately, led to their displacement and destitution. Their flight and 
application for protection, which unequivocally exhausted the respondents, 
represented a struggle to claim their human rights, and was by no means a 
straightforward feat. As such, while the respondents appeared to have a 
relatively optimistic if idealistic perspective of the Australian political 
system and how it functions to represent various interests – thinking in a 
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particularistic, national sense - few were optimistic, nor idealistic about the 
actual existence of universal rights in global political practice, nor the 
extension by countries like Australia of political goodwill beyond their 
own borders and national community.  
 
Further to discussion of the respondents’ attitudes toward the political 
system in Australia, it is noteworthy that they tended to perceive it and talk 
about it from the vantage point of guests, outsiders or what may be 
characterised as non-members of the polity. That is, there is a clear sense 
that they do not feel as if they are entitled members of the democratic 
community in Australia, which suggests that they do not substantively 
identify with and therefore engage with said system or polity. Yasin 
conveyed this clear sense that he was an outsider looking on, and not an 
actual part of the Australian polity itself, saying “I feel that it is, that in 
Australia they have an administration and rights… yeah they are better 
than us, they have you know democracy” (Author interview with Yasin). 
Such comments suggest Yasin, and many others in the sample, identifies 
with the values exhibited by Australia’s political system and views it as 
positive, yet does not feel they belong, or that they are entitled to be 
included as active members within the Australian polity. Simply, it appears 
naturalised in the respondents’ minds that they are on one side of an “us” 
and “them” divide, that their Iraqi refugee identity prohibits their full 
inclusion into the Australian polity at this early stage in their settlement.  
 
The respondents tend not to ascribe any one discernible “causative” factor 
to their feelings of not belonging in the Australian polity. Instead their 
prespectives pointed to a range of factors; from living under an oppressive, 
authoritarian regime and being persecuted due to their identity in Iraq, to 
the majority suffering protracted, oppressive, displacement and asylum 
journeys, which included detention and mental anguish. The vast majority 
of respondents were simply exhausted by the conditions of their lives, 
which in large part stem from unjust political structures to which they are 
bound. That is, the respondents, for most of their lives have been denied 
basic freedoms and lived in conditions of low social reflexivity, unable to 
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change their positions and fortunes within socio-political systems they 
have experienced thus far in their lives. This, in turn, has corrupted their 
ability to trust and identify with macro political structures, whether in Iraq 
or Australia, to which they feel subject and powerless to affect.  
 
This observation that the vast majority of respondents have a history of 
negative and traumatic experiences with political systems to which they 
are subject, and are therefore wholly disinclined to engage with such 
systems, is borne out in the contrast between the respondents’ positive 
social aspirations and their total lack of political aspirations. That is, while 
the respondents are open to and even desire wider social engagement and 
activity in the future, the sample exhibited no desire or aspiration to 
become involved politically in Australia, at any stage in their lives. That is, 
almost across the board, the respondents had no interest in involving 
themselves in public political discourse, debate or activism, then or ever. 
As noted above, for some, this tendency stemmed from their experience of 
politics in Iraq. For others, their decision to remain aloof from political 
issues seems to stem from a broader disillusionment with and cynicism 
about global political issues, such as human rights. And for a number, their 
apathy and disengagement stems from their mental health issues, and 
overall exhaustion they continue to feel as a result of their protracted 
displacement and ongoing struggles related to family reunification and 
other challenges for settling down in Australia. Indeed, there was a deep 
sense of mental exhaustion pervasive throughout the interview sample, as 
many were clearly overwhelmed with ongoing challenges that they face 
and feel ill-equipped to deal with successfully. 
 
Such mental exhaustion, in concert with sceptical and apathetic attitudes 
suggests a measure of alienation among the sample. The overall tenor of 
the respondents qualitative experience of political membership in Australia 
is in line with Geyer’s (2011, p. 389) contention that  
“in much of the Western world, the average person is 
increasingly confronted, on a daily basis, with an often 
bewildering and overly complex environment, which 
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promotes attitudes of political apathy, often politically 
dangerous oversimplification of complex political issues, 
and equally dysfunctional withdrawal from wider social 
involvements.”  
Many of the respondents are significantly overwhelmed with stress and 
anxiety, but do not have any one cause for their discontents, and in any 
case feel substantively incapable and unwilling to try and affect the system 
to which they are subject. As such, most remain disaffected by political 
discourses and processes and apathetic, ultimately choosing not to even 
follow, let alone engage with political processes in Australia. 
 
Despite an apparent political apathy and a clear lack of will or aspiration to 
engage politically, the respondents exhibited considered and reflective 
political opinions, particularly in certain areas of asylum, refugee and 
immigration policy to which they were subject. There is a tendency among 
the group to note that the popular depiction of refugees and refugee issues 
in Australia is negative and that issues pertaining to forced migration are 
wilfully ignored, over-simplified, and generally poorly understood both in 
the political and social milieu in Australia. The responses show that they 
view many of the Australian government’s policy approaches and 
decisions as over-simplistic, and as having chronic or unwanted effects 
that the government chooses to ignore.  
 
Although the interview respondents articulated carefully considered 
political opinions and intimate knowledge of the key factors driving policy 
choices, they overwhelmingly translated this knowledge into political 
inactivity or passivity. Indeed, as outlined above, most feel wholly 
consumed by more immediate and visceral challenges of their day-to-day 
lives. When pressed on their perceptions of their own potential to be 
affective political agents, especially in the area of refugee and family 
reunification policies, none of the respondents felt they had the necessary 
entitlements and capabilities to affect change in this area. Each felt 
themselves as relative outsiders, conceding that they prefer to remain 
passive, avoiding voicing their opinions in the public sphere. Four 
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respondents expressed doubt about the meaningfulness of their voice in the 
Australian context, two laughing as they did so, as if the potential for 
political activism was a ridiculous joke. This is best summed up in the 
statement of Yusuf who said, ‘What difference will my opinion make? It 
will not make any difference’ (Author interview with Yusuf). This 
respondent, like most of the other interview respondents who are on a path 
to full Australian citizenship, seems to have internalised his popularly 
constructed role as the ‘other’ in Australian political discourse, accepted a 
political stance at the margins of the system, and in doing so may be seen 
as politically alienated and apathetic, only included as a nominal member.  
 
Overall, the respondents exhibit low socio-political reflexivity in an 
outward sense, in that they are subject to what they see as the norm and 
rule handed down by the Australian state, yet feel incapable and powerless 
to reposition themselves in the public sphere so as to have their voices 
heard and their interests represented. This perception of their personal 
inefficacy in the political, practical sphere compounds rather than assuages 
their attitudes of disaffection, alienation and discontent, which they suffer 
privately. 
 
The vast majority of respondents may be seen as disaffected or alienated 
from politics and political debate. For the majority, this stems from their 
experiences of persecution within militant, authoritarian political systems 
as existed in Iraq at the time of their flight. Indeed authoritarianism as a 
form of government is premised on a logic of non-participation of political 
members. That is, state power is centralised and citizens and residents are 
subject to this centralised government, regardless of their personal political 
interests. Overall, given that the respondents were socialised and grew up 
in Iraq, they framed their ideas in light of their experiences in Iraq, and 
spoke of the Australian political system as something honourable yet 
unknown and foreign to them; a polity they respect, but to which they do 
not personally belong.  
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6.5 Compliant Subjects not Active Citizens/Political Members 
 
This section discusses the respondents’ attitudes and behaviours in light of 
their status as political members in Australia  - either as citizens or soon to 
be citizens. It is worth starting by reiterating the study’s theoretical 
concern with political membership. As has been stated a number of times, 
this study follows Habermas in positing that democracy is procedural and 
discursive, grounded in an inter-subjective structure of communication that 
ideally is to exhibit reflective and reciprocal communication, or discourse. 
Within democratic political systems, such as in Australia, members of the 
public deliberate, test claims to validity and thereby facilitate practical 
cooperation with one another. Democratic institutions and processes, then, 
are to provide a forum for citizens to deliberate as free and equal persons, 
for whom the legitimacy of the decision is related to the achievement of a 
“rational consensus” (Habermas 1996; Bohman 2015; Gutman and 
Thompson 2004). That is, this study approaches legitimate democracy as a 
bottom-up political process in which active members of a demos are to 
cooperate with one another to represent their interests and ensure 
democratic legitimacy, not a top-down formulation of the “political class” 
that eschews and/or corrupts effective public deliberation and potentially 
gives rise to anti-democratic or authoritarian tendencies.  
 
This inclusive and dynamic conception of democratic political systems is 
contingent on the ideal, active and substantive role of members, or citizens, 
within such systems. For scholars like Habermas and Benhabib, citizens 
are to be motivated to participate by virtue of their political membership 
within cooperative, democratic political systems, in which the public is 
sovereign. Citizenship, then, according to Habermas and Benhabib, is a 
politico-legal document about solidarity and belonging. They tend to argue 
that the public’s sense of belonging and solidarity will result from their 
inclusion and participation in a socio-legal framework in which they have 
access to actionable individual rights through democratic forums. A 
number of sociologists, such as Calhoun, argue that such a suggestion is 
overly “rationalist” and places too much emphasis on a bare inclusion into 
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the legal-political framework afforded by the constitution, and fails to 
recognize substantive issues of belonging that tend to stem from issues of 
culture, power and marginality. Calhoun argues, for example, that 
‘Citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not merely included by law’ 
(Calhoun 2002, p. 153). In response to such claims Habermas admits that 
in the case of cultural values, for example, we need not expect agreement 
among all citizens, and he introduces compromise as a possible discursive 
outcome of democratic procedures. Bohman notes, “a law then would be 
legitimate only if it could be agreed to in a fair and open deliberative 
process in which all citizens may freely continue to participate whatever 
the outcome” (Bohman 1996, p. 89). The democratic principle in this form 
expresses an ideal of citizenship and highlights the importance of the 
qualitative experience of socio-political membership for individuals within 
a polity. In other words, such a democratic principle emphasizes the 
importance of the qualitative experience of citizenship or political 
membership, such that members of the national polity feel included or 
entitled to be involved in public discourse and reasoning, and cooperate 
with fellow members of the demos in an ongoing fashion. In this way, 
what is crucial is not the agreement of citizens as such, but how citizens 
reason together within a common public sphere (Bohman, 2015). 
 
Both Habermas and Benhabib advocate an understanding of democratic 
political communities and political agents as reflexive, in that agents and 
structures are to inform each other’s ongoing development. Such claims 
presume a priori that political members relate to and identify with the 
democratic pathways available to them, and beyond that feel comfortable 
and capable to actively involve themselves in these processes such that 
their interests are represented. However, identification and engagement are 
not the only attitudinal and behavioural options or predilections available 
to individual, subjective actors that make up national communities, such as 
those in the sample. Indeed, an individual’s choice to engage or withdraw 
cannot be reduced to adherence to a norm or rule – such as the democratic 
norms posited by the likes of Habermas - nor to the mechanistic execution 
of a pre-existing structural code (Bourdieu 1977 and 1990; Taylor 1995), 
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but must be seen as both structured and structuring. Both political 
scientific and sociological literatures suggest that in plural societies such as 
Australia, individual agents must identify themselves as valued members 
of society and, to an extent, feel entitled and able to communicate in 
meaningful terms with the broader community to which they are supposed 
to be in positive relations with. Indeed, the self-identities of political 
members are more than personal narrative scripts for social or political 
action, they are channels through which individuals attempt to find 
emotional gratifications in everyday routines (Giddens 1991; Bourdieu 
1977). It is worth, then, finishing the discussion by reflecting on whether 
the attitudes and behaviours of the sample group may be seen to express 
this ideal form of political membership, in which citizens understand and 
act to fulfil certain socio-political roles and civic responsibilities to society 
in Australia. In other words it explores the participants’ experiences of 
socio-political membership in the country, and gauges their subjective 
orientation to the socio-political system as members. 
 
In light of the data analysis, as well as the three major themes discussed 
above, it may be seen that, generally, the individuals in the sample 
perceive themselves and behave not as active citizens or entitled 
democratic members, but as passive, compliant subjects. That is, the 
majority of respondents may be seen to exhibit a subjective orientation to 
the liberal democratic political system in Australia that does not see them 
identifying with and engaging with the demos, either socially or politically. 
Instead, a majority of respondents are somewhat socio-culturally 
disaffected or alienated in light of their experiences in Australia, which 
sees them withdraw from pursuing wider social activities, such as 
engaging in intercultural social networks or even attending English classes. 
Instead, they purposefully engage in culturally isolated social activities 
(this is despite their apparent desire for wider social networks and 
intercultural contact). Furthermore, the vast majority are politically 
disaffected or apathetic - in large part due to their experiences prior to 
arriving Australia – and steer clear of political activism or advocacy. This 
is despite the existence of carefully articulated political opinions, 
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particularly in the area of forced migration policies, as well as serious 
discontents among the group, particularly with the Australian 
government’s family reunification and asylum policies.  
 
In addition to feelings of being unwelcome, socio-cultural isolation and 
political apathy, factors that were well covered above, it is worth 
reiterating here that the respondents exhibit poor socio-economic status. 
The sample exhibited extremely high unemployment rates or 
underemployment, which is in conflict with their relatively high 
educational status (though their education qualifications are not recognised 
in the Australian context) and lends to a sense among respondents of their 
low social status and socio-political mobility or efficacy in their new 
context. This then translates to very low income levels relative to 
Australian society more broadly, drives their ongoing reliance on welfare 
and, overall, may be seen to contribute to high dissatisfaction levels among 
the sample. This is further compounded by poor mental and, for some, 
poor physical health.  
 
In effect, each of the respondents tended to be dealing with a suite of 
socio-economic problems and personal difficulties, as is exemplified in 
Hakeem’s quip, “We’re all at home drowning in our problems… we really 
don’t want to get into the politics on top of what we have because these 
things have really exhausted us” (Author interview with Hakeem). Such 
socio-economic disadvantage, in concert with low socio-political 
reflexivity on behalf of the respondents, tends to pattern the distribution of 
wealth to reinforce such existing inequalities, and to reconstitute the 
respondents’ largely marginalised and/or alienated social relations (Young 
1990; Sen 1992). In turn, such relations tend to invert what appears to be 
the continuous expansion of “liberty” – or the “cosmpolitanisation” of the 
socio-legal framework, as per Benhabib’s theory - and reifies the 
respondents’ position as socio-politically marginalised, unrepresented 
actors in the Australian socio-political system. 
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Moving on from these points, which were discussed comprehensively 
above, it is worth focussing on the respondents’ attitudes and behaviours as 
political members in the Australian context. Overall, and as has already 
been stated, the empirical data shows that the respondents exhibit attitudes 
and behaviours that may be characterised as those of compliant subjects or 
supplicants, not engaged, active citizens. The respondents tend to perceive 
themselves as embodying particular socio-political identities and traits that 
are largely poorly understood, stereotyped and somewhat maligned in the 
Australian context. They perceive a societal expectation that the bearers of 
such traits  - particularly their “refugee”, “Muslim” and in some cases 
“Iraqi” aspects of their identity - are to remain compliant and passive, 
unentitled to act as full political members in the Australian context, yet 
necessarily expected to be grateful for the protection and nominal 
membership granted them by the Australian state.  
 
It is impossible to attribute causative factors for the respondents’ tendency 
to feel disaffected and somewhat alienated, and remain disengaged from 
democratic processes, rather than seek out active engagements. By and 
large the factors that contribute to these attitudinal and behavioural 
tendencies are complex and interrelated. This is in line with this study’s 
conception of political agency, which is based on the theories of Pierre 
Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, who seek to navigate the middle ground 
between structural determinism and voluntaristic subjectivism (Bourdieu 
1977; 1990, Giddens 1984; 1993). Indeed, the micro-level theoretical 
premise for this research is that socio-political agency is shaped to an 
extent by the structural context of agents. Individual selfhood, motives, 
and consciousness are linked to shared self-referential narratives that 
together constitute ‘self-identity’ (Giddens 1991). In other words, self-
identities are more than personal narrative scripts for social or political 
action; they are channels through which individuals attempt to find 
emotional gratifications in everyday routines (Giddens 1991; Bourdieu 
1977).  
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In light of the major themes of the data analysis, it may be seen that, to a 
significant extent, the respondents’ perceptions of themselves as relatively 
culturally illiterate, unentitled guests of the Australian nation state, and 
their attendant behavioural passivity in the common public sphere, appear 
to be learned attitudes and habits, rather than inherent, voluntaristic 
preferences. Indeed, many of the respondents’ social and economic 
aspirations for engagement have been challenged and largely thwarted 
since arriving, and their public passivity has to an extent been informed by 
such experiences. In saying that, there are instances where personal 
preferences and choices, rather than perceived Australian societal 
expectations, tend to more clearly inform the respondents’ attitudes and 
behaviours. These instances are discussed below, before moving onto the 
more structurally determined aspects that contribute to their overall 
subjective orientation of disaffection and compliance to the democratic 
political system in Australia.  
 
As was posited in the theoretical approach chapter, any approach to 
exploring how refugees encounter and navigate their experiences within 
the liberal democratic political system in Australia must be based on the 
understanding that individuals are never empty vessels. Every human 
makes social and political choices according to instilled paradigms of 
morality, felt sentiment, and principal understandings about the structure 
of society - origin, host and anywhere in between. In other words, it is 
based on the notion that political attitudes and behaviors, like all attitudes 
and behaviors, are connected and contextualized by surrounding factors 
and environments. The way individuals reflectively observe and constitute 
their personal realities is in part sui generis.  
 
All of the respondents had a complex, traumatic relationship with their 
self-identities prior to arriving in Australia. That is, according to the 
interview responses, their backgrounds and initial displacement were 
intimately linked to their personal identities, and the suffering and 
persecution they endured due to their perceived social identities. As such, 
the respondents were already highly sensitised about their social identity 
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prior to arrival in Australia and, for many of them, their search for refuge 
was part of an effort to protect their personal identities, or at least find a 
context in which aspects of their identity – such as their nationality, 
religion, ethnicity, political preferences or profession - would be respected 
and tolerated. That is, their desire to seek refuge was in part seen as a 
strategy of personal identity maintenance, as each of the respondents 
placed great importance on their socio-cultural identities and associated 
behavioural preferences, deriving meaning, social connections and support 
from this particular aspect of their lives. This is typified by Hakeem’s 
comment: “I decided to come here because in that country, in Iran, they 
used to tell us ‘you are Iraqis.’ In Iraq they used to tell us ‘you are 
Iranians’… So I could not stay. I didn’t have a country, I didn’t have the 
documents, so I decided to come to Australia just to become, to belong to 
some country to have proper document to have a proper identity” (Author 
interview with Hakeem). At the time of flight, none of the respondents 
could continue to abide the oppressive system of militant identity politics 
to which they were subject. Each maintained that physically removing 
themselves from their context at that time, and applying for refuge and 
political membership elsewhere (no matter the means of achieving such a 
goal) was their only option for ongoing survival.  Most of the respondents 
expressed a clear desire to maintain their personal, cultural identities in the 
Australian context, particularly as their flight form Iraq, to an extent, 
represented the climax of their chronic political persecution justified, to a 
large extent, in terms of identity.  
 
Given that all of the respondents were persecuted in Iraq due to some 
aspect of their identities, and, to an extent, sought respect for their 
identities by applying for refuge in Australia, they may seen to be highly 
aware of and sensitive to others’ perceptions of their identities. 
Furthermore, they appeared interested to interpret how their identities are 
perceived and treated in their new socio-political context, and many were 
quick to draw conclusions in light of their previous, traumatic experiences, 
which have left them erring on the side of caution and self-preservation. 
Furthermore the Australian socio-political context was unknown to most of 
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the respondents before arriving, which means that, to an extent, their initial 
experiences were particularly influential in informing their fledgling, 
evolving self-identities, as they developed in their new socio-political 
context. 
 
 Overall, it may be seen that the respondents’ socio-political experiences 
have informed a dominant perception that an “us and “them” dichotomy 
exists in the Australian context. In this dichotomy, the respondents are 
constructed as the unwanted or insurmountably different  “other”. In other 
words, it may be seen that nearly all the respondents, at some stage since 
arriving, have internalised the social role of “other” to the dominant 
Australian mainstream, typically due to their “refugee,” “asylum seeker” 
and or Muslim identities (or a combination of aspects of these identity 
markers), as this is how they perceive these identities are represented and 
treated in Australian public discourse and government rhetoric. Many of 
the respondents’ attitudes and behaviours in the Australian context flow, to 
some extent, from this central perception or interpretation. As Ali said of 
media and government representations of forced migrants: “they are 
definitely not giving a good picture of refugees”(Author interview with 
Ali). And as Yasin said, more personally of the governments forced 
migration policies: “I feel like Canberra is waging an emotional war on 
us.” Or as Said remarked of Australians’ understandings of Islam and 
Muslims: “One of the main misunderstandings is against Muslims. They 
think all Muslims are fanatics and terrorists.” This perception of 
themselves as the poorly understood, unwanted “other,” not substantively 
belonging to nor in solidarity with the national community, particularly 
cropped up around issues of punitive immigration detention, perceptions of 
insurmountable cultural difference, perceptions of populist stereotypes of 
refugees and Muslims, discrimination in a range of settings, and the 
Australian state’s lack of recognition of the respondents education and 
skills - their human capital - and a lack of opportunities to utilise and 
develop such skills in the longer term. 
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This phenomenon among the sample lends credence to Benhabib’s 
argument that the underlying political issues in debates surrounding forced 
migration are concerned with defining the boundaries of belonging and 
determining the extent to which constructions of “us” and “them” continue 
to be naturalized. Benhabib views such controversies as reenacting in 
practice the theoretical “dilemma” of discursive scope: Universalist norms 
are mediated with the self-understanding of local communities. In this 
case, given that the respondents’ perceptions of themselves as the 
unwanted “them” tended to exist upon arrival – as was discussed above, 
the respondents have been protractedly displaced and therefore chronically 
alienated form socio-political structures for many years of their lives – it is 
interesting to note that their subsequent inclusion into the Australian polity 
as new members and their socio-political experiences as members have 
tended to further naturalize this interpretation of their place in Australian 
society, not assuage it. In turn, this informs many of the respondents’ 
interpretations of themselves as unentitled to act as full members of the 
democratic polity, instead acquiescing to a perceived expectation that they 
remain grateful and passive, even in the face of socio-economic 
marginalization and ongoing political discontents. As such, the 
respondents as political members in Australia tend not to readily identify 
with the socio-political system, but are largely disaffected or alienated by it 
and do not involve themselves in public discourse or pursue democratic 
attachments beyond those necessary for their material needs and survival.  
 
Overall, the sample do not readily identify with the Australian social 
milieu, and those that do feel it is more of a one way process – more akin 
to assimilation than multiculturalism or any cosmopolitan atmosphere. 
They view their social experiences and acculturation as non-reciprocal, 
lacking trust between social actors, and in fact, they do not feel they are 
valued within the broader milieu, as they carry identity tags of Muslim and 
refugee that all are aware are stigmatised and present real world challenges 
when trying to orchestrate a life in the country. That is, all the respondents 
are acutely aware of the discourse surrounding their socio-cultural identity 
in the Australian context, which tends to construct them as unwanted 
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outsiders. As Yuval Davis points out, the politics of forced migration 
employs narratives and discourses of autochthony – “us and them” – to 
naturalize the extent to which discourses of belonging become naturalized. 
The Iraqis in this study, apart form the notable exception of the former 
ADF interpreters, are acutely aware of their depiction in the Australian 
polity as the alien other, and have very much internalised this narrative 
into their self-identity in the Australian context. A remark from Yusuf 
exemplifies this point, “I have nothing to do with it… In terms of politics 
and things like that, why would I discuss it? I am nobody. It is their 
jobs… I will not make any difference. This is a country with its own flag 
and government; it provides therefore it determines. I am just an asylum 
seeker.”” (Author interview with Yusuf). In fact, Yusuf was a citizen at 
the time of the interview, but clearly perceived himself as “just an asylum 
seeker” – a person still looking for rights. 
 
This phenomenon among the sample resonates with Hein de Haas’s claim 
that “‘harsh’ political discourse on immigration… can be a catalyst for the 
very xenophobia and apocalyptic representations of a massive influx of 
migrants to which they claim to be a politico-electoral response” (de Haas 
2007, p. 826). Xenophobic and apocalyptic representations of forced 
migrants in the Australian context has tended to corrupt belonging for the 
respondents in the sample, who are not only aware of their politically 
stigmatized and exploited identity in the Australian context, but internalize 
this identity in their approach to the political milieu and the public sphere 
in Australia. Namely, many in the sample feel alienated by the public 
sphere and rhetoric emanating from it, and so disengage and remain aloof 
from any form of political participation or activism, as they perceive 
themselves as largely inefficacious to reduce the perceived value conflict. 
Indeed, political inefficacy is a key psychological variable for political 
alienation; people who perceive themselves to be relatively inefficacious in 
politics – that is, who perceive themselves to be unable, by their own 
behaviour, to influence or control desired political outcomes – are more 
likely than others to withdraw their self-identification, interest, attention 
and participation from politics. As has been stated elsewhere in this study, 
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harsh rhetoric from political elites toward forced migrants should be seen 
as both a self-serving and self-perpetuating discourse, failing to appreciate 
the entrenched social process of migration, feigning its impermanence and 
thereby dehumanizing forced migrants themselves. Such a state of affairs 
propagates a vicious cycle that stagnates legitimate democratic 
reproduction and denies or corrupts substantive political membership and 
democratic representation to individuals, such as those in the sample, who 
legitimately sought protection under international law. 
 
The respondents’ qualitative experience of political membership in 
Australia has seen them internalise a social identity that is passive, and 
publicly uncritical. This is at odds with the at times highly critical 
perspectives and interpretations of the respondents. Such a disjuncture acts 
to foster feelings of disaffection and alienation. That is, the respondents’ 
basic politicised values and self-identities were consistently at odds with 
the Australia socio-political system’s dominant public narrative about 
them, but few felt entitled, linguistically and culturally capable, or 
mentally well enough to redress such discontents. And those that did act to 
redress their discontents – whether they did so while in detention or after 
arrival in the community – had only limited or no success in achieving 
their desired outcomes, and their efforts to engage tended to, in the long 
run, inform further feelings of inefficacy and estrangement form the socio-
political system in Australia (Schwarz, 1973). In light of all of this, and 
this study’s overall concern with the respondents’ qualitative experiences 
and understandings of political membership in Australia, the respondents, 
by and large, may be seen as compliant subjects and not active citizens. 
They are not involved in, nor represented in political discourse and the 
decisions borne of such discourse. Instead, they are subject to decisions of 
the state, qua political fairness of the political elite and mainstream 
Australia, and feel a heavy societal expectation that they act as passive 
supplicants. 
 
Overall, then, it may be seen that for the Iraqi respondents in this study, the 
Australian polity’s imagination remains beholden to the “unitary model of 
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citizenship”, and its attendant normative forces and rhetorical devices of 
national, territorial politics, which expound racially, culturally and 
religiously parochial notions of the political community in Australia. Such 
rhetoric conceptualises the demos in a racialized form, which necessarily 
operates both socially and politically to silence those narratives within the 
polity that highlight the growing inapplicability of such conceptions. The 
findings of this study highlight, too, the increasingly untenable ethical 
restraints that such notions of the national polity place on the national 
community’s social arrangements, which condones the sustained 
marginalization of particular individuals and groups based on heavily 
essentialized and misrepresentative social identity markers. Not only do 
such dominant rhetorical characterisations of the political community as 
ethnos, not demos, corrupt positive political membership for the 
respondents in this study, but it promotes and entrenches the 
marginalization of their particular social identities; reifies the politico-legal 
category of refugee and asylum seekers as persons expected by the 
national polity to be supplicant recipients of state beneficence. As well as 
reinforcing the socio-cultural marginality that comes with popular level 
characterisations and populist disdain for Islam and Muslims.  
 
Such a state of affairs undermines democratic principles and legitimacy in 
the country; devalues the demos as the ultimate arbiters of sovereign 
power and thereby elevates the role of state actors - the corporate and 
political classes – from that of facilitators of democracy to a social 
group/class – indeed, a social identity in itself – uncritically trusted with 
the distribution of rights and resources. In turn, this undermines the value 
that political members place on the importance of democratic 
representation and deliberation as the remit of all citizens and those that 
stand under the law, and privileges the notion of political largess payed out 
to citizens, generally according to the interests of the wealthy, who are 
given de facto powers to dictate, even if unconsciously, what are 
considered desirable and undesirable socio-cultural attributes of political 
members in Australian society.  
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Such a socio-political system affects the style of discourse in the country - 
how citizens reason with one another in the public sphere, as per 
Habermas’s contention - to such an extent that certain political members 
actively avoid participation as they do not see such discourse, and its most 
vocal participants, as welcoming of their voice. In terms of this study’s 
central theoretical concerns, the socio-political conditions that Iraqi 
refugees find themselves are not obviously amenable to the progression of 
a democratically grounded cosmopolitan project. Rather, the Iraqi refugees 
in this study are largely disaffected or alienated in their current context. 
Disengaged from any democratic discursive mechanisms that may allow 
them to air and discuss their grievances in a constructive way, such that, 
even if their interests are not readily progressed, they feel included in the 
conversation, valued in the society and involved in an ongoing manner. 
The disaffected and alienated detach from democratic mechanisms and 
broader society, thereby stagnating legitimate democratic representation 
and reproduction in the country. Under such conditions, the democratic 
system does not “cosmopolitise” but instead acts to further entrench this 
anti-democratic trend.  
 
Overall, the finding that the Australian socio-political milieu does not foster 
the conditions for a democratically grounded cosmopolitan project for the 
sample under exploration speaks to Amartya’s Sen’s assertion about the 
primary, not secondary importance that the empirical fact of pervasive human 
diversity brings to bear upon any project aimed at equality among humans. 
Democratic cosmopolitan theories, such as expounded by Benhabib, tend to  
“Proceed with the assumption of antecedent uniformity (including 
the assumption that ‘all men are created equal’) thus miss out on a 
major aspect of the problem. Human diversity is no secondary 
complication (to be ignored, or to be introduced ‘later on’; it is a 
fundamental aspect of our interest in equality” (Sen, 1992, xi).  
Indeed, Benhabib and Habermas recognize diversity but tend to downplay the 
inequity between variously, socially and culturally situated subjects of law, 
and emphasize the theoretical potential for democracy and law to operate 
inclusively, to “cosmopolitanise”, as the most critical factor. However, this 
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study suggests that this is insufficient to address, or deflects substantive 
attention to the diverse stratifications of power and culture along which 
societies are arranged, and which inform the marked difference between 
equitable rights (informed by a belief in the inherent rights of man) and legal 
rights (the rights one has not just by virtue of their membership in a group, but 
also their position with that group).  In other words, Habermas and Benhabib’s 
theories, while instructive of how democracy should ideally function, tend to 
assume that political members are uniformly “free and equal persons”, yet the 
capability of any individual socio-political actor to act effectively within said 
systems, is for these respondents, marked with stratifications and inequity. 
Such stratifications, which exist at sub-national and trans-national levels, are 
vital in determining whether an individual or a social group have the socio-
political understandings and self-perceptions required to become involved in a 
particular national, democratic discourse, as well as the capability and the 
desire to engage democratically. Until the challenges put forward by issues 
pertaining to diversity, and particularly political and symbolic violence in the 
name of various qualifications around social identity, are adequately 
considered and accounted for, the extension of political space and the 
redistribution of political power, seen through a lens of cosmopolitanism, 
remain abstract and idealistic for most marginalised groups and individuals. 
“Opportunities for innovative, distributive, and multi-perspectival forms of 
publicity and democracy,” (Bohman in Turner et al, 2007, p. 732) may only be 
harnessed alongside a project that recognises vast power inequities between 
social groups, and the ubiquitous use of identity politics and violence to 
sustain such inequities. 
 
In the case of the sample in this study, the vast majority feels ill equipped, 
incapable, unwelcome or unentitled to seek redress for their considerable 
discontents, which they see as emanating from a paternalistic state structure 
and a dominant national social group to which they feel instrumentally and 
substantively subject. As such they feel disaffected, and at times alienated, 
which leads them to purposely isolate themselves from the broader community 
as a coping strategy, thereby defecting from or acquiescing to the dominant 
discourses of the liberal democratic political system in Australia, and reifying 
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a position at the margins of the national community, rather than in a newly 
innovated socio-political space. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This study explored the socio-political attitudes and behaviours of a sample 
group of Iraqi refugees who were given protection in Australia after 2003. In 
doing so, it explored whether the respondents’ subjective orientation to the 
Australian socio-political system saw them identify with the socio-political 
system and its public discourses, policies and law, or whether they had an 
attitude of disaffection or alienation to the system, and did not engage with 
democratic processes. It did so in order to gauge whether the socio political 
conditions amenable to a democratically grounded cosmopolitan project exist 
for this group.  
 
The study was conceived in light of the contentious public discourses and 
policies that surround forced migrants, and particularly Muslim asylum 
seekers, in the Australian socio-political milieu. It was concerned to study the 
particular context of Iraqi forced migrants living in the Australian community, 
as they face a political and practical paradox; they are at once victims of 
circumstances in which the Australian state played an active role, while being 
subject to, indeed the target of, the country’s deterrent, militarised, punitive 
and racialised forced migration policy and rhetoric (McNevin 2007; Marfleet 
2007; Dunn et al 2007; Crock 2010). Such conditions inevitably affect the 
settlement and socialization of protected refugees living in the Australian 
community (Kateb, 2006). 
 
It was found that the respondents identify with the socio-political system in so 
far as it provided them protection, safety and official inclusion in the politico-
legal framework in Australia. Most respondents also identified with many 
liberal democratic values, such as the rule of law, personal freedoms and 
liberties safeguarded by the law and effectively enforced, and democracy as a 
system of governance. Furthermore, the respondents were profoundly grateful 
for the welfare provided them by the Australian state. Despite these positive 
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identifications with the socio-political system, for most of the respondents in 
this study their qualitative experiences in the Australian milieu, have informed 
perceptions of the political community as strange, unwelcoming and therefore 
substantively off-limits to them. Their testimonies, which cast them not as 
entitled and active political members, but as compliant and passive subjects, 
tended to suggest that the socio-political system in Australia does not foster 
the conditions for a democratically grounded cosmopolitan project in their 
case. In other words, the system does not act reflexively, incorporating the 
voices of new political subjectivities and developing in line with the new and 
changing needs of the populous, such as those in the sample. Rather, by and 
large the respondents did not identify with many aspects of the dominant 
discourses extant in Australia, nor did they relate to many quotidian aspects of 
life in Australia, such as the social and ethical norms they have perceived 
through their experiences in the community. Indeed, the respondents were 
mostly disaffected and dissatisfied with their current situation, as many 
struggle with mentally illness, are chronically unemployed and caught in a rut 
of socio-economic marginalization. Further, they are frustrated with their 
dealings with the immigration department, and, overall, perceive themselves as 
socially immobile in the Australian milieu. Many of the respondents in the 
sample are struggling to reconcile a pride in heritage with the forlorn realities 
of a life of compliance, and at times, assimilation or subjection. As such, they 
purposely isolate themselves, and refrain from participating in Australia’s 
liberal democratic, socio-political system.  
 
Such findings suggest that macro-level democratically grounded cosmopolitan 
theories, as expounded by Habermas and Benhabib, are not applicable to the 
sample group of Iraq refugees in this study. In saying that, however, the 
individuals in the sample, did express aspirations to be able to act as full 
democratic members – “free and equal” not just before the law but also in 
public discourses and social and cultural life. Furthermore, as stated, the 
respondents did identify with the liberal democratic system on a theoretical 
level, mostly in light of their official protection and politico-legal inclusion, 
but also in light of their experiences of authoritarian systems of governance in 
Iraq and other asylum countries.  
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The behavioral and attitudinal trends exhibited by the sample highlight that 
this group are disconnected and at times alienated by the socio-political sphere 
in the country. The tone of discourse is not representative but relies on 
outdated rhetorical tools of territorial national, racialised politics, which is out 
of date and restricts the ability for meaningful conversations that move 
forward. Thereby retarding political and social integration and reifying anti-
democratic trends, which see this groups largely marginalized and 
unrepresented. This is instructive of wider patterns of social exclusion and 
racialization of certain groups in Australia, and should not be treated as a 
parochial issue, but rather as an indication that the political community and 
system in Australia lacks the reflexivity necessary to recognise new forms of 
political agency and subjectivity that anticipate and innovate new modalities of 
political citizenship. Indeed, many of the respondents’ ongoing grievances 
may be related to the symbolic power and potential violence of social identity 
constructs when used in the public sphere to pursue particular, identity-framed 
political agendas. The respondents’ particular social identity markers, such as 
refugee, asylum seekers, Iraqi and Muslim, are by and large constructed in 
Australia’s public discourse in harsh or negative terms that paint the holders of 
such identity markers as inimical to abstract “Australian values” or its socio-
cultural preferences and “way of life.” This indelibly affects their ability to fit 
in to the broader community. Indeed, collectively, all polities and groups have 
differential power and hegemonic projects. It is important to remember that 
people’s membership status is then affected by where they are located within a 
polity and how they are constructed, in often unstable and contested ways, by 
manifold social divisions. The meaning and power of one’s membership status 
in a political community depends on one’s social location, but also the location 
of one’s collective in a global system of stratification of various collectives, 
communities and states (Lukes 2005).  
 
This is particularly interesting in light of the multicultural ethos that underpins 
a socially diverse and purportedly inclusive society in Australia. Indeed, some 
scholars contend that the greatest threat within Western democracies is not 
terrorism, as has been argued by nation states of the global North particularly 
 306 
after September 11, but the sustained marginalization of citizens from their 
political system. In this way, violent extremism is understood as a 
manifestation of the same outlook that informs individuals who choose to 
withdraw from the public sphere, rather than attack it.  In other words, both the 
disconnected and the destructive defect from the political system and hinder its 
capacity to facilitate change. Neither of these political behaviors reproduces 
the democratic political system or contributes to the process of responsive 
claims making which is championed as the guiding principle and foundational 
strength of manifestations of Western political systems (Gest, 2010; Benhabib 
2004; 2007). In an era of universal rights norms and increased human 
mobility, new forms of political agency, such as are represented by the 
respondents in this study, will continue to emerge, unseating entrenched 
political narratives, and countries like Australia will be further challenged in 
their prerogative to define the boundaries of the national community and 
articulate democratic closure. The certain perspicacity that those on the 
margins of a given system or community have for pointing out that system’s 
inherent contradictions should be harnessed so as to genuinely explore 
possible avenues through which the tensions between global and national 
norms and practice may be ameliorated.  
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